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Foreword 
I 
T HOSE who prior to World War II knew the chief legal personalities of Europe recognized the out-standing position held by Ernst Rabel, the author of 
the present treatise. 
Born in 1874 in Austria, as a young man he studied law 
in his own country, in Germany, and in France. His univer-
sity career has been most distinguished; he taught Roman 
and modern civil law in Switzerland and Germany, the many 
invitations he received leading to celebrated professorates, 
notably at Munich and ultimately at Berlin, where he occu-
pied an influential position. His contributions to compara-
tive legal history have been noteworthy; he first introduced 
the comparative study of Egyptian papyri with the medieval 
documents; he is a leader in the efforts, through the modern 
search for interpolations, to reconstruct the original Roman 
private law; his services as editor of various research publi-
cations in the field of legal history are well known. These 
broad interests were complemented by extensive comparative 
work on the modern Swiss, French, and German laws, later 
including the Common Law as well; his contributions in the 
preparation of international drafts of unified law, especially 
that on sales of goods, are widely recognized. 
In Rabel, outstanding legal scholarship has been enriched 
by wide and unusual practical experience. He practiced law 
in Vienna and served as judge in the appellate courts of 
Basle and Munich. Shortly after the First World War, he 
became a member of the German-Italian arbitral tribunal. 
As a judge of the Court of International Justice (World 
ix 
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Court) at the Hague, between I925 and I928, he took part 
in German and Polish suits. He was president of the Inter-
national Association of Comparative Law and a member of 
the Council and Executive Committee of the Institute for 
Unification of private Law in Rome. He received diverse 
honors in Italy, Greece, Poland, Spain, and Norway. 
The central interests and achievements of the author 
have been in the development of comparative legal research. 
In the course of the First World War, he recognized the 
danger of a narrow legal nationalism and in I 9 I 6 founded 
and became Director of the Institute of Comparative Law 
in Munich, the world's first research institute for compara-
tive law. In I926, being appointed Director of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute of Foreign and International Private 
Law in Berlin, he was entrusted with the task of organizing 
and conducting a much larger enterprise. This Institute, 
parallel to the Institute of Foreign Public Law and the Law 
of Nations, directed by the late Viktor Bruns, was devoted 
to research as well as to the giving of practical information 
and advice to the Foreign Office in Germany, legislative au-
thorities, courts, lawyers, and business firms. Under Rabel's 
guidance, the Institute trained a staff of experts in the vari-
ous legal systems of the world, some of whom are now in 
this country as law teachers, or members of the legal pro-
fession, and, in conjunction with the sister organization, 
established the most comprehensive law library in Europe. 
The opinions delivered by the Institute under Professor 
Rabel's responsibility in matters of legislation, conflict of 
laws, international trade and international law, numbered 
about a thousand. The Institute exercised a profound in-
fluence in the legal thought and methods not only of Ger-
many but also of those numerous other countries whose 
scholars availed themselves of its facilities. 
After the completion of the Restatement of the Law of 
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Conflict of Laws in 1934, the American Law Institute had 
under consideration a plan to supplement the Restatement 
by a parallel work presenting to the American public the 
rules, principles, and doctrines of the leading foreign coun-
tries. But, until in 1937 the Nazi insanity removed from the 
directorship of the world's then principal organization de-
voted to the study of comparative law the director whose 
foresight and leadership conceived and conducted it, it had 
seemed all but impossible to find the right man for a task 
requiring so wide and mature a background of learning and 
experience. The opportunity thus offered to bring Doctor 
Rabel to this country to do much to break down our isola-
tionist legal attitudes was unique. Doctor Rabel knows the 
private law system of German and Latin-American countries. 
He knows much of the common law of the English-speaking 
peoples. Furthermore, he has not only the law professor's 
knowledge of legal theory, but the practical knowledge of the 
similarities and differences in the application of the legal 
principles of different systems to the solution of concrete 
legal problems. 
Accordingly, in the spring of 1939, the American Law 
Institute took steps to bring Dr. Rabel to the United States 
with the guarantee of two years' employment. He arrived in 
this country in September, 1939, and at once began work 
preparatory to the preparation of this treatise, of which the 
first volume is now published. In the spring of 1942, his ar-
rangement with the Institute having been fulfilled, the Law 
School of the University of Michigan gave him a position, 
which has now enabled him to complete the first of the vol-
umes contemplated. His work in Michigan has been done 
under the most fortunate surroundings, as he has had the 
active advice and assistance from the point of view of a 
leading American specialist in international law, Professor 
Hessel E. Y ntema. 
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The present treatise is the confirmation of Doctor Rabel's 
life work. Its primary purpose is to make a comparison of 
the significant legal systems of conflict of laws with refer-
ence to the specific problems arising in each topic. The first 
volume, besides containing a most interesting and compre-
hensive introduction dealing with the literature, theories, 
and sources of the subject, is devoted to a study of the prob-
lems of what may be described as family relations, such as 
the personal law of individuals, marriage, divorce and an-
nulment, and parental relations. It is a field presenting a 
variety of interesting and difficult conflicts problems. The 
second volume now well under way will deal principally with 
Foreign Corporations, Torts, and the General Problems of 
Contracts. It is hoped that there may be further volumes, 
covering the other legal topics treated in the American Law 
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws. 
In the course of its preparation and completion, the plan 
of the work has undergone substantial change. 
The original plan was that of a work which, in arrange-
ment, should exactly parallel the sections of the Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws. This plan has turned out to be imprac-
ticable. The differences between the European and American 
systems are too great to allow such minute comparison, sec-
tion by section. The major subdivisions, however, present 
sufficient analogy to those of the Restatement to draw at-
tention to the significant distinctions and similarities. Com-
parison between the foreign and American law has been 
emphasized throughout. The book does not simply constitute 
a presentation of foreign law, but a painstaking and compre-
hensive comparison of the solutions accorded to the par-
ticular problems of family law, both here and abroad. It 
is this feature that gives the work its special value and 
attractiveness. 
The author conceives that comparison of laws requires 
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study in the legal systems compared of the solutions reached 
on particular practical problems rather than the review of 
general theories. In thus emphasizing the comparative solu-
tions of concrete problems, he is in accord with our common 
law habit of thought. Consistently carried out in the present 
treatise, it greatly increases the value of the work in the 
English-speaking countries. The method does not ignore the 
necessary consideration of theories but obviously gives them 
less significance than is usually found in most European 
literature. 
The work offers not only comprehensive assistance to the 
practicing lawyer or the judge who is concerned to know the 
answers in other countries to a conflict of laws problem, but 
will also furnish the English-speaking reader with foreign 
law concepts of the rules of conflicts of laws and their appli-
cation in a form easily comprehended by those whose legal 
training is largely confined to our common law and statutes. 
In all the topics treated, the author enables us to appreciate 
the "other fellow's" point of view and compare its practical 
results with our own. This is not an insignificant service to 
a people just awakening from a self-centered legal sleep to 
an appreciation of the fact that we must hereafter go for-
ward in a world which is increasingly one. 
WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, Director 
The American Law Institute 
II 
I T is appropriate to add a few remarks from the view-point of the University of Michigan. The foregoing statement by the director of the American Law Insti-
tute outlines the distinguished career of the author of the 
present work and indicates the circumstances under which he 
was invited by the Institute to undertake a comparative sur-
vey of the existing systems of conflicts law. As therefrom 
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appears, while the inspiration to bring to this country an 
internationally recognized jurist with unique qualifications 
for the task-an extraordinary opportunity afforded only by 
the malign policy that has betrayed Germany and crucified 
millions in this generation-is to be credited to the Institute 
and more particularly to the generous wisdom of the di-
rector, the studies reflected in the present volume have been 
substantially accomplished at Ann Arbor, in large part with 
the aid of funds and further assistance provided by the 
University of Michigan. 
This co-operation, illustrating an appropriate function, as 
once suggested by the writer, for a nondenominational Insti-
tute in the world of academic rivalries, deserves a word of 
commendation. On the part of the University, it has been 
motivated not only by the liberal disposition of the Faculty 
of Law to promote worth-while research and their long-
standing interest in comparative legal studies, but more es-
pecially by the significance of the enterprise. This is no mere 
tabula ex naufragio, thus rescued from the maelstrom in 
which contemporary European culture is engulfed. The sur-
vey undertaken is essential at the present time for the proper 
development of a branch of law of special interest for inter-
state and international trade, arising, as Story states, "from 
the conflict of the laws of different nations, in their actual 
application to modern commerce and intercourse." More 
generally, it exemplifies a fundamental mode of legal in-
vestigation, which each day becomes more nearly indispen-
sable in the modern world. 
The latter consideration, the need in these times for com-
parative legal research, does not call for extensive comment. 
The present conflict, multiplying contacts among the most 
distant peoples and through untold suffering and sacrifice 
uniting them to vindicate the common values of humanity, 
like the Napoleonic wars and the War of 1914, again empha-
FOREWORD XV 
sizes that no one is unconditionally immune from influences 
operative within the effective orbit of international inter-
course. In a universe progressively interrelated by the mira-
cles of modern communication, therefore, it is neither pru-
dent nor even longer possible for any nation to pursue a 
policy of self-sufficient isolation. In such a universe, the 
notion that the corresponding legal order is compartmental-
ized exclusively within political frontiers is inadequate. 
For legal science, so pervasively indoctrinated these hun-
dred years by the preconceptions of sovereignty and national-
ism, this spells the necessity of comparative reorientation, of 
ampler realization that justice both comprehends and tran-
scends local interests. If the price of peace and liberty is con-
stant vigilance in an integrated world, it is expedient to know 
what transpires abroad as well as at home. While legal sci-
ence in each country will and should continue to cultivate first 
its peculiar institutions and traditions, these can no longer 
be accepted as the horizon of legal knowledge. The practical, 
specialized study of indigenous techniques, legislative, judi-
cial, and administrative, must be complemented by scientific 
comparison with other legal systems-to ascertain their 
manifold bearings on domestic interests; to prepare the re-
forms that may be desired from time to time to bring the 
municipal laws into harmony with advancing conceptions of 
justice and the requirements of the international community; 
to share in efforts to provide appropriate uniform legislation 
for the commerce of the world; in fine, to establish a more 
objective scientific basis for the consideration of legal prob-
lems. To attain these ends, indeed even to appreciate the 
special genius of each legal system, the comparative method, 
necessarily supposing intensive historical and functional in-
vestigation of particular institutions, is indicated. Without 
this perspective, as Ihering pointed out long ago, there is no 
legal science worthy of the name. Blind without history, juris-
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prudence without comparative understanding can scarcely 
rise above the level of provincial casuistry and empirical 
craft. 
Obviously, such understanding of the existing legal sys-
tems is most immediately needed in those branches of law 
that are concerned with international relations. Of these, the 
law of conflict of laws, devoted to the principles governing 
assumption of jurisdiction and resort to the proper law in the 
solution of private disputes of an international complexion, 
is in a parlous state, permitted presumably by the fact that 
it is almost wholly administered in the ordinary courts in the 
positivistic atmosphere of municipal law. For, in this subject 
matter concerned with determining the application of the di-
verse legal provisions that may be involved in any such dis-
pute, in consonance with, or at least without violating, com-
mon standards of justice, emphasis is rampant upon terri-
torialism and nationality, upon the dominant pretensions of 
lex fori or ordre public, in other words, upon ideas that ob-
scure, limit, or frustrate the very purpose in view. 
This, it is worth recalling, was not always the emphasis. 
More than a hundred years ago, Story founded the modern 
law of conflict of laws on a broad, comparative basis, that 
looked despite uncertainty and diversity in the then existing 
doctrines, "towards the establishment of a general system of 
international jurisprudence, which shall elevate the policy, 
subserve the interests, and promote the common convenience 
of all nations." Fifteen years after Story penned these words, 
in the preface to the eighth volume of the monumental Sys-
tem des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Savigny voiced two in-
teresting prognostications in like vein. Adverting to the 
variety of opinions among both writers and courts respecting 
conflicts of laws, he nevertheless conceived that, from the 
exceptional and active common concern in the problems of 
this field of law, there would develop a universal, existent 
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community of legal understanding and legal life. The further 
suggestion that the principle of nationality, then coming into 
prominence, would not make itself felt in a subject, the na-
ture of which involves the resolution of conflicts of national 
laws within a recognized community of the various nations, 
equally reflects Savigny's international point of view. 
How soon and how far these anticipations were to be dis-
appointed is writ at large in the illuminating introduction 
that forms Part One of the present volume. 
A etas parentum, peior avis, tulit 
Nos nequiores, mox daturos 
Progeniem vitiosiorem. 
But two years after Savigny wrote, the doctrine of nation-
ality, which in its exaggeration has so much contributed to 
international disorder during the past century, was pro-
claimed by Mancini as the fundamental principle of the law 
of nations and shortly became the distinctive basis of legisla-
tion in Continental Europe. Consequently, to borrow the 
author's expression, the international community, as contem-
plated by Story and Savigny, disintegrated. Story's broad 
understanding of the conflicts of law doctrines current in his 
time eventually shrank in the United States to the dimensions 
of the introverted treatment of the subject by Wharton and 
later by Beale: in England, Westlake bridged the way to 
Dicey's Anglican positivism; on the Continent, Savigny and 
his international-minded successors were duly eclipsed by the 
intransigent, if despairing, nationalism of Bartin and Kahn. 
Thus, by 1900, the dominant supposition was a caricature 
of the truism that international private law is not interna-
tional but private law; absorbed in domestic legislation and 
precedents, the doctrine reflected the prevailing provincial 
dogmatisms of legal science generally. Apparently, justified 
recognition of the circumstance that, under existing condi-
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tions, national courts typically administer conflicts rules as 
a branch of municipal law, was thought to warrant indiffer-
ence to their international raison d' hre. Consequently, legal 
theory in this field in recent years, having lost sight of the 
underlying purpose to be had in view, has devoted itself with 
aprioristic methods to unreal issues and become something 
of a logical mystery. Essentially, it face~ the problem of how 
to square in terms of national interest or tradition a circle 
of internationally superior needs. 
In this country, the current isolationism of conflicts of law 
doctrine has been accentuated by certain contributing fac-
tors: first, by a quite natural preoccupation on the part of 
specialists in the subject with the relatively frequent internal 
conflicts of jurisdiction and law arising within the federal 
structure of the United States; and second, by the extensive 
influence of the theories expounded by Beale, including the 
belief that reference in this field to civil law authorities is 
not one that tends "to preserve the correctness and purity 
of the common law." It deserves repeating-even after al-
most twenty years-that this is a conceit, strange and for 
the United States inexpedient. Strange, since it disavows the 
considerable indebtedness of common law doctrines respect-
ing conflicts of laws to the civil law; inexpedient, since a great 
commercial nation cannot afford to remain in ignorance, 
particularly in this subject matter, of the laws of foreign 
countries with which it trades. In consequence of these in-
fluences, despite the pioneer work of Lorenzen and more 
recent contributions by Kuhn, Nussbaum, and others, inade-
quate attention has been given in this country to the relations 
between the doctrines of conflicts law as here evolved and 
those of foreign countries other than England. It affords 
little consolation that the condition is paralleled elsewhere. 
But it does serve to explain why no systematic effort has been 
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made hitherto to provide a comprehensive, critical compari-
son of the existing systems of private international law. 
Had it not been for this background, the preparation of 
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, initiated in 
1923 and promulgated in 1934, might well have been the 
occasion for such a survey. This, however, was not to be-it 
was precluded by the prepossessions of the reporter, by the 
curious determination, deviating from the original plan, to 
restate "the law as it is," and still more effectually by un-
familiarity with comparable foreign doctrines on the part of 
those invited to participate as advisers (except for a time 
Lorenzen) . Hence, the failure in this monumental codifica-
tion of the Common Law to take account of other systems 
was not merely an effect of, but has become a cause to per-
petuate an inappropriate view of international private law, 
which no longer befits the United States. On this count alone 
and apart from other limitations duly noted by critics, we 
repeat, the Restatement needs to be restated. But the pre-
ceding observations will suggest that it is still more impor-
tant to provide the indispensable basis for such revision, in-
cluding the comparative information without which inbred 
doctrines remain unquestioned and their objective, scientific 
consideration in terms of international needs is excluded 
a limine. 
To supply this need, as the author justly observes in the 
preface, is a large task. The requisite survey of the existing 
systems of conflicts law involves critical examination and 
comparison of the significant rules on specific problems with 
reference to their evolution and purposes, as exemplified in 
these systems, and in the light of the pertinent literature and 
jurisprudence for each country, preferably accompanied by 
corresponding suggestions for improvement. Moreover, as 
conflicts rules look to reciprocal recognition and understand-
ing of the respective specific institutions of local law, it is 
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necessary that any such survey should be made on the back-
ground, however succinctly adumbrated, of the historical de-
velopment and contemporary nature, significance, and inter-
relations of these institutions, considered in the context of 
the legislations of which they form part. The present volume 
is a first and substantial contribution to this undertaking; in 
addition to a magistral review of the literature, sources, doc-
trinal development, and general theories of the subject, it 
provides a comparative conspectus of the rules applicable to 
conflicts in the extensive field of family law. It is more than 
an annotation to the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of 
Laws, as was at first contemplated. It is the first comprehen-
sive comparative legal study that has been published in Eng-
lish for many moons, certainly the first in any language to 
take adequate account of the laws of the Americas as well as 
of Europe. It is, in sum, a pioneer, intensive exploration of a 
substantial part of the labyrinth of the laws of conflicts from 
the indicated international point of view, a contribution not 
only essential for progress in this field but also of general 
interest as an exemplar of the comparative method in law. 
In pursuance of its undertaking to support this enterprise, 
the University has made substantial provision to maintain 
and implement the author's individual researches, including, 
among other things, accommodations in the Legal Research 
Library, ministerial assistance as required from time to time, 
and editorial collaboration, especially in adapting the au-
thor's incisive expressions to the idiosyncrasies of English 
style, the independent verification of all citations, and the 
preparation of the various tables (except for the index, which 
was made up by the author). In arranging this assistance, the 
responsibility for which was cast upon the editor as a condi-
tion of the adoption of the undertaking for a time by the 
University, various obligations have been incurred, which 
deserve to be acknowledged: 
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To the University authorities, to the Faculty of Law and 
Dean Stason in particular, for their constant and generous 
support in the effective prosecution of the work. To all those 
who, as members of the research staff, were engaged in one 
way or another in preparing, editing, and seeing the manu-
script through the press, an exacting task in which the com-
parative use of legal materials from many countries has 
presented an unusual variety of questions, for their indis-
pensable, respective contributions, efficiently rendered. To 
Eldon R. James, Law Librarian, Library of Congress, and 
Arthur C. Pulling, Director of the Harvard Law Library, 
for the appreciated assistance of their respective staffs, which 
has made it possible to verify all save perhaps a dozen of 
the limited number of references to works not available in 
the Legal Research Library. To Hobart R. Coffey, to whom 
the editor is indebted equally with the author for expert re-
lief unstintingly given in the revision of the manuscript. And, 
not least, to the author himself for unfailing co-operation 
and courageous devotion to a complex task under disturbed 
conditions. 
Yet this is to be added. However indispensable the assist-
ance provided by the University has been for the prosecution 
of the work, the product is in substance exclusively the au-
thor's; he alone collected the materials, and the views ex-
pressed herein are his. It is fortunate that a jurist of the 
author's attainments and scholarly sagacity has addressed 
himself to the task, which, it is hoped, may be extended in 
additional volumes to other significant branches of conflicts 
law. 
HESSEL E. Y NTEMA 
Preface 
FULL ap~lication .of compar~tive methods to the law of conflicts reqmres a workmg plan of some magni-tude. \Ve ought to take stock of the conflicts rules 
existing in the different countries of the world, state their 
similarities or dissimilarities, and investigate their purposes 
and effects. The solutions thus ascertained should moreover 
be subjected to an estimation of their usefulness, by the stand-
ards appropriate to their natural objective. Conflicts rules 
have to place private life and business relations upon the le-
gal background suitable to satisfactory intercourse among 
states and nations. They are valuable to the extent that their 
practical functioning, rather than their legal appearance, 
serves this purpose. 
To meet the challenge of this program with limited forces 
is a risky undertaking. Nevertheless it has to be attempted. 
The conditions of the law of conflicts are deplorable. It may 
be said, to the reader's and my own consolation, that the 
staggering provincialism apparent in the international family 
law presented in this volume is not equaled in other parts. But 
if conflicts problems have been cultivated by men of the high-
est erudition, idealism, and endeavor, they have also been the 
object of prejudice and dogmatism. Suggestions of almost all 
needed ideas may be found, but little agreement on a sound 
choice. The courts of this country dealing with a wealth of 
interstate cases have prevailingly shown sincere respect for 
foreign legislation and applied an accomplished method of 
comparative research. But this admirable attitude, which is 
the most outstanding model for the practice of private inter-
national law, suffers exceptions, and in the field of interna-
tional relations throughout the world, despite enormous ef-
xxii 
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forts, the simple truth that harmony presupposes mutual 
understanding and tolerance, has not prevailed in conflicts 
law more than in foreign affairs. 
All considered, the further we extend our comparative sur-
vey, the less doubt can subsist about the need for a total re-
consideration of the international purpose and the undevel-
oped resources of this branch of law. The time has passed 
when we may rest satisfied to state a rule and to regret it. 
Not that the premature legislation or halfhearted treaty 
making, familiar to the last decades, should be advocated. 
What this book is intended to suggest is a patient and con-
certed world-wide discussion determined to relieve the pres-
ent chaos. I am convinced that large results must not be de-
ferred to a remote future. The legal profession has great 
power and deserves great confidence. If it decided to con-
sider conflicts law as a matter of general interest and gave it 
its unbiased attention, much might be obtained that now 
seems Utopian. I am particularly hopeful of the lawyers in 
the United States. 
According to the program, I have regarded my foremost 
task to be the collection and grouping of the significant rules, 
theories, critical views, and proposals, and the cases animated 
by them. This task is comprehensive and worth-while enough 
to dictate sacrifices. It has not been possible to spare the 
reader and myself tedious enumerations and many a mosaic 
of incoherent pieces, and I have had to renounce historical 
and theoretical developments. Neither is there space to de-
scribe at length the institutions of private law that are the 
subject matter of the conflicts rules. This compulsory limita-
tion is the more regrettable, as common law lawyers have 
not been introduced to the concepts of civil law as European 
lawyers were informed of Anglo-American institutions dur-
ing the period between the two wars. 
I have also restricted my own critical appraisals, and I 
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have doubted whether any recommendations for the future 
should be added. Yet, in view of the personal encouragement 
that I have received from such scholars as Elliott E. Cheat-
ham, Max Rheinstein, and Hessel E. Y ntema, and recently in 
Ernest Lorenzen's great review of the last period of Ameri-
can conflicts law, it seems to be the writer's duty not entirely 
to conceal his impressions regarding the desirable path that 
the evolution may take. Theoretical conclusions of more gen-
eral scope as well as specified proposals for elaborating the 
rules may be expected, when comparative research in this 
singular and disturbed field has become broader and bolder. 
I hope the survey itself will almost automatically arouse the 
wish for certain reforms. 
Because of the war time, European rules and cases are 
stated, in principle, as they were in 1939 at the beginning of 
the war. This is a rather convenient date for a view back, 
while a new epoch is starting. More recent materials coming 
through have, of course, been registered. 
The Legal Research Library of the University of Michi-
gan in Ann Arbor has afforded me a hospitable haven and 
ample facilities for work. Its farsighted policy has enabled 
me, for the first time in a work of this kind, to include a sub-
stantial amount of Latin-American doctrine. My satisfaction 
in this regard is somewhat impaired by the fear that my ef-
forts of analysis have not been entirely successful in regard to 
certain Latin-American formulations. As these countries pos-
sess outstanding scholars in this field who are the natural in-
termediaries between common law and civil law, it is to be 
hoped that they will participate in carrying on the work here 
begun and supply the details not yet mentioned in the litera-
ture but with which the courts must deal. 
To the American Law Institute, the Dean and Faculty of 
the Law School, University of Michigan, and the Research 
Department of the W. W. Cook Foundation directed by 
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Professor Lewis M. Simes, I owe deepest gratitude. Dean 
Emeritus William Draper Lewis, the eminent and beloved 
director of the American Law Institute, has rescued me from 
the cataclysm of Europe; he has been the original sponsor of 
this enterprise and has not ceased to manifest his friendly 
interest in it. Professor Hessel E. Y ntema, since I 940, has 
fulfilled his task as editor with an unprecedented sacrifice of 
time and labor. He has generously provided me with informa-
tions and suggestions, constantly supervised during all these 
years the comprehensive ministerial aid furnished by the re-
search staff of the Faculty, and devoted his command of Eng-
lish style to an extremely delicate and exacting revision of 
the language of my manuscript. Professor Hobart R. Coffey 
has liberally shared in this burden, and to him, as Law Li-
brarian, as well as to his entire staff, who have been most 
kind, I am grateful. I feel cordially obligated also for the 
devoted services of Mrs. Lilly Melchior Roberts, who, with 
the assistance of Miss Dorothy Karl, has been especially 
helpful in checking the documentation, to Dr. Vladimir 
Gsovski, Chief of the Foreign Laws Section, Law Library 
of the Library of Congress, and to those whose contributions 
Mr. Yntema has deservedly acknowledged. 
Finally, it is my privilege to thank publicly Professor Max 
Rheinstein of the University of Chicago, the most faithful of 
friends, for the help he has freely given to this book as well 
as to me and my family. I am happy to see him represent in 
this country our common scientific ideals. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
March 5, 1945 
ERNST RABEL 
NOTE : Chapter I I was published in preliminary, condensed form 
in volume 28 of the Iowa Law Review, January I943, as "Divorce 
of Foreigners-A Study in Comparative Law." 
Preface to the Second Edition 
This volume, the first in Ernst Rabel's monumental com-
parative treatise on the conflict of laws, was initially pub-
lished in 1 94 5. Since then three additional volumes have 
been added, completing the survey of the systems of con-
flicts law as originally contemplated. Meanwhile, the first 
edition of the first two volumes has been exhausted for some 
time, and the literature of conflicts law has substantially 
increased, reflecting the new developments that have taken 
place since I 94 5. Accordingly, plans for a new edition of 
the first two volumes were discussed with the author before 
his death on September 7, I 9 55, and were approved by him; 
these plans contemplated that the manuscript should be 
prepared by an assistant of the Institute of Foreign and 
International Private Law, formerly directed by the author, 
who should be entrusted with the formidable task of inte-
grating with the original text the relevant conflicts materials 
which have appeared during the international turmoil of 
the past decade. 
This new edition has thus been made possible through 
the continued support of this research by the University of 
Michigan Law School and the generous co-operation of the 
Institute, now the Max-Planck-Institut in Hamburg, in 
making available the competent services of a member of 
the staff of the Institute, Dr. Ulrich Drobnig, who utilized 
the special facilities at the Legal Research Building in Ann 
Arbor from July, 1955, to June, I956. In accordance with 
the advice of the author, whom Dr. Drobnig fortunately 
was able to consult before undertaking the revision of the 
two volumes, the collection and inclusion of new material 
in the author's text has been strictly limited to the addition 
of new citations and illustrations. Consequently, alterations 
xxvii 
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of the text proper, as distinguished from the footnotes, have 
been avoided as far as possible. The additional materia] 
covers publications up to July r, 1956, but it has been pos-
sible to take account of a few later developments. The re-
vised edition of the second volume is to follow in the near 
future. 
HESSEL E. Y NTEMA 
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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
Literature and Sources of Conflicts Law 
I. ScoPE OF CoNFLicTs LAw 
I N the American literature, the law of conflicts includes both choice of law, which contemplates the determina-tion of the particular state law applicable to specific 
cases typically within the sphere of private law, and jurisdic-
tion of courts, regarded by some writers as an aspect of legis-
lative jurisdiction. In following this pattern, we shall observe 
the limitations of private law more strictly than is usual and 
only to the extent necessary explore the implications of con-
stitutional, administrative, procedural, criminal, and public 
law generally. Thus, the rules of judicial jurisdiction will be 
considered in connection with those matters which are gov-
erned in this country by the domestic or internal law of the 
jurisdiction (the lex fori) and consequently depend upon 
choice of court rather than on choice of law. 
According to the French doctrine, "private international 
law" combines choice of law, the law of nationality, and the 
legal status of foreigners. This last subject, concerned with 
the rules granting or refusing foreigners equal treatment 
with nationals, in theory is thoroughly different from con-
flicts law conceived primarily as choice of law. It presupposes 
that the law applicable to aliens has been selected and found 
to be the internal law of the state. For this reason, it is not 
regarded in Germany as part of private international law. 1 
In this country, likewise, rules relative to "foreign" indi-
viduals-aliens and non-residents-typically do not appear 
1 See I ZITELMANN 256; KAHN, I Abhandl. 263 ff. 
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in the treatises on conflicts law. The explanation given is 
that citizens and non-citizens are not differentiated 2 in re-
spect to private law; this seems to contemplate exclusively 
relations between the American sister states. Nevertheless, 
the rules concerning foreign corporations, pertaining for the 
most part to internal law and in fact presenting many special 
features in the United States and to some degree in Ger-
many, are included in the usual orbit of conflicts discussion. 
This practical method will be followed, although the regula-
tion of foreign corporations is different from choice of 
law and in general forms part of administrative law. 
Similar considerations make it desirable to give some at-
tention to substantive provisions concerned with property 
situated or contracts performed or acts done in another state, 
or that otherwise involve foreign elements. Such provisions 
often appear as purely internal rules, but they may include 
genuine conflict rules. For instance, a rule stating that a 
money debt expressed in foreign currency may be paid, at 
the option of the debtor, in domestic currency at the ex-
change of a certain date, is substantive merely. But the prin-
ciple, enunciated in certain American statutes and judicial 
decisions,3 that statutory formalities prescribed for insurance 
contracts apply only to contracts executed within the state, is 
not merely a rule of municipal law territorially limited; it 
contains two rules, the one substantive, imposing formalities, 
the other, a conflicts rule, however delicate the borderline 
may be.~ There are also scattered throughout the national 
2 I BEALE 8. On the rules, see MOORE, 4 Digest of International Law (I906) 
ch. XIII. 
8 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (I900) I79 U. S. 262; Johnson v. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. ( I90I-I902) ISO Mass. 407, 62 N. E. 733 (on Mass. Stat. I894, 
c. 522, § 73, now Mass. General Laws (I932) c. I75 § I3I); New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Long (I9I7) I77 Ky. 445, I97 S. W. 948 on Ky. Stat. § 679, 
Ky. Rev. Stats. (I953) § 299.I30 statutorily embodied since I950 (now Ky. 
Rev. Stats. (I953) § 304.648). 
4 In fact, the provision cited in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Long (supra 
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legislations numerous provisions that are not intended or are 
unsuitable for application by foreign courts, as for instance, 
the peculiar English provisions imposing upon certain per-
sons the burden of support of indigents.5 All such internal 
regulations, with potential international significance, deserve 
systematic examination in connection with the laws of the 
particular countries. In the present survey, it will be possible 
only to make occasional reference to such problems. On the 
other hand, in view of their preponderant influence, internal 
rules embodying so-called stringent public policies, and hence 
superseding the operation of general conflicts rules, must be 
taken into account. 
The observations in the present introduction are not in-
tended to serve as a general analysis of conflicts law. Modern 
writers in this field have begun to develop a body of general-
ized theories,6 but most of the topics they deal with are be-
yond present purposes. Certain problems, such as the attitude 
of the courts in the different countries with regard to public 
policy or the methods of considering foreign law in lawsuits, 
involve positive formulations of law, which ought to be re-
ported in a comparative survey and will be referred to in 
their appropriate connections. Other long-standing problems 
of deep scientific interest, such as the exact classification of 
conflicts law in the legal system, do not need more interna-
tional discussion. Others, including the dubious role of the 
n. 3) has been characterized as a "spatially limited" internal rule by Nuss-
BAUM, Principles 70. 
5 See infra pp. 349, 655, n. 8, 667, n. 63. 
6 A penetrating analysis has been made by MAURY in his Hague lecture, 
"Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 325. Other lectures 
under the same title by AGO, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247; DAVIES, an English 
author, 62 Recueil 1937 IV 427; and H. LEWALD, published separately, 
Basel, 1941 (an elegant theoretical study). See, moreover, I. HENRI HIJMANS, 
Algemeene Problemen van Internationaal Privaatrecht (1937) and W. 
NIEDERER, Einfiihrung in die allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen 
Privatrechts (ed. 2, 1956). 
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"preliminary question," 7 have not matured sufficiently to 
warrant general observations. 
Finally, there are problems regarding the structure and 
application of conflicts rules that are of interest from the 
viewpoint of method and have attracted wide and vivid at-
tention during recent years. The purpose of this introduction 
is to summarize the writer's view on these questions. This 
view premises that each case should be considered on its 
merits; therefore it does not presuppose the determination 
of individual problems by general dogmas. 
II. LITERATURE 8 
1. The International Historical Background 9 
In its generally accepted sense, the law of conflicts or pri-
vate international law dates from the medieval school of the 
7 See CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary 
Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221, 243· 
8 The titles of many of the works cited by authors' names in the following 
brief survey are to be found in the bibliographical list on page 661. The ac-
companying dates indicate the years in which the first considerable publica-
tions of the respective authors occurred. 
9 On the history of conflicts law: Outlines in English: 3 BEALE 188o-1975; 
CHESHIRE 68; RHEIN STEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Ger-
many," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 232-269; and YNTEMA, "The Historic 
Bases of Private International Law," 2 Am. J. Camp. Law (1953) 297-317, 
German translation in I Festschrift Rabel ( 1954) 513-537. 
Standard works: CATELLANI, II diritto internazionale privata e i suoi recenti 
progressi, 2 vols. ( 1895, 1902) ; LAINE, Introduction au droit international 
prive, 2 vols. (x888, 1892); NEUMEYER, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung 
des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus, 2 vols. (1901, 1916); 
idem, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den 
Niederlanden," in 2 Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht (1920) 190; MEIJERS, Bijdrage 
tot de geschiedenis van het internationaal privaat- en strafrecht in Frankrijk 
en de Nederlanden ( 1914) ; idem, "Nieuwe bijdrage tot het onstaan van het 
beginsel der realiteit," 3 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis ( 1922) 61; 
idem, "L'histoire des principes fondamentaux du droit international prive a 
partir du Moyen-Age, specialement dans !'Europe occidentale," 49 Recueil 
1934 III 543; GuTZWILLER, "Le developpement historique du droit interna-
tional prive," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 287 (with full list of literature 395-397). 
Historical summaries are given in almost every handbook; particularly 
recommendable are those by WEISS, 3 Traite 8-129, 13o-149; GuTZWILLER, 
Internationalprivatrecht 1521-1534; EsPINOLA, 7 Tratado II5-313. 
LITERATURE AND SOURCES OF CONFLICTS LAW 7 
postglossators (also named legists or commentators), who in 
the late thirteenth century succeeded the glossators in the 
universities of northern Italy and southern France.10 Like the 
Roman law into which it was artificially incorporated, this 
branch of law was regarded as universally binding. The ter-
ritorial realm of the doctrines of the postglossators exceeded 
even the boundaries within which the canon and Roman laws 
were received as "written reason," representing the law of 
all Christendom. These doctrines, as accepted and trans-
formed by eminent scholars in France 11 and Holland 12 dur-
ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gained recogni-
tion in England and in the United States. 
The law of conflicts thus became one field, in which the 
common and civil laws had a common doctrinal basis and 
which could be thought of as a truly international law. This 
conception of a world community was still prevalent when in 
18 34 the great American, Joseph Story, merged the Dutch 
doctrine with the Anglo-American cases. His treatise ac-
quired authority in both hemispheres and contributed to the 
continuation, in renewed form, of an internationally-minded 
school on the European Continent. In particular, Germany's 
10 The last and most authoritative member of the school of glossators, Ac-
CURsrus, instigated the query by his brief annotation (A. D. I228) to the first 
Imperial decree of the Justinian Codex (C. J. I, I, I), the Constitutio "Cunc-
tos populos." The postglossators developed the treatment of the conflict of 
statutes (i.e., those of the upper Italian cities) as glosses to this Constitution. 
The most outstanding postglossators were also the main authorities for con-
flicts law: BARTOLUS DB SAXOFERRATO (I3I4-I357) and BALDUS DE UBALDIS 
( I327-I400). 
11 The most famous scholars were MoLINAEUS (CHARLES DuMOULIN) 
(15oo-I566), and ARGENTRAEus (BERTRAND D'ARGBNTRE) (I5I9-I590). On 
these see also MElLI, "Argentraeus und Molinaeus und ihre Bedeutung im 
internationalen Privat- und Strafrecht," 5 Z.int.R. (I895) 363, 452, 554; and 
GAMILLSCHEG, Der Einfluss Dumoulins auf die Entwicklung des Kollisions-
rechts (1955). For what is now Belgium, NICOLAUS BuRGUNDUS (I586-1649), 
and for Holland, CHRISTIAAN RoDBNBURGH (I6I8-I668), may be mentioned. 
12 "Dutch school," main representatives: PAULUS VoET (I6I<}-1677); ULRI-
cus HuBER (I636-I694); JoHANNES VOET (I6I7-I7I3)· See LORENZEN, 
"Huber's De Conflictu Legum" in Celebration Legal Essays (in honor of 
John H. Wigmore, 1919) 199. 
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greatest jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (I 849) using 
Story's materials and rational method, 13 established the 
fundaments of modern conflicts law. It was significant that 
his treatment of this subject formed the last part of the cele-
brated System of Modern Roman Law; for him, there was 
no doubt about the suprastate nature of the subject matter. 
This work of the leader of the historical school became the 
principal authority in all Europe and Latin America during 
most of the nineteenth century and is still highly regarded in 
certain countries. The international conception of "inter-
national private law" was adopted by Foelix (I 843) in 
France, a professed follower of Story, by the Belgian Lau-
rent (I88o), the Italian Fiore (I869),14 the Swiss Brocher 
{I87I),15 and by almost all outstanding authors until ap-
proximately I 890.16 These authors wrote on conflicts law in 
a common atmosphere, among brethren of the same creed, 
envisaging its application in all countries. So did also the 
scholars who with the eminent German, Ludwig von Bar 
( I 8 6 2), 17 protested against being classified among the inter-
nationalists 18 but who neverthelesss thought that special 
studies, restricted to the positive laws of particular legal sys-
tems, unaided by general theory, narrow in perspective, 
are prone to choose improper premises or to misconceive the 
13 See SAVIGNY, iv (tr. Guthrie 44); GUTZWILLER, 29 Recueil I929 IV at 
34I-
14 PASQUALE FIORE, Elementi di diritto internazionale privata (Firenze, 
1869). 
15 CHARLES BROCHER, "Theorie du droit international prive," Revue 187I, 
4I2, 540, Revue 1872, I89, Revue 1873, 137, 390. 
16 NussBAUM, D. IPR. II, and in an extensive paper, "The Rise and Decline 
of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. 
(1942) 189, I94, accounts for the prevalence of universalism or aprioristic 
thought from I87o to 1930, on divers assumptions which the present writer 
does not share. See also GuTZWILLER, review of NussBAUM'S D. IPR., 8 z. 
ausl.PR. (1934) 652, and see the list of "nationalists" by KAHN, I Abhandl. 
3 n. 2 and 270 n. 29. 
17 BAR, Das internationale Privat- und Strafrecht (Hannover, I862). 
18 BAR, "Neue Prinzipien und Methoden des internationalen Privatrechts," 
I5 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (1900) I at II, 45· 
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sphere of individual principles in the "organism" of inter-
national private law.19 
In time, the international community disintegrated. The 
common law lawyers, segregated from the civil law back-
ground, instinctively receded from naive cosmopolitan atti-
tudes. Absorbed in the judicial decisions of their countries, 
they gave slight attention to developments elsewhere. In the 
civil law countries on the other hand, from the end of the 
eighteenth century, there appeared an increasing number of 
national codifications of private law, which divided the Euro-
pean Continent into separate units, secluding them behind 
progressively higher barriers of national legislation. Rela-
tively late, the impact of this process reached the conflicts 
law. The specialists in this branch of law, which seems pre-
destined always to lag behind the currents of general juris-
prudence, were tardily and rudely awakened by the discovery 
that the supposed international source of law did not exist.20 
Former universalist conceptions gave way to the knowledge 
that conflicts rules no less than other rules of law must have 
their roots in the soil of some state and that international 
rules in the proper sense flow only from international custom 
or treaties, and at that in a very thin stream. Thus, the long-
established international community of conflicts studies was 
dissolved, and the national conflicts rules succumbed to the 
same spirit of isolationism that permeated other fields of 
law. Against this background, the meager achievements of 
the Hague Conventions of 1902 and 1905 appeared like a 
little island of blossoming internationalism. 
Although the doctrine of "national" or "positive" origin 
of conflicts rules has been definitely established long since, a 
few ingenious thinkers have resented its dismal consequences. 
19 Preface to the second edition of BAR, I Theorie und Praxis des inter-
nationalen Privatrechts vii ( tr. Gillespie viii). 
2o The scientific formulation of the "positivistic" approach was given by 
NIEMEYER, Zur Methodik des internationalen Privatrechts (1894) 26. 
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They have tried to revive universal rules by new ideas. With 
this in view, Pillet ( I894) ,21 distinguished two classes of mu-
nicipal law, viz., necessarily territorial general rules and 
"permanent" rules of extraterritorial application, the distinc-
tive criterion being the "social purpose" of the rules.22 The 
German professor Zitelmann (I 897), in a work full of sug-
gestive ideas, conceived the possibility of creating a vast sys-
tem of conflicts law upon the basis of the law of nations.23 
Belatedly, Frankenstein ( I926) has spun a whole web of 
conflicts rules from the premise that the only "scientific" 
choice of law is primarily predicated upon the dominance of 
each state over its citizens and over things in its territory.24 
Such deductive systems have been commonly rejected. 
A third movement was initiated by the Italian patriot, 
Mancini (I 8 5 I). 25 His vigorous emphasis on the function of 
the nation produced a wave of emotional nationalism in the 
field of international law. When Mancini advised the draft-
ing of the preliminary provisions of the Italian Civil Code of 
I 86 5, his postulates were transferred from international 
public law to conflicts law, as expressed in the principle that 
all persons should be governed by the law of the state whose 
citizens they are, which by an eventful transition of ideas be-
21 PILLET, "Le droit international prive. Essai d'un systeme general de 
solution des conflits de lois," Clunet 1894, 417, 7II, Clunet 1895, 241, soo, 929, 
Clunet 1896, 5· 
22 Cf. GAUDEMET, "La theorie des conflits de lois dans )'oeuvre d'Antoine 
Piilet et Ia doctrine de Savigny," I MELANGES PILLET (1929) 89. 
23 See GuTZWILLER, "Zitelmann's viilkerrechtliche Theorie des Interna-
tional privatrechts," in Festgabe, x6 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Wirtschafts-
philosophie (1923) 468. A pious apology for Zitelmann's doctrine was written 
by BETri, "Ernst Zitelmann e il problema del diritto internazionale privato," 
17 Rivista (1925) 33, continued at x88. 
24 See the criticism by YNTEMA, Book Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. (1927) 
794; YNTEMA, Book Review, 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 1092; LoRENZEN, 
Book Review, 36 Yale L. J. (1927) 1030j LORENZEN, Book Review, 39 Yale 
L. J. ( 1930) 921; NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 260; Li!WALD, 2 Blatter f. 
IPR. (1927) 65; GUTZWILLER I534i PACCHIONI 65; complete bibliography 
by GHIRON, Z7 Rivista (1935) 125. 
2 5 "Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti," inaugural 
address at the University of Turin. 
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came identified as the national law. This principle was 
adopted in all Central and Southern Europe, as well as in 
Brazil, Japan, and China. It was advocated by internation-
alists such as Laurent, Andre Weiss, and Bartin and appears 
in the German, Swedish, Polish, and many other legislations, 
clearly embodying the doctrine of positivism. No other doc-
trine has found more fervent adherents ; none has more es-
tranged the civil and common laws from each other. 
These three schools, the aprioristic internationalists, the 
faithful expositors of fragmentary statutes and cases, the 
propagandists of nationality as the standard of personal 
rights and duties, have had their time, and their time is over. 
A new epoch began about 1925. Previously, a few far-seeing 
scholars, Bar,26 Kahn, Anzilotti, Niemeyer/7 perceived that 
conflicts rules, though derived from a national source like 
other ordinary legal rules, have special functions and pur-
poses requiring a method of international scope. Kahn, one 
of the most acute advocates of positivism, went so far as to 
postulate that both the international and the positivistic 
methods should be integrated through the comparative 
method and so superseded. 28 
2. Modern Treatises 
The following are the most significant works on conflict of 
laws of the nineteenth century and of the first quarter of the 
twentieth. 
England.29 The English courts were slow and reluctant to 
26 IS Archiv des offentlichen Rechts ( 1900) I, supra n. IS. 
27 KAHN, I Abhandl. 3u, 3I5, 322, 326; ANZILOTTI, II diritto internazionale 
nei giudizi interni (I 90S) ISI (see his earlier Studi critici di diritto inter-
nazionale privato (1898) I30 V), declared the conflicts rules national in form 
(source) and suprastatal in substance: this formula served as a basis of a 
peculiar theory which was followed by numerous Italian and French writers. 
Cf. Aoo, Teo ria 83 n. 2; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III at 366; NIEMEYER, 
Das IPR. des BGB. so. 
2s I Abhandl. 502 (written in 1900). 
29 Treatises by WESTLAKE, FOOTE, DICEY, HIBBERT, BURGE. 
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adjust themselves to the application of foreign law. Until re-
cently, the literature was sparse.30 In the nineteenth century 
Westlake alone wrote a treatise (I 8 58) purporting to estab-
lish a system of conflicts. With this exception, the English 
writers refrained from criticism of the courts and left the law 
in the incoherent state represented in the cases. The often re-
edited treatise of Dicey ( 1896) illustrates this descriptive 
method with its finest and its less desirable characteristics. 
The intercourse within the parts of the British common-
wealth occasioned a certain interest in their different legisla-
tions. The early work of Burge on colonial law, including 
private international law, is being published in a revised, 
monumental, though unsystematic, edition. 
United States. 31 Succeeding Chancellor Kent's influential 
Commentaries ( 1826-1830) ,32 Joseph Story's work ( 1834) 
was of immense importance.33 Admittedly, Story, who em-
ployed an eclectic method to choose among the various doc-
trines of his predecessors, the statutists, in substantial meas-
ure preserved their conceptions and solutions, but his touch 
modernized the wealth of casuistic practice that lay im-
mersed in the literature of half a millennium. These ma-
terials he enriched with the English and American case law, 
and he was the first to master the huge subject with the 
wisdom of a great judge. 
80 See HARRISON, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws ( 1878, 1879, 
reprinted and annotated by LEFROY, 1919) 121. The first writers were }ABEZ 
HENRY (1823) and BURGE (1838) according to HARRISON, Clunet 1880, 429i 
see also GuTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at 338. 
81 KUHN, "La conception du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et 
Ia pratique aux Etats-Unis," 21 Recueil 1928 I 193. 
Treatises: KENT, STORY, WHARTON, MINOR, GOODRICH. 
Case books: BEALE, LORENZEN, HARPER and TAINTOR, and by CHEATHAM, 
DoWLING, GooDRICH and GRISWOLD. 
For lists of Anglo-American articles in the field of conflict of laws see 
CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICH and GRISWOLD, Cases and Other Materials 
on Conflict of Laws (1941) p. xlix, and LoRENZEN, Cases and Materials on 
the Conflict of Laws (1937) p. xxi. 
82 J. KENT, Commentaries on American Law (4 vols., ed. I, New York, 
1826-1830). 
33 See the praise by HARRISON, supra n. 30, at 119 j 3 BEALE 1912. 
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Thereafter, only two notable treatises appeared during 
many decades: Wharton's valuable and richly documented 
two volumes (I 872), which recognized legislative action, in-
stead of "moral duty" or "comity" as assumed by the Dutch 
writers and Story, as the source of conflicts rules; and the in-
structive compendium of Minor ( I90I), providing a doc-
trinal analysis of the cases as of the turn of the century. 
A radical change came with the extraordinary achieve-
ments of Beale. In an admirable effort, he collected and 
sifted the case materials, which had piled up to a gigantic 
height, and, after many special studies, undertook to recon-
struct the American conflicts law into a unified system. His 
life work culminated in the Restatement of the Law of Cott-
flicts of Laws, 84 inspired and primarily prepared by Beale, 
which has been promulgated ( I934) by the American Law 
Institute, and in his Treatise (I 935) which presents an au-
thoritative commentary on the Restatement. One might com-
pare the historic role of Beale's work in American conflicts 
law with that of the Glossa Magistralis of Accursius in the 
Middle Ages. More than a century of Anglo-American case 
law was condensed under the leadership of a strong methodi-
cal mind. Values buried in the vast mass of decisions were 
brought to light and preserved for the future. In various sub-
jects, court practice gained increased certainty, and theoreti-
cal thinking received decisive impulses; indeed, a new litera-
ture grew up. Goodrich, footing on Beale's theories but add-
ing his own experience and sense for social policy, has written 
an excellent leading textbook. 
Most American writers, however, though grateful for 
Beale's work, have turned against his doctrines. Beale was 
84 Abroad the Restatement was much noticed. See particularly HARPER, 
"Das 'Restatement of Conflict of Laws' des Amerikanischen 'Law Institute,'" 
9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 8:u; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, "The American Restate-
ment," 21 Grotius Soc. 1935, 161; BARBEY, "L'oeuvre du Professeur Beale, de 
Harvard," Revue Crit. 1936, 86; NoLDE, "La codification du droit interna-
tional prive aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique," Nouv. Revue 1936, 7· 
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the last eminent advocate of the theory of territorialism that 
dominated the Dutch statutists. In its proper sense, the terri-
torial nature of law predicates exclusive control by domestic 
law in each jurisdiction. This theory, however enfeebled by 
gradual concessions, is the exact antipode of private interna-
tional law. This foundation of Beale's system was entirely 
destroyed by Lorenzen and Cook. The revived theory of 
vested rights by which Beale tried to maintain the doomed 
principle of territorialism was successfully attacked by 
Y ntema, Cook, Lorenzen, Heilmann, and, on the Continent, 
by Arminjon, Wigny, and others who simultaneously were 
particularly interested in combatting Pillet's kindred philoso-
phy.85 In addition, many particular points peculiar to the Re-
statement were the object of special critical studies. Thus, a 
new school has arisen, paralleling German efforts and prom-
ising further improvements. 
France and Belgium.86 The French masters of statutist 
doctrine in the sixteenth century, d'Argentre and Dumoulin, 
and their many disciples in the two succeeding centuries 37 es-
tablished a tradition that has continued until recently, just as 
the method of the postglossators in private law survived 
after the Napoleonic codes for a considerable period into the 
nineteenth century. This heritage, it would seem, included 
various traits-a certain conservatism in method, an inclina-
tion toward a priori assumptions, an alert interest in the 
problems presented in the courts, and comprehensive elabo-
ration of the arguments involved in particular issues. Con-
currently, the influence of Story and Savigny added new 
elements. A large number of talented authors assured the 
85 See infra pp. 23ff. 
86 Treatises of FOELIX, BoUCHER, V AREILLES-SOMMIERES, BAR TIN, PILLET, 
WEISS, AUDINET, DESPAGNET, VALERY, SURVILLE, NIBOYET, LEREBOURB-PIGEON-
NIERE, ARMINJON {the last three now leading). 
Belgium: LAURENT, ROLIN, POULLET {the last now leading). 
87 Most famous: FROLAND (published 1729, died 1746) j BOULLENOIS {168o-
1762) j BOUHIER {1673-1746). 
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French literature a leading role, more completely justified 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first 
quarter of the twentieth than in the sixteenth or the eight-
eenth. Richly documented treatises by Laurent, Boucher, and 
Rolin were followed by the original systems of V areilles-
Sommieres (I897), Bartin (Etudes 1897, I899), and Pillet 
(Principes I903, Traite I923-1924). Andre Weiss (Traite 
I 892-I 90 5) consolidated theory and practice in a compre-
hensive work, in which the nationality principle was brought 
to its climax. Numerous periodicals, headed by the Journal 
de droit international of Clunet (I874-) and the Revue de 
droit international prive published by Darras (I 90 5-)' in 
addition to the Dictionnaire de droit international prive pub-
lished by Vincent and Penaud in I888,38 collected so many 
French and foreign decisions that, as early as 1905, H. Don-
nedieu de Vabres was able to describe the "evolution" 39 of 
the French practice in a monograph. 
Bartin, Niboyet, Pillet's outstanding disciple, and Armin-
jon, a critically-minded former judge at the Egyptian Mixed 
Tribunals, continued this brilliant literature. These and 
other modern writers have constantly studied the judicial de-
cisions and meditated on general problems such as public 
policy, formalities of legal acts, capacity, matrimonial prop-
erty law, etc., while the courts have been interested in the 
theoretical as well as the practical aspects of the cases. The 
Revue has been continued in two rival periodicals edited, re-
spectively, by Niboyet and La Pradelle, who formerly had 
jointly published the useful Repertoire de droit international 
prive in ten volumes. 
The French manner of conceiving conflicts problems con-
ss R. VINCENT et E. PENAUD, Dictionnaire de droit international prive 
(Paris, x888-x889). 
39 H. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, L'evolution de Ia jurisprudence fram;aise en 
matiere de conllits des lois (Paris, 1905). 
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tains a two-fold weakness. The tradition deriving from d'Ar-
gentre, the French predecessor of Ulricus Huber, has laid an 
extraordinary emphasis upon the national interest. The fol-
lowing chapters dealing with the law of persons will show 
the devastating effect of innumerable open or concealed con-
siderations of French ((ordre public." For decades, writers 
sharply criticized the tendency of the courts to apply French 
law despite the ordinary principles of conflicts law, but, more 
recently the Traite of Niboyet ( 1938) and the Precis of 
Lerebours-Pigeonniere ( 1928), undoubtedly the two lead-
ing French works, testify to a violent struggle between the 
nationality principle, expounded by Andre Weiss and his fol-
lowers, and the fears and wishes of an apprehensive, ambi-
tious territorialism, represented by a movement, reflecting 
the interests of an immigration c'fntry, that accentuates the 
peculiarities of French legislation. On the other hand, the 
individualism and independent judgment characterizing 
French judges and jurists, which produce an abundance of 
ideas within the limits of their methods, have resulted in a 
curious instability. In many topics of conflicts law, every con-
ceivable opinion has its advocate. Neither writers nor courts 
feel bound by precedent. Consequently, French conflicts law 
as a whole presents a great wealth of inspiring conceptions, 
attended by a degree of uncertainty, if not chaos, that is 
scarcely compatible with the very purpose of this branch of 
law. 
ltaly.40 Dionisio Anzilotti, eminent scholar of interna-
tional public law, has devoted a part of his work to conflicts 
law and is to be regarded in both fields as the founder of an 
important school, which also includes Cavaglieri, Salvioli,41 
and Udina. At a relatively early date, Diena published mono-
40 Treatises: FIORE, DIENA, GABBA, ANZILOTTI, CAVAGLIERI, UDINA, PAC-
CHIONI, FEDOZZI, Aco, GEMMA, Bosco, SCERNI. 
41 G. SALVIOLI, Storia del diritto italiano (Torino, 1930). 
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graphs on international commercial law (I900-1905) and 
the principles of private international law (1908-19I0). In 
the 1930's, a succinct manual by Pacchioni (I930) and a 
perspicacious treatise by Fedozzi ( 1935), accompanied un-
der his leadership by works of other writers on ecclesiastical, 
commercial and procedural conflicts, continued the Italian 
tradition. This tradition has been characterized by refined 
abstract theory, nourished by intimate knowledge of the 
French and German developments. While Anzilotti pos-
sessed a high sense of practicality, his successors have more 
and more yielded to the scholastic passion for formulae and 
dialectic argument. Italian writers have been the last in Eu-
rope to consider court decisions. Fortunately, the light has 
recently been seen by the younger authors noted below. 
The distinguished periodical founded by Anzilotti in 
1906, the Rivista di diritto internazionale, includes impor-
tant contributions to conflicts law, but only few selected de-
cisions. Fedozzi founded a promising Rivista italiana di di-
ritto internazionale privata e processuale ( 193 I-I 932), 
which was ended by his lamented death. 
Other Latin countries. Numerous meritorious compendi-
ums related to the French, Belgian and Italian literature on 
conflicts law have been published in Argentina (Zeballos, 
Calandrelli, Alcorta, Romero del Prado and, now leading, 
Vico), Brazil (Clovis Bevilaqua, Rodrigo Octavio, Pontes 
de Miranda, Eduardo Espinola and his son) , Colombia 
( Restrepo-Hernandez), Cuba (De Bustamante), Guate-
mala (Matos), Rumania (Antonescu), and Spain (Lasala 
Llanas, Trias de Bes) . 
The Netherlands. During this period, three outstanding 
works appeared, namely those of Asser (I 8 So), Jitta 
( I 9 I 6) , and Kosters ( I 9 17). 
Germany. In Germany there was a less known statutist 
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school from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century,42 when 
Waechter destroyed the entire doctrine (I 842) .48 The mod-
ern development was brilliantly inaugurated by Savigny in 
I 849.44 His theories were accepted both by Roman law schol-
ars such as Seuffert, Keller, Holzschuher, Unger, Wind-
scheid, and Regelsberger and by students of German legal 
history like Walter, Gerber, Baseler, Roth, and Gierke.45 
Although an admirer of Savigny, Bar (I 862), in his works, 
especially in the second edition of his treatise, entitled 
Theory and Practice (I 8 8 9), took a distinct position, joining 
theoretical conception with profound study of civil and com-
mon law cases and presenting, for the first time since Story, 
a comprehensive comparative law of conflicts. Zitelmann's 
highly refined system and the penetrating analytical studies 
of Franz Kahn, as well as the historical works of Neumeyer, 
characterized the high level of scientific treatment in Ger-
many at the turn of the century. Leading decisions were re-
produced in the Zeitschrift fur I nternationales Recht of 
Bohm, later Niemeyer. Gebhard's drafts of the law of 
I 896 46 and the commentaries thereon by Niemeyer, Habicht 
and Niedner are noteworthy. 
Nevertheless, this literature was sporadic and heterogene-
ous, without definite working plan and method. The courts 
struggled for principles; their decisions, although by no 
means negligible, were not conveniently digested and, conse-
42 Thorough survey and criticism by WAECHTER, 24 Arch. Civ. Prax. 
( 1841) 230 ff., and BAR § 19 ff.; see for the names also GUTZWILLER, 29 Re-
cueil 1929 IV 329-331. 
43 WAECHTER's series of articles entitled "Ueber die Collision der Privat-
rechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten," appeared in 24 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841) 
230 ff., 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842) Iff., 161 ff., 361 ff. 
44 On SAVIGNY's work and effect: GuTZWILLER, Der Einlluss Savignys auf 
die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts ( 1923), and same, in 29 Recueil 
1929 IV at 353· 
4 5 For details see GUTZWILLER, Der Einlluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung 
des Internationalprivatrechts so, 56. 
46 Einfiihrungsgesetz of August 18, 1896. 
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quently, were for the most part unknown. The German 
courts, otherwise meticulous, often ignored the conflicts 
problems hidden in cases. 
In striking contrast to the richness of the French litera-
ture, for many years there was no textbook on conflicts law 
in Germany, and a good Austrian handbook by Walker was 
used in repeated editions by the few interested students. 
Switzerland.41 In the nineteenth century, only the legisla-
tion of Zurich aroused more than local interest from the 
viewpoint of conflicts law. At the beginning of the present 
century, the work of Meili, succeeding Brocher, was well 
known. It has been followed more recently by the booklet of 
Stauffer, by Beck's extensive commentary on the Swiss en-
actments, and finally by treatises on private and commercial 
laws by Schnitzer. 
Greece.48 Greek legal science has exhibited much devotion 
to private international law. There are excellent contribu-
tions of recent date by G. Streit and Maridakis. 
3· New Orientation 
Roughly speaking, it may be contended that, until about 
I 92 5, in the Anglo-American orbit, the theoretical approach 
and, in the Continental literature, the practical understand-
ing, left very much to be desired. Had minds such as those of 
Story and Bar continued to illuminate the way, grave mis-
takes and defects would have been avoided. The deplorable 
state of this branch of law was worse than the experts would 
acknowledge. A few overrated controversies were endlessly 
discussed. Other problems, often involving the simplest ques-
tions of daily occurrence, were neglected. Few things were 
certain, and there were more incongruities than in any other 
field of law. It needed the unspoilt mind of a newcomer to 
47 Treatises of BROCHER, MEILI, STAUFFER, BECK, SCHNITZER. 
48 Treatises of KALLIGAS, CEKONOMIDES, KRASSAS, STREIT, MARIDAKIS. 
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conflicts law to be appalled at the maze of confusion and in-
justice. Mancini's outburst at the absurd, deplorable anarchy 
in the conflicts rules is famous. In 1879 Frederick Harrison 
stated: 
"There is a department of Law, the first principles of 
which have been furiously disputed by lawyers; the canons of 
which are hesitating and contradictory; the sources of which 
are themselves a matter of argument; having an authority 
which is most differently interpreted by doctors and judges; 
and a sphere which is understood in various ways ;-and yet 
this branch of Law is attaining in our day continual develop-
ment and fresh importance from a variety of causes, and in 
a manner often unobserved." ' 9 
Each word of this indictment, despite all efforts, remained 
true for half a century thereafter. Recently, Cook has de-
scribed the American cases as "hopelessly contradictory and 
chaotic," even on the simplest questions. 5° This situation, bad 
enough in each particular country, is worse in a world in 
which conflicts laws are inconsistent. A marriage may be 
valid in one jurisdiction, invalid in another, previously valid 
but dissolved in a third. Such is the state of the contractual 
relation, regarded as the most solemn and sacred, whose ex-
istence or failure involves the most vital interests of the 
spouses, their issue, and their relatives. The reaction of the 
business world to the desperate plight of national conflicts 
laws-in the words of a terrified corporation lawyer, a veri-
table labyrinth, 51-superimposed upon the divergent national 
commercial laws, has resulted in a striking phenomenon; in-
ternational commerce has devised an elaborate network of 
arbitration and standard forms to eradicate these conflicts 
laws so far as feasible. 
49 HARRISON, Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws 98. 
50 CooK, Legal Bases 136. 
n R. FRANKEL, "Der Irrgarten des international en Privatrechts," 4 Z.ausl. 
PR. (1930) 239, 241. 
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It is reassuring that a thorough revision now appears in 
the offing. On the one hand, the technical revolution of the 
means of communication reducing distances and destroying 
isolation and, on the other, the political and economic up-
heaval caused by the first World War, have made it clear 
that international life needs a better order. The peace and 
postwar treaties and the numerous international tribunals 
created after the war brought little improvement, but they 
did exhibit appreciation of this need and at the same time 
added a great many new problems. 
In Germany/2 depressed and struggling for life, the situa-
tion was most acute, and the interest in foreign and interna-
tional law became painfully alive. While, before the war, the 
otherwise richest juridical literature of the world had left 
comparative law and conflicts rules to very few scholars and 
no funds seemed available in the prosperous prewar times for 
research in these subjects, the distress of the war and post-
war years reversed this attitude. The change of views was 
distinctively reflected in the creation of two comprehensively 
planned and broadly conceived institutes in Berlin, devoted 
respectively to foreign and international private law and to 
foreign public and internationallaw (I 924-1925) .53 In these 
institutes, facts and legal phenomena were to be collected, 
current problems defined, and the functions and purposes of 
legal institutions clarified by comparative research. With re-
spect to conflicts of laws, the German cases had first of all to 
be collected. This undertaking was greatly facilitated by the 
works of Lewald and Melchior, who each for his own hand-
book assembled the materials, both the older and more re-
52 Treatises: see text. Monographs and papers: DUDEN, EcKSTEIN, H. LE-
WALD, NEUNER, RAAPE, RABEL, RAISER, WAHL, WENGLER. 
53 "Institut fiir ausliindisches und internationales Privatrecht" and "Institut 
fiir ausliindisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht." For history and organi-
zation see RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Ger-
many," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 232, 240. 
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cent. In I 926, the Institute of Foreign and International Pri-
vate Law initiated a yearbook of German decisions 54 and 
commenced in its Review 55 to provide surveys of the foreign 
cases. To signalize this modified outlook, the Review cele-
brated the fiftieth anniversary of the Reichsgericht ( I929) 
in a series of articles constructing special doctrines on the 
basis of judgments of this, the supreme court of Germany, 
comparable to the American style of treatment and entirely 
dissimilar to the usual European literature. It was one of the 
tasks of the Institute to answer inquiries of German courts, 
attorneys, and administrative authorities; in many hundreds 
of opinions, information on conflicts matters was given, ex-
tending knowledge and intelligent use of the applicable rules 
so that the gulf between theory and practice, which had ex-
isted since the end of the statutist period, was almost closed. 
German lawyers were amazed at the number and quality 
of the newly discovered precedents, which were soon given 
attention by several handbooks. Lewald ( I930-I93 I) was 
the first to renovate the German conflicts law (excepting 
commercial matters) on the basis of decided cases, with well-
considered conclusions. Melchior ( I 9 3 2), following the 
form of Dicey's treatise, regarded the decisions as a true 
source of law, supplementary to the Code; in this belief, he 
inquired primarily into the ideas underlying the cases and 
formulated rules of impressive originality. All other German 
writers deny the binding force of case law. Nevertheless, 
Nussbaum ( I932) in his treatise devoted primary attention 
to cases and procedure and preferred a practical treatment 
to theoretical analysis. Raape (I 9 3 I ) provided a profuse 
exegesis of the provisions in the Introductory Law of I 896; 
because of its explicitness, this book will be most frequently 
54 Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Pri-
vatrechts in den J ahren 1926 und 1927 (Berlin, 1928-). 
55 Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, 
1926-). 
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cited in our survey as representing the German doctrines. 
Finally, Martin Wolff (I 933) masterfully condensed the 
subject matter in a textbook, small in size but rich in content. 
More recently, Raape, the only one of these writers still in 
Germany, published a commendable introduction to the pres-
ent German conflicts law ( 1938-I939). 
Thus, the long-standing scarcity of production was re-
placed during a few years by a vigorous stream of literature. 
As deductive considerations gave way to practical studies, 
many values were modified. However, it is not in the nature 
of German students to sacrifice entirely systematic thinking 
to empirical considerations.56 In addition to the treatises 
mentioned, the learned outlines by Gutzwiller ( 19 3 I) and 
a number of monographs (Neuner, Raiser, Wengler, etc.) 
contain good science. But for the time being too much had 
and still has to be corrected to allow much generalization. 
This new German school quickly influenced other Euro-
pean countries. In conservative England, the pitiful state of 
conflicts law was suddenly subjected to refreshing criticism 
by Foster 57 and Beckett; 58 a new handbook by Cheshire 
challenged Dicey's leading treatise, the second edition ap-
pearing shortly after and extending the reforms suggested 
in the first. An admirable collaborative undertaking was ini-
tiated in Italy. Through the endeavors of Salvatore Galgano, 
commencing in 1927, several comprehensive periodicals were 
inaugurated, covering and annotating foreign decisions; of 
these, the Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale 
privato continued after the outbreak of World War II. 
56 This seems to be disapproved by NussBAUM, Book Review, 40 Col. L. 
Rev. ( 1940) 1461, 1470, who condemns what he calls the new "logistic 
school." 
5 7 J. G. FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. 
5 8 BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private In-
ternational Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46. 
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Authors such as Babinski and Przybylowski in Poland,59 and 
younger scholars, including Vittorio Tedeschi and Balladore-
Pallieri in Italy, Fragistas, Vallindas and Zepos in Greece, 
von Steiger and Niederer in Switzerland, participate in this 
practical international co-operation. 
A little later than in Europe, a corollary reform began in 
the United States and Canada.60 Here, the enormous case 
material had been assembled by Beale as the basis of the 
Restatement. Immediately, new studies, criticizing antiquated 
doctrines and correcting inaccurate terminology, appeared 
by such eminent scholars as Lorenzen, Cook, Y ntema, 
Cheatham, Falconbridge in Canada, Harper, Griswold and 
Stumberg, who also published a realistic handbook. Another 
modern treatise was devoted to the conflicts law of one par-
ticular state, Arkansas, by Leflar. The methodological 
postulates of this reform have recently been stated in Cook's 
magistral Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 
( I 942) . Numerous law review articles and a monograph or 
two, such as Hancock's book on torts,61 are promising for the 
future development of this branch of law. 
The American literature has attracted much attention in 
France and Belgium, where its importance has been stressed 
by Barbey, Leprt~tre, Wigny, and Batiffol, the last being the 
best informed French expert on foreign conflicts law and 
international needs. 
A common feature of all these new attempts is the decided 
turning from deductive methods to considerations of policy. 
There are many other points of agreement, but also many 
controversies as respects method. Private international law 
59 LEON BABINSKI, Zarys Wykladu prawa miedzynarodowego prywatnego 
(Outlines of Private International Law) Vol. I, I935; KAZIMIERZ PRZYBY-
LOWSKI, Prawo Prywatne Miedzynarodowe (Private International Law) 
Vol. I, I935· 
so See Cheatham, Cases, ix, x. 
61 MOFFA1T HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of Laws, Michigan Legal 
Studies (Ann Arbor, Chicago, I942). 
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has again become a young science, and children do have 
diseases. 
It remains to summarize what has recently been done for 
research in foreign conflicts law. In the first place, foreign 
cases, enactments, and literature have been reproduced or 
reviewed on a large scale in the publications of the above-
mentioned institutes in Berlin and Rome,62 as well as in other 
periodicals 63 and books of reference.64 For an excellent col-
lection of the enacted conflicts rules in force throughout the 
world, as of 1953-an indispensable work-we have to 
thank A. N. Makarov.65 Under the auspices of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, many competent lecturers 
have treated the laws of particular countries as well as spe-
cial problems of comparative interest.66 
In addition, Niboyet and La Pradelle, generously aided 
62 Institute of Berlin: Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches und internationales Pri-
vatrecht (since 1926/27), containing continuous reviews of conflicts law in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
selected decisions involving conflicts law in the United States, Scandinavian 
cases, and reports from many other countries; Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf 
dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts ( 1928-) ; Beitriige zum aus-
liindischen und internationalen Privatrecht (1928-). Rome Institute for Legis-
lative Studies (Instituto italiano di studi legislativi), editor GALGANO: Annu· 
ario di·diritto comparato (1927-); Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto inter-
nazionale privato ( 1932-) (among seven periodicals). 
68 Especially for Eastern Europe until World War II the periodicals of the 
Institute in Breslau ( Osteqropa Institut) : Zeitschrift fiir osteuropiiisches 
Recht ( 1925-1927), later merged with Ostrecht into Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht 
( 1927-1934) and finally again, Zeitschrift fiir osteuropiiisches Recht (Neue 
Folge, 1934-1944). This tradition is continued since 1955 by Osteuropa-
Recht ( 1955-). 
Internationales J ahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichtswesen, edited by ARTHUR 
NussBAUM (Berlin, 1926-1934). American edition: International Year Book 
on Civil and Commercial Arbitration (New York, 1928-). 
Journal du droit international. Fonde par Clunet, continue par Andn!-
Prudhomme et Goldmann (1874-). 
International Law Quarterly (1947-1951), continued as International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1952-). 
64 BERGMANN, Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht ( ed. 3, 1952). 
65 MAKAROV, Die Quell en des internationalen Privatrechts. vol. I: Gesetzes-
texte ( ed. 2, 1953). 
6 6 Published in Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit international de Ia 
Haye (1925-). 
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by foreign contributors, have published the Repertoire de 
droit international, which includes reports on the conflicts 
laws of many countries, some not previously examined, as 
well as articles on related topics in French law accompanied 
by comparative observations. Much information is given in 
the Rechtsvergleichendes H andworterbuch of Schlegel-
berger, in which the conflicts laws of the world were, for the 
first time, described in an excellent, though sketchy, synthetic 
review ( 1933) .67 The treatise on Greek Priva'te lnterna-
national Law ( 1937) of the distinguished Greek diplomat 
and scholar, G. Streit, and his valiant disciple, Vallindas, 
admirably indicates the literary doctrines of all countries. In 
the United States, Lorenzen 68 deserves commendation for 
attracting the attention of the scholarly world to foreign 
conflicts laws. Finally, Arthur K. Kuhn has coordinated on 
broad lines American and European institutions of private 
international law ( 1937) and Nussbaum has published a 
volume of comparative observations on the general doctrines 
of common law and civil law (1943). 69 
4· Developments after World War II 
The upheavals of the war and the post-war period, re-
sulting in displacement of many millions of people, have 
presented a variety of new conflicts of laws problems. In 
Germany, absorbed by urgent practical issues, only the pre-
war books of Raape and Martin Wolff 69a have reappeared, 
67 1nternationales Privatrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. (1933) 32o-542. 
68 See in particular LoRENZEN, "The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws," 
36 Yale L. ]. (1927) 731; 37 ibid. (1928) 849; 38 ibid. (1928) 165./d., "The 
Conflict of Laws of Germany," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 8o4; 40 ibid. (1931) 401. 
69 Unfortunately I do not know more than the title of LEVY ULLMANN, 
Cours generale de droit international prive selon Ia methode historique, juris-
prudentielle et comparative ( annee universitaire 1931-1932) stenographie 
publiee par "Les cours de droit" (licence, 3• annee). 
69a RAAPE, Internationales Privatrecht (ed. 3, 1950; ed. 4, 1955); MARTIN 
WoLFF, Das internationale Privatrecht Deutschlands ( ed. 2, 1949; ed. 3, 
1954). 
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each in two revised editions, reflecting in their supplements 
the special problems of German interzonal law. Italy's new 
codification of 1942 has given rise to the treatises of Balla-
clore Pallieri, Monaco, and Morelli. 69b In France, still 
strongly influenced by Niboyet's territorialism, as last em-
bodied in his extensive Traite, 69c Lerebours-Pigeonniere's 
Precis has been revived in three post-war editions and the 
valuable Traite of Batiffol has been added.69d Especially 
gratifying is the active interest of English lawyers. Besides 
the thoroughly revised post-par edition of Dicey's treatise 
and new editions of Cheshire's and Martin Wolff's trea-
tises,69e the English literature has been enriched by the books 
of Graveson and Schmitthoff.69t In Spain, Goldschmidt's 
comprehensive Sistema and the treatises of Arjona, Miaja, 
Orue and Verplaetse are noteworthy, 69g and in Sweden those 
of Gihl, Michaeli, and Karlgren.69h In their respective 
69b BALLADORE PALLIERI, Diritto internazionale privato (1946 j ed. 21 1950) j 
MoNACO, Diritto internazionale privato (1943); Manuale di diritto interna-
zionale pubblico e privato ( 1949) ; L'efficacia della Iegge nello spazio (VAs-
SALLI, Trattato di diritto civile italiano vol. I, 4) (1952); MORELLI, Elementi 
di diritto internazionale privato italiano (ed. 2, 1949; ed. 41 I955). 
69c NIBOYET, Traite de droit international prive fran<;ais ( vol. I and z, 
I938; vol. I, ed. 2, I947i vol. 2, ed. 2, I95Ii vol. 3, I944i vol. 41 1947; vol. 5, 
I 948 ; vol. 6, I 949-50). 
69d LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Precis de droit international prive ( ed. 41 I946 j 
ed. 51 I947 i ed. 6, I954) ; BATIFFOL1 Traite elementaire de droit international 
prive (ed. I, I949i ed. 2, I955). 
69e DICEY, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict 
of Laws (ed. 6, under the general editorship of MORRIS, I949); CHESHIRE, 
Private International Law (ed. 4, I952i ed. 5, I957); MARTIN WOLFF, Pri-
vate International Law (1945), (ed. 2, I950). 
69f GRAVESON, The Conflict of Laws (1948) (ed. 2, I952, ed. 3, I955); 
ScHMITTHOFF, The English Conflict of Laws (I945), (ed. 2, 1948; ed. 3, I954). 
6Dg WERNER GoLDSCHMIDT, Sistema y Filosofia del Derecho Internacional 
Privado (vol. I, I948, ed. 2, I952; vol. 2, I949, ed. 2, I954); ARJONA, De-
recho Internacional Privado ( I949, I954); MIAJA DE LA MUELA, Derecho 
Internacional Privado (vol. I, I954i vol. 2, I955); ORUE, Manual de De-
recho Internacional Privado (ed. 3, 1952); VERPLAETSE, Derecho internacional 
privado ( I954) · 
6Dh GIHL, Den Internationella Privatrattens Historia och Allmanna Prin-
ciper (I95I); MICHAELI, Internationales Privatrecht gemass schwedischem 
Recht und schwedischer Rechtsprechung (1948); KARLGREN, Kortfattad Laro-
bok i Internationell Privat-och Processriit ( I950). 
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countries, the treatises of Borum (Denmark), Brake! (the 
Netherlands), Poullet and de Vos (Belgium), Schnitzer and 
Niederer (Switzerland), Maridakis (Greece), Blagojevic 
and Eisner (Yugoslavia), and Lunz (Soviet Russia), are 
representative. 69J 
In the Americas, the fertility of the Latin-American pro-
duction and the scarcity of the Anglo-American literature 
are in strange contrast with the practical importance of con-
flict of laws in their respective areas. In the United States, 
the two standard works of Goodrich and Stumberg have 
been re-edited.69k In Canada, the new enlarged edition of 
Falconbridge's Essays 691 comes close to being a treatise. 
Among the recent Latin-American publications, the treatises 
of Romero del Prado, Ennis and Sapena (Argentina), 
Alb6nico and Duncker (Chile), Tenorio and Valladao 
(Brazil), Quintin Alfonsin (Uruguay), Salinas (Bolivia), 
Caicedo and Cock (Colombia) , and Ortiz (Costa Rica) are 
valuable. 69m 
69j BoRUM, Lovkonflikter ( ed. 3, I948); VAN BRAKEL, Grondslagen en 
Beginselen van Nederlandsch Internationaal Privaatrecht (ed. z, I95o; ed. 
3, I953); POULLI!T, Manuel de Droit International Prive Beige (ed. 3, I947); 
DE Vos, Le Probleme des Conflits de Lois (vol. I and z, I946); ScHNITZER, 
Handbuch des Internationalen Privatrechts (vol. I and z, ed. 3, I950); 
NIEDERER, Einfiihrung in die allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen Privat-
rechts (I954; ed. z, I956); MARIDAKIS, IAinTIKON AIE9NE~ AIKAION 
(Private International Law) (vol. I, I95o; vol. 11/I, I954; 11/z, I956); 
BLAGOJEVIC, Medunarodno privatno pravo (I950); EISNER, Medunarodno 
privatno pravo ( I953) ; LuNZ, Me.lK.I{yHapo.I{HOe lJacTHoe TipaBO (Private 
International Law) (I949)· 
69k GOODRICH, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (ed. 3, 1949); STUMBERG, 
Principles of Conflict of Laws (ed. z, I95I). 
G9l FALCONBRIDGE, Essays on the Conflict of Laws (ed. 2, I954). 
69m ROMERO DEL PRADO, Manual de Derecho Internacional Privado (vol. I 
and 2, I944); ENNIS, Derecho Internacional Privado ( I953); SAPENA, De-
recho Internacional Privado (vol. I, I944); ALB6NICO, Manual de Derecho 
Internacional Privado (vol. I and 2, I950) ; DuNCKER, Derecho Internacional 
Privado (I950); TEN6RIO, Direito Internacional Privado (ed. z, I949; ed. 3, 
I953) ; VALLADAO, Estudios de direito internacional privado ( I947) ; QUINTIN 
ALFONSIN, Curso de derecho privado internacional ( I955) ; SALINAS, Manual 
de Derecho Internacional Privado (ed. 2, I948); CAICEDO, Derecho lnter-
nacional Privado (vol. I and 2, I949); CocK, Tratado de Derecho In-
ternacional Privado (ed. 4, I952); ORTIZ, Curso de Derecho Internacional 
Privado (I947)· 
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In the field of comparative conflict of laws, studies re-
stricted to two countries form a new development, designed 
primarily for practical purposes. This type of comparative 
study, inaugurated in booklet form by the "Bilateral Stud-
ies" edited by Nussbaum,69n has achieved a high degree of 
perfection in a binational co-operative work on the Franco-
German conflict of laws in the field of domestic relations.690 
III. SouRCES 
I. Codifications 
The first considerable codification of conflicts rules was 
provided in articles 7 to 3 I, inclusive, of the Introductory 
Law that accompanied the German Civil Code of I896. 
This body of rules had been elaborated carefully by Geb-
hard but, for somewhat obscure reasons, allegedly political, 
was reduced by Bismarck and the upper House so as to cover 
in its final form only a part of the subject matter. Contracts 
are left out entirely, and most rules are limited to cases in 
which the application of German law is required (so-called 
unilateral rules). What is more, these provisions lack the 
elaborate detail work for which the Code is famous. Never-
theless, the task was novel, and the skill and precision em-
ployed were high enough to impress contemporaries. Subse-
quently, this part of the German law served as a model for a 
slightly more extensive Japanese Law of June IS, I898, and 
for a similar Chinese Law of August 5, I9I8. The Hague 
san Bilateral Studies in Private International Law ( ed. by NUSSBAUM, 
vol. I) ; NussBAUM, American-Swiss Private International Law, 1951; vol. 2, 
DELAUME, American-French Private International Law, 1953; vol. 3, KoL-
LEWIJN, American-Dutch Private International Law, 1955; vol. 4, DOMKE, 
American-German Private Law Relations. Cases 1945-1955, 1956) ; vol. 5, 
EDER, American-Colombian Private International Law, 1956; vol. 6, EHREN-
ZWEIG, FRAGISTAS, and YIANNOPOULOS, American-Greek Private International 
Law, 1957; vol. 7, PHILIP, American-Danish Private International Law, 1957. 
690 Le droit international prive de Ia famille en France et en Allemagne 
( 1954) ; German ed.: Das internationale Familienrecht Deutschlands und 
Frankreichs ( 1954). 
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Conventions of I902 and I905 on divers matters of con-
flicts law were based on the same principles, and they were 
in turn closely followed by the Swedish statutes of July 8, 
I904, amended by later laws, and of June I, I9I2. Also, 
the excellent Austrian draft of I 9 I 3 of an international 
private law was conceived on the same lines; it served as the 
basis of the important Polish Law of August 2, I926 (whose 
principal author Zoll had been a member of the Vienna draft 
committee), as well as for the Czechoslovakian Law of 
March I I, I948. Indirectly, the German law has influenced 
all more recent legislative projects in Europe. 
The Code Napoteon of I804 devoted to the problem of 
its territorial application only one article of the preliminary 
title and a few other dispersed provisions, and in European 
France there was no subsequent codification. Likewise, the 
Austrian Civil Code (I 8 I I), which is still in force in some 
regions, was satisfied with a few superficial rules ( §§ 4, 34-
37, 300), in contrast to the Prussian Landrecht (1794), 
which incorporated more comprehensive provisions, partly 
based on statutist doctrine (see, e.g., Introduction, §§ 2 7-49) 
and partly representing original ideas. The European and 
Latin American civil codes of the French type have retained 
the custom of touching on conflicts in a preliminary title, or 
law, but with gradual additions, for instance, Italy (I 86 5, 
and enlarged in I 9 3 8 and I 942), the Netherlands ( I 8 29), 
Quebec ( I866), Brazil ( I942). 
Recently, such preliminary provisions have taken the shape 
of short codifications in the civil codes of Greece (I 940), 
Peru (I936),Egypt (I948),andSyria (I949).70 
7° Also the modified Civil Code of Rumania of 1940, published in the 
Monitorul Oficial no. 2o6 of September 6, 1940, contained in its preliminary 
provisions a codification of conflict rules. The code, however, never entered 
into force after its effective date had been deferred to an undetermined 
future time (Decree-law 4 225 of December 30, 1940, Monitorul oficial no. 
306 of December 31, 1940); German translation 54 Zeitschrift fiir ver-
gleichende Rechtswissenschaft ( 1941) 221-229. 
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Moreover, the statutory regulations of French Morocco 
(I 9 I 3) and Spanish Morocco (I 9 I 4), concerning relations 
between subjects and foreigners, include a number of modern 
conflicts rules based on the French doctrines. In the absence 
of codifications in the motherlands, these provisions are 
often cited. Suggestions for legislation have been made by 
learned societies. In particular, a draft of the Society for 
Legislative Studies, concerning the status of foreigners in 
France and of Frenchmen in foreign countries, 71 deserves 
attention. Bartin considers this project as the legislation of 
tomorrow/2 but it is a singular document of overstressed 
nationalism. 
A separate position has been taken by Switzerland. The 
statute of June 25, I89I, was mainly a regulation of the 
interstate conflicts between the Swiss cantons having at that 
time full legislative power over private law. A few addi-
tional provisions incidentally considered Swiss citizens 
abroad (arts. 28-3 I) and foreigners in Switzerland (arts. 
32-34). In I9I2, when the Federal Civil Code of I907 be-
came effective, the significance of the statute of I 89 I was 
limited to cases of the latter type; thus, international private 
law was left largely dependent upon these not too well-
drafted sections and certain additions (C. C., final title, 
art. 59). What the Federal Tribunal has been able to do 
with this precarious legislation is noteworthy. 
The most extensive national codification of conflicts law 
has been undertaken in the tiny principality of Liechtenstein; 
provisions dealing with conflicts have been inserted in the 
various chapters of a recent civil code, which has been par-
tially promulgated. This codification is a curious mixture of 
71 Deliberations and Project have been published in Bulletin de Ia Societe 
d'etudes legislatives; see the tentative draft in 24 ibid. ( 1928} 399; discussion 
26 ibid. (1930) 76; and definitive text in 26 ibid. (1930) 175. BARTIN was 
president and NIBOYET reporter of the draft committee. 
12 BARTIN, ~ Principes 201. 
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clauses inviting big finance and reflecting inordinate na-
tionalism.78 
2. Special Legislation 
Conflicts rules on special matters exist, of course, in many 
countries. In numerous states of the United States, various 
uniform laws and other statutes deal with the conflicts as-
pects of marriage and wills; also provisions on immovable 
property, contracts and capacity are frequent. 74 There is but 
one exceptional Federal enactment,75 although Congress ap-
parently has legislative power on the subject.76 
3· Multilateral Treaties 
(a) Montevideo Treaties. The treaties on international 
law of Montevideo of February I 2, I 8 89, are a worthy ob-
ject of pride for the five countries that have ratified them, 
viz., Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.77 
The first international agreements of their kind, they 
achieved an extensive unification, remarkable despite the 
73 See the review by WAHLE, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) I34· 
74 An attempt to collect these and certain other statutory provisions has 
been made by MAKAROV, Quellen. 
75 U.S. C. tit. 22 § 72, see infra p. 257, n. I6I. 
76 CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflicts of Laws," 89 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. ( I94I) 430, 441, 442; cf. also CHEATHAM, "Federal Control of Conflict 
of Laws," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (I952-53) 581-606. 
77Texts: Official (Spanish) text in ERNESTO RESTELLI, Aetas y tratados 
del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Montevideo 
I888-I889 (I928). 
French: MARTENS, IS Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 424-453; German: 
HECK in I Z.int.R. ( I89I) 339-340, 477-482; MElLI, Die Kodifikation des 
internationalen Civil- und Handelsrechts ( I89I) I03-I 38. 
History: Aetas de las sesiones del Congreso sudamericano de derecho inter-
nacional privado, Buenos Aires, I889. 
Literature: PRADIER-FODERE, "Le congres de droit international sudameri-
cain et les traites de Montevideo," in 2I Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I889) 
2I7-237, 561-577; SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso 
sudamericano de Montevideo (Buenos Aires, I889); HECK, "Der Kongress 
von Montevideo und das internationale Vertragsrecht der siidamerikanischen 
Staaten," I Z.int.R. (I89I) 339-346, 477-483, 592-6oo; BEWES, "The Treaties 
of Montevideo, Text of I889,'' 6 Grotius Soc. I92o, 59· 
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close relationship of the legislations involved, facilitating 
cooperation. Of this unification, the treaties concerned with 
"international civil law" and "international commercial 
law," in particular, will be considered in the appropriate 
connections in the present book. To celebrate the fifty years' 
anniversary of the treaties, a conference was held in Monte-
video in 1939 and 1940, which adopted considerable mod-
ernizations of the old rules.78 However, the new texts have 
been ratified only by Uruguay and Argentina. For the most 
part, conflicts rules are contained in the treaties respectively 
concerning international "civil" law, the law of land com-
merce, and the law of maritime commerce. In the present 
volume, the first of these treaties is of special interest and 
will be referred to as the treaty of Montevideo. 
(b) Hague Conventions. Widely praised but much less 
comprehensive, the Hague Conventions of 1902 and 1905 
were concluded only after arduous efforts.79 Their provisions 
78 Segundo Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado de 
Montevideo, 1939-1940, published by Facultad de derecho y ciencias sociales, 
Institute argentino de derecho internacional. For a first view of the contents, 
see RABEL, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Con-
flicts," in 39 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1941) 517. English translation by J. IRRIZARRY 
y PUENTE and G. L. WILLIAMS in 37 Am. ]. Int. Law, number 3, July, 1943· 
79 Conventions of The Hague of 1902 and 1905. Official (French) text in 
MARTENS, 3 I Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 706-715; 6 ibid., 3" serie, 
48o-489· 
English translation by ARTHUR H. KUHN, in F. MEILI, International Civil 
and Commercial Law (1905) 532; German translation in German Reichs-
gesetzblatt 1904, 221 If.; RGBI. 1909, 409 If., RGBI. 1912, 453 ff.; reproduced 
in MAKAROV, Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts (1929) 336 If., 342 
If.; Italian translation in AMEDEO GIANNINI, Le convenzoni dell'Aja di diritto 
internazionale privato {Roma, 1925). 
On the history of the Hague Conventions see Actes de Ia Conference de Ia 
Haye, chargee de reglementer diverses matieres de droit international prive 
(13-27 septembre 1893) (2 vols. in r, LaHaye, 1893); Actes de Ia Deuxieme 
Conference de Ia Haye chargee etc. (25 juin-13 juillet 1894) (La Haye, 
1894); Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye pour le droit interna-
tional prive (29 mai-r& juin 1900) {LaHaye, 1900); Actes et documents de 
Ia Quatrieme Conference de Ia Haye pour le droit international prive ( r6 
mai-17 juin 1904) (LaHaye, 1904). Provisions of national law and cases re-
lating to the Conventions: J. KosTERS and F. BELLE MANs, Les conventions de 
Ia Haye de 1902 et 1905 sur le droit international prive (La Haye, 1921), 
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cover but a few selected questions, and these they answer 
with many reservations on the part of the reluctant member 
states. With the exception of the relatively popular pro-
cedural treaty, they were ratified by only a few, though im-
portant, states and later partially deserted even by some of 
these. 
In 1954,79a the conventions were binding upon the follow-
ing states: 
(i) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws in regard 
to Marriage, of June 12, 1902. 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), 
Sweden, Switzerland. 
(ii) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws and juris-
dictions in regard to Divorce and Separation, of June 
12, 1902. 
Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Rumania (old territory). 
(iii) Convention to regulate the Guardianship of Minors, 
of June 12, 1902. 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old terri-
tory), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. 
continued by surveys in 6 Bulletin de l'lnstitut intermediaire international 
( 1922 ff.), since 1933 under title of Bulletin de l'Institut juridique interna-
tional. Literature: F. KAHN, Die Dritte Haager Staatenkonferenz fiir inter-
nationales Privatrecht, in Griinhut's Z. vols. 12, 13, and IS (1903, 1905), also 
in KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 37-178, 303-444. BUZZATI, Trattato di diritto interna-
2ionale privato secondo le convenzioni dell'Aja (Milano, 1907); also French 
by F. REY (Paris, I9II). MEILI and MAMELOK, Das internationale Privat-
und Civilprozessrecht auf Grund der Haager Konventionen (Ziirich, 191I); 
LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum internationalen Privatrecht," in STRUPP, 
I Wi:irterbuch des Vi:ilkerrechts und der Diplomatie 454-481; HEINSHEIMER, 
"Haager Zivilprozessabkommen," ibid. 487. M. TRAVERS, La Convention de 
Ia Haye relative au mariage (2 vols., Paris, 1912); TRAVERS, La Convention 
de Ia Haye relative au divorce et a Ia separation de corps (Paris, 1909); 
TRAVERS, "La Convention de Ia Haye relative a Ia tutelle des mineurs et les 
accords anterieurs passes par Ia France," Revue 1912, 641. 
79a See 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 893. 
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( iv) Convention concerning the conflict of laws relating 
to the Effects of Marriage on the rights and duties of 
the spouses in their personal relations and on the prop-
erty of the spouses, of July I 7, I 90 5. 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Rumania (old territory), Sweden. 
( v) Convention concerning Interdiction and similar 
Measures of Protection, of July I7, I905. (Interdic-
tion means the deprivation of an adult's competency to 
act legaiiy.) 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Sweden. 
(vi) Convention concerning Civil Procedure, of July 17, 
I 90 5 (treats only the participation of foreigners in 
lawsuits). 
Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, 
France (as to the signatories of the protocol of ratifi-
cation of July 4, I924), Germany, Hungary, Israel, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia. 
During both World Wars, it was disputed whether con-
ventions were suspended as between the belligerent groups. 
Italian and Dutch courts negatived the question. 5° The peace 
treaties after World War I enumerated only the conventions 
mentioned under (iii) and (vi) among the multilateral con-
ventions to be revived.soa The peace treaties after World 
80 Leading in Italy App. Venezia (Oct. 9, 1917) Giur. Ita!. 1917, I 2, 440, 
in the Netherlands H. R. (Apr. 2, 1948} N. J. 1948 no. 442; compare also 
Allen v. Clark (1947), 331 U.S. 503, for a bilateral treaty. For termination 
of a bilateral treaty, the French Cour de Cassation in an important decision 
(Cass. p!en. civ., June 22, 1949) 77 Clunet (1950) 122. For other cases and 
opinions, see AuBIN, 5· Beiheft zur Deutschen Rechts-Zeitschrift (1948) 1o; 
VERPLAETSE, 2 Revista Espaii. Der. Int. (1948) 501 j PLISCHKE, 48 Am. J. 
Int. Law (1954) 245. 
soa But several conventions were reinstated later by bilateral agreements; 
see MAKARov, Quellen (1929) 335, 342, 346, 352, 356. 
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War II were deliberately tacit on this point, the prevailing 
opinion being that multilateral treaties are only suspended 
during the war. Bob 
A very important step has been taken by the Protocol 
signed at The Hague, March 27, 193 I, recognizing the 
competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
now the International Court of Justice,B1 to interpret the 
Hague conventions on private international law, now bind-
ing on Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden. 
(c) C6digo Bustamante. This is a complete codification 
in 437 sections, including the entire international private law 
in 29 5 sections and in the remainder criminal and procedural 
conflicts law. Drafted by the Cuban jurist, Antonio Sanchez 
de Bustamante y Sirven, this Code of International Private 
Law was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference in 
Havana on February 20, 1928,82 and has been ratified by 
fifteen Latin American states, viz., 83 
BOb Note, 46 Am. J. Int. Law (1952) 532. Doubtful cases are settled in 
bilateral agreements. Thus, the applicability of The Hague conventions to 
the Federal Republic of Germany was expressly stipulated as respects its 
former enemies of World War II situated west of the Iron Curtain, except 
Belgium as to the Convention on Guardianship and Portugal as to the Con-
vention on Civil Procedure. 
81 Between member states of the Statute of the new court the attribution of 
competence to the former court is substituted (art. 3 7 of the Statute) ; see 43 
Revue Crit. (1954) 896. 
B2 Spanish text with Portuguese, French and English translations in 86 
League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 711; English and French in HuosoN, 
4 Int. Legislation 2279 No. 186, 2283 No. 186a; French by PAUL GouLE in 
NIBOYET et GouLi, 2 Recueil de textes usuels de droit international (1929) 
508. Also in BUSTAMANTE y SrRVEN, Le Code de droit international prive et 
Ia Sixieme Conference panamericaine (1929) 150. In German, books I and II 
by MAKAROV and REUPKE, in MAKAROV, Que lien ( 1929) 397-418. 
On the history of the Code, see ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BusTAMANTE y 
SrRVEN, La Comisi6n de jurisconsultos de Rio de Janeiro y el derecho interna-
cional (Habana, 1927), translated by GOULE: La Commission des juriscon-
sultes de Rio de Janeiro et le droit international (Paris, 1928); El C6digo de 
Derecho Internacional Privado y Ia VI. Conferencia panamericana (Habana, 
1929), translated by GouLE: Le Code de droit international prive et Ia VI" 
Conference panamericaine (Paris, 1929). 
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Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Bolivia and Peru, having adhered to both the Montevideo 
Treaties and the Havana Treaty, have authoritatively de-
clared the former to prevail in their relations with each 
other.84 
(d) Scandinavian Treaty. Extensive legislative coopera-
tion among the Scandinavian countries, 85 fostered by their 
historic affinity, has found significant expression with respect 
to conflicts law in a convention concluded in Stockholm on 
February 6, 1931, by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and Sweden, containing "provisions of private international 
Literature: See primarily the works of the author of the Code, ANTONIO 
SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE y SIRVEN (cited in the Jist of abbreviations), in-
cluding his discussion of the application of the Code to Cuba in his Manual de 
derecho internacional privado (Habana, 1939). AUDINET, "Un pro jet de Code 
de droit international prive," Revue 1927, I; FRAGA, "Die Kodifikation des 
internationalen Privatrechts in Amerika," I Z.ausl.PR. ( 1927) 563; KUHN, 
Book Review, 20 Am.]. Int. Law (1926) 631; 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 480. 
83 For ratification and accessions to this and the subsequently mentioned 
treaties, see League of Nations, Official No. A.6.1939. Annex I. V. 
84 In signing the C6digo Bustamante, Bolivia reserved its obligations under 
the Montevideo Treaties. This has been held decisive for the relations be-
tween Bolivia and Peru by the Supreme Court of the latter country. Decision 
of Gonzalez, Dec. 7, 1935, 2 Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos vigentes entre 
el Peru y otros Estados (1936) 516; Lurs G. ALVARADO, Apuntes de derecho 
internacional (1940) 6o. 
85 Relatively uniform legislation on marriage, adoption and guardianship 
was introduced in Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1917 to 1927, and 
Finland approximated its laws to this convention in 1925 and 1929. Conven-
tions, including Iceland, followed on: Collection of Maintenance Allowances, 
of February 10, 1931 (English and French translations in 126 League of Na-
tions Treaty Series (1932) 51; HUDsON, 5 Int. Legislation 885 No. z8z); on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, of March 16, 1932 (139 League 
of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 181; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 6 No. 305); 
on Bankruptcy, of November 7, 1933 (155 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(I935) I33; HuDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 496 No. 35I); and on Inheritance and 
Succession, of November I9, I934 (164 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1935) 279; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 947 No. 397, 953 No. 397a). Cf. 
UDDGREN, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (I935) 5I3; MARKS VON WURTEMBERG, IO Z.ausl.PR. 
( I936) 711. 
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law in the field of marriage, adoption, and guardianship," in 
force from January I, I932.86 
(e) Conventions on Negotiable Instruments. Substantial 
success was attained in the two Geneva conventions of I930 
and I93I 1 providing a Uniform Law of Bills of Exchange 
and a Uniform Law of Checks: 87 
(i) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of 
laws in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promis-
sory Notes, of June 7, I930, in force from January I, 
I934· 
Austria, Belgium, Danzig, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without colonies), 
Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland. 
( ii) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of 
laws in connection with Checks, of March I9 1 I93 I, in 
force from January I, I934· 
B6 English and French translations in u6 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1931) 141; HunsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 877 No. 281,884 No. 28n; German 
translation and comment by BLOCH in 8 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 627; VIGGO BENT-
ZEN-HAMMERICH, "La recente Union scandinave de droit international prive," 
Revue 1934, 855. 
87 Official French and English texts in 143 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1934) 317, 332, 409, 424; HUDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 550 No. 259, 558 No. 
259a, and 915 No. 284, 924 No. 284a. 
Comments: HUDSON and FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws 
Concerning Bills of Exchange," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 333 at 370; FELLER, 
"The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1932) 668 at 692i ARMINJON et CARRY, La Iettre de change et le billet a 
ordre (Paris, 1938); LESCOT, La nouvelle legislation de Ia lettre de change 
(Paris, 1937) ; PERCEROU et BouTERON, La nouvelle legislation fram;aise et 
internationale de Ia lettre de change, du billet a ordre et du cheque (Paris, 
1937); XAVIER }ANNE, "L'unification internationale des lois sur les effets de 
commerce," 56 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1929) 52, I SYMMIKTA STREIT 
( 1939) 477-483; LENHOFF, Einfiihrung in das einheitliche Wechselrecht, 
(Wien, Berlin, 1933); QuAssowsKI, "Die Genfer Abkommen iiber die Ver-
einheitlichung des Wechselrechts," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 770; DE SEMO, 
"L'unificazione intemazionale del diritto cambiario," 7 Annuario Dir. Comp. 
(1932) 220. 
Decisions: v. Bargen, Internationale Rechtsprechung zum Genfer einheit-
Iichen Wechsel- und Scheckrecht (1954). 
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Danzig, Denmark (except Greenland), Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal 
(without colonies), Sweden, Switzerland. 
On the fringe of the war, the three Baltic countries 
adopted a slightly modified version of all six Geneva con-
ventions; 87a after the war, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
enacted the Geneva conflict rules in their internal legisla-
tion.87b 
(f) Other multilateral efforts. On the fringe of our sub-
ject matter, recent important conventions have been con-
cluded on the following topics : 88 
(i) Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened for signa-
ture at Geneva, September 24, 1923.89 
Alabama, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (and 
many parts of the British commonwealth), Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand. 
(ii) Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature at Geneva, Sep-
tember 26, 1927.90 
87a Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and 
Promissory Notes between Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia from April 8, 1938 
(official French text and English translation in 191 League of Nations Treaty 
Series II9)· See v. Nottbeck, 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1939) 604. 
87b Yugoslavian Law on Bills of Exchange (Dec. u, 1946) art. 94-100, to 
which also the Law on Promissory Notes (Dec. 26, 1946) refers (art. 23) ; 
Czechoslovakian Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Dec. 22, 
1950), title I §§ 91-98, title II §§ 69-75 (German and French translations of 
all texts: MAKAROV, Quellen). 
88 See list of ratifications and accessions League of Nations, Official No. 
A.6.1939· Annex I.V. 
89 27 League of Nations Treaty Series (1924) 157; MARTENS, 19 Nouveau 
recueil general de traites 3• serie, 156; HunsoN, 2 Int. Legislation 1062 No. 98. 
90 92 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 301; HuosoN, 3 Int. Legis-
lation 2153 No. 183. 
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Austria, Belgium, Great Britain (and parts of the 
British commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Nether lands, Portugal, 
Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand. 
(iii) Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating 
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, opened for signa-
ture at The Hague, April 12, I930, in force from 
July I, I937·91 
Ratifications or accessions until August 28, I939, by 
Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (all territories), Can-
ada, Australia, India, China, Monaco, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden. 
(iv) Simultaneously with the Convention under (iii), a 
"Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness" 
and a "Special Protocol concerning Statelessness" have 
been concluded,92 the first of which is in force from 
July I, I937 in Brazil, Great Britain (with all terri-
tories), Australia, South Africa, India, Chile, China, 
the Netherlands, Poland, El Salvador. 
( v) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
opened for signature at Geneva, July 28, I95 I, with 
the important conflicts rule of art. I 2 on the personal 
status of refugees.92a Australia, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Ecuador, France, Germany (Federal Republic) 
Great Britain, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia. 
91 Text from League of Nations Document, C.224.M.x n.1930.V; HuDSON, 
5 Int. Legislation 359 No. 249· 
92 League of Nations Document, C.zz6.M.n3.I930.V; League of Nations 
Document, C.227.M.II4.1930.V., HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 381 No. 251 and 
387 No. 252. 
92a 189 United Nations Treaty Series (1954) 137; French text also 43 Revue 
Crit. (1954) 245· 
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More conflicts rules have been established in multipartite 
conventions providing uniform treatment of such matters as 
communication and transportation, with respect to problems 
that proved inaccessible to unification.93 
(g) Drafts. The tireless efforts of the Dutch Govern-
ment in promoting the Hague Conferences on conflicts law 
were continued in I925, I928,94 I95I 195 and 1956,95a andre-
sulted in elaborate treaty drafts regarding the law of succes-
sion on death ( 1925 and I928), bankruptcy ( 1902 and 
I928), on the recognition of foreign corporations, renvoi, 
and civil procedure ( I95 I), on transfer of title and jurisdic-
tion in international sales, support of minors, and execution 
of support titles (I 9 56), which were not ratified. The 
draft on uniform conflicts rules for the sale of goods 
(I 9 5 I), which also was not ratified, is outstanding.95b More-
over, certain provisions supplementary to the earlier con-
ventions, referring in particular to persons without na-
tionality or having more than one nationality, were adopted 
9s For example, see the rules concerning aviation, enumerated by HuDSON, 
4 Int. Legislation 2354· 
94 Conference de Ia Haye de droit international prive. Actes de Ia Cin-
quieme Session tenue du I2 octobre au 7 novembre I925 (La Haye, 1926). 
Documents relatifs a Ia Cinquieme Session (La Haye, I926). Actes de Ia 
Sixieme Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (La Haye, 1928). Documents 
relatifs a Ia Sixieme Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (LaHaye, I928). 
See accounts by KosTERS in Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I 926) I 56, 245 ; 
(I928) 8I3i (I929) 308, 79Ii TRAVERS, Revue I926, 220j VOLKMAR, JW, 
I926, 307 i I928, 857 i }ULL!OT DE LA MORANDIERE, CJunet I928, 28I. 
95 Conference de Ia Haye de droit international prive. Actes de Ia Septieme 
Session tenue du 9 au 3I octobre I951 (La Haye I952). Documents relatifs a 
Ia Septieme Session (La Haye I952). English translation of the draft con-
ventions in I Am. J. Comp. Law (I952) 275-288, German translation in 17 
Z.ausl.PR. (I952) 269. Comments by DE WINTER [I951] Nederlands Juris-
tenblad 877; DE LA MoRANDIERE, 4I Revue Crit. ( I952) 5; DoLLE, I7 
Z.ausl.PR. (I952) I6I; KUHN, 46 Am. ]. Int. Law (1952) 5I5; and on the 
desirability of future American cooperation NADELMANN, I Am. ]. Comp. 
Law (I952) 268; REESE, 5 ibid. (I956) 611. 
95a Text in 45 Revue Crit. (1956) 746 ff., English translation in 5 Am. J. 
Comp. Law (I956) 65o-66I. DE LA MORANDIERE, 46 Revue Crit. (1957) I. 
95b Comments by DE CASTRO, 5 Revista Espafi. Der. Int. ( I952) 765; NIAL 
and DENNEMARK, 40 Svensk Juristtidning ( I955) 8I; and supra n. 95· Former 
drafts are reprinted in GuTZWILLER and NIEDERER, Beitriige zum Haager 
International-privatrecht I95I (Freiburg/Schweiz, I95I) 64 ff. 
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and, although not ratified, apparently have had some influ-
ence. Both political contrasts and doctrinal controversies 
contributed to all these failures. 
Also, the Convention on uniform rules of Private Inter-
national Law, concluded on May I I, I 9 5 I, by Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg 95c is as yet not ratified. 
4· Bilateral Treaties 
In addition to the multilateral treaties, both the postwar 
periods produced numerous bilateral treaties, containing 
clauses promoting international intercourse. The subjects 
treated include status of foreign persons, both individuals 
and business organizations, judicial assistance, enforcement 
of foreign judgments, and the like, with occasional true con-
flicts rules interspersed. In this way, more progress was 
achieved than in any other, and for the first time Great 
Britain participated. 
5· Case Law 
It has already been noted that even in civil law countries 
conflicts rules to a large extent are judge-made. French and 
Belgian courts have to operate almost without any written 
rules. The manner in which German courts, from early times, 
have treated the problems in this field and have done so since 
I900 in the absence of provision by the Introductory Law, 
has some similarity to Anglo-American practice.96 The same 
is true of Switzerland, whose statute is insufficient, and in 
many other countries. 
Consequently, the rules are flexible and incomplete, and 
very far from being frozen or petrified as certain theorists 
95c The French text with motives is reprinted in 40 Revue Crit. (1951) 710 
(4I ibid. (I95I) I65 and 377), an English translation appears in I Int. 
Comp. Law Q. (1952) 426. See MEIJERS, 2 Am. J. Comp. Law (I953) I. 
D6 See GUTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 75• 
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imagine. Precedents are reversed, when shown to be unrea-
sonable. 
In the United States, it is problematical whether conflict 
of laws is subject to general federal law, in addition to 
common law as coined in the different jurisdictions. It seems 
now settled that no such source of law is available to the 
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases.97 Except in 
such cases, the question is open 98 but has so far remained 
without practical importance. Federal courts may perhaps 
still subject conflicts rules regarded as procedural to an ap-
proach different than in state courts.99 
However, as may be noted by foreign readers, this ques-
tion has nothing to do with the influence of the Federal 
Constitution, as developed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, on the application of the conflicts rules. As 
the cases, in their overwhelming majority, involve the rela-
tions between two sister states of the Union rather than 
international intercourse with a foreign country, constitu-
tional requirements respecting due process of law, interstate 
commerce, privileges and immunities of citizens, full faith 
and credit of acts, documents and judicial proceedings, or 
impairment of obligations, exercise a more or less intensive 
effect by unifying and controlling the solution of conflicts in 
the separate jurisdictions.100 
97 Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. (1941) 313 U. S. 
487; Griffin, Administrator v. McCoach, Trustee (1941) 313 U.S. 498. 
98 CooK, Legal Bases 108, 143. 
99 Note: "After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins: Some Problems in 'Substance' 
and 'Procedure,"' 38 Col. L. Rev. (1938) 1472; Note: "Congress, the Tomp-
kins Case and the Conflict of Laws," 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) 1002; Nuss-
BAUM, Principles 62 ff. 
1oo See the explanations to foreign readers by YNTEMA, "lnternational-pri-
vatrechtliche Entscheidungen in den Vereinigten Staaten im Jahre 1926," in 
z Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 856; and LoRENZEN, "The Federal Constitution of the 
United States of America as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Re-
cueil d'Etudes sur les sources du droit, en l'honneur de Franc;ois Geny (1934) 
437-465; RHEINSTEIN, "Das Kollisionsrecht im System des Verfassungsrechts 
der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," in I Festschrift Rabel (1954) 539-589. 
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6. International Custom 
Apart from treaties, is there any international conflicts 
law established by custom within the international com-
munity of states? According to an opinion universally ob-
taining, each member of this community is bound to have 
some sort of conflicts law, in order to leave to other states 
the power of adjudicating situations, persons or things, ex-
clusively belonging to their respective domains.101 What does 
this maxim practically mean, however, after Zitelmann's 
failure to derive the conflicts law from the requirements im-
posed by the law of nations upon states? Probably no tangi-
ble derivation can be found.102 Of course, outside of the 
domain of conflicts law, public international law has impor-
tant aspects for the treatment of foreigners 103 and assump-
tion of jurisdiction.104 
There are, finally, certain rules of almost universal force, 
such as the rules that the law of the situs governs immov-
able property, that a tort is governed by the law of the place 
where the allegedly tortious act transpires, or that the 
formalities of legal acts are determinable by the law of the 
place where they occur. These rules were established by 
statutist doctrines at a time when state borders did not exist 
as today. But now these uniform rules are national. The law 
of nations never was their source. They are ·simply cus-
tomary law of a great majority of states, though as such 
important. International courts have been glad to avail 
1o1 Since SAVIGNY § 348, a constant principle. See for literature AGo, Teoria 
70 n. I, 82 n. I, 126 n. I, and for analysis BARTIN, I Principes 112. 
1°2 MELCHIOR (skeptical), 36; RUNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit inter-
national prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue I936, 3I4, SI2 at 
536; FEDOZZI u6. Contra: CAVAGLIERI 49, 50; }ITTA, La methode du droit 
international prive (La Haye, I89o) 69; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 325, 
355· CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," 89 Univ. of Pa. L. 
Rev. ( 194I) 430 at 434 ff., mentions three cases of diplomatic intervention 
without result. 
1oa See M. WOLFF, IPR. IO. 
104 See CHEATHAM, 89 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. ( I94I) 430 ff., supra n. I02. 
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themselves of such rudiments of trans-national rules. The 
common law countries possess in common numerous addi-
tional rules of customary origin, which because of their sig-
nificance are known as principles of conflict.105 No conflicts 
rule, however, has attained, on the basis of international 
usage, a universal standing without exception, equivalent to 
that of the general principles of the jus gentium. 
7· Conclusion 
It is notable that of the enacted or restated conflicts rules 
existing today in the world, only the two Latin American 
multipartite treaties and the Restatement, the latter not a 
law but purporting to reproduce the law, are comparable in 
comprehensiveness and elaborateness to codifications of 
private law as known to lawyers in most countries. The re-
maining efforts, rudimentary if not poor, contrast strikingly 
with the usual fondness of civil law countries for statutes 
and codes 106 and even with the recent increase of legislation 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Niboyet once tried to jus-
tify the complete absence of French legislation on conflicts 
law by the elusive nature of the subject.107 But the chaotic 
brilliance of the French literature and practice suggests 
rather that the preparation for crystallizing the law has been 
insufficient. The German enactment as a whole is so unsatis-
factory that, as early as 1927, a movement for a new codifi-
cation appeared.108 
However, the two copious formulations of conflicts law 
achieved in the Western hemisphere have remarkably analo-
105 BuRGE, 2 Colonial and Foreign Law 29-36 (Statement of Principles); I 
WHARTON I ("preliminary principles") ; DICEY (Table of Principles and 
Rules) XLV-CXXIX. 
106 For the predilection of civil law countries for statutes, attention may be 
recalled to SPERL, "Case Law and the European Codified Law," I9 Ill. L. 
Rev. (I92S) sos. 
107 NrBOYET, 26 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. ( I930) 77· 
10s Mitt. Deutsche Ges. f. Volkerrecht, Dresden Meeting I927· 
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gous defects, despite their very different history, function, 
and character. The American Restatement has been accepted 
in the courts and, it seems, in the literature, to the extent 
that it reflects the actual cases or clarifies controversial is-
sues. Its doctrinal background has been repudiated almost 
unanimously. Hence, many rules asserted in the Restatement 
as flowing from principles are devoid of authority. The 
Havana Code introduced a great wealth of refined provi-
sions in the laws of the participant states 109 and is admired 
throughout Latin America. But, as the Code largely rests 
on a selection among literary opinions, mostly of French 
writers, its practical us.efulness has yet to be tried in the fire 
of litigation. Of such confirmation, nothing is known so far. 
As all doctrinal studies of the Code evidently suggest, there 
are certain difficulties in analyzing its rules. 
Once more, the immaturity of this branch of law appears 
and its need of intensive, prolonged cultivation. 
109 Occasionally, the thesis has been adopted that the code represents the 
general law of the country. Thus, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal, 
senten~,;a estrangeira no. 993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 has applied its 
jurisdictional rules in relation to Portugal. Similarly, the Supreme Court of 
Peru (July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 has termed the Montevideo 
Treaty "the law of the land" in relation to Japan. 
CHAPTER 2 
Structure of Conflicts Rules 
I. THE PARTS OF THE RULE 
I NTELLIGENT application or development of con-flicts rules requires full awareness of the two parts of which these rules are necessarily composed. Thus, al-
though it need not exactly conform to the example, a typical 
conflicts rule runs as, for instance, section 29 5 of the Re-
statement: 
( 1) The validity of a trust of movables created by a will 
( 2) is determined by the law of the testator's domicil at the 
time of his death. (Numbers added.) 
The first part of the rule defines its object, that is, certain 
operative facts/ the legal consequences of which are deter-
mined in the second part. From another point of view the 
first part raises, and the second part answers, a legal ques-
tion. In comparison with ordinary legal rules, there is one, 
a fundamental, difference. The legal effects of an ordinary 
rule of law are fully indicated; the question raised is immedi-
ately solved by commanding or prohibiting or authorizing 
certain conduct. ("Material," "substantive," "internal" 
rules, in German, Sachnormen.) In contrast, conflicts rules 
decide only which state shall give such immediate solution. 
The specific quality of these rules resides therefore in the 
second part that declares the municipal law to which the 
question should be referred or "connected" (in German, 
angekniipft) or, in other words, prescribes the legislative 
1 German: "Tatbestand," translated by LEA MERIGGI, Revue 1933, 201 at 
205, n. 1, into Latin: "substratum" (subject matter); Italian: "presupposto" 
(premise). 
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domain in which the question should be "localized." (There 
is no point in arguing which mode of thinking represented by 
these expressions is preferable.) An essential element of con-
flicts rules, therefore, is the indication of a "connecting fac-
tor" or "point of contact" (A nkniipfungspunkt, point de 
rattachement) 2-the testator's domicil as of the time of 
death in the case above, or in other cases the situs of prop-
erty, the place where a contract was concluded or where it is 
to be performed, etc. In this line of thought, the facts local-
ized by the connecting factor appear separately as the "thing 
connected." In the example above, these facts form thefirst 
part of the rule, while the connecting factor appears in the 
second part. For the sake of simplicity, we shall continue to 
conceive of the rule in the manner stated, although, in some 
conflicts rules, the localizing elements or some of them, are 
inserted in the first part. 
Strangely enough, the misfortunes of the doctrine taken 
over from the nineteenth century have been caused largely 
by insufficient attention to this nature of the conflicts rules. 
As will be seen hereafter, the parallelism of the first part 
with substantive rules was overlooked, and the basic peculi-
arity in the second part was not consistently appreciated. 
Part of the confusion lay in the traditional notion of "the 
law of the forum." Lex fori once meant the entire set of legal 
rules in force at the place of suit. In a system of pure terri-
torialism, every tribunal either applies its own law as a 
whole or dismisses a case found to belong to a foreign juris-
diction. There is no choice of law, no application of foreign 
law in such a system-a system which was observed in Eng-
2 Term introduced by KAHN, cf. NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 261, 
translated as point of contact by LORENZEN, and as connecting factor by FAL· 
CONBRIDGE. For recent discussion, see FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. ( 1937) 235, 537 at 549; reprinted in his 
Essays, chap. 5, p. 124. CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization 
and Preliminary Question in Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 
241, "localization." 
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land with more consistency than anywhere else and is still 
represented in many conceptions of Anglo-American law. If 
the entire "law of the forum" be considered a unit, conflicts 
rules are in effect integrated with the internal law. But when 
assumption of jurisdiction no longer implies application of 
the domestic rules and there exist choice of law rules, the 
latter must live apart from the internal set of rules. At this 
stage of development, appropriate language can designate 
as law of the forum only the pure internal law, strictly ex-
cluding conflicts rules. 
Likewise, the extensive recent discussion, under the French 
catchword of "qualification," 3 of the nature and function of 
the law of conflicts has been a source of difficulty. Bartin, the 
author of this expression, assumed that conflicts rules are an 
inseparable part of the law of the forum 4 and that, ac-
cordingly, the legal terms used in a conflicts rule must by 
logical necessity be explained ("qualified") in terms of the 
peculiar concepts of the lex fori. Had it not been for this 
theory, characterization would never have attained the role 
it occupies in the present literature. In fact, as that theory 
has suffered increasing exceptions and modifications, the term 
qualification has become uncertain. The writers argue which 
characterization problems are genuine and which false and 
even whether characterization is of immense or minimal sig-
nificance. Such terminological disputes should be ended. 
The real subject of the basic debate about conflicts law is 
the interpretation of the rules of conflicts. This is essentially 
broader than commenting on expressions. Moreover, it 
s While KAHN spoke of "latent conflicts of law," HARTIN's term "qualifica-
tion" became usual in Europe. BECKET!' and CHESHIRE translate it by "clas-
sification," FALCONBRIDGE proposed "characterization" and is generally fol-
lowed. See FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 239, supra n. 2. For 
other surveys, see VAN PRAAG, "Bijdrage tot de leer der kwalifikaties in het 
internationaal privaatrecht," Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1939, 525, and 
recently FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 50. 
4 See infra n. 9· 
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furnishes a clearer objective than does reference to some sub-
stantive law, for evidently conflicts rules have to be inter-
preted by exploring their own meaning rather than the mean-
ing of something else, e.g., an internal rule. Emphasis should 
be shifted from "characterization" to "interpretation." 
If nevertheless characterization is to retain a technical 
meaning, it may be used to denote the problem whether or 
not a certain expression in a conflicts rule has the same con-
notation as a similar word employed by domestic law or in a 
foreign system.5 Characterization of facts as such is not sig-
nificant of conflicts law. 
The most important objective in interpreting a conflicts 
rule is to determine its scope. The borderline, for instance, 
delimiting the cases for which the conflicts rule on contracts 
prescribes the applicable law from those subject to the con-
flicts rule concerning torts, must be marked in every conflicts 
system. This process may be termed classification in the 
proper sense. 
II. THE FIRST PART: THE OBJECT oF THE RuLE 
The statutist doctrine classified each substantive rule of 
positive law in one of three categories, territorial law 
( statuta realia), extraterritorial law ( statuta personalia), 
and "mixed statutes" (statuta mixta), the last-named cate-
gory being assimilated to the first by the late French and the 
Dutch school. Thus, in the statutist conception, the object of 
conflicts law is the substantive rule of law. The substitution 
for this of the legal relations between persons or of persons 
to things by Savigny constitutes the chief advance from this 
to the modern conception. Savigny and his followers, who 
apparently are still numerous, therefore deemed it to be the 
characteristic task of conflicts law to connect each single 
"legal relation" with a certain country. 
5 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1931) 253, Qualifikation 23. 
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This conception, despite its advantages, still was not quite 
correct. Its consequences, as later deduced by Franz Kahn, 
demonstrate that the mistake was not harmless. The start-
ing point of analysis, as should be obvious, ought not to be 
the legal relation, e.g., an obligation, a property right, the 
relation between spouses. Any such relation must be based 
on a determinate legal system. Which system, when the ap-
plicable law is not even yet contemplated? At this stage, 
there is nothing but a factual or "social" situation.6 If two 
persons of Greek Orthodox faith go through a marriage 
ceremony before a Greek Orthodox priest in Paris, is this a 
marriage? The answer depends on what law we apply: the 
law of the forum, the French law, the Greek law, or per-
chance some other law. No court except in Greece, however, 
would actually apply its own internal law to the question. 
Nevertheless, Kahn and the many who share his view as-
sume that the legal relationship of marriage as constituted 
under the domestic law of the forum is exclusively the object 
of the conflicts rule. This makes no sense; it is simply a way 
out of embarrassment in order to find some legislation con-
taining the allegedly necessary definition of such object. Evi-
dently, conflicts rules must operate as do all other rules, 
directly on the facts of life, not on a legally predicated, ab-
6 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) at 243; reproduced in Revue 1933, I at 5 ff., 
Qualifikation at 8, followed by NEUNER, Der Sinn ( I932) ; M. WOLFF, IPR. 2; 
Priv. Int. Law 5 ; DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las calificaciones en el derecho 
internacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. (I933) 2I7 at 240, 265 at 280, 
282; VALLINDAS, Book Review, I Archeion ldiotikou Dikaiou ( 1934) I76; 
MEZGER, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1935, 447; I STREIT-VALLINDAS (I937) 
243; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (193'7) 235 at 242, supra n. 2, but now 
Essays 39; RoBERTSON, Characterization 63; HusSERL, "Foreign Fact Element 
in Conflict of Laws," part II, 26 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 453 at 471; MoRELLI, Ele-
menti 9 ff.; MoNACO, L'efficacia 35; GIHL 321; BoRUM 1. More precisely, the 
object has been described as a factual situation taken in abstracto; see 
MERIGGI, Revue 1933, 205, or as the facts underlying the relation which is 
mentioned by the conflicts rule and taken in abstracto, see NEUNER, "Die 
Ankniipfung im internationalen Privatrecht," 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 8I, 85. 
(Erroneous criticism by DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( I933) 239, 241, 
supra this note.) 
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stract subject matter. They refer to merely factual events, 
such as the marriage ceremony before the Greek priest, a 
document concerning the sale of a movable, a declaration by 
a married woman, purporting to transfer property, the death 
of an individual leaving no will, etcetera. 
This statement is of cardinal significance; it ends all specu-
lation about the necessary dependence of conflicts rules on 
some legal system, whether the law of the forum or the lex 
causae. This supposition was engendered by the short manner 
in which conflicts rules have been generally framed, as for 
example: 
Immovables, even those possessed by foreigners, are gov-
erned by French law. The laws concerning the status and 
capacity of persons govern a Frenchman, even resident 
abroad. (French C.C. art. 3.) 
Or, when the rules became more detailed: 
The capacity of a person is to be determined according to 
the laws to which the person belongs. Personal relations be-
tween German spouses, even though domiciled abroad, are 
governed by the German laws. (German EG. art. 7 par. 1, 
art. 14par. 1.) 
Broad stretches of subject matter have thus customarily been 
indicated by abbreviated terms, seemingly corresponding to 
the captions of large chapters of private law, such as ca-
pacity, relation between spouses, inheritance, et cetera. But 
this is merely the technique of shorthand expression. 
III. INTERPRETATION AND CHARACTERIZATION 
No doubt such legal terms ordinarily have been taken 
from the headings used in the civil code or accepted legal 
classification of the forum. But was that always so, must it so 
remain; is the interpretation of such a term bound to its 
specific significance in the internal law? 
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I. Lex Fori 
Franz Kahn, 7 in his elaborate earlier opinion, which to a 
vaguely defined extent he later revoked, 8 and Bartin,9 who 
first sponsored the theory, considered it a matter of course 
that when a conflicts rule speaks of domicil or marriage set-
tlement or tort, it meant exactly what such expression signi-
fies in the corresponding domestic law. This theory has had 
an immense following 10 and has been adopted in the Re-
statement 11 and the C6digo Bustamante.12 Logical as well as 
so-called practical arguments have been adduced in quantity 
to prove this assertion; 13 they may now also be found repro-
duced in English 14 and need no repetition. 
7 KAHN, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrage zur Lehre des internationalen 
Privatrechts ( I89I), I Abhandl. I, especially "Latente Gesetzeskollisionen" at 
92· 
8 KAHN, itber Inhalt, Natur und Methode des international en Privatrechts 
(I899), I Abhandl. 255 at 3I2. 
9 BARTIN, "De ]'impossibilite d'arriver a Ia suppression definitive des con-
flits de lois," Clunet I897, 225, 446, 720, reprinted in BARTIN, Etudes (I899) 
I; BARTIN, I Principes ( I93o) 22I; BARTIN, "La doctrine des qualifications 
et ses rapports avec le caractere national des regles du conflit des lois," 3 I 
Recueil I 930 I s6 5· 
10 For lists see MELCHIOR I IO § 78; MAURY, "Regles generales des con flits 
de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 467. To mention the most significant 
names, in France: ARMINJON, BATIFFOL, H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE, NIBOYET, SURVILLE, WEISS; in Belgium: POULLET, DE Vos; in 
Germany: GuTZWILLER, LEWALD, MELCHIOR, NEUMEYER, NussBAUM, RAAPE, 
ZITELMANN; in Italy: ANZILOTTI, AGO, BUZATTI, CAVAGUERI, FEDOZZI, PERASSI, 
SALVIOLI, UDINA; in the N ether]ands: VAN BRAKEL, KOSTERS, MULDER. 
More recently in Britain and the United States: CHESHIRE; LORENZEN, "The 
Theory of Qualification," 20 Col. L. Rev. (I92o) 247; LORENZEN, "The 
Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of 
Laws," so Yale L. J. (I94I) 743; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (I937) 
245, supra n. 2; ROBERTSON, Characterization 24; CoRMACK, Renvoi, repub-
lished in his Essays (I947) 46; cf. 30 Can. Bar Rev. (I952) us, reprinted 
in his Essays ( I954) 58; I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. ( I94I) 22I at 223, supra n. 2. 
11 Restatement § 7· 
12 C6digo Bustamante art. 6. Also the Civil Codes of Egypt of I948 (art. 
IO) and of Syria of I949 (art. n) as well as the never applied Rumanian 
Civil Code of I940 (art. 48); cf. 54 Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Rechtwis-
senschaft ( I94I) 22I and supra p. 30 n. 70. 
1s See especially NIBOYET no. 4I6. 
1 4 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46, esp. 53 ff.; 
ROBERTSON, Characterization 59· 
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2. Lex Causae 
Another opinion went in the opposite direction; the terms 
or concepts of the conflicts rule should be understood accord-
ing to the foreign internal law referred to by the conflicts 
rule itself. Originated by the French Despagnet, and recently 
revived by Pacchioni, M. Wolff, and Balladore Pallieri/5 
this theory has been generally rejected.16 In the present 
writer's opinion, which is not here elaborated, the solutions 
sought by Wolff are acceptable in special circumstances, but 
not in principle.17 
3· Comparative Method 
A third opinion, which, in opposition to both these dog-
mas, advocates a method rather than a doctrine/8 was ex-
pounded by the present writer in I 929 and r 931.19 In this 
15 DESPAGNET, "Des conflits de lois re!atifs a Ia qualification des rapports 
juridiques," Clunet 1898, 253; DESPAGNET et DE BoECK, Cours de droit inter-
national public {ed. 4, 1910) no. 106 bis; M. WoLFF, IPR. 54; Priv. Int. 
Law 154 ff.; PACCHIONI, EJementi I67; BALLADORE PALLIERI 63 ff.; partly also 
NEUNER, Der Sinn, and FRANKENSTEIN, "Tendances nouvelles du droit inter-
national prive," 33 Recueil 1930 III 245 at 3I3. 
16 For a resume of the almost general rejection, see MAURY, "Regles ge-
nerales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 484. 
17 See infra p. 66. 
1 8 Rightly MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 477· 
19 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 752 at 755; RABEL, "Das Problem der Quali-
fikation," 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 24I, separate (I9S6), (in Italian) 2 Rivista 
Italiana (I932) 97, (in French) Revue I933, I. 
In the same sense: in Belgium: WIGNY, Revue Crit. I936, 392; England: 
BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private Inter-
national Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46; France: J. DoN-
NEDIEU DE VABRES 765 j Germany; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) j SILBERSCHMIDT, 
48 Z.int.R. (1933-34) 313 at 334 and 54 Zentralblatt (1936) at I7j ZWEIGERT, 
Festschrift Raape (I948) 35; Italy: MERIGGI, "Saggio critico sulle qualifica-
zioni," 2 Rivista Italiana (1932) 189, (in French) Revue I933, 20I, (in 
English) I4 B.U.L. Rev. (I934) 319; ZANCLA, Sede di fatto del rapporto, 
Atti deli'Accad. Pelorit. (1936) 18; Spain: DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv. 
{1933) 240 at 245, supra n. 6 (in part divergent); YANGUAS, Derecho Inter-
nacional Privado (Madrid, 1944) 238; Switzerland: WERNER NIEDERER, Die 
Frage der Qualifikation als Grundproblem des internationalen Privatrechts, 
in Zurcher Studien z. internat. Recht, no. I (Ziirich, 1940); Einfiihrung in die 
allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts {ed. 2, 1956) 246; VON 
STEIGER, Die Bestimmung der Rechtsfrage im internationalen Privatrecht, 
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view, the factual situation, which is the true premise of any 
conflicts rule, must be referable indifferently to foreign as 
well as to domestic substantive law. Hence, if legal terms are 
used to describe this factual situation, they must be suscepti-
ble of interpretation with reference to foreign institutions, 
even those unknown to the lex fori. This operation includes 
comparative research. Thoughtful courts have always em-
ployed this method, but systematic efforts are needed grad-
ually to free national conflicts rules from undue dependence 
on internal conceptions. 
For example, the first theory above was resorted to in the 
English case, Leroux v. Brown,20 in which the parties in 
France made a contract satisfying every condition of validity 
under French law. However, the action failed on the ground 
that the statute of frauds imposes a rule of procedure, which 
as such must be observed by all litigants in England. Conse-
quently, the conflicts rule on "formalities" was deemed in-
applicable. This decision has been severely criticized.21 
Although the case conforms to the lex fori doctrine domi-
Abhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, I29 Heft, (Bern, I937). (The 
Federal Tribunal has left the decision open; see BG. (Feb. 24> I939) 65 
BGE. II 66, 7I; BG. (Oct. 30, I940) 30 Praxis 63 no. I, at 64). NEUNER and 
MERIGGI, however, add essential propositions of their own. Practical appli-
cation of this method to particular problems has been made by WERNER VON 
SIMSON, Die materiellen Wirkungen des rechtskraftigen Urteils im interna-
tionalen Privatrecht (Thesis, Freiburg i.Br., I935); H. P. ZsCHOKKE, Die 
Rechtsstellung internationaler Kartelle, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir In-
ternationales Recht, Druckschrift no. 35 (I936); HANS H. RIEMANN, Die 
Schuldvertrage im internationalen Privatrecht (Dresden, I939) v and 9· 
United States: CHEATHAM, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of 
Laws," 2I Cornell L. Q. (I935) 570, warns against "two closely related prac-
tices" (p. 589), viz., (I) "the uncritical transfer to Conflict of Laws of the 
meaning given to a term in internal law," and (z) "the use of. a distinction 
worked out in internal law as decision of an issue in Conftict of Laws without 
adequate consideration of whether the internal law distinction is appropriate 
to the other issue." 
20 (I852) 12 C. B. 8oi. 
21 See BECKET!', "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) at 69 § I8; CHESHIRE 
55 and 655; FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characteriza-
tion," I5 Can. Bar Rev. (I937) 220, 224, now Essays 98, is doubtful, however. 
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nant in the United States, it has been generally disapproved 
by American courts and writers. 22 Moreover, it appears that 
in this country foreign statutes of frauds are deemed to pre-
scribe formalities as defined by the conflicts rule relating to 
formalities, though such statutes may be otherwise inter-
preted in the various jurisdictions for other purposes. This 
construction agrees with the third theory above. 
The reason for this solution is obvious. It offends justice 23 
to deny enforcement of an oral contract complying with local 
requirements of form, for the mere reason that the domestic 
law requires a memorandum in writing. Conversely, a con-
tract unenforceable where executed, may be deemed to de-
pend on such other contacts as the conflicts rule of the forum 
admits; thus, by the applicable conflicts rule, a contract may 
be considered valid under the law of the place of perform-
ance. But, if under the conflicts rule the transaction has no 
connection with the forum, it cannot be validated by the 
municipal law of the forum. The object of the conflicts rule 
on formality thus may include foreign statutes of frauds 
and exclude the domestic statute, irrespective of domestic 
classifications. 
The prescriptions of the domestic statute of frauds indeed 
may be considered to relate to procedure in a court for the 
purpose of their application ex officio, irrespective of formal 
demand by a party, or to determine whether failure to ob-
serve the statute constitutes reviewable error, as well as to 
decide whether amendments thereof have retroactive effect. 
The purposes of conflicts law are different. In fact, the Eng-
lish writers seem to regret Leroux v. Brown only because of 
22 Straesser Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (1925) 8 F. (2d) 
6o1; Ohlendiek v. Schuler ( 1929) 30 F. (2d) 5; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts 
§ 6oo. 
23 See Lams et ux. v. F. H. Smith Co. (1935) 36 Del. 477, 178 At!. 651, 
Clunet 1937, 873, LoRENZEN, Cases 269; CHEATHAM, Cases 372; LoRENZEN, 
"The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale L. J. (1923) 311, 
320; GOODRICH 247; 3 BEALE § 602.1. 
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its implications for conflicts law. French 24 and German 25 
courts classify provisions concerning oral agreements as 
formalities in all respects, and certainly not as procedure, the 
only doubt being whether they do not affect the substantive 
requisites of consent to a contract. 
In consequence, an American, French, etc., court has to 
apply the English statute of frauds, or, until 1954, the spe-
cial provision of section 4 of the British Sales of Goods 
Act, 25a respectively, to an English transaction, in particular 
to an agreement to sell concluded in England. (That this is 
true, although the English courts reach the same result on 
procedural lines, in the case of English transactions, needs 
some comment in our later discussion.) 26 
There is very little doubt, in fact, that conflicts law has its 
own denotation of formality, independent of either the lex 
fori or the lex causae.21 
Without resuming all arguments of the vivid controversy 
that went on during the last decade, it may be stated that 
the lex fori theory has visibly shrunk under the weight of 
the attacks to which it has been subjected. In the first place, 
there seems today little support for the once-pretended logi-
cal necessity of resorting to domestic notions, Niboyet's 
argument de necessite. There still are die-hards,28 it is true. 
24 Cass. (req.) (April 18, 1865) S.I865.1.317; Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 1922) 
D.I9Z2-I.I27, S.I923.I·249· 
25 Unanimous. For a foreign provision prescribing written contracts, see 
KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW.1929, 448, IPRspr. 1929, no. 7· See also the definition 
of formalities in art. 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1930 for the settlement 
of certain conflicts of law in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promis-
sory Notes. 
25a S.4 of the Sales of Goods Act. 1893, as well as important cases of s.3 
of the Statute of Frauds, 1677, have been repealed by the Law Reform (En-
forcement of Contracts) Act, 1954. 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34· 
26 Infra pp. 71 ff. 
27 This problem will be treated in connection with the requirements for 
contracts. 
28 A climax was reached by RuNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international 
prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 
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While even Bartin conceded two "exceptions" to the princi-
ple of characterization according to the domestic ideas, some 
of his followers have insisted on its pure application. In par-
ticular, Bartin saw that the question whether foreign-situated 
property is movable or immovable, is almost universally de-
cided according to the law of the situs and not to the lex 
fori. 29 This is clearly a sound rule and, thanks to its adoption 
throughout the world, an oasis of uniformity; but important 
writers have protested.8° Franz Kahn diluted his own axiom 
even more; he states that a rule referring "parental power" 
or "tort" to some foreign law does not mean exclusively 
what the civil code of the forum means by such terms, but 
also includes "the corresponding and similar foreign no-
tions." Only the "nucleus of the foreign institution" must be 
similar, not the "technical envelope." 81 For this acute 
thinker, a half-century since, the lex fori was not an infallible 
guide, but rather a signpost showing vaguely a direction. 
At present, the advocates of the lex fori theory, conscious 
that the theory must be justified by convenience rather than 
logical necessity, 82 are entangled in difficult efforts to avoid 
absurd results. They feel, for instance, free to concede that 
a concept such as contract or tort may have a much broader 
scope in conflicts law than in private law.33 Again, the Ger-
(I936) 3I4. 5I2, who declares any separate development of conflicts law 
"logically" impossible. Contra: BALOGH, I Symmikta Streit ( I93,11) 88. 
29 This is now for BARTIN the "only true exception," I Prin~ipes 236. 
so NIBOYET, 3 Traite no. 957 and 2 Repert. 411 no. 27; KAHN, I Abhandl. 
76; and others. 
81 KAHN, I Abhandl. 112 {1891), generally followed up to 193I, although 
KAHN himself sensed the futility of this escape in 1899, see I Abhandl. 3II; 
cf. RABEL, Revue I933, 20, 24· 
82 RoBERTSON, Characterization 74; LEWALD, Regles generales des conll.its 
de lois 77· 
88 Aao "Regles generales des conll.its de lois," 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at 
33 7; M~uRY, "Regles generales des con flits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 I!~ ?25 
at 494; BATIFFOL, Traite no. 295 and 297; FEDOZZI 186. See also the cntiCIS~ 
by PACCHIONI, Elementi 181. GuTZ'":ILLER, ~lso a follower of. the lex fort 
theory has seen that the Mixed Arbttral Tnbunals have apphed numerous 
gener;l legal concepts of the civilized world, or of the civil law countries 
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man conflicts rule ( EG. art. 2 I ) concerning the right of an 
unwed mother to claim support from the illegitimate father 
of her child, is strictly predicated upon a rule of the German 
Civil Code specifically granting such right; Raape recognizes 
this connection but nevertheless suggests the application of 
the rule to an essentially different claim under Norwegian 
law and to certain even more remote types of actions for 
damages under other laws.34 For such analysis of the com-
pass of conflicts rules, he employs comparative methods as a 
matter of course. Nussbaum, who on the contrary is a de-
cided foe of comparative methods in the subject, yet applies 
the conflicts rules regarding wrongs to liabilities without 
fault, irrespective of the treatment in internal law, construes 
terms such as "company" or "corporation" "in the freest 
manner," and particularly recommends "flexible methods" 
and "broad" interpretation.35 Maury 36 ends his apology for 
the lex fori with the following recipe: 
One starts from the lex fori, from its concepts. But these 
concepts are adapted first to their international function and 
then enlarged by a comparison with those of the foreign 
laws. We approach the viewpoint of Mr. Rabel, but we do 
it rather modestly. 
This dictum has been adopted by Robertson 37 with a 
qualification. He avows that 
"some categories (of conflicts law) will be quite different 
from any category of the internal law, because designed to 
make provision for institutions of the foreign law not known 
to the internal law of the forum." 
(see "Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertrage einge-
setzten Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshi:ife," 3 Int. J ahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichts-
wesen (1931) 123 at 149 ff.). 
84 RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 401 at 452, 524. 
35 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 48, 194, 288; NussBAUM, Principles 73· 
86 MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 325 at 504. 
37 ROBERTSON, Characterization 91. 
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Such independent categories, he confesses, 
"are already known to have been developed for most types 
of cases that are likely to arise, such as contract, tort, suc-
cession, administration, matrimonial property, marriage, di-
vorce, legitimacy, adoption, and so on." 
These writers clearly and consciously draw on comparative 
law, although Robertson 38 disapproves of "international 
principles of comparative law determining disputed charac-
terizations." 
It will be interesting to see what remains of the Bartin-
Kahn theory after dealing with particular problems in the 
course of this book. 
However, the "logical" argument has been overturned in 
a striking manner, thanks to the special refutations by 
Neuner 39 and, more recently, by Cook,40 both pointing out 
the mistake of seeking in internal law the concepts needed 
in conflicts law. The naive argument they criticize attributes 
an absolute character to juridical concepts, irrespective of 
their purposes; it presupposes that the concepts of domicil, 
contract, capacity are identical in the laws of property, 
family, jurisdiction, taxation-and conflicts I Only the an-
cient "realism of concepts," which had some force in Greco-
Roman philosophy and a disputed role in Roman jurispru-
dence,41 and the Begriffsjurisprudenz of the nineteenth cen-
tury, ridiculed in Jhering's "Heaven of Concepts," present 
equal errors. The relativity of legal concepts is a mere com-
monplace in all other departments of law. 
The chief reason why the present writer started the attack 
against that theory and here stresses its utter unsoundness, 
38 ROBERTSON, Characterization 31, 189. 
89 NEUNER, Der Sinn, esp. 132; also "Policy Considerations in the Conflict 
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 484. 
40 CooK, Legal Bases, esp. 214. 
41 SoKOLOWSKI, Die Philosophie im Privatrecht (2 vols., Halle, 1902-1907), 
and for criticism, RABEL, Viertelj ahrsschrift fiir Wissenschaftliche Philo-
sophie und Soziologie, 1904, 108. 
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is illuminated by the very title of Hartin's paper, "On the 
impossibility of arriving at a definitive suppression of the 
conflicts of law." Naturally, if each conflicts law is nothing 
but an annex to the corresponding internal law and receives 
its sense and meaning only from this national and local 
source, uniformity cannot be achieved, even though all con-
flicts laws should be unified, without simultaneous unification 
of all municipal laws. The temporarily complete victory of 
this idea has weighed heavily on hopes and endeavors to 
reform and unify the national bodies of private international 
law. Black pessimism resulted, and it is no wonder that the 
excesses of nationalism in our field were particularly serious 
in the writings of the many students who followed Kahn and 
Bartin. This gloomy outlook, unfortunately, is still shared 
by certain present writers. 
As things now stand, few points respecting the writer's 
opinion still seem to call for explanation. The most signifi-
cant is the objection on a priori grounds that this compara-
tive-analytical method, though representative of the future, 
is useless for existing law.42 
It has never been denied that the actual conflicts rules of 
the European codifications or those usually applied by Anglo-
American courts originally had linguistic connections.42a The 
question is merely that of "freeing," "emancipating," these 
rules from their domestic background. Is this illicit? A few 
Italian writers say so; in their opinion, rules must be inter-
preted within the perspective of the legislator. But, even if 
42 PACCHIONI, Elementi 182; FEDOZZI 190; DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. 
Priv. (1933) 240 at 247; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict 
of Laws," 55 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 245, reprinted in his Essays (1947) 
46, but omitted in ed. 2, 1954. followed by DAviEs, "Regles generales des 
conflits de lois," 62 Recueil 1937 IV 497; GRAVESON 53; MAURY, 57 Recueil 
1936 III 325 (definitely milder), followed by BATIFFOL, Traite no. 297· 
42a WERNER GOLDSCHMIDT, I Sistema 268 enumerates several concepts in 
conflicts rules not derived from the internal law. As an example he mentions 
the English distinction between movables and immovables not corresponding 
to the Common Law concepts of real and personal property. 
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this were true, do we have to assume that draftsmen of con-
flicts rules have been ignorant that foreign laws may differ 
in many respects from their own conceptions? In laying down 
the rule that wrongs are governed by the law of the place of 
wrong, do legislators not consider the possibility that an 
injury done abroad may constitute a wrong where com-
mitted, though not in the forum? Or are conflicts rules not 
supposed to be applied indifferently as respects all laws of 
civilized peoples? In fact, their compass is generally world-
wide, and, in the absence of a universal language, they 
necessarily employ the "word-symbols" of the domestic 
vocabulary. 
Again, whether rigid limitations on the interpretation of 
legal rules be inferred from the alleged intention of the legis-
lator, as the Italian school seems to postulate, or from the 
principle of strict construction of statutory texts, often fol-
lowed at common law, such restrictions are inconsistent with 
the methods of creative interpretation recognized in modern 
legal practice. Formalism is particularly misplaced in con-
struing conflicts rules, the overwhelming majority of which 
are in an unsettled and formative stage throughout the 
world. Most are unwritten, and many of the written rules 
are vaguely drafted and defectively constructed. As a matter 
of fact, the art of interpretation, a versatile and fecundating 
implement of modern private law, is not used with entire 
efficiency in our field. Clumsy constructions and half-hearted 
attempts at adjusting antiquated maxims or correcting in-
exact texts abound. Should progressive development from 
case to case and through systematic effort be barred, this 
stepchild of jurisprudence would be an orphan indeed. 
Yet, in the case of many writers, one hand does not seem 
to know what the other is doing. While Ago is the most in-
transigent adversary of analytical comparison, he has se-
lected from a hundred cases discussed in the literature, one, 
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the simplest, to demonstrate with what perfect safety the 
lex fori theory operates.48 This is the case. Under German 
and other laws, spouses may by settlement institute heirs to 
either of them. The Italian legislation does not expressly 
allow such appointment by contract of a successor upon 
death. How should an Italian judge consider such a settle-
ment by German spouses? Ago agrees that the question is 
covered by the Italian conflicts rule concerning intestate suc-
cession and wills, although these two grounds of succession 
do not include settlements. German law therefore governs. 
But Ago declines to accept any extensive interpretation based 
on comparison of the three grounds of inheritance involved. 
He takes the application of the conflicts rule respecting in-
heritance for granted, because the Italian inheritance law, 
tacitly excluding settlements respecting succession at death, 
implicitly classifies them as grounds of succession. By chance, 
the question came up in the French Court of Cassation. 44 A 
prenuptial settlement concluded in France by Italian na-
tionals contained a stipulation by the wife, leaving at death 
the unrestricted portion of her estate, including a French 
immovable, to the husband. It was pleaded that the settle-
ment was void under Italian law, since it contemplated a 
donation of future acquisitions. The court held the gift valid 
under the lex situs, viz., the French provision allowing devise 
by prenuptial settlement, thus emphasizing the contractual 
aspects of the transaction. Niboyet apparently conceives that, 
while the French court proceeded on the basis of the law of 
succession, an Italian court would have held the gift invalid 
specifically on the ground of the conflicts rule concerning 
matrimonial property.45 However all this may be, since the 
48 AGO, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at 333· 
44 Cass. (req.) (May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 406, Clunet 1925, 126. The 
French law of the situs was likewise applied to a settlement of Spanish 
spouses, Cass. (civ.) (April 2, 1884) Clunet 1885, 76. 
45 See NIBOYET 503 no. 417. 
INTRODUCTION 
Italian Code does not recognize such agreements either in 
the chapter on matrimonial property or in defining grounds 
of succession, the characterization cannot be inferred from 
these chapters. Unconsciously, Ago did assimilate the for-
eign institution within the titles mortis causa on the basis of 
a comparison of legislations. 
The process required for such interpretations, in fact, is 
necessarily of a comparative nature and has always been so 
recognized by thoughtful scholars.46 Assuredly, the com-
parison has not always been comprehensive, systematic, and 
fully documented. But today, at least in civil law countries, it 
is no excuse to neglect comparative studies on the ground of 
unavailability of information. So much has been done in mak-
ing the sources and literature accessible even in distant 
countries that the existence of gaps should be an incentive 
rather than a deterrent for scholars able to collaborate. So 
far as interstate conflicts go, the studies in this country are 
the most prominent example of continuous consideration of 
some fifty internal laws. Never has comparative law been 
more thoroughly utilized than in this country, and never so 
much uniformity achieved. 
It has been objected, nevertheless, that a scientific ap-
proach to conflicts law by comparative critique is precluded 
by the defective conditions of comparative research and that 
conclusions will be arbitrarily subjective. Such an assertion 
indicates lack of personal experience in such work. The com-
mon law is a living refutation. In civil law countries, no seri-
ous student of conflicts law has failed to consider neighbor-
ing legislations. Moreover, comparisons between the com-
mon law and the civil law were undertaken by Story in 
America in I 834 and by Bar in Europe in I 86 2 with patent 
success. To bridge the gulf between these two halves of the 
46 See for instance KAHN, I Abhandl. 315, 491; 2 Abhandl. 18. 
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legal world is the task of the present generation of lawyers. 
Hidden behind apparent dissimilarity, there are fundamental 
likenesses, suggesting international cooperation, though of 
course not necessarily unification. 
No doubt, existing comparisons of the kind required in the 
field of conflicts of laws are of recent date and far from ex-
haustive.47 General concepts, which may be used universally, 
are being built up but slowly. However, a great deal of 
knowledge has been attained, and to gain more is within the 
capacity of modern science. Researchers to a variable extent 
are of course engrossed in the legal culture in which they 
have been educated.48 A lawyer is apt to state more ac-
curately and to give preference to the conceptions of his 
system over foreign ideas. However, with increasing inter-
national collaboration in comparative work, the qualities of 
the different scholars will compensate for each other, and 
the multiplicity of views in the world will provide a rich 
variety of outlooks. In any case, an imperfect attempt to do 
justice to foreign institutions is superior to any technique 
which ignores them. Judges are fully entitled to limit their 
inquiries to the two or three laws primarily influencing a case 
in which legal science has done nothing to help.49 Instinc-
tively this is what the courts do. 
With respect to the narrower subject of characterization, 
expediency alone is decisive. It may be that categories as de-
fined by internal law have a role to play in such subjects as 
jurisdiction, procedure, taxation, etc., but ordinarily not in 
the case of conflicts rules. For conflicts law, characterization 
according to the law declared applicable in the conflicts rule 
47 The following are not new admissions by the writer. See RABEL, 3 Z.ausl. 
PR. (19z9) 756; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z87, Qualifikation 7z, Revue 1933, 1 at 
61. 
48 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 19Z9) 756; BECKETI, "The Question of Classifica-
tion ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law (1934) 46 at 59· 49 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) z67, Revue 1933, 1 at 37· 
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also is by no means excluded, but only for special situations. 
Martin Wolff was perhaps inspired by the problems of mari-
tal property with which he first happened to deal, to suggest 
this method of characterization. In principle, a private law 
term used in a conflicts rule means what is common to the 
various institutions of the national laws serving the same 
legislative purpose. 
It is not even true that the so-called connecting factors 
should always be understood as defined by domestic law. 
Domicil cannot be so simply treated. Nationality is exclu-
sively defined by the state whose national an individual is 
claimed to be. The place of contracting in negotiations be-
tween absent parties is not to be determined by the law of 
the forum alone, at least if under this law the place is found 
to be situated abroad, etcetera. 
IV. THE SECOND PART: REFERENCE TO A LEGAL SYSTEM 
1. The Nature of the Reference 
While American students of conflicts law but recently have 
begun to discuss other general problems, as a rule they have 
been interested in the controversy regarding the locus standi 
of foreign law in court. 
The doctrine of territorialism indicated by d'Argentre and 
perfected by Huber is predicated upon Huber's first axiom 
that the laws of a state have force only within the territorial 
limits of its sovereignty. This tenet, adopted in the American 
cases, was solemnly formulated by Story, Dicey, and Beale. 5° 
The first section of the Restatement reproduces it literally: 
"no state can make a law which by its own force is operative 
in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state 
is its own law ... " 
"Law" in this connection means internal law, and the conten-
tion therefore is that foreign internal law has no "force," 
50 STORY §§ I8 ff., DICEY 9 j I BEALE 52. 
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even though invoked by a conflicts rule. The flagrant incon-
sistency of this thesis with actual needs and practices was ini-
tially relieved by Huber's theory of ((comitas gentium" and, 
after this shallow idea had finally exploded,51 by Dicey's and 
Beale's attempt to reanimate the theory of vested rights. 52 
Hence the Restatement, section 1, continues: 
" ... but by the law of each state rights or other interests in 
that state may, in certain cases, depend upon the law in force 
in some other state or states." 
This theory has also been employed in modern France by 
Pillet and Niboyet, 58 on the background of conceptions emi-
nently hostile to the application of foreign law. However, 
both the Anglo-American and the French theories of ac-
quired rights have been critically destroyed,54 together with 
that of neoterritorialism.55 
The Italian writers think, nevertheless, that the phenome-
51 DICEY (ed. I) 10; I BEALE 53; GOODRICH II; LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 282 
nos. 29, 30. 
52DJCEY u; BEALE, 3 Cases on the Conflict of Laws (I902) §§I-5; 3 
Treatise I968; CHESHIRE ( ed. I) 3, revoked in ed. 2, 86; SCHMIITHOFF 35· 
53 VAREILLEs--SoMMIERES V ff., XXXIV ff.; PILLET, Principes 495-57I; Nmo-
YET, 5 Repert. 708 to 725, 3 Traite 284-299. 
54 United States: CooK, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of 
Laws," 33 Yale L. J. ( I924) 457, Legal Bases I; LORENZEN, "Territoriality, 
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (I924) 736; YNTEMA, 
"The Hornbook Methods and the Conflict of Laws," 37 Yale L. J. ( I928) 468; 
HEILMANN, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws," 
43 Yale L. J. (I934) 1082; STUMBERG, "Conflict of Laws. Foreign Created 
Rights," 8 Texas L. Rev. (I930) I73 and STUMBERG 9· 
England: CHESHIRE 32; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 2. 
France and Belgium: ARMINJON, I Precis 27I and ARMINJON, "La notion 
des droits acquis en droit international prive," 44 Recueil I933 II 5 esp. at 59; 
J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 754; WIGNY, "La theorie des droits acquis d'apres 
Antoine Pillet," 58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I93I) 34I and WIGNY, Essai 
I 59· 
Germany: HORST MuLLER, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im 
internationalen Privatrecht, Hamburger Rechtstudien Heft 26 (I935), au-
thoritatively reviewed by GUTZWILLER, IO Z.ausl.PR. ( I936) 1056. 
55 All European writers have protested against the principle of territori-
alism. See for instance NIBOYET, 6o4, stating that the French courts, for some 
time immediately after the Code came into force, were perhaps impressed by 
the memory of the former strict territorialism of the statutists, but actually 
rejected this nefarious principle. 
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non of the application of a law created by a foreign state still 
presents a problem, and on independent grounds eminent 
critics of Beale's theory in this country think the same. In the 
opinion once proposed and then revoked by Anzilotti, which 
has been perpetuated by others, a foreign rule cannot be ap-
plied unless it has been appropriated by the state of the 
forum and transformed into a domestic rule.56 
This theory of "material reception" of foreign law sup-
poses an untenable fiction. Nobody really believes that Nor-
wegian marriage law is made the law of Oklahoma, just for 
the purpose of deciding in Oklahoma whether the parties 
years ago celebrated a valid marriage in Oslo. Where one 
party sues for annulment, a Norwegian enactment interven-
ing in the meantime and modifying the conditions of annulla-
bility of previous marriages, is applicable, 57 clearly because 
the Norwegian law and not that of the forum governs. 
Another opinion is that the foreign rule is adopted by 
"formal reception" only; the conflicts rule is construed as 
implying that the foreign rule is inserted into the body of the 
domestic law of the forum but with the significance and value 
it has under the foreign system. 58 
The "local law theory" as developed in this country is 
kindred to these conceptions, presumably more closely to the 
idea of "formal" reception. It differs in the thesis peculiar to 
this country that the judge creates the law according either to 
his own or to foreign legal rules as the case may require. But, 
56 ANZILOTTI, Studi critici di diritto internazionale privata, parte II ( I898) ; 
PACCHIONI, Elementi 137; Contra: FEDOZZI 162: "artificial," "a phantom of 
studio"; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 Ill 325 at 382. 
57 HARTIN, I Principes 298. 
58 ANZILOTTI, Corso di diritto internazionale (Roma, I923) 85; GHIRARDINI, 
"Sull'interpretazione del diritto internazionale privata," 13 Rivista ( I919) 
290; PERASSI, "Su l'estensione del diritto internazionale privata italiano aile 
nuove Provincie," Rivista I926, SIS; BALDONI, La successione nel tempo delle 
norme di diritto internazionale privata (Rom a, I932) 9; Aao, 58 Recueil 1936 
IV 247; Bosco 95; also MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 386. 
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for conflicts law more than any other branch of national law, 
law must exist before and outside of lawsuits. 
After all, why can the foreign rule not simply come into 
court without crutches? Is it not sufficient that the court's 
own conflicts rule orders application? Once more, the full 
power of conflicts rules seems to be greatly underestimated. 
On the other hand, no kind of domestication invests a for-
eign rule with exactly the same power that domestic rules 
have. For example, the maxim jura novit curia is usually not 
extended to .foreign law. 59 The dominant opinion in Europe 60 
as well as in this country 61 has entirely discounted the rem-
nants of the doctrine inherited from Ulric Huber; there is no 
longer any problem. 
2. The Extent of the Reference 
The theory of Bartin, Kahn, and their followers purports 
not only to determine the content of the first part of the con-
flicts rule but also that of the second part; not only should 
the matters referred to a foreign law be selected according to 
domestic conceptions, but also the foreign rules to which 
these matters are referred must accord with the domestic 
system. Consequently, within the limits of a conflicts rule re-
specting "torts," foreign substantive rules concerning what 
in the eyes of the forum would be "quasi-contract" are in-
applicable. 
An example of this kind of argumentation is furnished by 
the well-known English decisions relating to the statute of 
limitations. In the leading case of Huber v. Steiner, 62 Tindall, 
69 BARTIN, I Principes 295· 
60 PILLET, I Traite no. 5I; BARTIN, I Principes 20 § 10; LEREBOUR8-P!GEON-
N!ERE no. 2I6; RAAPE I2; CAVAGL!ER!, Revue I930, 397, 405. 
61 CAVERS, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 
( I933) I73, I77, thinks that the majority of voices is contrary to the local law 
theory. 
62 2 Bing. N. C. 202 (C. P. I835). 
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C. J., refused to apply the French rule of prescription to a 
French promissory note. He declared the French rule pro-
cedural, on the ground of Story's test that a limitation im-
posed on enforcement only rather than upon the right is pro-
cedural in character. German law has been treated in the 
same way in the English courts.63 Actually, the undisputed 
German conception and the dominant French opinion is that 
a limitation bars the action only and the right survives. This 
does not mean that a limitation is procedural; it is substan-
tive in the precise sense here relevant, namely, that it pro-
vides the debtor an exception to his obligation, a material 
right of defense.64 Consequently, the French and German 
courts characterize statutes of limitations as substantive for 
the purposes of conflicts law. Modern English writers agree 
that the English cases are wrong; they deprive the debtor of 
a defense because of the accidental forum.65 The American 
decisions in cases where the courts do not feel bound by the 
early doctrine, give effect to foreign statutes of limitations. 5 6 
While Kahn corrected his doctrine by suggesting some 
latitude in recognizing foreign rules as applicable but pro-
tested against the application of foreign law in its totality,67 
recently Bartin has radically restricted the scope of his 
theory.68 He has done so, following an argumentation usual 
63 Societe Anonyme Metallurgique de Prayson v. Koppel, The Times, No-
vember z, I933, 77 Solicitor's Journal (I933) 8oo cited by BECKETI', I5 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (I934) 75, supra n. 48. 
64This alone is relevant. Neither BECKETI', I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
( I934) 46 at 75, supra n. 48, nor ROBERTSON, Characterization 248, 25I, have 
reported correctly on the Continental law. 
6 5BECKETI', I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 75 ff., supra n. 48; CHESH-
IRE 653 j MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, "Delimitation of Right and Remedy," 
I6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I935) zo at 4I; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 
232; ROBERTSON, Characterization 64; CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, 
Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," I4 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. (I94I) zzi at 234· 
ua See Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C.C.A. 6th, I942) I24 F. (zd) 663, 
and Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I942) 723. 
67 KAHN, I Abhandl. I90. 
68 BARTIN, I Principes 23I; 3I Recueil I930 I 56I, 603. 
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in Italy, namely, that, in the first instance, the lex fori, being 
the legal order in which the conflicts rule originates, pre-
scribes the characterization to be adopted, but that, the ap-
plicable law having been selected, it must be applied with its 
attendant interpretation.69 In other words, characterization 
by the lex fori for choice of law-characterization by the 
foreign law once chosen. This reasoning has found favor 
with several Anglo-American writers under the name of "sec-
ondary characterization," 70 but seemingly they do not agree 
with each other on numerous details. 
This generous concession to common sense is welcome, but, 
due to its faulty origin in the lex fori theory, it is not broad 
enough and lacks a clear concept. For instance, it has been 
recently suggested 71 that, if the object of a conflicts rule is 
"primarily" characterized as property, those foreign rules 
that are considered property law in the foreign country 
should be applied. Yet, in a court in state X, why should a 
claim recognized by the domestic law of the forum (state 
X), on the theory that property is recoverable, not be sus-
tained under the "applicable" law of Y, which regards the 
property as lost but provides recovery on some quasi-con-
tractual or other theory? Or, to return to the statutes of 
limitations, the German Reichsgericht in a notorious early 
69 ANZILOITI, Corso di lezione ( 1918) 359 and Corso di diritto internazion-
ale privata (1925) 79; CAVAGLIERI 104; PERASSI, Lezione di diritto interna-
zionale, parte prima (1922) 78; UniNA, Elementi 51; AGo, Teoria 145; FE-
DOZZI 183 j BOSCO 107 j BALLADORE PALLIERI 65. These authors, however, speak 
in a very fragmentary manner. 
1° CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 72; in ed. 4 (1954) while the names of primary and 
secondary classification have been dropped, the author insists on his dis-
tinction in substance; UNGER, "The Place of Classification in Private Inter-
national Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3 at 17; ROBERTSON, Characterization 
chs. v, II 8 ff., and IX, 23 5 ff.; CORMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. ( 1941) zZI at 
234, supra n. 65; SCHMITTHOFF 38. Contra: RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 8 
Brooklyn L. Rev. ( 1938) 253 at 256; FALCONBR!DGE, "Renvoi, Characterization 
and Acquired Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) 369 at 373; NussBAUM, Book 
Review, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1461, 1467. 
11 CORMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 235 and n. 86, supra n. 65. 
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decision refused to apply the limitation statutes of Tennes-
see, whose law was considered controlling, because in 
America the defense was regarded as merely proceduraU2 
This refusal to apply a foreign provision because it is con-
sidered procedural in the foreign law, illustrates the theory 
of secondary characterization; it is evidently absurd. 
Recently, the Reichsgericht discovered the correct solution 
long anticipated by many writers, namely, to apply the Amer-
ican statute.73 The reasoning is, however, uncertain and 
partly based on the precarious ground that in German eyes 
the American remedy "also" possesses a "substantive" ele-
ment justifying its application. 
All such doubtful and complicated manipulations are un-
necessary. The needs are simply and efficiently fulfilled by 
the application of the foreign law as it stands and, despite the 
admonition of Kahn, "in its totality." 74 If the first part of 
the conflicts rule, the description of the matter referred to 
the applicable law, is correctly formulated, i.e., not burdened 
by internationally impractical concepts, it contains in itself all 
that is necessary for its purpose. All else belongs to the se-
lected system. In other words, the question which state's law 
governs the case, is answered by the choice of law; there is 
no reason why reference should not be made to this law as 
a whole instead of to parts prematurely chosen. (Whether 
some public policy of the forum is involved is entirely sepa-
rate and independent.) More precisely, the court has to de-
cide the question exactly as a court sitting in the foreign state 
would do, if such court had jurisdiction and had to apply its 
own domestic law. 
72 RG. (Jan. 4, 1882) 7 RGZ. 21. 
73 RG. (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 121, IPRspr. 1934, no. 29, Revue Crit. 
1935. 447· 
74 See the writer's detailed argument, 5 Z.ausi.PR. {1931) 273, Revue 1933, 
I at 44, Qualifikation 52. No comparative law is needed for this purpose as 
certain critics have suspected. For a discussion of renvoi see infra p. 75· 
CHAPTER 3 
The Development of Conflicts Law 
I. RETARDING FACTORS 
I. Preconceptions 
I T is gratifying that the majority of writers now advo-cate emancipation from deductive methods.1 Past theories have left remainders too persistent, however, 
not to cause mischief. As a matter of course, and without 
reference to the desirability of doing so, the doctrine of terri-
torialism has allocated broad fields to the law of the forum, 
including that of divorce and support, which is to be discussed 
in the present volume. There is still reluctance to attribute 
full legal effect to foreign acts and judgments in cases where 
the original power or jurisdiction of the foreign state is 
freely admitted, as is shown in the treatment of foreign 
adoption and foreign corporations. 
Moreover, foreign law, though "applicable" under the ap-
propriate conflicts rule, may nevertheless be rejected on the 
ground of "public policy" of the forum. Due formerly to the 
jealousy of small communities and princes, recently to 
chauvinism and worship of the state, this ground has abnor-
mal significance.2 Though for a long time French courts were 
1 See in particular ARMINJON, "L'objet et Ia methode du droit international 
prive," 21 Recueil 1928 I 433, against deductive and for analytical method; 
LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflict of Laws," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 
781 at 8os, "There is some indication that our courts are prepared to adopt 
a somewhat more realistic approach in conflicts situations. The immediate 
hopes fgr the further development of the conflict of laws in this country would 
seem to be in this direction." 
2 JusTus WILHELM HEDEMANN, former democrat, wrote in Dt. Justiz 1939, 
1523: "Slowly the so-called private international law will take another aspect. 
73 
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generally attacked because of their exaggeration of ordre 
public, European writers now tend to outdo them. 
The increase of national feeling in Europe in the midst of 
the nineteenth century engendered Mancini's famous doc-
trine of nationality. The "principle of nationality," admin-
istered on a world-wide scale as Mancini insisted, would have 
been able to establish a balance in matters of personal status. 
But, excluded from the Anglo-American realm and from 
other countries, it created confusion on account of the claim 
of European states to govern the status and capacity of sub-
jects who had emigrated to such countries. Moreover, as we 
shall see, the principle was repeatedly interpreted without 
sense of responsibility and reciprocity. 
The doctrinal arguments generally adduced against such 
practical necessities as "renvoi" and the right of the parties 
to a contract to determine the applicable law are so signifi-
cant that these two institutions deserve preliminary discus-
sion immediately hereafter. Both have been rejected as in-
compatible with state sovereignty l The power of parties to 
choose their law by agreement was even declared "impossi-
ble," because there had to be first a substantive law allowing 
them such choice l 
In a similar misuse of logic, 8 it has been declared that the 
law governing the effects of a contract cannot "logically" 
control the extent to which error, fraud, or duress affects the 
consent of the parties-there must be a law to determine the 
validity of the transaction, before the law governing its ef-
fects can be selected. The law of the state of incorporation, 
It might be that the general clauses concerning public policy and reprisals 
(articles 30 and 31 of the Introductory Law) will overshadow everything 
else of the private international law." In the first World War, the Reichs-
gericht upheld firmly the conflicts rules, and the government in no serious 
respect interfered. 
s See on the following examples, RABEL, "Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung in 
einzelnen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts, Vorbemerkung," 3 Z.ausl. 
PR. (1929) 752; WAHL, ibid. 791; KESSLER, ibid. 768. 
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or other law regulating the life of a corporation, has been 
said to be unable "logically" to determine the conditions of 
valid constitution of the corporation. The settled rule that 
the law governing torts decides whether or not an act is a 
tort has been characterized as a "legal impossibility." 4 Re-
membering the deduction of the clever Romanist, Miihlen-
bruch, that assignment of a chose in action is logically in-
admissible, and similar errors of eminent jurists,5 we may 
derive consolation from the thought that time will provide a 
remedy. 
In the United States, courts and writers are cognizant of 
such handicaps and are endeavoring to overcome them. Tra-
dition and modernism are engaged in an interesting combat 
with varying results. Circumstances differ in the parts of this 
vast country. In respect to certain problems, it is difficult to 
state what American law actually is, as the Restaters have 
come to suspect. But the writers, practically without excep-
tion, and the great majority of the courts are seriously con-
scious of their duty to reach adequate solutions. When hand-
books and notes in law reviews report on a subject, they 
usually present the forward trend of advanced courts in 
preference to formalistic decisions and precedents exaggerat-
ing local policy. 
2. Renvoi 
The controversy on "renvoi" is the most famous dispute 
in conflicts law, 6 a classic example of violently prejudiced 
4 This was the expression of 2 FRANKENSTEIN 363. 
5 See RABEL, Aufgabe and Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, Miin-
chener J uristische Vortriige, edited by the J uristische Studiengesellschaft in 
Miinchen, Heft r, reprinted from 13 Rhein, Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht 
(1925). 
6 Bibliography is to be found in PoTu, La question du renvoi en droit inter-
national prive (1913); up to 1929 in LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29 
Recueil 1929 IV 519; and in the footnotes by MAURY, "Regles generales des 
conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 519 ff. On the history of the problem since 
a French case of 1652 see E. M. MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull. 
Inst. Int. ( 1938) 191, 197. 
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literature confronting naively consistent practice. Only where 
courts finally succumbed to the persuasion of world-wide 
learned criticism, did they falter, as in Greece, Italy, and in 
Anglo-American literature in addition to the treatises: LORENZEN, "The 
Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law," 10 Col. L. Rev. (1910) 
190, 327; same author, "The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Mean-
ing of 'The Law of a Country,"' 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 509; idem, Cases 299-
303, 318-323; SCHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American 
Law," 3 I Harv. L. Rev. ( 1918) 523; POLLACK, "The 'Renvoi' in New Y ark," 
36 Law. Q. Rev. (1920) 91; ALLEMES, "The Problem of Renvoi in Private 
International Law," 12 Grotius Soc. ( 1927) 63; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and 
Succession to Movables," 46 Law Q. Rev. (1930) 465, 47 Law Q. Rev. (1931) 
at 271; also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi et succession mobiliere," in Revue 1932, 
254, 451; idem, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. 
( 1937) 559-567; idem, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," 17 
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) 369 at 378; idem, "Renvoi and the Law of Domicile," 
19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 3II to 317, 329 to 334; idem, "Renvoi in New York 
and Elsewhere," 6 Vand. Law Rev. (1953) 708 et seq.; all these papers re-
arranged in FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 137-263. L. T. BATES, "Remission and 
Transmission in American Conflicts of Laws," 16 Cornell L. Q. ( 193 I) 3 II; 
DICEY (-MORRIS) 47-61 as against ed. 5, Appendix, Note I, 863 to 878; BENT-
WICH, "Recent Application of the Renvoi in Matters of Personal Status," 14 
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1936) 379; MoRRIS, "The Law of the Domicil," 18 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law ( 1937) at 32; CowAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical 
Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1938) 34-39; GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 
51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 193 7) II65; CoRMAcK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Local-
ization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
( 1941) at 249 to 275; RAEBURN, "The 'Open Offer' Formula and the Renvoi 
in Private International Law," 25 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1948) 2II-235; 
E. W. BRIGGS, "'Renvoi' in the Succession of Tangibles: A False Issue Based 
on Faulty Analysis," 64 Yale L. ]. (1954/55) 195-220. See also LORENZEN, 6 
Repert. 284 nos. 4o-44, 353 no. 366; Decision Note, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 253; 
BENTWICH, "The Development of the Doctrine of Renvoi in England in 
Cases of Succession," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 433; BELLOT, "La theorie anglo-
saxonne de conflits de lois," 3 Recueil 1924 II 99, 164 to 168; KUHN, "La con-
ception du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique aux 
:Etats-Unis," · 22 Recueil 1928 I 186 at 27o-272. On the English cases, see 
furthermore MELCHIOR 194 n. 2; ELKIN, "La doctrine du renvoi en droit 
anglais," Clunet 1934, 577; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern 
English Law (Oxford, 1937); GRASSETTI, "La dottrina del rinvio in diritto in-
ternazionale privata e Ia 'common law' anglo-americana," 26 Rivista ( 1934) 
3-41, 233-261, 350; DE NovA, Book Review of GRASSETTI, 12 Annuario Dir. 
Comp., parte prima ( 1937) 258; and DE NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio 
in diritto inglese," 30 Rivista (1938) 388; idem, "II rinvio nella recente 
giurisprudenza inglese," II Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1954) 120; RHEIN STEIN, Book 
Review, 12 Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 314 at 316. 
In continental Europe besides the notes mentioned infra n. 7, P'AGENSTECHER, 
Der Grundsatz des Entscheidungseinklangs im internationalen Privatrecht 
(Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen 
der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1951, no. 5) is noteworthy. 
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the isolated and now superseded Tallmadge case in New 
York.7 On the other hand, the constancy of the French, Ger-
man, and Swiss courts has been sufficient to impress their 
foremost I tali an opponent, Anzilotti, 8 and recently their 
main French adversary, Niboyet.9 
In the course of the debate, many wrong arguments, 
"logical" and "practical," were advanced on either side.10 
Most of these have cancelled each other long since. Accord-
ing to the view shared by the writer and gaining favor in this 
country, 11 the entire problem is not to be taken in the lump 
and decided on a priori reasoning. The various categories of 
cases merit individual consideration in the light of expedi-
ency. Hence, in the subsequent treatment of each particular 
subject, the prevailing opinions, and the chief countries con-
1 In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's Court, New York 
County, October, 1919) 109 N. Y. Misc. 696, x8x N. Y. Supp. 336. DEAK, 
Book Review, I La. L. Rev. (1939) 642, at 644 n. 14, notes that the court mis-
understood the French rule. In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 
652, 77 Clunet (1950) 976, 16 Z.ausl.PR. (1950/51) 620 with note ZWEIGERT; 
notes 64 Harv. L. Rev. (x9so/sx) x66; so Col. L. Rev. (1950) 862; 35 Minn. 
L. Rev. (195o/sx) 87; 26 N.Y. U. L. Rev. (x9so/51) zox; 4 Int. Law Q. 
(1951) 268; LEWALD, Renvoi Revisited ? in: Fragen des Verfahrens- und 
Kollisionrechts, Festschrift fiir Fritzsche (Zurich, 1952) x6s-x8o; NussBAUM, 
American-Swiss Private International Law (Bilateral Studies in Private In-
ternational Law, no. x, 1951) 21. On a dictum of Steinbrink J. in Lann v. 
United Steel Works Corporation (1938) x66 N. Y. Misc. 465, I N. Y. Supp. 
(2d) 951, "cavalierly" dismissing the problem of renvoi, see FREUTEL, "Ex-
change Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. 
Rev. ( 1942) 30, at 42 ff. 
8 ANZILOTTI, formerly against renvoi, Studi critici di diritto internazionale 
privato, parte 3, 193, 300, elaborated a system approaching the ideas of 
the English judges, Corso di diritto internazionale privato ( 1925) 66, 77; 
Decision Notes, 12 Revista (1918) 81, 288. 
9 NIBOYET, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1939, 474-476 and 3 Traite no. IOI3-
IOI6, now accepts renvoi as definitively adopted by the courts, moreover as 
convenient, but in addition also as a tribute to territorialism. 
10 Surveys on these arguments in English: LORENZEN, "The Renvoi Doctrine 
in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of 'The Law of a Country,'" 27 Yale L. J. 
(1918) 509; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 252 to z6o, supra 
n. 6. Cf. in favor of renvoi: LEPAULLE, "Nature et methode du droit interna-
tional prive," Clunet 1936, 284, 296; Conclusions of M. REY in a French case 
of 1935, Nouv. Revue 1936, II4. 
11 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1937), n65 at n84, supra n. 6. See also 
RAAPE, IPR. 65; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 3) no. 260. 
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cerned, will be stated. Here we have to deal only with the 
basic issue.12 
Renvoi, translated as "remitting," "reference back," 
properly means that, when a conflicts rule of a state refers to 
the "law" of another state and the conflicts rule of the latter 
state directs the application of the former's own internal law, 
such law is applied. Thus, in a French court, succession upon 
death to the movables of an American citizen domiciled in 
France is governed by the "American law" but, the law of 
the domicil, i.e., French inheritance law, being applicable un-
der American principles of conflicts, this law is applied by the 
French courts. 
When the principle of renvoi was first adopted in the 
Forgo case by the French Court of Cassation/3 the avowed 
motive was favor of the law of the forum, the law familiar 
to the judge and appearing to him the most suitable. In that 
case, moreover, the French state had a material interest. The 
judgment gave the property of a deceased Bavarian citizen 
in the absence of heirs to the French exchequer rather than to 
that of Bavaria. This narrow-mindedness is responsible for 
much of the ensuing heated attacks on the doctrine. Never-
theless, many courts applying renvoi exhibit a similar atti-
tude, and some writers, as well as a few projects, recognize 
only the reference back to the law of the forum, in contrast 
to other forms of reference.14 However, renvoi ought not to 
1Z The policy considerations involved in the following exposition were in-
dicated by the present writer in "El fomento internacional del derecho pri-
vado," I8 Revista Der. Priv. (1931) 367; RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 28I; 
RABEL, 7 ibid. (1933) I99 n. I; RABEL, Die Fachgebiete n8; they are in 
essential agreement with the opinions of MELCHIOR and GRISWOLD, funda-
mental for German and American laws, respectively. 
13 Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, I88z) Clunet 1883, 64; moreover, confirming the 
doctrine, Cass. (req.) (March I, 19Io) Clunet 19Io, 888, the vote of the 
Counsellor Denis, published in Clunet 1912, 1013, declared: "]'aime mieux Ia 
loi fran~,;aise que Ia loi etrangere." 
14 STAUB, Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Anhang zu § 372 no. 5 (a); 
HOLDER, 19 Z.int.R. ( I909) I98; NUSSBAUM, Principles 99· 
The drafts of the new Italian preliminary provisions allowed only reference 
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be understood as a concession to judicial deficiencies or preju-
dices. It represents the idea that a rule of conflicts of country 
X, referring to the law of country Y, should not be pursued 
to the point where the court in X applies to an inheritance 
the law of Y, and a court in Y the law of X. Except under the 
influence of the learned literature, no normal judge would 
approve such a result. The theoretical accoutrements for this 
feeling have finally been furnished by a few modern writers. 
Reasonable interpretation of conflicts rules, often, if not nor-
mally, restricts the application of foreign substantive rules of 
law to the territorial limits defined by the respective foreign 
legal systems. in their conflicts laws.15 Hence, the reference to 
the "law" of a foreign state may mean selection of the spe-
cific internal law that such state itself applies, and even an 
express reference to the internal law of a state may be condi-
tional on its applicability by the state in question to the par-
ticular case.16 
The opposite opinion, generally prevailing until recently, 
takes it for granted that a sound conflicts rule must neces-
sarily refer to the material rules of some country and not 
leave the ultimate issue to foreign conflicts law. Why? One 
argument asserts that it is unworthy of a sovereign state to 
follow the commands of a foreign state.17 It appears that 
Italy, influenced by the intended universal significance of the 
Italian conflicts rules, has been won over by this argument.18 
back and have been justly criticized as inconsistent by Aao, "Le norme di 
diritto internazionale privato nel progetto di co dice civile," 23 Rivista (I 93 I) 
297 at 349, 3 so. 
In Soviet Russia, reference back is considered to agree with the spirit of the 
law; see MAKAROV, Precis I23; but LUNZ 129 also recognizes reference over. 
lS MELCHIOR 242-244. 
16 RAAPE 7 4I and RAAPE, IPR. { ed. I) 42. 
17 The argument was invented in France: LABBE, Clunet I 88 5, 5 at 9; 
VALERY 486 nos. 372, 374; PILLET, I Traite 532; BARTIN, I Principes 205, 
and many others. 
18 See MELCHIOR 200; cf. 2.p. An entire book against the doctrine of the 
Italian courts has been published by PHILONENKO, La theorie du renvoi en 
droit compare {Paris, I935). 
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It seems most curious that Italy's dignity should be offended 
when Italian courts apply the Italian Civil Code instead of 
English case law. Another, the most popular argument, 
states that renvoi leads to a vicious circle. If the "accept-
ance" of renvoi from the (American) country of nationality 
to the (French) law of domicil is right, dominant opinion 
reasons, the same method must continue with renvoi from 
the French law of domicil to the American law of nation-
ality. "Logical mirror," "international lawn tennis," "ping-
pong," are celebrated names of the supposed circulus inex-
tricabilis/9 time and again designated as the "most powerful 
argument" for rejecting renvoi. 20 By parity of reasoning, it 
has been supposed that an English or American court re-
sorting to renvoi ought to accept renvoi from the French law 
of domicil to the American law of nationality, and so forth. 
A striking, though tacit, answer has been provided by the 
English practice, more than a hundred years in development, 
in the very field where renvoi originated, viz., where national-
ity and domicil principles conflict.The practice enables the 
English courts to obtain results in harmony with the Conti-
nental decisions in specific situations and to avoid the circulus. 
Basically, confronted with the French and German renvoi 
practice, the English courts simply have given free play to 
their own principle of domicil. The estate of an English de-
cedent domiciled in France is distributed under French law, 
both in French courts by renvoi and in English courts as the 
19 KAHN, I Abhandl. zo; LAINE, Clunet 1896, Z4I at z57, 481; BARTIN, 30 
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1898) 155; STREIT, zo Recueil 19Z7 V IOI; 
LEWALD 17 no. 2z; In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's 
Court, New York County, October, 1919) 109 N. Y. Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. 
Supp. 336. 
20 The "decisive argument" for innumerable writers and still so, for in-
stance, for LEWALD, "La Theorie du renvoi," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 545, 
595; MEIJERS, "La question de renvoi," 38 Bull. In st. Int. ( 1938) 191, Z19. 
For this "powerful" reason, the Italian drafts limited renvoi to reference 
back, and the final text, C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. zo, eliminated it 
entirely. 
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law of domicil. Put to the test when Italian courts repudiated 
renvoi, disdained to apply Italian inheritance law, and in-
sisted on British law for British successions in Italy, the Eng-
lish judges exhibited real wisdom in avoiding the absurd 
result not of renvoi but of the rejection of renvoi. They 
realized that the traditional form of their domiciliary princi-
ple refers to the same law which is applied by the court of the 
domicil.21 Under the principle as now defined, the reference 
to the law of domicil points primarily to the conflicts law of 
the domicil. The cases use different language to express this 
policy of forbearance. Undue attention has been given to in-
consistencies and to sayings such as that the English court 
should decide as if sitting at the place of the domicil.22 
In fact, several modes of stating renvoi are thinkable and 
have been employed by writers, courts on the Continent, and 
British judges. Falconbridge lucidly distinguishes three for-
mulations of renvoi, 23 and some authors, who have contrived 
an intricate system of distinctions, call the English method 
"double renvoi." But these details do not touch the essential 
point, namely, the policy behind the cases. The writers who 
seem not to have understood this policy-unfortunately 
there are many-may be excused, since even Luxmoore, J., 
21 In re Ross, I Ch. D. [1930] 377, 388. 
22 Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Ecc. Ct. (1841) 855, 863, per Jenner, J., often 
quoted, and adopted by DICEY in his early thesis that "the object of our courts 
is to deal with such a will exactly as the courts of the domicil would deal 
with it." DICEY, The Law of Domicile, as a Branch of the Law of England 
(London, 1879) 295· 
The differences of language and certain errors in the decisions were sub· 
jected to a meticulous criticism by MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Mod-
ern English Law, followed widely by CHESHIRE 62-87, in an unforunate 
contrast to his former view, "Private International Law," 51 Law Q. Rev. 
(1935) 76 at 77, (CHESHIRE, ed. x, 135-139). Both authors, in the spell of the 
formalistic international theories, failed to appreciate sufficiently the policy 
questions. The same is true of the subtle criticism by MORRIS, x8 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1937) at 32, supra n. 6, now also DICEY(-MORRis) 47-61. See 
GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1938) at II72, supra n. 6, and his Book Review, 
51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 573· 
23 FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," 17 Can. 
Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378, now Essays x86. 
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in In re Ross 24 and Lord Maugham, in In re Askew/5 while 
confirming and fortifying the rule, evidently regretted that 
the precedents had abandoned the pure domiciliary test. The 
English rule is a praiseworthy contribution to international 
harmony, not difficult to derive from the principle- of domi-
cil. It was prepared by the historic doctrine that jurisdiction 
implies application of the law of the court.26 Finally, these 
principles have been illuminated by the Privy Council in a 
recent case 27 "with all the weight of a considered judgment 
devoted to the issue" of renvoi in general.28 The reference 
from the lex situs to the national law in the Palestinian Suc-
cession Ordinance, 1923, of a deceased owner is construed as 
pointing to the law which the courts of the national country 
would apply to the property in question, as distinguished 
from property in their own country, the contrary construc-
tion being regarded as "deliberately cutting across the princi-
ple" 29 recognized by the English courts. 
What, then, of the mirror cabinet? If the world is split 
into two contradictory systems, there must be some modus 
vivendi. Renvoi is one of the best means to this end. It stands 
to reason that it cannot be applied in the same manner by the 
two antagonistic groups and at the same time reach conform-
24 In re Ross, Ch. D. [1930] 377· 
25 In re Askew, 2 Ch. D. [1930] 259· 
26 See the interesting discussion by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
(1937) at 32, supra n. 6; RHEINSTEIN, u Annuario Dir. Comp. (1937) 315 ff.; 
KUHN, Comp. Com. 52; DE NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio in diritto 
inglese," 30 Rivista 1938, 388 at 412-41 5· 
27 Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Nahas [1941] 3 All E.R. zo, per 
Clauson, L. J., the Judicial Committee (including Lords Atkin, Russel of 
Killowen, Romer and Sir George Rankin). 
28 KEITH, "The Privy Council on Renvoi," Journ. Comp. Leg. (1942) 69. 
29 [1941] 3 All E.R. at 25. The decision is heavily relied on by WYNN-
PARRY, J., In re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch. 506 at 513 (affirmed on 
other grounds, [1948] Ch. uS); notes by MoRRIS and JENNINGS, 64 Law Q. 
Rev. (1948) 264; MANN, u Mod. Law Rev. (1948) 232; FALCONBRIDGE, Es-
says 229; RAEBURN, 25 Br. Year Book Int. Law (1948) zu, supra n. 6; 
BRIGGS, 64 Yale L. J. (1954/55) 195, suPra n. 6; also 15 Z.ausl.PR. (1949/50) 
149 with notes of NEUHAUS, ibid. 161, and W. GOLDSCHMIDT, ibid. 342; II 
Giur. comp. DIP. (1954) II9 with notes of LIPSTEIN and DE NOVA. 
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ity.30 The English method, in turn, is not to be observed by 
courts following the nationality principle! Theorists should 
not demand schematic symmetry just to obtain an argumen-
tum ad absurdum. This understood, it need no longer be 
feared that the English attitude will create new cases of 
circulus inextricabilis.81 The difference between nationality 
and domicil as tests of personal law requires a different tech-
nique in each group of countries. Indeed, the nationality 
principle does not mean that a foreign national is subject 
necessarily to the substantive law of his country; it means 
that the state to which the individual belongs should deter-
mine his personal relations. The law of domicil does not 
mean that everybody must be subject to the substantive law 
of his domicil. The reasonable construction is that the law 
of the place of domicil determines what law should govern. 
so The view of the English courts has a striking parallel in an equally wise 
old decision of the Appeal Court of Liibeck, of March 21, 1861, Krebs v. 
Rosalino, 14 Seuff. Arch. 644 no. 107. The case was entirely analogous to the 
Annesley case [1926] Ch. 692. The testatrix, a subject of Frankfurt on the 
Main, according to the normal concept of domicil, had her last domicil in 
Mainz, but, as she did not have the governmental authorization for domicil 
according to the French Civil Code in force in Mainz, she lacked domicil 
there in the meaning of the law of Mainz, quite as Mrs. Annesley did under 
French law. The conflicts rule of Mainz was uncertain; possibly it subjected 
succession to movables to the law of nationality of the deceased, i.e., the 
statute of Frankfurt. The Court of Liibeck, under its own conflicts rule, re-
ferring the succession to the domicil of the de cuius, declared that correct 
application of the principle required that the entire law of the testator's 
domicil in its totality be applied and succession upon death be adjudicated 
as in the courts of the domicil. 
In his recent work, LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois ( 1941) 49, 
56, again insists that thus the Court of Liibeck refers from domicil to nation-
ality, while the Forgo case and all its followers refer from nationality to 
domicil. But why should this contrast which involves no contradiction, be cited 
as a reproach to the renvoi principle, rather than to the diversity of conflicts 
principles and of concepts of domicil? 
s1 This is feared by MORRIS, "The Law of Domicil," 18 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law ( 1937) 32, 37 and now DICEY (-MORRIS) 56; CHESHIRE 68; MAURY, 
57 Recueil 1936 III 329, 538; DE NovA 441; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
( 1941) 221 at 272, supra n. 6; NussBAUM, ''Rise and Decline of the Law-of-
Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. (1942) 189, 202, 
and Principles 98. 
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Instead of following writers 32 who with a certain pride de-
clare that they intend to "explain away" the English con-
ception of renvoi, the English model should be extended to 
other types of cases and to other countries in accordance 
with the spirit of the principles guiding the forum. 
As to such types of cases, the German 38 courts have con-
sistently assumed that reference back must be accompanied 
by the acceptance of reference to a third law (Weiterver-
weisung, transmission).34 In the case of an English testator 
domiciled in Germany who leaves immovables in Georgia 
(U.S.A.), the German rule refers to English conflicts law 
which refers to the lex situs. The statute of distribution of 
Georgia, therefore, is applicable in a German court as well 
as in England, although German conflicts law itself does not 
distinguish immovables for the purpose of succession. The 
persistent objections to this extension of the renvoi principle 
chiefly tend to demonstrate that the chain of references may 
lead nowhere, a fear not justified by any noteworthy case ma-
terial 85 and not significant in view of the standard set by the 
English precedents. There must always be some hierarchy in 
the applicable laws. Renvoi is not just an aimless game. 
Illustrations: 36 (a) A Danish national dies domiciled in 
Rome, Italy, leaving movables in Germany. A German court 
will consult the national "law," i.e., the Danish conflicts law, 
8 2 MORRIS, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, CHESHIRE and others. 
33 More doubt exists with respect to French courts, but transmissive refer-
ence is recognized by Cass. (req.) (Nov. 7, 1933), Guez c. Ben Attar, Clunet 
1935, 88, Revue Crit. 1934, 440 and Tribunal civil de Ia Seine (June 28, 
1950), 40 Revue Crit. (1951) 648 with note MoTULSKY, 79 Clunet (1952) 174 
with note PHILONENKO; also BATIFFOL, Traite no. 309. 
34 For this translation see ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in 
Anglo-American Law," 31 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1918) 523. 
35 See NussBAUM, 42 Col. L. Rev. (1942) 202, supra n. 31. 
36 The first example is solved by MELCHIOR 225 § 151, as in the text, while 
WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 1) 50 (2), uses the first and third examples in order to 
show that renvoi to a third Jaw should not be followed, if the two foreign 
laws involved disagree in the choice of Jaw. The case on which they agree 
is often excepted from the doctrinal refusal of renvoi. 
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which refers to the domicil and allegedly does not recognize 
renvoi. Therefore, the Italian statute of distribution is ap-
plied. It does not matter that Italian conflicts law equally re-
fuses renvoi so that an Italian court under its nationality 
principle would apply the Danish inheritance law. Hence a 
German judge can without difficulty apply W eiterverweisung 
in this case, although the two foreign conflicts laws involved, 
the Danish and the Italian, do not agree with each other. 
(b) A United States citizen domiciled in Rome leaves at 
death movables in Poland. The inheritance law of Italy is 
not applicable in any one of the three countries. An Italian 
court would apply "American" 37 inheritance law. An Amer-
ican court, were it to adopt the English renvoi practice, 
would give effect to the inheritance law of an American state. 
A Polish court, on the basis of the nationality principle and 
renvoi, should reach the same result. 
(c) An Argentinian domiciled in Rio de Janeiro dies lea v-
ing movables in France. The French court is referred by its 
conflicts rule to the Argentine principle of domicil, and 
thereby to the conflicts rule of Brazil. Until recently, Bra-
zilian conflicts law "accepted" the Argentine "renvoi," and 
Brazilian inheritance law was applicable in Buenos Aires as 
well as in Rio de Janeiro. 
The present Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942, adopt-
ing the domicil principle, leads to the same result. The cir-
cumstance that the two internal laws are not in disaccord is 
not material in a French court, which simply follows the de-
cision that the national (Argentine) court would render. 
In the only decision on renvoi since the five former highest 
tribunals of Italy were replaced by the present Supreme 
Court, the advantages of "transmission" or reference over, 
as distinguished from reference back, are recognized.38 This 
case, decided in 1937, is regarded as spectacular, since it is 
contrary to the settled practice of other courts, to the great 
majority of writers, as well as to the formal prohibition of 
37 Which state's law? See infra pp. 138 ff. 
88 Cass. Ita!. (Dec. 29, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 1939) II 228. 
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renvoi expressed in the new Italian Code, then soon to enter 
into force.39 
While some authors accept only reference back 40 and 
others solely reference over,41 an increasing number advocate 
renvoi in either form for situations in which the same law is 
indicated by the conflicts rules of two or more foreign coun-
tries principally involved.42 For instance, in case two Swiss 
nationals, uncle and niece, whose intermarriage is prohibited 
by Swiss law, were to marry in Soviet Russia while there 
domiciled, the marriage would be valid according to both 
Russian law and Swiss conflicts law.43 Presumably, it is ad-
mitted, the validity of the marriage would be recognized by 
any court.44 Again, by the admission, the existence of a pre-
conception is at least partially avowed. 
In addition to references from the national law to the 
domiciliary law, others from the law of situs to the national 
or domiciliary law and vice versa, and in the field of obliga-
tions, have been admitted with good justification. The par-
ticular situations need separate consideration. 
Ordinary renvoi is not able to settle a "positive" conflict 
of conflicts rules. Where a Spaniard dies domiciled in the 
United States, his movables are distributed here under the 
statute of the domicil and in Spain under Spanish inheritance 
law. This thorny problem is best covered by bilateral trea-
ties. Or it may be obviated by extraordinary concessions, as 
in the Swiss statute on conflicts. In an admirable effort to 
avoid collisions regarding Swiss nationals abroad, the statute 
39 See GRASSETII, Note to the decision supra n. 38. 
40 See supra n. 14. 
41 The sovereignty of the forum is said not to be involved; BATE, Notes on 
the Doctrine of Renvoi (1904) 112 ff.; also, Austrian OGH. (May 2, 1929) 
JW. 1931, x66 (for obscure reasons). 
42 LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 574; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 
329 at 549; M. WoLFF, IPR. 76. 
43 Example adduced by RAAPE, 24, 745, as support for renvoi in general. 
44LEWALD, Regles genchales des conflits de lois (1941) 58. 
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provides that Swiss citizens should be subject to Swiss mu-
nicipal law only if the local domestic law of the domicil does 
not claim to govern.45 Hence, the national law extends to 
Swiss nationals abroad only under a negative condition. 
At present, renvoi is prescribed by statutory provisions in 
Germany, Austria, Poland, Sweden, Finland, China, Japan, 
Siam, Liechtenstein, and Israel, 46 moreover by the Hague 
Convention on Marriage, 47 and the Geneva conventions con-
cerning negotiable instruments.48 In practice, it occurs be-
yond the limits of these provisions 49 and in other countries. 5° 
45 NAG. arts. 28, 3I. Compare also the German EG. art. 28, the Polish law 
on international private law of I926, arts. I6, I9 par. 31 and the Czecho-
slovakian law on private international law of I948, ss. I7, 23. But the Federal 
Tribunal has restricted the scope of this concession by excluding the cases 
where the conflicts rule of the foreign domicil either remits the case to a 
third state's law (BG. April 3, I9521 78 BGE. II zoo, 203) or declares itself 
applicable but by virtue of a conflicts rule differing from the Swiss rule (e.g., 
by subjecting an illegitimate child's support claim to the personal law of the 
unwed mother where Switzerland applies the Swiss father's personal law, 
BG. Feb. z, 1955, 8I BGE. II I7, zo). 
46 Germany: EG. art. 27, in five cases of status questions. 
Austria: Decree of Oct. IS, I94I 1 § IS. 
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 36. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of I904 with subsequent amendments, c. I § z, c. 2 § I. 
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § 53, Law of Dec. 28, I929, § 9· 
China: Law of I9I8, art 4· 
Japan: Law of I898, art 29. 
Siam: Law of I939 on Private International Law, art 4· 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 45 and SCHLUSSABTEILUNG, § 70; S.R. art. I3 par. 
z; see also for another provision WAHLE, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 137. 
Israel: Palestine Order in Council, Sept. I, I922, art. 64 (2) ; Succession 
Ordinance, March 8, 1923, s. 4 (iii) (c). 
Cf. cases commented by WENGLER, "Internationales und interreligioses Pri-
vatrecht in Paliistina," 12 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1939) 772, 790. 
Also the Rumanian C.C. (1940), supra p. 30, n. 70, art. 46. 
Yugoslavia: Law on Succession of April 25, 1955, arts. I 56, 159. 
47 Art. I. Member states, supra p. 34· 
48 Resolutions of the Hague ( I912) concerning checks, art. 32, similar pro-
vision in Soviet Russia: Law on checks, of Nov. 6, I9291 art. 36. Cf. MAKAROV, 
Precis I91. Geneva conflicts rules on bills of exchange ( I930) art. z par. I 
and on checks (I93I), art. z par. I. These rules are not only binding between 
the contracting parties (supra p. 38), but have been enacted by several coun-
tries as internal law, see MAKAROV, Quellen (Index). 
49 The German Supreme Court especially applies the principle of renvoi to 
all matters of conflicts laws. See MELCHIOR § I39· 
50 MELCHIOR I98, mentions Argentina (contra: Vrco no. 304 and art. zo 
of the Draft Civil Code, 82 Clunet (I955) 232), Brazil (but see note 52 
88 INTRODUCTION 
Under the influence of the theoretical literature, the recent 
codes of Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Syria 51 have rejected 
renvoi, as does the Brazilian law of 1942,52 while at the same 
time reducing conflicts by its acceptance of the domiciliary 
principle. But in the Continental literature, the traditional 
hostility of the writers is being abandoned. 58 In 1932, the In-
stitute of International Law, which had censured renvoi in 
1895, 1898, and 1900, recognized the conventional, legisla-
tive, and judicial trend, manifesting itself in various coun-
tries in certain applications of the renvoi doctrine, particu-
larly with respect to personal status.54 
A like change of mind is to be hoped for the United States. 
The usual case for resort to renvoi is here almost without 
infra), Belgium (decisions in DE Vos, 2 Probleme no. 821), Bulgaria, Lux-
embourg, Norway, Portugal (also the Draft Civil Code, arts. 30, 31) Spain 
(cf. W. GoLDSCHMIDT, 15 Z.ausl.PR. (1949/so) 342, supra n. 29), Rumania 
(supra n. 46), and Venezuela. To be added are certainly Switzerland 
(SCHNITZER 205), Lebanon (Cass. Dec. 26, 1951, 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 364 
with note GANNAGE) and probably many other countries. See also Anglo-
German Mixed Tribunals (May 31, 1926) 6 Recueil des decisions des tri-
bunaux arbitraux mixtes 540. 
51 Ita!. C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 30. 
Greek C. C. ( 1940) art. 32. 
Egyptian C. C. ( 1948) art. 27. 
Syrian C. C. (1949) art. 29. 
The Dutch decisions prevailingly reject renvoi (VAN BRAKEL, 75 n. r). 
The Benelux-Draft on uniform conflict of laws, supra p. 39, though in 
principle not accepting renvoi (art. r, par. I) admits both reference back 
and reference over from the national law of a person to the law of his 
domicil (art. 15, no. 2 and 3). 
5 2 Brazil, Lei de IntrodU(;ao, of Sept. 4, 1942, art. r6. 
58 France: in addition to older writers (WEISS, VAREILLE&-SOMMIERE, 
COLIN), LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, "Observations sur )a question du renvoi," 
51 Clunet 1924, 877 and now Precis no. 259; ARMIN JON, "Le renvoi," Revue 
1922-1923, 565 at 583 ff. and now r Precis no. 194; NIBOYET, 3 Traite no. 
IOI3-IOI6, 
Belgium: ROLIN, POULLET no. 256. 
Germany: NUSSBAUM (D. IPR. sr) M. WOLFF (IPR. 76), RAAPE (IPR. 64), 
in addition to the older writers recorded by MELCHIOR 201 § 137. 
Switzerland: ScHNITZER 198; NIEDERER 274. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI. 
Spain: TRfAs DEBEs, "Regles generales des conflits de lois," 62 Recueil 1937 
IV 62; GoLDSCHMIDT, r Sistema 377· 
5~ Annuaire 1932, 471. 
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significance, as, in common with almost the entire British 
Empire, none of the States accept the principle of nationality. 
This evidently is the reason why the basic need has not been 
felt as in Europe. Other conflicts, however, have occurred, 
striking enough to compel the Restaters to admit some excep-
tions to their rejection of renvoi. 55 Cowan proves that renvoi 
is "logically" possible,56 and Griswold vigorously pleads for 
renvoi wherever no special reasons militate against it. 57 Even 
from an opposed point of view, Cormack, in effect, accepts 
the practical result of renvoi in all cases respecting status and 
property, since he would determine these matters according 
to the law considered applicable at the domicil or situs re-
spectively.58 It would accordingly seem that the critic who de-
clared his appreciation for Griswold's advocacy of a cause 
lost before the formidable array of the enemies of renvoi, 59 
may soon have to look for another ground of sympathy. 
The new, more realistic approach to renvoi looks for in-
ternational agreement rather than doctrinal solutions. The 
Draft Convention of the Hague Conference (I 9 5 I) "to de-
termine conflicts between the national law and the law of 
domicil," 59a though limited in range seeks to eliminate the 
most important group of conflicts. According to the Project, 
the reference of the national law of a person to the law of his 
domicil is binding both for the domiciliary state and for third 
countries (art. I). In order to avoid divergent qualifications, 
the Draft defines "domicil." This is a considerable progress. 
55 Restatement § 8. 
56 COWAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (1938) 34-49· 
57 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1937) n6s. 58 CORMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 229 supra n. 6 · contra 
F "R . ' ' ALCONBRIDGE, envoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 Can. Bar Rev. 
(1941) 3II at 335, 337, now Essays 141, 164. 
59 Annual Survey of English Law 1938 388. 
59
a Texts and general comment, supra ~. 41, n. 95· For other proposals, see 
RABEL, 4 Int. Law Q. ( 1951) 402-411; German counterproposal, 17 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1952) 273-
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But elaborate construction in this field will still be needed, 
after the blank negation is suppressed. 
3· Choice of Law by the Parties 60 
The doctrine of "autonomy of the parties" is also to be 
noted in this connection as an example of obstinate theory 
opposed to universal practice. The details will be considered 
later in connection with contracts. 
The practice allowing parties to a contract to determine 
the law applicable to their contractual relation, recognized in 
Dumoulin's theory, for centuries has been applied by courts 
throughout the world with slight dissent.61 In commercial 
arbitration, this right of the parties is taken for granted. If 
this time-honored view has recently suffered vacillation, it is 
due to the fanatical campaign of the handbooks in the last 
decades. After World War I, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 
which were free to choose their method, had no doubt about 
the rule.62 
Despite this practice, prevailing theory 63 attacks the free-
dom of the parties to a contract to determine the law that 
shall govern its validity, because this enables them to evade 
60 An excellent comparative study on the subject is the book by H. BATIFFOL, 
Les conflits de lois en matiere de contrats (1938). 
61 The Swiss Federal Court had held that the questions connected with the 
formation of a contract, such as those concerning consent, fraud, error, for-
malities, power of attorney, are inaccessible to the parties' choice of law; it 
seems that these questions were determined, preferably at least, under the 
law of the place of contracting. See BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. II 397, 399; 
BG. (July 12, 1938) 64 BGE. II 346, 349· Recently, concededly under the 
influence of the Swiss writers, the court has admitted that the formation of 
a contract also is generally governed by the parties' choice of law, with the 
exception of formalities and the capacity to contract; BG. (Feb. u, 1952) 
78 BGE. II 74, 83 with note GUTZWILLER, IO Schwz. Jahrb. (1953) 304; 
(Aug. 27, 1953) 79 BGE. II 295, 299· 
62RABEL, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 42. 
aa See the endless lists of majority opinions by CALEB, Essai sur Ie principe 
de l'autonomie et de Ia volonte en droit international prive (1927) 81; 
MELCHIOR 500 § 353 n. I j GUTZWILLER I6o6 n. I; BATIFFOL II, Exceptional 
positions were taken by KOSTERS (1917) 733; SURVILLE ( 1925) 351, 
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compulsory rules of a law otherwise controlling. It has been 
said that to allow parties to select their law would elevate 
them to the rank of a legislature and delegate to them a 
sovereign power. Hence, it is supposed, each contract must be 
localized in one state whose law shall prescribe whether the 
contract is valid and whether, or to what extent, the parties 
are allowed to submit controversies to the law of another 
state. To recognize an agreement respecting applicable law 
before determining which law governs the validity of the 
agreement, is accordingly regarded as putting the cart before 
the horse. 
On the other hand, courts operate on the unassailable 
basis of a customary, extremely well-settled conflicts rule. Au-
tonomy is needed in the first place by international and, in 
this country, also by interstate commerce. For such matters, 
at least in peace time, few compulsory, imperative rules of 
law are provided in the national legislations; existing prohi-
bitions will more often than not be considered by the court 
in which the contract is in issue either from the viewpoint of 
local public policy or as a defense based on illegality of per-
formance. Thus, the danger that prohibitions established by 
one law may be evaded by a party exercising the right to se-
lect another law is practically negligible, so that a state or-
dinarily has no substantial interest, as the theory postulates, 
warranting intrusion into the international freedom of con-
tracting. On the contrary, the merchants have an enormous 
interest that a certain and preknown body of rules should 
govern future litigation. They are surrounded by a chaos of 
national conflicts laws and national legislations, private and 
commercial. Contracts between merchants of different na-
tions are likely to touch several territories. No attorney is 
able to predict the law under which the various rights and 
duties of the parties will be adjudicated in all courts in which 
litigation may occur. This primordial need for relative cer-
92 INTRODUCTION 
tainty is documented by the multitudinous usages and stand-
ard forms of the several branches of international trade and 
impels courts familiar with business requirements, British, 
French, German, and Swedish, to grant the parties wide lati-
tude. They usually assert without qualification that the appli-
cable law is determined by the parties.64 
N onmercantile situations must be independently evalu-
ated. The case in which Dumoulin advocated autonomy of 
the parties involved marriage settlements; the French courts 
still insist on free choice of law by the parties in this case. 
The prevailing view, however, is that the law governing in 
the absence of a settlement, controls the permissibility of the 
settlement, 65 including any agreement respecting the appli-
cable law. In fact, as contrasted with business contracts, mar-
riage settlements are frequently subjected to restrictions im-
posed by law. 
The attitude of the courts has finally received the support 
of a succession of German 66 and an increasing number of 
French 67 writers. The dominant theory has also been criti-
cized of late in the United States; 68 that the cases do not 
6 4 See, e.g., for English dicta, CHESHIRE 206. 
65 See infra, Effects of Marriage on Property, Chapter IO. 
66 The first opposition to the dominant reasoning was expressed in my ob-
servations, I Z.ausi.PR. (I927) 42 n. I, and Book Review, 4 Z.ausi.PR. (I930) 
4I7i also in IS Revista Der. Priv. (1931) pi, 363, for the reasons explained 
above; more study was given with arguments of varying kind by HAUDEK, 
Die Bedeutung des Parteiwillens im internationalen Privatrecht, Rechtsvergl. 
Abhandl. no. 7 (I93I); MELCHIOR 498 § 351 ff. (1932); NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 
2I4 (I932); M. WoLFF, IPR. I39i Priv. Int. Law 4I6; RAAPE, IPR. 424; 
DOLLE, I7 Z.ausi.PR. (I952) I70i also the Swiss author NIEDERER 193-196. 
67 LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE, Note, DALLOZ I931.2.33 and Precis no. 25I j 
WIGNY, "La regie de conflit applicable aux contrats," Revue Dr. Int. (Bru-
xelles) (1933) 676; PLANIOL, RIPERT et ESMEIN, 6 Traite pratique 64I no. 
467 j PERROUD, CJunet 1933, 289 j BATIFFOL 8 j }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 253 j 
MAURY no. 54I; also }EANPRETRE, Les conflits de lois en matiere d'obligations 
contratuelles, selon Ia jurisprudence et Ia doctrine aux Etats-Unis (I936) I37· 
Cf. RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (I937) 327. 
68 CooK, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Ill. L. Rev. (I936) 143 
at I45i CooK, Legal Bases (I942) at 349; and ibid. 389; and see LORENZEN 
and HEILMANN, "The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," 83 U. of Pa. L. 
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confirm the hostility of the Restatement to election of law by 
the parties, is well known.69 
Hence, the recent literature interests itself more in the 
limits to be imposed upon the autonomy of the parties' inten-
tion than in challenging its existence/° Consideration was 
given to a particularly important phase of this problem in 
connection with the uniform conflicts rules in relation to sales 
of goods prepared by the International Law Association and 
the Sixth and Seventh Hague Conferences.71 The British 
lawyers were in significant opposition to the insistence of 
Continental scholars that the validity of an agreement mak-
ing a certain law applicable, should be subject to the same 
law that, under the intended Convention, should be applied 
in the absence of such agreement. The proponents of this re-
striction claimed that this would ensure greater certainty for 
the parties than if the law of the forum were to determine 
the validity of the agreement. In the Draft Convention of 
the Seventh Hague Conference ( I 9 5 I ) , the former view 
was adopted recognizing for international sales the parties' 
free choice of law unrestricted by some "primary law" or a 
"legitimate interest" of the parties. However, the entire dis-
cussion and others that followed in the literature make it de-
sirable to sound a warning that business security will be fur-
ther menaced by ensnaring commercial autonomy in a net-
Rev. ( 1935) 555; WILLis, "Two Approaches to the Conflict of Laws: A Com-
parative Study of the English Law and the Restatement of The American Law 
Institute," 14 Can. Bar Rev. (1936} I; YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the 
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183; idem, "'Autonomy' in Choice 
of Law," I Am. J. Comp. Law (1952) 341. 
69 See the writers cited in the precedent note and in a detailed criticism by 
NussBAUM, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement," 51 
Yale L. J. (1942) 893. 
7°See M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 2) 118; Priv. Int. Law 416 no. 398; and M. 
WoLFF, "The Choice of Law by the Parties in International Contracts," 49 
Juridical Review (1937) 110, 118. 
71 A clear resume is to be found in Int. Law Association, 35th Report (1928) 
136 ff. 
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work of limitations through a combination of substantive and 
conflicts rules. 
Of course, when the world enjoys a reliable uniform con-
flicts law, neither renvoi nor self-choice of law will be so 
largely needed as today. 
II. THE PuRPOsE OF CoNFLICTS LAw 
r. Uniformity 
Since Savigny, it has been customary to regard the attain-
ment of uniform solutions as the chief purpose of private in-
ternational law. Cases should be decided under the same sub-
stantive rules, irrespective of the court where they are 
pleaded.72 We may gratefully note that this postulate has 
continued in favor, if only as an ideal remote from reality, 
at a time when separate conflicts laws have grown up in the 
various countries and their diversities have been prized. The 
real value of this postulate under present conditions is that it 
forms a test for the relative convenience of conflict rules.73 
The time has come to approach the goal with more energy. 
One of the considerations leading to a universally useful 
rule is the legitimate expectation of the parties. Not to dis-
appoint fair assumptions by persons disposing of property or 
entering into engagements, was the justified motive of the 
twisted doctrines protecting vested rights.74 For example, 
formalities are subject to the law of the place where a trans-
action has been concluded; the acquisition of property is gov-
erned by the law of the situs as of the time of the acquisition; 
72 SAVIGNY § 348; recently, for instance, TAINTOR, "'Universality' in the 
Conflict Laws of Contract," I La. L. Rev. (I939) 695, 699; HANCOCK, Torts 
in the Conflict of Laws (I942) 54· 
73 SeeM. WoLFF, IPR. 9, Priv. Int. Law IS; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 
I96; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 423; NEUNER, "Policy Considerations 
in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (I942) 479, 483. 
74 GoODRICH, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q. 
(1930) 156, 167 ff. and GOODRICH 7 j CHESHIRE 31 37 j NEUNER, 20 Can, Bar 
Rev. (I942) at 482, suPra n. 73· 
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capacity to contract a business obligation partly is, or should 
be, determined by the law governing the validity of the con-
tract, etcetera. "When a matter has been settled, in conform-
ity with the law then and there controlling the actions of the 
parties, the settlement should not be disturbed because the 
point arises for litigation somewhere else." 75 This "funda-
mental premise" suggests that courts should search, in the 
absence of express intentions with respect to the applicable 
law, for the "tacit" and eventually the "presumed" intentions 
of the parties. 
Moreover, as a European writer has recently postulated, 
when a fact or an act is governed by a certain law according 
to all the conflicts laws practically involved, this law should 
be applied by any court before which the case may come as a 
result of subsequent circumstances. 76 
In a more general way, Savigny regarded it a guarantee of 
uniform treatment of legal relations that the law of that 
place where the relation has its legal "seat" should be ap-
plied everywhere-a conception that through Wharton has 
been admitted in the Supreme Court of the United States.77 
Gierke substituted for "seat" "center of gravity"; Bar 
sought localization "according to the nature of things"; and 
Westlake recommended the law of the state with which the 
relation has closest connection. All these formulas tend 
toward the same goal, the importance of which still is in no 
wise impaired. But the obstacles barring the way to the goal 
have increased since the world order envisaged by Savigny 
has been dissolved into more than a hundred national legal 
systems. 
In view of the difficulties of reaching uniformity, a more 
modest aspiration has been correctly proposed by Cook, 
75 GooDRICH, 36 W. Va. L. Q. (1930) 156, 164, supra n. 74· 
76 MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 3& Bull. lnst. Int. (193&) at :225. 
77 Pritchard v. Norton (1&&2) 106 U. S. 124 at 130. 
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namely, to attain "as much certainty as may be reasonably 
hoped for in a changing world" and is compatible with 
"needed flexibility." 78 
2. Policy Considerations 
A just result or the realization of prescribed policies is 
now often viewed as the main purpose of conflicts law.79 This 
is right without doubt, if certain fundamental distinctions be 
borne in mind. 80 
(a) The usual confusion of private and conflicts laws has 
engendered the conception that both have to follow the same 
pattern of values and purposes. If this were true, all the 
differences that permeate the national laws with respect to 
the organization of the family, the categories of property 
rights, freedom of contract, privileges and duties, public in-
terests, and so on, would be reflected, nay reproduced, in the 
conflicts rules of the divers countries. The writers have for-
mulated their axioms according to their particular views. 
Kahn, 81 for instance, who considered relationships created by 
internal law to be the subject matter of conflicts rules, re-
quired conformity with the fundamental idea of the internal 
institution. If, in the doctrine of the internal law, parental 
power is regarded as a mere right, the father's personal law 
should govern; if the father's duty is accentuated, the law of 
the child. Under Pillet's leadership, French writers trans-
formed their doctrine of sovereignty 82 so as to require the 
determination of what law ought to govern capacity to con-
tract, succession on death, etc., in conformity with the "social 
78 CooK, Legal Bases 432. 
79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (I932); CAVERS, "A Critique of the 
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) at I73; NEUNER, "Policy 
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. ( I942) at 486; 
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (I937) 55, recognize "a desirable result" in 
their third and fourth classification of "social policies." 
80RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 284. 
81 KAHN, I Abhandl. 112. 
82 See DE Vos, IS Revue Inst. Beige ( I929) I, 97; I6 ibid. ( I930) I33· 
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purpose" of the state regulations pertaining to personality, 
family, security of commerce, etc.; the applicable law is that 
which most efficiently protects the purpose fostered by the 
forum's own domestic legislation.83 
This identification of motives, sometimes extremely conse-
quential, aggravates the difficult task of the conflicts law be-
yond all limits. To care for social prosperity is the responsi-
bility of the municipal private laws, which have to resolve the 
merits of each particular problem. The principle, jus suum 
cuique tribuere, instructs legislators and judges to ponder 
carefully private and public interests. But this is what each 
private law does for itself; the function of private interna-
tional rules is to choose the applicable law with all its evalua-
tions whatever they may be. Existing conflicts law presumes 
that all laws of civilized countries are of equal rank, not to 
speak of sister states in a federation. Assuredly, the origin of 
this idea was political, and its modern theoretical foundation 
came from its connection with the law of nations. But, as 
things are, to inject national policies directly into conflicts 
law, will destroy it. In such event, "international public or-
der" would embrace all internal laws. 
(b) When preconceptions are eliminated, policy in the 
field of conflicts law is of course the main object of concern. 
Conflicts rules have never been entirely uninfluenced by the 
underlying social situation. This is pioneer ground. How the 
interest of the state, of other states, of the parties, of third 
persons in good faith, of commerce or trade in general, are 
to be valued against each other in various situations and best 
reconciled with the postulate of certainty, needs renewed and 
detailed deliberation. For the time being, it would be entirely 
premature to try to enumerate or to analyze such considera-
tions in a general way.83a 
83 See the illustrations of NrBOYET 500 no. 416. 
saa For recent discussions, especially by American and German writers, see 
NEUNER, "Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. 
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(c) The postulate that conflicts rules should have just re-
sults may be understood-or perhaps misunderstood-as 
signifying that the outcome of lawsuits in every case should 
conform, not to the lex fori, but to the judge's sense of 
justice. 
We well know that courts will try many direct or devious 
ways to satisfy this sense of justice. They will use the faculty 
to reject a foreign rule on the ground of a public policy of 
the forum. They will classify an unwelcome foreign rule as 
inapplicable foreign procedure. They will, with a desired end 
in view, affirm or deny a person's domicil. And we may trust 
the courts always to select, of two accessible ways, that which 
leads to the result to them appearing preferable. 84 These 
expedients of judicial wisdom cannot be closed entirely, and 
should not be, while conflicts rules remain crude and vague. 
It is good to know that inscrutable judgments occasionally al-
leviate the conflicts chaos. 
Yet, subservience to subjective and local values would be 
dangerous and unsound as a general policy. Cavers seems to 
envisage disintegration of conflicts rules as the consequence 
of his postulate of just results and, by way of palliation, rec-
ommends re-enforcement of the doctrine of stare decisis and 
recourse to standards. 85 Such programs, not sufficiently de-
tailed, are disturbing. 
Several points discussed in this chapter are illustrated in 
(1942) 479-501; HARPER, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 56 Yale 
L. J. (1947) II55-II77; WENGLER, "Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsiitze des 
IPR. und ihre Kollisionen," 23 Zeitschrift fiir Offentliches Recht ( 1943/ 44) 
473-509, 41 Revue Crit. (1952) 595-622, ibid. 42 (1953) 37-60; ZWEIGERT, 
Festschrift Raape (1948) 49-52; KEGEL, "Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz 
im Internationalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Lewald (1953) 259-288. 
84 American courts prefer to satisfy a desirable solution in usury cases than 
to have all decisions harmonized. See STUMBERG 237, and WENGLER, Book 
Review, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 967. 
85 CAVERS, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 173 at 196, supra n. 79· Recently 
CAVERS himself has confessed troublesome doubts concerning his reference to 
social and economic considerations, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 
1170 at II73· 
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the case of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. 
Cox.86 The plaintiff, having been injured on a passenger train 
in Missouri, for consideration released her rights to the local 
agency of the railroad by a document executed in Missouri. 
Under a statute of Missouri, she could not bring an action to 
cancel the release without refunding the sum received. With-
out doing so, she sued in Arkansas, and the Supreme Court 
held ( I ) that the failure of tender was characterized in Mis-
souri as going to the basis of the right, but ( 2) that in Ar-
kansas such a suit could be prosecuted without returning the 
sum, and (3) that, therefore, the question being merely pro-
cedural in the forum, the suit should be allowed. From the 
viewpoint of a sound system (or of analytical jurispru-
dence), there are three fundamental objections to be made. 
( I ) The Missouri provision is questionable, though possibly 
directed against ambulance chasing. ( 2) Yet, even if wrong, 
the provision is of course substantive, affecting the material 
rights of the plaintiff, any procedural consequence being 
merely accessory. The law of Arkansas not requiring tender 
is equally substantive; it denies what the other law affirms. 
(3) The Court evidently applied the law of the place where 
the contract was made and performed. On this ground, it 
should not have evaded its own conflicts rule, as it did by a 
characterization according to the alleged lex fori. What 
really was intended is obvious, however. The court wanted 
desperately to satisfy its own sense of equity as against an 
objectionable foreign law. 
Ill. RATIONALIZATION 
I. Special Rules 
Inductive methods include the creation of special rules for 
typical situations. Case law in this country has produced a 
sa St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Cox (1926) 171 Ark. 103, 
283 S. W. 31; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 272. 
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wealth of such specific rules, whereas the European codifica-
tions have been satisfied to formulate conflicts rules in very 
broad and generalized terms. Specialization of the rules has 
recently become a recognized tendency, particularly in the 
field of obligations, in which, even in this country, general 
axioms have done much harm. The Institute of International 
Law has been active in this direction since I908. The Polish 
Law of I 926 (art. 8) and the Czechoslovakian Law of I 948 
( § 44-46) state different points of contact appropriate to 
the various types of contract-contracts executed at an ex-
change or market, retail bargains, construction and employ-
ment contracts with the state and other public corporations, 
insurance contracts, contracts with attorneys and similar per-
sons, employment by business enterprises, etcetera. The Per-
manent Court of International Justice has held that a gov-
ernmental loan by issue of bonds having several places of 
payment is subject to the law of the issuing government.87 
Maritime shipping contracts have been made the subject of 
special international conventions.88 The scope of a power of 
attorney is determined under the law of the state in which 
the agent acts.89 Courts in all countries have elaborated a 
wide-flung net of specialized solutions by localizing contracts 
according to the "tacit," "presumed," or simply the ficti-
tiously assumed intent of the parties.90 
This growing emphasis on the law corresponding to the 
particular type of contract has two additional wholesome ef-
fects, namely, promotion of uniformity, since types of con-
tracts are the same everywhere under modern circumstances, 
and concentration-so far as feasible-on one convenient 
87 Judgments nos. I4 and IS of July 12, I929. 
88 Cf. for instance, the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty of I889 on 
commercial law, arts. I4 and IS, changed in the Draft of I940 on commer-
cial maritime law to art. 2S· 
89 Restatement § 34S; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( I929) 812 ff. 
90 For a synthesis, see BATIFFOL. 
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law. In the latter regard-the problem of depet;age 91-it is 
noteworthy that both American and Continental conflicts 
laws suffer from cumulated application of several conflicts 
rules, referring to different legislations, to one and the same 
contract. The Restatement, for instance, divides the prob-
lems arising on a contract into two parts, subjecting one part 
to the law of the place where the contract is concluded and 
the other to the law of the place where the contract is to be 
performed.92 The division is precarious and very objection-
able in several respects, but chiefly because a contract should 
not be split on a priori grounds. A similar distinction between 
the creation and the effect of contracts was admitted by the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal.93 Still worse, the German courts al-
locate the duties of the seller and the buyer to the laws of 
their respective places of performance, these, if not other-
wise provided, being presumed to be at the corresponding 
domicils. A bilateral contract cannot be broken up into such 
fragments without distorting a number of problems.94 All 
such rules will vanish when the different types of contracts 
in general form the center of interest. 
Another point will hold our attention in the next chapters. 
Capacity to contract is generally determined in this country 
by the law of the place where the contract is made, a law not 
necessarily the same as the law governing the contract in 
other respects, for instance, that intended by the parties. In 
Continental Europe, an individual's capacity is determined as 
a rule by his personal law, a law potentially different from 
that or those governing other aspects of the contract. In both 
hemispheres, the respective rules concerning capacity appear 
overextended, and the distinction between capacity and other 
91 For theoretical discussion of the method of connecting isolated parts of 
the facts with different countries, see WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 230. 
9 2 Restatement§§ 332 and 358; cf. in particular CooK, Legal Bases, 345, 346. 
93 Supra n. 61. 
94 See NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928} 108. 
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aspects of contracts, at least in certain cases, should be 
abolished.95 
2. Independent Conflicts Rules 
The crucial point to be reformed is the blind subjection of 
conflicts rules to the private law of each country. The ex-
tremely broad and at the same time fragmentary rules usual 
in the enacted conflicts laws of the nineteenth century, includ-
ing the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, incor-
porate language taken from provincial legal thinking. As 
these rules are progressively refined, the more urgent is their 
independence of notions defined by the law of the forum in 
order to enable other legal systems in the pertinent cases to 
be invoked. 
This need is by no means limited to "characterization." 
Cook has pointed out how often in this country confusion is 
caused by applying the "law" of a state, without exact in-
quiry whether such law is not limited to domestic cases and 
raises no question of conflicts law.96 Thus, a statute of Texas 
prescribing that a married woman cannot charge her sepa-
rate estate to secure her husband's obligation, does not nec-
essarily impose such restriction upon a wife domiciled in an-
other state, even when the transaction occurs in Texas.97 
Resort to statutory construction is the usual method of 
avoiding faulty conclusions. This method, however, should 
be limited to its natural domain. A statutory provision must 
be analyzed in respect to the question whether it incorporates 
a fundamental policy of the state (as in the case of the Texas 
statute mentioned). It may occasionally occur also, as we 
have remarked before, that a private law rule is not intended 
or is not fit to be applied in another jurisdiction, a situation 
95 Infra pp. 210 ff. 
96 CooK, Legal Bases. 
97 CooK, Legal Bases 438, 439· 
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that much more frequently occurs in the case of administra-
tive (police) regulations. But answers to the regular ques-
tions of conflicts law are rarely contained in municipal stat-
utes. Private law rules ordinarily qo not direct which persons 
or movables they include. It is as mistaken to apply such rules 
blindly to events all over the world as to presume them lim-
ited to merely domestic situations. They are simply neutral; 
the answer is not in them. Generally, therefore, what is 
needed, or even feasible, is not an interpretation of the stat-
ute but a rule of private international law to accompany and 
delimit the rule of private law. A striking example is the con-
fusion exhibited in determining the relation between adop-
tion and inheritance statutes in different states, a confusion 
chiefly attributable to futile attempts to interpret one or 
the other of these statutes, neither dealing with conflicts 
questions.98 
A full program for the needed reform cannot be outlined 
in this place. There is no reason why this branch of law 
should not enjoy the abundance of legal devices, characteriz-
ing modern private or penal law. 
3. Internationalization 
Against the expectation of a priori theorists, it is remarka-
ble to what extent conflicts rules are able to serve in many 
countries, once relieved from the burden of local legal tech-
niques and related to situations in actual life. The modern 
means of communication, the organization of international 
trade, the progress of science, and some general trends in the 
evolution of social policy, provide a common basis. An un-
biased examination of the actual facts represented by an in-
ternational sale, an employment contract, a claim for work-
men's compensation, or a negotiable instrument payable to 
the holder, should and will result in similar solutions every-
Ds Infra pp. 21o-2I2 and 698. 
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where. As a matter of fact, there exists a truly international 
consideration of all these and many other matters, which en-
counters few obstacles in national legal peculiarities but 
many in doctrinal traditions. 
Here it is that comparative research again comes in to in-
dicate whether and, if so, to what extent unification or mu-
tual reconciliation is feasible and desirable. In one respect, 
this statement requires qualification. With little justification, 
the comparative method is often suspected to favor imitation 
of alien ways and to sacrifice national characteristics. The 
facts are to the contrary.99 Not infrequently, foreign insti-
tutions, naively adopted without adequate comparison, have 
been transplanted from their natural soil to degenerate in 
uncongenial surroundings. Often also, "reception" of for-
eign legal institutions has occurred without appreciation of 
the grave defects inherent in an admired law. Scientific 
comparison discerns the essential from the accidental causes 
and effects of legal rules.; its purpose is to enrich, rather than 
to standardize the juridical world. 
Conflicts law, however, has it own measures. It urgently 
requires sanctuaries from chaos. The more private rights are 
protected by international justice, the more will unification 
be desired. Federations such as the United States or Switzer-
land 100 know from copious experience how indispensable is 
a common background of legal concepts and principles to 
cope with the peculiar terms and ideas of particular states or 
99 See, for example, FusTEL DE CouLANGES, La cite antique 2: "Pour a voir 
mal observe Ies institutions de Ia cite ancienne, on a imagine de les faire 
revivre chez nous." HEYMANN, Das ungarische Privatrecht und der Rechts-
ausgleich mit Ungarn (1917) 96; EuGEN HuBER, Erlauterungen zum Vorent-
wurf des Schweizerischen Zivil-Gesetzbuchs 7; RABEL, Aufgabe und Not-
wendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, published as Miinchener Juristische 
Vortrlige Heft I (1925) 9, 23. 
1oo BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287: for the purpose of intercantonal 
conflicts law, the scope of matrimonial property law, as contrasted with in-
heritance law, is to be defined according to the general Swiss concePts and 
the nature of things rather than to the cantonal laws involved in the case. 
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cantons. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 1920's plainly 
exemplified the situation of courts that lack a "law of the 
forum" in the ordinary sense of the term and have no con-
flicts rules other than those that happen to coincide in the 
participating states.101 The great expectations for a develop-
ment of this branch of law by these courts, first dealing on a 
large scale with international private causes, were disap-
pointed.102 After the present catastrophes, fervent hopes may 
well attach to supranational courts adjudging private actions 
of international significance.103 But any substantial develop-
ment of such judicial relief will have to be accompanied by a 
radical turn of choice of law rules from provincial to world-
wide thinking. 
The new trend can be summarized in the three-fold effort 
toward realism, comparative method, and international 
understanding. 
101 See RABEL, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 33-47. 
102 On the conflicts cases of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals see GuTZWILLER, 
"Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertriige eingesetzten 
Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshiife," 3 Int. J ahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichtswesen 
(1931) 123· 
1°3 The Institute for International Law proposed in 1929 to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to disputes con-
cerning the interpretation of the conventions on private international law; 
see Annuaire 1929 III 305. This suggestion has been taken up by the Pro-
tocol of March 27, 1931 (supra p. 36), recognizing the competence of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret these Conventions. In 
my opinion regional international courts and a second division of the World 
Court should be created to deal with various kinds of private claims having 
international significance. 
PART TWO 
PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
CHAPTER 4 
The Personal Law 
I. NATURE AND ScoPE OF PERSONAL LAw 
1. Personal Law Defined 
T HE term "personal law" had its origin in the doc-trine of the Italian school of postglossators ( thir-teenth-fifteenth centuries) and their French succes-
sors (sixteenth-eighteenth centuries). This school divided all 
rules of law into three categories, viz., statuta realia, statuta 
personalia, and statuta mixta. Statuta personalia, "personal 
statutes," comprised those rules of law that followed a per-
son from one jurisdiction to another, thus having "extraterri-
torial effect," while the rules of the "statute real" applied ex-
clusively within the territory of a single sovereign. Ever since 
the times of the postglossators, the terms have been in use 
but with considerable variations in meaning.1 Even today 
writers disagree in defining personal law, and particular rules 
of law are variously characterized as pertaining to the realm 
of the statute real or to the statute personal. 2 
Despite these differences, however, it is commonly as-
sumed that in certain respects the legal position of an indi-
vidual should normally be determined by the law of that 
state with which he is deemed to be connected in a permanent 
way, rather than by the divergent laws of those states in 
which he may happen to be physically present, to act, or to 
engage in transactions. This proposition includes two parts: 
lz ARMINJON (ed. 2) 70 ff. nos. J8-I8 ter. 
2 Cf., for instance, WALKER 24. 
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First, that a person is attributed certain legal characteris-
tics of a comparatively permanent character; and, 
Second, that these permanent characteristics ought to be 
determined by one law for all purposes rather than from case 
to case by different laws. 
Scope of the personal law. The sphere of application of 
the personal law has fluctuated in the course of time and is 
not everywhere the same today. Under the broadest defini-
tion, problems pertaining to the following subjects would be 
regarded as problems of personal law: 
Personality or capacity to have rights in general (German 
Rechtsfahigheit, French capacite de jouissance) ; 
Beginning and end of personality; 
Capacity to engage in legal transactions (German Ge-
schaftsfahigheit) ; 
Protection of personal interests, such as honor, name and 
business firm, privacy, and the like; 
Family relations, especially the relations between the hus-
band and wife, parent and child, and guardian and 
ward, also transactions of family law, especially mar-
riage, divorce, adoption, legitimation, emancipation, 
and appointment of a committee for an incompetent 
person; 
Succession, both testate and intestate, to movables and in 
more recent times also succession to immovables. 
While in the various civil law countries this list is subject 
to varying restrictions, it is sharply reduced in American law. 
It is true, the general principle, repeatedly stated by British 
courts and textwriters, that the "status" of a person is deter-
mined by the law of his domicil, 3 is plainly accepted in the 
United States,4 where it has even been called "the most 
8 DICEY 469; CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 256. 
4Pfeifer v. Wright (1929 D. C. N.D. Okla.) 34 F. (2d) 69o; Strader v. 
Graham {x8so) IO How. (51 U.S.) 82; Woodward v. Woodward (x889) 
87 Tenn. 644, II s. w. 892 (emancipation in Louisiana); and others. 
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widely advocated rule of conflict laws." 5 Nevertheless, cur-
rent opinion in the United States is inclined to ascribe to the 
personal law a domain narrower than it receives in England 6 
and much more limited than it enjoys on the Continent. In 
particular, capacity to contract is now preponderantly re-
garded as being determined by the law of the place of con-
tracting rather than by the law of the domicil, although in a 
few American decisions 7 the domiciliary law has been recog-
nized as governing an individual's capacity to contract and in 
numerous cases it coincides with that of the place of con-
tracting.8 
Beale goes still further in reducing the significance of "sta-
tus," perhaps since he encountered difficulties in reconciling 
an ubiquitous personal law with the system of territoriality 
that he advocates. 9 In his treatise and in the Restatement, he 
proposes to delete what may be described as a remnant of a 
former status law, except for a strictly limited number of 
family relationships, such as marriage, the relation between 
parent and child, adoption, and guardianship. Although sta-
tus is defined in the Restatement in general terms 10 and al-
though the topics dealt with in Chapter 5 of the Restatement 
are designated merely as "those of chief importance," they 
seem nevertheless to be all-inclusive.11 
5 HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 27I n. I7. See STORY §§57 ff. and §§ 94-96 
and I WHARTON §§ IOI-I04 2/3, both recognizing only restrictions of public 
policy on the ubiquity of personal law. 
6 But also in England modern writers tend to limit the application of the 
personal law to questions of status. See the results reached by DICEY 6I9-
624, 758--786, and more recently CHESHIRE 159 ("a rule which regulates the 
capacity or incapacity of a person is part of the law of his status"). For the 
entire problem, see below, p. 206. 
7 Especially Brown v. Dalton ( 1889) 105 Ky. 669, 49 S. W. 443; also Huy's 
Appeal (1854) I Grant (Pa.) 51; Ritch v. Hyatt (1879) 3 MacArthur 536 
(Io D. C.); Matthews v. Murchison (I883 C. C., E. D. N.C.) 17 Fed. 760; 
Freeman's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420; cf. 2 BEALE u8o n. 4· 
8 Cf. RUDOLF MUELLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (I934) 888-890; BATIFFOL 328. 
9 See WIGNY, Essai 75· 
1o Restatement § II9 and comment. 
11 In the Restatement, "status" is not treated as containing permanent con-
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This position will attract the attention of any civil law 
writer as a striking contrast to established doctrines. In all 
countries outside of the United States, the concept of per-
sonal law has preserved a dominant position and has re-
tained more vigor than its ancient opponent, the territorial 
law, which has found such eminent defenders in this country. 
On the other hand, the traditional theory has been chal-
lenged in several respects by recent European critics, and ref-
erence has repeatedly been made to the American rules for 
this purpose. 
The broader conception of the personal law is to be found 
authoritatively defined in recent treaties concluded between 
Western and Oriental powers, whereby foreigners are ex-
empted from the territorial jurisdiction in "matters of per-
sonal law." It is interesting to note that the United States 
has participated in such treaties. The following definition is 
given, for instance, in the Agreement between the United 
States and Persia, concluded on July I I, I 9 2 8 : 12 
"Whereas Persian nationals in the United States of America 
enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the matter of per-
sonal status, ... non-Moslem nationals of the United 
States in Persia shall be subject to their national laws in the 
said matter of personal status, that is, with regard to all 
questions concerning marriage and conjugal community 
rights, divorce, judicial separation, dowry, paternity, affilia-
tion, adoption, capacity of persons, majority, guardianship, 
trusteeship, and interdiction; in regard to movable property, 
the right of succession by will or ab intestato, distribution 
and settlement; and, in general, family law." 
ditions or qualities, but it is limited to such "relationships" between persons 
as have been described by BEALE as relative in contrast to absolute ones, 2 
BEALE 649· This narrow definition has been criticized by KuHN as being made 
"wholly from the viewpoint of one (i.e., the American common law) sys-
tem," whereas, in solving problems of conflict of laws, the attribution of 
capacity and incapacity to persons has also to be considered. KUHN, Comp. 
Com. us. 
12 Published in U. S. Executive Agreement Series No. 20. 
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By the Convention of Montreux of May 8, 1937, which 
abolished the system of capitulations in Egypt, the Mixed 
Tribunals were retained for a further period, running until 
1949, and status and capacity were declared to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of these tribunals in the absence of consular 
jurisdiction where the religious courts are not competent. 
This Convention provided the following definition of per-
sonal status: 
"Personal status comprises: suits and matters relating to 
the status and capacity of persons, legal relations between 
members of a family, more particularly, betrothal, marriage, 
the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife, dowry 
and their rights of property during marriage, divorce, re-
pudiation, separation, legitimacy, recognition and repudia-
tion of paternity, the relation between ascendants and de-
scendants, the duty to support as between relatives by blood 
or marriage, legitimisation, adoption, guardianship, curator-
ship, interdiction, emancipation and also gifts, inheritance, 
wills and other dispositions mortis causa, absence and the 
presumption of death." 18 
2. Legal Problems 
Status. Usually,"status," taken from the Roman doctrine 
of status libertatis (freedom), status civitatis (citizenship), 
and status familiae (position as head of the house or as free 
person subjected to the paterfamilias) 14 refers to situations 
18 Rules concerning Judicial Organisation in Egypt, art. 28, referred to in 
art. 10 pars. I and 2 of the Convention Concerning the Abolition of the 
Capitulations in Egypt, Montreux, May 8, 1937. Text in U. S. Treaty Series, 
No. 939, in 34 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (1940) 201, 182 League of Nations 
Treaty Series ( 1937-1938) 37, and in HUDSON, 7 Int. Legislation 684 No. 
48o-48oc. The Convention has been ratified by the United States, Egypt, 
. Belgium, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, Union of 
South Africa, New Zealand, India, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. See comment in 1 STREIT-
VALLINDAS 385-400. Cf. comment in 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) x6x; 
MoRELLI in 29 Rivista (1937) 324, 329· Other provisions in the Regulations 
contain elaborate rules on conflict of laws, prepared on the basis of the 
Hague Conventions. 
14 In the Roman sense status means a degree in legal capacity; cf. SIBER, 
2 Romisches Recht (1928) 25. 
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subjected to the personal law. The word, "status," is com-
monly used but should not be taken as a precise legal term. 
Its exact meaning in English law has been discussed in many 
places but in a manner described by competent English writ-
ers as confused.15 "Of all the perplexing questions which the 
science of jurisprudence presents, the notion of status or con-
dition is incomparably the most difficult," declared Austin.16 
Some American decisions also have considered the concept 
nebulous, while unwarranted conclusions have been deduced 
from it by others.17 In fact, modern law recognizes no abso-
lute legal characteristics inherent in a person as in the Roman 
or medieval laws. Qualification of an individual as husband 
or legitimate father indicates no more than the existence of 
legal relations with another person, although it is true that 
third persons may thereby to a certain degree be excluded 
from challenging the relationship. 
Prohibitive policy. It is universally agreed that foreign 
laws affecting a person's status are to be disregarded where 
they have a political or penal character.18 Hence, such impair-
ments of a convict's capacity to enjoy civil rights or to engage 
in transactions as are provided by the English Forfeiture Act 
of July 4, 1870, the French Law of May 31, 1854 (arts. 2 
and 3), or American civil death statutes, are not enforced by 
the courts of other states.19 
15 See CHESHIRE ( ed. z) zo& and for a survey ALLEN, "Status and Ca-
pacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. ( I930) 277. 
16 AusTIN, 1 Jurisprudence (ed. s, I88s) 351; ibid. 943: "To fix the 
notion of status with perfect exactness, seems to be impossible." 
17 See the penetrating observations of TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy 
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," IS Can. Bar Rev. ( I940) 589, 591, 
691-697· 
18 See STORY § I04; 1 WHARTON 18 § 4b; STIMSON, Conflict of Criminal Law 
( I936) I; I BAR § I46. It is no exception to this rule, that a person may be 
considered incapable of being entrusted with a function, such as guardian-
ship, because of a foreign conviction; see, e.g., Spanish C. C. art. 237 par. 2 
and TRIAs DE BEs 72 no. 99· 
19 The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I940, art. 
1, 2nd sentence, provides that no incapacity of a penal character nor for rea-
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Likewise, a law or decree disenabling a person from dis-
posing of his property, in a manner discriminating against 
him rather than for the purpose of his protection, is gener-
ally denied effect outside of the state of enactment.20 Thus 
the Soviet Russian monopoly of trade prohibiting all private 
persons residing in Russia from concluding contracts with 
foreign countries except through the Commissariat of Com-
merce, like other monopolies of public law, is inapplicable 
outside of Russia. 21 
Connection of a person with a given territory. What con-
nection must exist between an individual and a particular 
state in order to subject such person to the personal laws of 
that state? There are two different systems. In certain coun-
tries, the necessary connection is deemed to exist between an 
individual and a particular state, if the individual is one of its 
nationals; in other countries, the necessary connection is 
found in the fact that the individual is domiciled in the state 
in question. 
3· Rationale 
While, a generation ago, the existence of a personal law 
was explained by such theoretical arguments as the nature of 
law, the needs of sovereignty, the character of the power of 
a sovereign over persons, and the like, in recent times the 
advocates of the theory of personal law customarily resort 
to more practical considerations of convenience and ex-
pediency. 
A first line of argument is based upon the interests of the 
sons of religion, race, nationality or opinion will be recognized. On the non-
application of foreign civil death statutes, see Note in 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
(1939) z88. 
20 See the recent decision of Trib. comm. Bruxelles (June 9, 1938) Jur. 
Comm. Brux. 1938, 4IZ, and App. Ziirich (March I, 1939) 4Z Bull. Inst. Int. 
(1940) 87. 
21 MAKAROV, Precis 194 reaches the same result by another (mistaken) 
reasoning. 
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individuals concerned. The legal position of a person, 1t IS 
said, must be the same everywhere; it would be unjust and 
impracticable to have it determined in different ways in dif-
ferent countries or in different situations, perhaps in some 
instances even in the same court. In other words, the unity 
and identity of a person should be respected and guaranteed 
by the consistent application of one and the same law in all 
countries and in all situations. 
A second line of reasoning has become singularly effective 
today. Each state is said to have a profound governmental 
interest in the regulation of the personal status and the 
family relations of its subjects, 22 an interest which every 
other state ought properly to respect. In order to protect 
this interest more effectively, exclusive jurisdiction over ques-
tions of status is often claimed by the state of the personal 
law, or the rules of the personal law are declared to belong to 
the domain of public policy. Thus, a state which adheres to 
the principle of nationality attempts to extend its own system 
of social regulation to its nationals living abroad, whereas a 
country adhering to the principle of domicil imposes its own 
laws upon the foreigners living within its borders. These 
tendencies, and particularly that of extending one's own laws 
to nationals living abroad, are so firmly rooted in the politi-
cal traditions of Europe that recent counter-currents have 
not only failed to leave any deep impression on the legisla-
tures but have even suggested to an eminent French author 
that the scope of application of the personal law should be 
expanded far beyond its present extent.23 
22 With respect to those matters that are recognized in the Restatement as 
covered by status, this governmental interest is explained in § 119 comment c. 
23 BARTIN, z Principes zo, 90. Throughout the four volumes of FRANKEN-
STEIN'S work, the national law is considered as "the primary basic principle 
of private international law." See vol. 4, 650. 
Recently the Danish writer BoRUM recommended that his country go over 
from the domiciliary principle to that of nationality. See his Personalstatutet 
552, 565. 
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It seems, indeed, that uniform regulation of matters of 
status is justified, at least with respect to the basic facts of 
personal life. Whether a person shall be deemed to be mar-
ried, divorced, adopted, subject to guardianship, or civilly 
dead, should be decided at any place in the same way, if un-
certainty and confusion is not to beset the individual, his 
family, and other persons with whom he engages in transac-
tions. The weight of this consideration may vary as regards 
different problems, and careful investigation of the interests 
at stake ought to be undertaken with regard to each situa-
tion. But, essentially, the principle seems undeniable. 
The most formidable objection against a single personal 
law arises from the present state of international law; the 
doctrine cannot be carried out consistently. Apart from the 
intricacies caused by conflicting rules of jurisdiction, serious 
conflicts are due to the difference between the principles of 
domicil and nationality, resulting in the subjection in different 
states of one and the same individual to different laws. More-
over, no agreement exists with respect to where a person is 
domiciled, nor is nationality an unfailing criterion. It should 
not be overlooked, however, that many such conflicts can be 
remedied by special techniques, especially by application of 
the "renvoi," an institution that, on account of its usefulness, 
should be viewed without theoretical prejudices. 
II. CONTACTS DETERMINING THE PERSONAL LAW 
1. Domicil 
(a) Domicil of origin. In all the centuries since the post-
glossators, the traditional contact for the determination of a 
person's status has been his domicil. In earlier, ancient and 
medieval, organizations, the legal condition of an individual 
in its totality was created by his "origin" as a member of a 
political unit, in Roman law his origo, signifying his citizen-
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ship in an autonomous city. Following the older fundamental 
role of descent, some of the pandectists in various cases re-
sorted to what was shortly and paradoxically described 24 as 
the domicilium originis, generally the domicil of the father 
of the individual at the time of the latter's birth.25 Although, 
naturally and legally, a child takes its father's domicil at 
birth and upon attaining majority may acquire a new domicil, 
the domicil of origin substituted for the actual domicil, when 
doubtful or incorrectly obtained or where no domicil was to 
be found. This subsidiary concept was employed in the eight-
eenth century by French writers and in the Prussian legisla-
tion 26 as the prime test for determining majority or interdic-
tion for prodigality.27 Even today in Argentina, it is applied 
to persons without an actual domicil.28 In British countries, 
this criterion has been retained and singularly developed; not 
only is the domicil of origin resorted to whenever the domicil 
of choice cannot be ascertained or has been abandoned with-
out establishing a new domicil, but the courts also require 
such strong evidence of abandonment of the domicil of origin 
that it has been said to be "difficult to conceive of a case in 
which the domicil of origin can be shaken off." 29 It corre-
sponds to Continental nationality rather than to Continental 
domicil. 5° 
24 See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. ( q) · 
25 See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (n). The same definition of domicil of origin is 
still proper in English law. See WESTLAKE § 245; 6 HALSBURY 200. 
26 Prussian A1lg. Landrecht of I794, Einleitung § 29. 
It may be suggested that the same idea is implied in the much discussed 
words of § 34 of the Austrian AUg. BGB. which may be translated as "laws 
of the place to which the foreigner is subject ( als Untertan unterliegt) by 
virtue of his domicil or if he has no actual domicil by virtue of his birth." 
27 0rigina1ly by FROLAND and BOULLENOIS; see PILLET, Principes 304 no. I43 
n. I; 2 ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) So ff. no. 18 ter. 
28 Argentina, C. C. arts. 96 and 89 zd part; cf. I VICO no. 392. 
29 CHESHIRE I8o; cf. Lord Macnaghten in Winans v. Att. Gen. [I904] A. C. 
287 at 29I; Lord Hanworth in Boldrini v. Boldrini [1932] P. 9· 
80 BENTWICH in: The Law of Domicile in its Relation to Succession and the 
Doctrine of Renvoi ( I9II) 12; 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( I93 I) 57; 6 Z.ausl.PR. ( I932) 
7I5; 52 Jurid. Rev. (I940) 284, 285 ff. Cf. the British diplomatic note of 
Nov. I, I946 to the Syrian government, II U. N. Treaty Series I53· 
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(b) Domicil of choice. The normal concept of domicil is 
presented by that domicil which is voluntarily chosen by an 
independent person. The law of this domicil primarily con-
trols personal relations in the following countries: 
All English common law countries and, in addition, Scot-
land, South Africa, and Quebec (where the principle 
has been laid down in the C. C. art. 6) . 31 
Denmark,32 Norway,83 Iceland.34 
Argentina: C.C. arts. 6 and 7.35 
Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7. 
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power ( I936) 
art. xvii ; Law on Foreigners ( I 9 3 6) arts. I7 and I 8. 
Nicaragua: C. C. tit. prel. VI, 1. 
Paraguay: C. C. arts. 6 and 7. 
Peru: C. C. ( I 9 3 6) tft. prel. art. V (for non-Peruvians). 
The Treaty of Montevideo of I 889, article I (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay) still in force among the 
contracting countries, is to the same effect .. Article I of the 
text of I940, ratified by Argentina and Uruguay, provides 
that the existence, the status, and the capacity of physical 
persons are governed by the law of domicil. 
(c) Domicil by operation of law. In most of the just men-
tioned countries, altqough not in all, as for instance not in 
Norway and Denmark, 36 certain groups of persons (wife, 
minor children, etc.) are considered by law to share the 
domicil of other individuals. The latter accordingly deter-
mines the status of the dependent person. 
(d) Residence. If, according to the concepts of the forum, 
it is found that an individual has no domicil of choice or as a 
31 It seems to be recognized in Canada generally; cf. 1 JOHNSON 182, 454· 
32 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 19; BORUM 91. 
88 CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 569 no. 66. 
34 4 LESKE-LOEWENFELD I 76I. 
85 Domicil is decisive not only for capacity to contract but also for per-
sonality. See I VICO no. 438, rejecting other theories. 
86 BORUM 93· 
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dependent, either within or without the country, different so-
lutions obtain. English courts apply the law of the domicil 
of origin. In this country, it is generally assumed that a domi-
cil once established continues until it is superseded by a new 
domicil.37 This proposition is a direct corollary of the axiom 
that every person must have a domicil and is therefore cate-
goric. In addition, it is presumed that an intended change or 
abandonment of the last established domicil is not completed 
until a new home has been acquired.38 
All these views are represented in Latin-American legisla-
tions. In addition, the subsidiary test of residence, well 
known in such fields as jurisdiction and taxation,39 at times 
appears in conflicts law. This method has been followed by 
the Montevideo Treaty 40 and the C6digo Bustamante/1 as 
well as by the recent Brazilian law.42 In default of residence, 
the latter two enactments contain a supplementary reference 
to the place where the individual is temporarily dwelling. 
These expedients would seem to serve well also in this 
country in cases where the continuance of a former domicil 
cannot be affirmed without undue fiction. 
2. Nationality 
The principle that an individual's personal law ought to be 
determined by his nationality was first established at the be-
37 Restatement § 23 and its various Annotations. See also 28 C.J.S., Dom-
icile § 13. 
38 28 C.J.S., Domicile § 16. 
39 This rule has been adopted in following the doctrine of SAVIGNY 107 
§ 354 in an influential provision of the Chilean Civil Code art. 68: mere resi-
dence replaces civil domicil with respect to persons not domiciled elsewhere. 
40 Text of 1889, art. 9, which is not really contrary to art. 5, as has been 
claimed; text of 1940, art. 5, 2°-4°. 
The Argentine C. C. arts. 89, 96, resorts to the domicil of origin, and art. 
98 declares that the last known domicil prevails when no new domicil is 
known; but art. 90, 5°, provides for a legal domicil as the place of actual 
residence for transients as well as for persons having no known domicil. 
41 Art. 26. 
42 Decreta-Lei n. 4.657 of 1942, Lei de Introduc;ao, art. 7 § 8. 
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ginning of the nineteenth century in the Code N apoteon, 
which provided that the French laws concerning personal sta-
tus and capacity govern Frenchmen even when residing in 
foreign countries (Art. 3 par. 3). In the converse case of a 
foreigner residing in France, the French courts, after some 
initial doubts, now generally apply by way of analogy the law 
of the country of which he is a national. 
While this French provision exerted a steady influence as a 
model, an additional powerful impulse was started in the 
same direction by the Italian patriot, Mancini. In a famous 
lecture, delivered in Turin in I 8 5 I, he proclaimed that a per-
son should be subject in all respects affecting his personality 
to the law of his nation. The Italian Civil Code adopted this 
doctrine, referring the concept of nationality to political al-
legiance to a given state and extending the sphere of the per-
sonal law from problems of "status and capacity," to which 
it was applied in France, to the whole law of family rela-
tions. 
In this way, the notion that an individual's private rights 
should be determined not by his physical location but by his 
political allegiance, owes its origin to the awareness of na-
tional identity that was born in the French Revolution and 
strengthened in the Italian struggle for national unity. With 
the expansion of political nationalism, the idea that each 
country should determine the legal status of its subjects, ad-
mitting the analogous claims of other states, expanded like-
wise and has been adopted in the following countries: 
France and French colonies: C. C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Italy and Italian colonies: C. C. (I 86 5) Disp. Prel. art. 6; 
C.C. (I938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. I; C.C. (I942) 
Disp. Prel. art. I7 par. I. 
Belgium: C. C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3· 
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The Netherlands: Law of May IS, I829, arts. 6, 9; H. R. 
(Jan. 5, I9I7) W.I0073, N.J. ( I9I7) I43; Hof Am-
sterdam (June 6, I9I9) W.I0444, N.J. (I9I9) I032. 
Surinam: Law of Sept. 4, I 868, art. 7. 
Rumania: C. C. art. 2; for foreigners, App. Bucarest 
(May 9, I 90 I) Sirey I 904, 4.2 I (with note by the pro-
curator of the government at the court of cassation) ; 
Plastara, 7 Repert. 62 nos. I4I, I43· 
Bulgaria: Law on Persons and the Family of Aug. 5, 
I949, arts. 24, 57, 58. 
Czechoslovakia: Law of March I I, I 948, I. 
Finland: Law no. 379 of Dec. 5, I929. 
Germany: EG. BGB. arts. 7, 9, I3-I5, 17-25. 
Greece: c. c. ( I940) arts. s-8, IJ-24, 28. 
Hungary: Law no. IV/I952 and Decree-Law no. 23/ 
I952. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23. 
Poland: Law of Aug. 2, I926, art. I par. I. 
Portugal: C. C. arts. 24, 27. 
Spain: C. C. art. 9; for foreigners cf. Trias de Bes 66; 
Lasala Llana 20-22, and decisions cited. 
Turkey: Law of March I, I9I5 for foreigners: for Turks 
abroad see Salem, 7 Repert. 26 I no. I 99· 
Yugoslavia: Law of April3, I946, arts. 82, 85, 86; Law 
of April 25, I955, arts. IS6-I59· 
Syria: C. C. art. I 2. 
Israel: Palestine Order in Council of I922, as amended, 
§ 64. 
Egypt: C.C. art. I I. 
Iran: C. C. art. 962. 
Siam: Law of March Io, I939, § 10. 
China: Law of Aug. 5, I9I8, art. S· 
Japan: Law of June I 5, I 898, art. 3· 
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Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3· 
Cuba: C. C. art. 9· 
Dominican Rep.: C. C. art. 3 par. 3.43 
Ecuador: C. C. art. I4. 
Haiti: C. C. art. 7· 
Honduras: C. C. art. I3. 
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Mexico: former C.C. ( I884) art. I2. See pages 126-I29, 
infra. 
Panama: C. C. art. sa. 
Venezuela: C.C. art. 9· 
Treaty: Colombia-Ecuador of June I 8, I903, art. 2. 
The nationality principle was also adopted in the Hague 
Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5, 44 and formed the base of the 
Treaty of Lima, I878. In the Treaty of Montevideo, on the 
other hand, the domiciliary law was preferred. During the 
preparation of the C6digo Bustamante, vigorous efforts were 
made to overcome the cleavage dividing the American na-
tions with respect to the test of personal law, but unfortu-
nately without success.45 Article 7 of the C6digo declares that 
"Each contracting state shall apply as personal law the law 
of the domicil or the law of the nationality or that which its 
domestic legislation may have prescribed, or may hereafter 
prescribe.'' 
Hence, no unified rule whatever has come into existence. 
3· Mixed Systems 
Sweden. The Hague Conventions on Marriage ( I902), 
on Divorce and Separation and on Guardianship, based on 
the principles of nationality, have been adopted as internal 
43 See the reservation no. I of the Dominican delegation to their signature 
to the C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (19z9) No. 
1950, Z40, Z4I, 376. 
44 It also was adopted for the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals in their Regula-
tions of Judicial Organisation, art. z9, and is preserved in the Egyptian C. C., 
art. II. 
45 See BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes de Rio ZI3 ff. 
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law of Sweden. Succession and inheritance also are governed 
by the national law of the deceased.45a However, as between 
the Scandinavian countries all these matters are, in general, 
regulated by the law of a person's domicil in one of the Scan-
dinavian countries.45b The domicil test is now also employed 
in certain cases as respects capacity to marry, nullity of mar-
riage, and divorce.45c 
This dual system has not been regarded as irrational, but 
the present legislative trend seems to favor reference to the 
domiciliary law.45d 
Switzerland. Switzerland 46 applies Swiss private law to 
foreigners domiciled in Switzerland and prescribes that a 
Swiss national abroad shall be governed by the law of his 
domicil. If, however, the state of the foreign domicil does 
not subject the Swiss national to its municipal legislation, 
then the Swiss courts have to resort to the law of the canton 
of which he is a citizen. This proviso applies, for instance, to 
Swiss nationals domiciled in France, Germany, or Italy, all 
of which follow the system of national law. 
In this way, conflicts with the law of the domicil are 
avoided, the Swiss law being resorted to only where it is also 
applied by the courts of the domicil. Followi.ng this approach 
of the Swiss law, the German courts are now in agreement 
that a Swiss citizen domiciled in Germany is to be judged ac-
cording to Swiss law and that Swiss law ought not to be in-
45a Act governing certain international relations concerning marriage, 
adoption, guardianship and similar matters of July 8, 1904, as amended; 
Act governing international relations concerning Succession of March 5, 1937. 
45b Decree of Dec. 31, 1931 and Act of March 1, 1935. 
45cAct of 1904 (supra note 45a), c. 7 sec. 2 {2), 4a. 
45d FoLKE SCHMIDT, "Nationality and Domicile in Swedish Private Inter-
national Law," 4 Int. Law Q. ( 1951) 39 ff. 
46 NAG. arts. 2 and 28. Capacity to contract, however, is excepted from the 
rule stated in the text and is subjected to the principle of nationality; see 
below, p. 200. 
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terpreted as containing a renvoi to the law of the domiciJ.47 
Austria. The draftsmen of the Austrian Civil Code of 
I 8 I I probably intended that the law of the domicil, either 
of choice or of origin, should be applied to foreigners 
whether living in Austria or abroad.48 The relevant section 
of the Code 49 was so badly drafted, however, that its mean-
ing was never quite certain. While the older annotators re-
garded the provisions as establishing the domiciliary test,S0 
authors and courts of the nineteenth century came to look 
upon it as a full-fledged adoption of the principle of nation-
ality.51 This development was motivated not only by the gen-
eral trend of the period but also by the provision which the 
Code had established for Austrians living abroad. Under this 
provision, not all private affairs of such citizens were subject 
to Austrian law, but only acts and contracts of Austrians oc-
curring abroad, to the extent that the Austrian law limits per-
sonal capacity to undertake such acts and contracts and these 
acts and contracts are intended to produce legal effects in 
Austrian territories.52 
Most annotators were inclined to regard this provision as 
a general adoption of the principle of nationality so far as 
Austrians were concerned and to neglect the limitations ex-
pressed in the text.53 The Supreme Court, however, follow-
4 7 See the following Swiss authors: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 3; BECK, 
NAG., I4I no. 36. 
In Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, I9I2) Warn. Rspr. I9I3 no. 37; RG. (Nov. 8, 
I922) I05 RGZ. 340; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 12, I9I7) 35 ROLG. 380, cf. 
MELCHIOR 224 § I50j RAAPE 750. 
48 In the case of a person having no domicil at the relevant moment, pre-
sumably the law of his domicil of origin was intended to be applied. 
49 Allg. BGB. § 34· 
5o SAVIGNY § 363 II j UNGER, I System I64 j for further citations see WALKER 
92 n. I9· 
51 RANDA in 6 Griinhut's Z. (I879) 785; KRASNOPOLSKI in 25 Geller's 
Zentralblatt ( I907) I08; STEINLECHNER in 2 Festschrift zur J ahrhundertfeier 
des Allg. BGB. (I9II) 65; WALKER 93 and n. 24. 52 Allg. BGB. § 4· 
58 See WALKER 9I n. I6j I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (I925) 94 calls the re· 
striction superfluous. 
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ing a theory which had been established by an ingenious au-
thor, 54 imbued the limitations with new life by holding that 
the numerous peculiar restrictions of Austrian marriage law 
would not be applied to an Austrian marrying abroad and 
not intending at the time of such marriage to live in Aus-
tria.M This decision has been criticized as opening the door 
to law evasion.56 The German decree of October 25, 1941, 
still in force in Austria, has confirmed the trend to the 
nationality principle. 
Latin America. However, the ideas underlying the pro-
vision of the Austrian Code appeared so reasonable to An-
dres Bello, the draftsman of the Chilean Civil Code of 1 8 55, 
that he adopted it, in a modified form, for his own country.57 
His example has been followed in several other Latin Ameri-
can countries, where the Austrian rule has been adopted in 
combination with varying systems. 
Under the Chilean Code, every inhabitant of the country, 
even though he may not be a citizen or a domiciliary, tech-
nically speaking, is declared subject to the law of Chile. 58 
Similar provisions, with or without textual modification, have 
been included in the laws of Colombia,59 Ecuador,60 
Mexico,61 and El Salvador.62 The provision in itself has been 
vigorously criticized 63 and seems to have been made the ob-
54 MAX BURCKHARD, 2 System des Oesterreichischen Privatrechtes ( 1884) 
223. 
55 OGH. (May 24, 1907) 10 GIU. NF. no. 3787, 8 Amti.S. NF. no. 1007, 
Spruchrepertorium (Collection of binding precedents) no. 198; cf. WALKER 
91, 622; see below, p. 305. 
56 PERROUD, Clunet 1922, 5; WALKER 625. 
57 BELLO's notes, which indicate that he was influenced by the Austrian law 
as well as by the French Code, are referred to by I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 
no. 148. 
58 Chile: C. C. art. 14. 
59 Colombia: C. C. art. 18. 
60Ecuador: C. C. art. 13. 
61 Mexico: Federal C; C. art. 12. 
62 El Salvador: C. C. art. 14-
63 Cf. CHAMPEAU (respecting Colombia) Clunet 1894, 932; BORJA, 1 
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ject of a diplomatic exchange of notes between Chile and 
France.64 On the other hand, each of these legislations de-
clares the national law applicable to a national living abroad: 
first, as concerns his capacity to engage in "certain transac-
tions" producing effects in his own country; and, second, with 
respect to his family relations.65 This combination of domi-
ciliary and national law 66 has already been noticed as anoma-
lous.67 The interpretation of these provisions necessarily 
must cause difficulties; in fact, in Colombia 68 efforts looking 
to a reasonable interpretation have been made, and recently, 
after thorough consideration, the commission for reform of 
the Civil Code has proposed that the entire system be re-
placed by the simple law of domicil.69 
In addition, Costa Rica has adopted the principle of na-
tionality, but prescribes that foreigners are governed by the 
law of Costa Rica when they act in that country or if their 
contracts are made and are to be performed therein.70 This 
Estudios sobre el c6digo civil chileno (1899) 211-213; URIBE (regarding Co-
lombia) Revue 1911, 322. 
64 WEISS, 3 Traite 255 mentions a diplomatic note of August 20, 1882, in 
which the Chilean minister, Verga, refers to a restrictive interpretation of art. 
14. Apparently, the French Government had protested against the application 
of Chilean law to French citizens living in Chile. It has not been possible to 
ascertain whether any practical results ever came from this correspondence. 
65 Chile: C. C. art. 15, No provision in Mexico, but see former C. C. (1884) 
art. 12. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 19. 
Ecuador: C. C. art. 14. 
El Salvador: C. C. art. 15. 
66 MATOS 277 no. 175; SALAZAR FLOR 483. 
67 BORJA, o p. cit. supra n. 63 at 213 ; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 no. 149; 
Soro's observations in: Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil 
1939-1940, 92, 98 inter alia. The present system on that occasion was de-
fended by ZULETA ANGEL (ibid.) and }ULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE of Paris 
(ibid. 116). 
68 See 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 ff. nos. 149-159· 
69 Art. 36 of the Draft on formation, promulgation, effects, interpretations 
and derogation of the laws, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil op. cit. 
supra n. 67. Uruguay, which formerly had adhered to the same combination 
(C. C. arts. 3, 4), has by Law of Dec. 3, 1941 already introduced the pure 
domiciliary test (C. C. art. 2393). 
10 Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3· 
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provtswn has been superadded to the others in the Civil 
Code of El Salvador.71 
Contrary to their Austrian prototype, which, at least in 
the last period of the Austrian law, was used to mitigate the 
effects of the principle of nationality, these various Latin 
American countries expand their own national law beyond 
the limits of the basic principle which they have adopted. 
These sophisticated modern endeavors are quite in line with 
recent European, especially French, 72 tendencies, claiming ap-
plication of the domestic law to nationals living abroad as 
well as to foreigners domiciled within the forum. The prin-
ciples of nationality and of domicil are thus inconsistently 
combined. 
A final stage of this unfortunate development has been 
reached at present in the Civil Code of Peru of 1936.78 This 
Code generally adopts the law of domicil 74 to govern all 
foreigners whether domiciled abroad or in Peru. Neverthe-
less, the Peruvian law on status and capacity extends without 
any limitations to all Peruvians living abroad. 75 The Vene-
71 El Salvador: C. C. I912, art. I6 par. 3· 
72 See infra p. I 64. 
73 A complete history of the matter is given by LUis ALVARADO, Apuntes de 
derecho internacional (Lima, I940) 43-7'3· ' 
74 A. GusTAVO CoRNEJO, I C6digo Civil ( I937) so no. 49 points out that 
the reference to the law of domicil is intended to include the conflicts norm 
of the domicil (as in Switzerland). 
75 C. C. (I936} Tit. Prel. art. V par. I. For this reason, the Peruvian 
delegation appointed to revise the Montevideo Treaties declared, in a reser-
vation to the text of I940 on international civil law, that the provisions 
therein respecting status and capacity should be understood not to affect the 
provisions of the Peruvian national law applicable to Peruvians. Cf. RABEL, 
"The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts," 39 
Mich. L. Rev. (I94I) 5I7, 52I. At the same time, under the original treaty 
provisions actually in force, the new code is inapplicable to Peruvians domi-
ciled in Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay; cf. ALVARADO, op. cit. 
supra n. 73 at 7I. Previously the Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 
usS, has reserved the exclusive jurisdiction of the Peruvian courts over all 
questions of status, capacity and family relations as regards Peruvians dom-
iciled at any place and foreigners domiciled in Peru; cf. ROGER, 7 Repert. 
30 no. 49· 
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zuelan Civil Code of 1942 follows this model.76 The same ex-
cessive claim has been made with respect to marriage in the 
recent Civil Code of Latvia.77 
A similar conception is said to control the problems of 
capacity for contracting in the Soviet Union; everybody in 
Soviet Russia and every Russian abroad is subject to Soviet 
Russian law. 77a However, this is not deemed to concern the 
general capacity of having rights, which seems "not to be 
considered by the Soviet law as a faculty inherent to man as 
such." 78 
III. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES 
The principle of nationality cannot be applied to persons 
who are not nationals of any country, and it causes difficulties 
in its applications to persons who are nationals of more than 
one country. For both types of cases, the principle of nation-
ality must be supplemented by special rules. 
I. Multiple Nationality 
In matters of status, a person who is simultaneously a na-
tional of the state of the forum and of some other state is 
usually considered by the forum as exclusively its own na-
tional, his additional foreign nationality being disregarded. 
This approach has been traditionally followed in France, 
Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg 79 and 
has been adopted more recently by statutes in Czechoslo-
vakia, Liechtenstein, Egypt, Syria, China, Japan, and Siam, 
and by the courts of Germany and of other countries.80 The 
76 Venezuela: C. C. (1942) arts. 8 and 9· 
77 Latvian C. C. § 11; cf. ScHILLING, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 226, 229. 
77a LUNZ 163. 
78 See MAKAROV, Precis 175 and 192. 
79 Surveys by KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 59, also in 30 }he rings J ahrb. ( 1891) 68; 
MAURY in 9 Repert. 297 no. 113. 
so Czechoslovakia: Law of March 11, 1948, s. so. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. 1. 
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Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (art. 3) has 
recognized the right of a state to apply its law in such cases. 
Where, on the other hand, a person is a national of two or 
more countries but the litigation arises in a third country, the 
law most consistently applied is that of the country of which 
the person is not only a national but where he also has his 
domicil or habitual residence or, in the absence thereof, his 
residence. 81 This view was approved by the Sixth Conference 
on International Private Law held at the Hague in 1928, 
which formulated corresponding provisions to complement 
the older Hague treaties on international family law; 82 
eliminating reference to domicil, the test is "habitual resi-
dence" and, in its absence, simply the "residence" at the time 
decisive for the particular purpose, for instance, when the 
personal capacity to marry is in question, the moment of the 
marnage ceremony. 
Another solution has been essayed by J apan,83 and still 
Egypt: C. C. art. 25 par. 2. 
Syria: C. C. art. 27 par. 2. 
China: Decree of August 5, I9I8, art. 2 par. I. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. I. 
Siam: Law of March Io, I9391 art. 6 par. 3· 
To the same effect Brazil: Former introd. art. 9 par. 2. 
Germany: RG. (J~n. 24, I9o8) I8 Z.int.R. 533, 539i RG. (March I3, I924) 
Leipz.Z. I924, 74I; RG. (Nov. 5, I928) 43 Z.int.R. (I93Q-I93I) 86, IPRspr. 
I929, no. I. 
81 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of Oslo I932, art. 2, Annuaire 
I932, 47I (residence habituelle et principale). 
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9 (domicil, residence). 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. 2 (domicil, residence, last acquired citi-
zenship). 
Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DE BEs in 6 Repert. 247 no. 78; for Hungary: SzA.szY 
in II Z.ausi.PR. (I937) I70 (domicil). On other theories, see 2 ARMINJON 
(ed. 2) 34 ff. no. IO bis. 
82 See the list of the various supplementary clauses in MAKAROV, Allge-
meine Lehren des Staatsangehiirigkeitsrechts (I947) 288. The Hague Con-
vention of I930 on Conflicts of Nationality Laws, art. 5 (HUDSON, 5 Int. Leg. 
359, also in 24 Am. J. Int. Supp. (I930) I92) declares not to prejudice the 
matters of personal status. 
83 Law of I898, art. 27 (law of the last acquired nationality). 
Similarly, Siam: Law on Conflict of Laws of March Io, I939 s. 6 par. I, 
see LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois, no. 42 n. 8 at Ioz; also 
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others have been suggested.84 For the purposes of public in-
ternational law, it has long been a well-recognized tendency 
to prefer among several nationalities of a person that which 
in a given case appears the most "effective" one.85 This prin-
ciple has been formulated by the Hague Convention on Con-
flict of Nationality Laws of 1930, as follows: 
"Within a third State, a person having more than one na-
tionality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prej-
udice to the application of its law in matters of personal sta-
tus and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the 
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize ex-
clusively in its territory either the nationality of the country 
in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the na-
tionality of the country with which in the circumstances he 
appears to be in fact most closely connected." 86 
2. Stateless Persons 
A person not being a national of any country is called an 
apatride or apolide or heimatlos. 87 Such a situation could 
arise under ordinary international circumstances, where a 
child of parents whose home country adheres to the pure 
principle of jus soli, was born in a country in which the jus 
sanguinis was in force. The recent unrest of legislation re-
specting married women has engendered other cases. Thus, 
where a Swiss woman marrying a Frenchman before 1945 
failed to sign a declaration of intention to acquire French 
citizenship, under article 19 of a French law of November 
12, 1938, she did not acquire French nationality, though not 
Czechoslovakia, Law of March u, 1948, s. 51. Cf. I BAR § 88 at z6I, tr. by 
GILLESPIE at 194· 
84 See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 29, I934) Clunet I937, 570 and comment. 
Egypt (C. C. art. 25 par. I) and Syria (C. C. art. 27 par. I) authorize their 
judges to determine the applicable law. 
85 Greece: C. C. art. 3I par. 2; see FLOURNOY, "Dual Nationality and Elec-
tion," 30 Yale L. ]. (I92I) 693; MAURY, 9 Repert. 298 no. u4. 
86 Art. 5· 
87 This German expression is used by French and other writers, while the 
official German term is "staatenlos." 
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retaining her former citizenship.88 Untold numbers of indi-
viduals have also been rendered stateless by the political 
events of this century. Many thousands of emigrants have 
lost their nationality by Soviet decree and many more by the 
ruthless legislations of Italy and Germany, introducing the 
system of "expatriation" as a political measure against real 
or alleged political enemies. Furthermore, the peace treaties 
following World War I and later events have made it fre-
quently impossible in fact to ascertain the nationality of a 
person, who in such a case must practically be treated as an 
apatride, as is done in the case of gypsies.89 
At present, individuals lacking a definite nationality are 
generally subject to the law of their domicil or habitual resi-
dence, and, in default thereof, to the law of their temporary 
residence. This has been the view of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law since 1880.90 Most countries accede to this posi-
tion.91 It was also adopted by the Sixth Conference on Inter-
88 Swiss Department of Justice, BBl. I939 II, 284 no. I4. This case would 
not arise under art. 8 of the 1930 Convention on Conflicts of Nationality 
Laws which Switzerland did not ratify. Under the French Code of Nation-
ality of Oct. I9, I945 (art. 37), the Swiss wife would acquire French nation-
ality by her marriage. On the other hand, if she repudiates this nationality 
(Code, art. 38), she would upon declaration retain today her Swiss nation-
ality of origin (Swiss Nationality Law of Sept. 29, I952, art. 9). 
89 Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. 1. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3I par. I. 
Yugoslavia: Law of April 25, I955, art. I57· 
90 Institut de Droit International: Resolution of Oxford, art. 6 pars. 2 and 
5, Annuaire I88I-I88z, 57; Resolution of Oslo, art. 3, Annuaire 1932, 47I, 472. 
Unfortunately the Institute has changed its attitude in a Resolution on 
"Statut juridique des apatrides et des refugies" voted in Brussels in I936, 
Annuaire I936, II 292. Art. 4 provides that the law applicable in the case of 
a stateless person will be that of the country either of a nationality possessed 
previously or of his domicil or, in the absence of either, of his habitual resi-
dence at the date regarded as relevant by the court. 91 Belgium: POULLET 307 no. 255; Congo: Decree of Feb. zo, I89I, art. 8 
(for foreigners domiciled in Congo). 
Czechoslovakia: Law of March u, I948, s. 52. 
France: Trib. civ. Nantes (Nov. 28, 1901) Clunet I902, 590; Trib. civ. 
Seine (Feb. I4, I908) Revue I9IO, uz; Cour Paris (Nov. 25, I9I3) Revue 
I9I4, I3o; App. Nancy (June 10, I9I4) Clunet I9I5, 620, Revue I9I4, 579; 
French Morocco: Law of I913, art. 5 (for foreigners domiciled in Morocco). 
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national Private Law at the Hague in 1928 92 in the comple-
mentary drafts just mentioned, in which, as in all recent 
treaties, the term "domicil" is abandoned in favor of "ha-
bitual residence" or, in its absence, "residence." The new 
Italian Code has intentionally chosen the test of residence.98 
Another solution was formerly adopted by the German 
Civil Code (EG. art. 29), providing that a person who had 
once held but subsequently lost the nationality of a country 
without acquiring another, was declared to remain subject to 
his former national law. This provision compelled the Ger-
man courts to decide the private status and the incidents of 
family relations of Russian emigres in accordance with the 
legislation of the Soviet Union, i.e., the country which was 
their very enemy and which had refused to accept the role of 
successor to the former Russian Empire. 94 With respect to 
succession upon death, the situation between Germany and 
Greece: C. C. art. 30. 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 44 (2). 
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 29 (residence}. Previously the law of 
June 13, I9I2 on nationality, art. 14, subjected the apolidi residing in Italy to 
Italian civil law, but for other apatrides there was controversy, although resi-
dence was the test most frequently adopted. See UmNA, Elementi I22. The 
new code substitutes domicil as the test. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3I par. 2. 
The Netherlands: KoSTERS 289 (domicil). 
Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. I. 
Rumania: 7 Repert. 63 no. I5I. 
Sweden: Supreme Court (Feb. 25, I949) 23 Nordisk Tidsskrift (I953) 20, 
I6 Z.ausi.PR. (I950/5I) I45· 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7a. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 2. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. 2 par. 2. 
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, art. 6 par. 4· 
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9· 
Cf. TRACHTENBERG, "Heimatlose-Heimatlosat," 8 Repert. 565 no. 72 et 
seq.,· MELCHIOR 449 n. I. 
92 Cf. MAKAROV ( ed. I) 42I VIII I b. 
93 Italian C. C. ( I938} Disp. Prel. art. I9; cf. Relazione I938, no. I5; C. C. 
( I942) Disp. Pre I. art. 29. 
94 RG. (Oct. 6, I927) Warn. Rspr. I928, no. I3, IPRspr. I928, no. 22. 
An analogous provision is contained in the Yugoslavian Law on Succession 
of April 25, I955, art. I 57· 
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Russia was at first remedied by a treaty.95 Recently, however, 
Germany has adhered, by a new law, to the rule proposed by 
the Sixth Conference at the Hague.96 
In addition, two multipartite treaties of 1933 and 1936 on 
the status of refugees (the one treaty, in case they have no 
nationality, the other irrespective of nationality), determine 
the personal law of refugees by the law of the country of 
domicil or, in default thereof, by that of the country of resi-
dence.97 The same principle is maintained, regardless of na-
tionality, by a Convention of 195 r superseding the former 
treaties.97a 
The test of domicil or residence has thus proved to be in-
dispensable in important cases. 
3· Nationals of Countries with a Composite System of Pri-
vate Law 
Composite law on personal basis. In Algeria, Tunisia, 
Syria, Egypt, Iran, India, China, and other Eastern coun-
9 5 German Law of Jan. 6, 1926, on the German-Russian Treaties of Oct. 
12, 1925 {based on the "Rapallo" Treaties of 1922) RGBI. 1926 II I, art. 4· 
96 German Law of April 12, 1938 (RGBI. 1938 I 380) art. 7, altering the 
text of EG. art. 29, states that insofar as the laws of the state to which a 
person belongs are declared decisive, the legal relations of a person without 
nationality are to be decided according to the laws of the state in which he 
has, or if the decisive moment lies in the past, had at the moment, his ha-
bitual residence, or, in the case of lack of habitual residence, his residence. 
Literally the same provision in the Austrian international family law in 
§ 17 of the (still valid German) Decree of Oct. 25, 1941. 
Cf. a comment by VON STACKELBERG, 12 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1938) 66. The "motives" 
of this legislation explain that Germany accepts the generally adopted prin-
ciple in the form proposed by the Sixth Hague Conference, which now gov-
erns the personal law so far as it goes, while other matters remain subject 
to their own special rules, as e.g., C. Civ. Proc. § II4 par. 2. 
97 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, Geneva, Oct. 
28, 1933, arts. 4, 5 in 159 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935-1936) 199, 
6 HunsoN, Int. Legislation 483 If. No. 350; Provisional Arrangement con-
cerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936, 
arts. 5, 6, in 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 75, 7 HunsoN, Int. Legisla-
tion 375 No. 448. 
97a Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 
art. 12, in 189 U. N. Treaty Series {1954) 137· Ratification, see supra p. 40. 
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tries, personal status is determined by religion, class or 
race.98 In India, for instance, the law is different for Bud-
dhists, Hindus, Mohammedans, and whites, although it is in 
every case a "law of the forum." 99 Some elements of this 
system also survive in Eastern European countries. 
Such diversity of personal law is a part of the substantive 
law of the country concerned. When a conflicts rule refers to 
the "law" of such a country, either because it is the law of the 
domicil of an individual or because it is his national law, no 
uniform law being in force in any part of the country, the 
reference can only be to the particular set of rules that gov-
erns the group of persons to which the individual belongs.100 
Under this approach, it is obvious that the conflicts rule is 
quite sufficient in itself and that it does not need any addi-
tional rules, complementary to those which invoke the law 
of domicil or nationality. 
Difficulties may arise, it is true, from the fact that the 
regulation of interreligious or interracial relations in the 
oriental countries concerned is often so obscure and incom-
98 Cf. on Egypt and other Islamic countries: ARMIN JON, in Clunet 1912, 
698, 1025; C!unet 1913, 34, 435, 812; and I Precis I 54· On Palestine, Trans-
Jordan, Cyprus, Syria and Iraq: GoADBY 79, 107, 142; WENGLER, Interna-
tionales und interreligioses Privatrecht in Palastina," 12 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1939) 
772-808; VITTA, Conflict of Laws in Matters of Personal Status in Palestine 
(1947). On India: BARTHOLOMEW, "Private Interpersonal Law," I Int. Comp. 
Q. (1952) 325-344. On Hindus in Zanzibar before the British courts: HUGH 
E. KINGDON, The Conflict of Laws in Zanzibar (1940) 15. On the Belgian 
Congo: MAURICE VERSTRAETE, "Intergentiel Recht," 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1940, 
col. n69. On the Netherlands Indies: KoLLEWIJN, "Interracial Private Laws," 
in The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay 
Archipelago, edited by SCHRIEKE (Batavia, 1929) 204. 
99 On the contrary, in an Indian court a Chinese Buddhist custom is foreign 
Jaw. See the careful judgment by Sir George Rankin in Tan Ma Shwe Zin v. 
Khoo Soo Chong [1939] A. C. 527 (Privy Council). Cf. Casdagli v. Casdagli 
[191&] P. (C.A.) 89 at no, per Scrutton, L. J.; and, in general, ARMIN JON, 
Clunet 1913, 39· 
too GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II xo. 
Siam, Law of March xo, 1939, art. 6 par. 5; Portugal, Draft C. C. (1951) 
art. 33· 
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plete that it may not be easy for a foreign judge to cope with 
their ascertainment and application.101 
Composite law on territorial basis/02 As contrasted with 
the grouping of population according to personal qualifica-
tions, the law of conflicts is directly affected when the law of 
a country to which a conflicts rule refers is split into territori-
ally different systems. A composite system of law on a terri-
torial basis makes nationality an incomplete criterion. The 
United States, the British Empire, and Mexico (until re-
cently also Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia) are examples of 
political units lacking a unified law on personal status; their 
territories are divided into parts where different bodies of 
rules are in force. A court which has to apply the "Mexican 
law" relative to a Mexican subject's capacity to marry, 
would be unable to find an appropriate set of rules, except by 
locating such person in one of the several states of Mexico. 
A secondary rule of conflicts is necessary. 
First case: Where interregional rules exist. 
If the country to whose law reference is made possesses a 
unified internal regulation declaring which one of the several 
1o1 See for Palestine: GoADBY 119; For Latvia {where classes are distin-
guished): BERENT in 4 Leske·Loewenfeld I 577; For Bulgaria: DANEFF, 38 
Bull. Inst. Int. (1938). 
102 Cf. I ZITELMANN 403 ; RAAPE 29 and IPR. 142; WALKER 104; MELCHIOR 
451 § 3ro; DE NovA, in 30 Rivista (1938) 388; 44 Revue Crit. (1955) 1; and 
II richiamo di ordinamenti plurilegislativi: Studio di diritto interlocale ed 
internazionale privato (1940) {not available); GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. 
( 1935) II 3; VITTA, Conflitti interni ed internazionali, Saggio comparato 
( 1954); 1 STREIT-VALLINDAS §§ 16, 17 {the best survey of facts and litera-
ture) ; CHESHIRE 192; FALCON BRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 
19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 311, Essays 199. The aggrandizement as well as 
the post-war split of Germany caused problems in view of which the doctrine 
of interregional law has been discussed again; see quotations by DE NovA, 
15 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1941) 338, 339 and for the recent questions of 
"interzonal law" FICKER, Grundfragen des deutschen interlokalen Rechts 
(1952); DROBNIG, Sammlung der Entscheidungen zum interzonalen Recht 
1945-1953. 2 vols. (1956). See furthermore the Swiss NAG. in its original 
main application to intercantonal conflicts and the French law of July 24, 
1921 concerning the conflicts between the French and the local law of Alsace-
Lorraine. 
THE PERSONAL LAW 137 
private laws applies to the individual concerned, this regula-
tion is universally accepted for the purpose of secondary ref-
erence. For instance, the Polish law of "internal relations" 
( interlocal private law), enacted simultaneously with the 
Polish law on international private law, August 2, 1926/03 
provided that the status and the capacity of an individual of 
Polish nationality, domiciled abroad, is to be determined by 
Polish courts in the first instance under the law of the last 
domicil he had in Poland and, in the second, under the law 
of the Polish capital. Accordingly, German, French, Italian, 
etc., courts apply the same expedients. This method was rec-
ommended by the Institute of International Law 104 and has 
been adopted in several statutory enactments.105 
It is easily understandable that a foreign court looking for 
the "national law" of an individual, should adopt the locali-
zations effected by the sovereign of the foreign nation. But 
the theoretical background of this operation has been a sub-
ject of discussion. An essential resemblance between interre-
gional and international private laws cannot be denied; both 
are types of conflicts rules. Yet the reference leading from 
the conflicts rules of the forum through the interprovincial 
rule to a particular family law of a territory must not be 
treated as identical with a regular renvoi; the foreign inter-
103 Arts. I and 3· Another example is art. I4 of the Spanish Civil Code, 
providing that the conflicts rules established with respect to the persons, the 
transactions and the property of Spaniards abroad and of foreigners in Spain 
are applicable to the persons, transactions and property of Spaniards in ter-
ritories or provinces of different civil legislations; see BEATO SALA, I Revista 
Der. Priv. (I9I3-I9I4) 2oi; TRIAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. 266 no. I6S. 
104 Resolutions passed at Oxford, 188o, art. 3 par. 3, Annuaire I88I-I882, 
57· 
105 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 7 §I. 
Finland: Int. Fam. Law of 1929, § 52. 
Egypt: C. C. art. 26. 
Syria: C. C. art. 28. 
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, art. 6 par. s. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 3· 
China: Law of I918, art. 2 par. 3· 
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regional rule is not in competition with the forum's own con-
flicts rules.106 As a matter of fact, the strongest adversaries 
of renvoi agree with this use of foreign interregional 
statutes.107 
It must be presumed that the interlocal rules are to be 
adopted with all their characteristics, e.g., what they under-
stand as "domicil," the domicil concept of the forum being 
immaterial. Also, such particular notions must be applied as 
the Swiss cantonal citizenship 108 or the "town settlement" 
(H eimatzustandigkeit) 109 which was a basic concept in the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and remained in force in the 
successor states.110 In Hungary and Czechoslovakia it was 
abolished but recently.111 
Second case: Where no interregional rules exist and the in-
dividual is domiciled within his national country. 
Most countries that have no uniform private law also lack 
106 Cf. RAAPE 34 against I ZITELMANN 398 and NIBOYET 493 no. 411 j 
GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 1935) II 4, against other Italian writers; 
and see the survey by I STREIT-VALLINDAS 354· 
1°7 NIBOYET, op. cit. supra n. 106; LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 590; see 
RAAPE 34-
108 "Heimat" is still important for the matters of cantonal legislation that 
have not been unified. 
109 The French text of the Treaty of St. Germain of Sept. ro, 1919, art. 3 
uses the term "indigenat" with the Italian equivalent "pertinenza" in 'paren-
theses. The German translation in the Austrian Staatsgesetzlatt 1920, at 1048 
is "Heimatrecht." The English version "citizenship" as published in British 
and Foreign State Papers ( 1919) sos, is wrong. 
no See, e.g;, for parts of Yugoslavia, PERITCH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 879 
n. 15 and LOVRic, ibid. 1038 n. 172 (Croatia-Slovania). See also PERITCH, 32 
Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 3· 
For Czechoslovakia, HoCHBERGER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 1938) 621, 629 reported 
that Czechoslovakian nationals domiciled in Czechoslovakia were considered 
having the capacity of their domiciliary law, but if domiciled abroad, that of 
the law of their township. Before enactment of the uniform C. C. of 1950, 
the Act on Private International Law of March II, 1948 had declared rele-
vant for the interlocal relations a person's domicil or last domicil in the 
country or, in absence of either, his ethnical origin or other connections with 
one of the local laws ( s. 54). 
111 In Hungary it had been replaced by domicil for interlocal purposes by 
Law XIII of 1939; cf. 13 Z.ausi.PR. (1940) 258, 259· For Czechoslovakia 
see preceding note. 
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a unified set of interlocal rules. Such a situation existed in 
Germany before th·e Civil Code took effect on January I, 
I 900, and after World War I the same was true in all coun-
tries that had annexed new provinces and in which legal uni-
fication was not yet achieved. Yugoslavia and Rumania were 
until recently in this situation. But the foremost examples 
are presented by the British Empire and the United States. 
With respect to the former, it is hardly doubtful that "there 
is in fact no system of conflict of law common to all parts of 
the British Empire," 112 that would enable a foreign court to 
discover all-British rules connecting British subjects with 
their several jurisdictions. Neither is it permissible to apply 
the English rules on conflicts or on the law of status to all 
British subjects, for the English law cannot be construed as 
"the true nationall~w" of all British subjects.113 Perhaps in 
the future, some point of localization might be found in local 
conceptions of nationality, Canadian, South African, etc., 
which seem to be in a state of development, in addition to the 
notion of British subject; 114 but the new conception of do-
minion nationality apparently has not yet been taken into con-
sideration for such purpose 115 and in any event would not 
112 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, Essays 205, supra n. 102. 
113 This was contended by DICEY (ed. 5) &73; see contra CHESHIRE 193; 
DICEY (-MORRIS) 57i FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 328, Essays 
209, supra n. 102. 
114 See KEITH, The Dominions as Sovereign States ( 1938) 184-199. Cf. 
EMMEIT, "Nationality in the Union of South Africa," 17 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law (1936) 187; 18 ibid. (1937) 181; see also GEY VAN PITTIUS, Nationality 
Within the British Commonwealth of Nations ( 1930) 223. 
115 The problem has scarcely been discussed; in 2 Encyclopaedia of the 
Laws of England (ed. 3, 1938) 467 ff. it is observed that at present colonial 
nationality is not distinguished from the British, although in the future the 
principles embodied in the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (c. 4) might affect 
nationality within the Empire. 
The latent significance of the new local nationality for the purpose of 
jurisdiction, in particular divorce jurisdiction, has been pointed out by KEITH, 
"Das Verhiiltniss des Statute of Westminster von 1931 zum internationalen 
Privatrecht," 6 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1932) 301, 308 and op. cit. supra n. II4 at 193; 
EASTMAN, "Australian Nationality Legislation, Nationality of Married 
Women," 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 179. A more radical develop-
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specify the law of one of the several component states or 
provinces of the dominion in question. 
However, unanimity is still to be found in one group of 
cases, viz., where the individual is domiciled at some place 
within the entire territory of the country whose legal system 
is divided, or where, as to matters of inheritance, the individ-
ual was there domiciled at the time of his death. The rule is 
quite generally recognized that the law of such place consti-
tutes his personallaw.116 Thus, the principle of domicil has 
retained a further supplementary hold in Europe. 
Although this rule is well settled, it is nevertheless not cer-
tain whether it follows that "domicil" is to be defined under 
the law of the forum and not, as in the first case described 
(where interlocal rules exist), in accordance with the con-
ceptions existing in the territory where the individual is said 
to reside. 
Third case: Where no interregional rule exists and the in-
dividual is domiciled outside his national country. 
A troublesome situation arises where there are no inter-
regional rules, and the individual is not domiciled in any part 
of his national country. Several opinions have been put for-
ward. 
(a) The prevailing doctrine in Germany,111 followed by 
the Swedish legislation,118 applies the law of that district 
ment toward the criterion of local citizenship for personal status might be 
expected with respect to Eire. 
116 I ZITELMANN 405 at n. 7; RAAPR 36 (b); MELCHIOR 452 § 3II n. 3· 
With respect to their interprovincial rules, the Court of Cassation of Ru-
mania (March 3, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (I939) 654, Clunet I938, 946 held that 
divorce is governed by the law of the domicil of the parties at the time of the 
action, not by that of the place of celebration of the marriage nor by that of 
the origin of the parties, and, therefore, applied the Austrian Civil Code to 
the divorce of parties domiciled in Bucowina (the actual local law of that 
province). 
1 17 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; LEWALD I3; RAAPE 36; MELCHIOR 
452· 
118 Swedish Int. Fam. L. of I904 with amendments, c. 7 § I par. 2; Law of 
March 5, I937 on Conflict of Laws in regard to Succession, c. 3 § I. See II 
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of the national's country where the individual now domiciled 
abroad had his last domicil 119 or, if he never had any domi-
cil in his national country, the law in force at the capital of 
that country.120 
This doctrine is satisfactory in certain cases. The connect-
ing factors evidently were borrowed from procedural 
models; 121 to allow nationals domiciled abroad to sue or be 
sued locally, jurisdiction, ordinarily based on actual domicil, 
in emergency cases may be based upon the last previous domi-
cil or, as a final resort, may be assumed by the courts of the 
capital. Such provisions make sense in the intranational rules 
of a country like Rumania. Rumanian citizens are not subject 
to foreign personal laws even when domiciled abroad and 
therefore must be connected with one of the territorial laws 
of Rumania. A French or German court, adhering to the 
same principle of nationality, may very well agree to locate a 
Rumanian citizen somewhere in Rumania. For analogous 
purposes, in order to secure Frenchmen living abroad a domi-
cil in France in case they need one, the French private draft 
of 1930 establishes an artificial domicil: (i) at the French-
men's last domicil in France, (ii) subsidiarily at his last resi-
dence, (iii) otherwise at his birthplace, and ( iv) in the last 
resort at any place chosen by him in a declaration before a 
French consuU22 
On the other hand, such subsidiary rules of the forum are 
obviously unsuitable for connecting a British subject with a 
determinate part of the British Empire. As a matter of fact, 
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 937, 39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 158. Similarly the Portu-
guese Draft C. C. ( 1951), art. 32. 
119 RG. (Nov. 30, 1906) 64 RGZ. 389 at 393; OLG. Karlsruhe (May 6, 
1898) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 311, 315. 
12° KG. (Aug. 20, 1936) JW. 1936, 3582 (Soviet Russian subjects); LG. 
Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Rumanians). 
121 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; German Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 15, 
27 par. 2, 6o6 par. 2, 642, 648. 
122 Art. 5 par. 2, 26 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 176; cf. NIBOYET, 26 
ibid. 78. 
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no German or French court is likely to apply them to a Brit-
ish subject. Where an Englishman is domiciled in France, 
French courts as well as other Continental courts apply 
French law, by renvoi. 
(b) Italian courts reject renvoi 123 and are confronted 
with a problem that has been called insoluble. When the 
Courts of Cassation of Florence and Naples, in leading cases 
of I 9 I 9 and I 920, respectively/24 proclaimed the anti-renvoi 
doctrine, they recognized at the same time that the British 
laws did not contain any rules linking British subjects domi-
ciled abroad with any British legal system. The only possible 
result was to adopt the law of the domicil of origin.125 
Thus, the English judgments in the cases of Johnson and 
0' Keefe, 126 which in fact (by renvoi) resort to the domicil of 
origin to determine the distribution of the estates of British 
subjects who die domiciled in Italy, are not without support 
in Italian law. 
But, of course, it does not correspond to the spirit of Brit-
ish laws that a person firmly settled in Naples for forty-seven 
years should be traced back to the origin of his father; at 
least, even in the eyes of a British court, the domicil of origin 
of the father of Miss O'Keefe was undoubtedly superseded 
by the domicil of her choice. For this reason alone the solu-
tion of the 0' Keefe case is absurd.127 
1 28 This well-known rule was stated by Luxmoore, ]., In re Ross [I930] 
I Ch. D. 377, 403. It is expressly confirmed by the Italian Civil Code (I942) 
Disp. Pre). art. 30. 
124 Cass. Firenze (July 2I, I9I9) Giur. Ita!. I9I9 I I I040. 
125 BuzZATI fully approving of the Naples decision, Cass. Napoli (Jan. 5, 
1920) Foro Ita!. I920 I 348. The same suggestion is made by CHESHIRE, "De-
cisions of National Tribunals Involving Points of International Law," 12 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (I93I) I74 at I76, and in his Private International Law 
193; 8CHMITI'HOFF IOI. 
126 In re Johnson, Roberts v. Att. Gen. [I903] I Ch. 82I per Farwell, ]. ; 
In re O'Keefe, Poingdestre v. Sherman [I940] Ch. 124 per Crossman, J. 
127 FALCONBRIDGE, I9 Can. Bar Rev. (I94I) 324, 326, Essays 2I3, supra n. 
I02; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law I32, who advocates to treat a British subject 
for the purposes of renvoi as stateless, if he cannot be connected with any 
country within the British Commonwealth. Another argument is advanced by 
GRASSEITI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (I935) II 3, 7, supra n. Io6. 
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(c) Recent Italian writers, with Falconbridge's approval, 
conclude that it is impossible to fix the status of a British sub-
ject living abroad and suggest that the Italian court apply the 
lex fori, viz., Italian municipal law.128 Such a gesture of 
despair seems to be uncalled for, however, if proper regard 
be paid to the historical development of the personal law; 
domicil was replaced by nationality in the nineteenth century, 
but not so as to exclude the test of domicil whenever the new 
test of political allegiance should fail to operate reasonably. 
Certainly, reference to domicil is preferable to a resigned re-
sort to the lex fori. The practical consequences illustrate 
what the choice of law means in this case: 
Suppose a Can:;~.dian dies domiciled in France, and an Ital-
ian court has to determine the intestate succession to his 
movables. If the Italian court were to apply Italian inherit-
ance law qua lex fori, instead of French law qua lex domicilii, 
the solution would be senseless and completely destroy har-
mony between the conflicts rules of the forum and those of 
the domicil, as well as with those of the Canadian courts 
which seek to follow any solution chosen by the court of the 
domicil but are unable to follow the law of the forum of a 
third country. 
(d) Zit elm ann suggested taking domicil alone as the 
test/29 He would limit the reference to nationality to the case 
where the actual domicil is situated within the national coun-
try. It has been objected that this view runs directly counter 
to the principle of nationality,130 but this argument is evi-
128 DE NovA and GRASSETI'I, supra n. 102, DE NovA, "II caso In re O'Keefe 
e Ia determinazione della lex patriae di un cittadino britannico domiciliato 
all'estero," Festschrift Raape (1948) 81; this author means the lex residen-
tiae which in the cases discussed by him happened to be also the lex fori 
(see his solution of a case essentially identical with the one adduced in the 
text infra, 46 Revue Crit. (1955) 14) and FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. 
( 1941) 323, Essays 208 supra n. 102. 
129 I ZITELMANN 405, followed by WALKER 105 n. 57· 
180 RAAPE 37· 
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dently wrong. It is true, on the other hand, that the lex domi-
cilii and the theory of renvoi result in the same decision in 
this case and are often hardly distinguishable from each 
other. But the case of a British subject domiciled in Italy in-
duced the leader of the Italian school of international law 
and the prominent opponent of renvoi, Dionisio Anzilotti, to 
abandon his opposition.131 
Adoption of the law of domicil by the Italian courts, either 
as an independent secondary test or, more appropriately, as 
the result of renvoi, is the only way leading out of the im-
passe. Renvoi is the better method, since harmony is pre-
served with the British rules, especially in relation to the defi-
nition of domicil. One cannot reject renvoi and hope for any-
thing tolerable. 
It has been observed that the law of domicil has not the 
same domain of application in all Briti5h countries.132 This, 
however, involves only special points immaterial for the gen-
eral rule. 
(e) The problem is not much different with respect to 
American citizens. If an American citizen is domiciled within 
a state of the United States, the reference to his "national" 
private law means the law which will be applied to him by a 
court sitting at his domicil. It has been properly noted in 
Europe that in this case the nationality principle needs no 
supplementary rule, because such domicil constitutes local 
citizenship in the state. 
Where an American citizen is, however, domiciled in a 
131 ANZILOTI'I, in approving notes to Trib. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1918) in 12 
Rivista (1918) 81 and App. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1919) in the same cause, ibid. 
288. The judgments were reversed by Cass. Firenze, supra n. 124. 
182 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, Essays 206, supra n. 102. 
His example, however, that under the primary rule in Quebec the lex loci 
actus, not the lex domicilii, governs the formal validity of a will, is not 
entirely relevant, since in this situation the law at the place of contracting is 
recognized-alone or optionally-by the Continental conflicts rules, and to 
such extent no renvoi problem is involved. 
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foreign country, renvoi has been adopted by numerous Euro-
pean courts upon the erroneous view that the conflicts law 
of the American state in which he had his last American 
domicil, referring to the law of his present domicil,133 applies. 
The conception in this country is that such an individual is 
still an American citizen but no longer a citizen of a particu-
lar state.134 Consequently, if there were Federal rules of con-
flicts, they might appropriately be resorted to in such case by 
a Continental court. But there are no such rules. Since the Su-
preme Court's decisions requiring Federal courts in diverse 
citizenship cases to follow the conflict rules of the states 
where they are sitting/35 it is doubtful to what extent an in-
dependent Federal system of conflicts law can be devel-
oped.136 However, in the United States, the scope of the law 
of domicil is substantially more uniform than in the British 
Commonwealth, with exception only of certain peculiarities 
in the law of Louisiana. Hence, it seems quite justified 187 for 
133 See the critical exposition by RHEINSTEIN, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 141. 
134 See Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 Fed. Cas. (1851 C. C. N.D. N.Y.) 1278, per 
Nelson, J.; Hammerstein v. Lyne (1912 D. C. W. D. Mo.) 200 Fed. 165. 
135 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938} 304 U. S. 64; Sampson v. Channell 
( 1940 C. C. A. 1st) no F. (2d} 754 and notes in 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 
( 194o-I94I) II9; 128 A. L. R. 405; and now especially Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U. S. 487 and Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 
u. s. 498. 
136 Supra p. 42. 
137 Professor Lawrence Preuss has attracted my attention to a somewhat 
similar problem which has been discussed in matters of extradition. Under 
the treaties, extradition usually depends on the recognition, by both the re-
questing and the requested countries, of the criminal character of the alleged 
offense. How is the "principle of double criminality" to apply to the United 
States where the administration of criminal law has not generally been uni-
fied? Is "country" in such case the United States or the state involved? In the 
case of Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard ( 1933) 290 U. S. 276, 28 Am. 
]. Int. Law ( 1934) 149, the United States was requested to extradite to 
England, Factor, who had been found in Illinois. The Supreme Court, by a 
six to three vote, held it sufficient that the criminal character of the act was 
recognized in twenty-two states, although not proved to be such in Illinois. 
(It has even been said that the number, twenty-two, is too high; see HUDSON, 
"The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition," 28 Am. J. Int. 
Law (1934) 274, 303 n. 120.) BoRCHARD, "The Factor Extradition Case," 
ibid. 744, has given the more cautious explanation that the considerable rec-
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French, German, Chinese, and other foreign courts to treat 
the questions that are generally decided in American courts 
by the municipal law of the domiciliary state, in the same way 
and under the same construction of domicil. 
Conclusion. To summarize, where nationality alone is in-
sufficient for ascertaining the applicable law, resort must be 
had in the first place to the rules respecting interregional re-
lations of the country whose national the individual is. If no 
such rules have been established in that country by an author-
ity covering the entire national territory, the spirit in which 
its courts generally solve the problem of demarcation be-
tween the legal systems included may reasonably be followed 
by foreign courts. Where, as in the United States and in the 
British Empire, domicil is generally decisive, a court of any 
other country has good reason to apply the same criterion 
with all of its implications. Only in the last resort need inde-
pendent conflicts rules be applied, based on a former domicil 
of choice or some other contact. 
Except for the last point, the attitude of the forum may 
thus be similar to that observed in dealing with religious, 
racial, or class differentiations. 
IV. DETERMINATION oF NATIONALITY AND DoMICIL 
I. Determination of Nationality 
Whether a person is a national of a certain country is a 
problem that is determined exclusively by the law of that 
country,138 a settled rule of international law confirmed by 
ognition in American state statutes was evidence of the American recogni-
tion of the criminality in question. The dissenting judges and HUDSON, loc. 
cit., maintain the older conception that the law of the state where the fugi-
tive is finally arrested is decisive. Evidently our own problem is easier to 
solve. 
138 See Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169 
U. S. 649, 668. MAKAROV, Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts 
( 1947) 59, 161. 
THE PERSONAL LAW 147 
the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930.139 
No other law than that of Brazil determines whether or not 
a certain individual is a Brazilian national; no other law than 
that of the United States answers to the question whether 
an individual is a citizen of the United States. The statement 
in a former American nationality law that "any American 
woman marrying an alien shall take the nationality of her 
husband," 140 if taken literally, surpassed the powers of the 
United States.141 The same formula was incorporated, how-
ever, in many old European statutes, as for instance, article 
19 of the CodeN apolion, sometimes interpreted to the effect 
that the wife should be subject to the personal law of the hus-
band, irrespective of whether she acquired his nationality by 
the law of his national country.142 
The principle that acquisition and loss of nationality de-
pend exclusively upon the law of the country concerned, is 
universally recognized not only in public but also in private 
international law; it is expressly stated in recent codifica-
13D Art. 2: "Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality 
of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that 
State." 
140 Act of March 2, I907, ch. 2543, sec. 3, 34 Stat. I228, repealed by the 
Cable Act, Sept. 22, I922, ch. 411, sec. 7, 42 Stat. I02I and later statutes; cf. 
8 U. S. C. ( I940) ch. I, notes to §§ I-IS. 
141 See WALDO E. WALTZ, The Nationality of Married Women (I937) 2I 
notes I5 and I6. 
An analogous charge of trespass upon foreign sovereignty has been made 
by several authors with respect to legislations attaching a certain foreign na-
tionality to corporations. See TRAVERS, 33 Recueil I930 III 25; CAVAGLIERI, 
II diritto commerciale internationale 203; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 460, no. I79· 
To the same effect I PONTES DE MIRANDA 460 objects to the Polish Law of I926 
on international private law, art. I par. 3, and P.G.R. of Liechtenstein, art. 
235, on the ground that these provisions choose the business center of a cor-
poration, even if in foreign territory, as the contact for determining the 
personal law of the corporation, although contrary to the local law of the 
place, and that the Liechtenstein provision seems in this way to determine the 
nationality of the corporation. This attack is unjustified at least inasmuch 
as merely the determination of private law rules is meant and renvoi is 
applied. See infra vol. 2, c. I9 IV. 
1 42 COLMET-DAAGE, I Revue de droit fran<;ais et etranger (I844) 401. 
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tions.143 Occasionally, however, there have been refusals to 
recognize certain foreign nationality regulations deemed to 
be contrary to public policy. French courts, for instance, have 
declined to recognize a Brazilian law of December 14, r889, 
which bestowed Brazilian nationality upon all foreigners 
who resided in Brazil on November rs, r889, and who did 
not expressly object to such en bloc naturalization.144 
This rule of international law is applicable without doubt 
to the determination of status under the nationality principle. 
In two cases, moreover, the conflicts law itself is affected: 
Suppose a divorced French woman goes through a second 
marriage ceremony in France with a Catholic Spaniard. To 
ascertain whether the woman by this marriage acquires Span-
ish nationality, Spanish law exclusively is consulted by all 
courts. Accordingly, as ( i) Spanish matrimonial law pro-
hibits the marriage of a Catholic with a divorced person, and 
(ii) under Spanish conflicts law this nullifying prohibition is 
extended to foreign marriages of Spanish nationals, conse-
quently (iii) by Spanish nationality law the wife does not 
acquire the nationality of Spain. Thus, a French court, in 
determining the question, would not apply its own conflicts 
rule designating the law applicable to the validity or invalid-
ity of the marriage. This is a remarkable case; the pre-
liminary question relating to the marriage apparently is 
answered in accordance with the law applied in deciding the 
main question.144a On the other hand, for some other purpose 
143 Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 29. 
C6digo Bustamante: arts, I2, I4, IS. 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 29. 
Convention of the Hague on Conflict of Nationality Laws of I930: art. 2. 
144 Trib. civ. Seine (July I3, I9I5) Revue I9I6, 67; cf. WErss, I Traite 768; 
the Brazilian law has been recognized, however, by Ct. Sup. Lisbon (May IS, 
I934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 424. In another case the same tribunal refused to 
recognize the acquisition of nationality by birth under a foreign country's jus 
soli: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I, 1916) Revue 19I6, 2I7. Contra: JoRDAN, 4 
Repert. 675 no. I44· 
144a A number of statutory conflicts rules designed for preliminary questions 
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the same court may declare the marriage valid under French 
law. The distinction between these two solutions has baffied 
some writers unduly. 
When according to this rule that nationality depends on 
the municipal law applied by the country involved,145 the na-
tionality of an individual has been ascertained (or found 
unascertainable), the ordinary conflicts rules of the forum 
determine his status. In a second group of problems, how-
ever, the French courts, considering that French nationality 
is at stake, have gravely altered their conflicts rules. 
The decision of the French Supreme Court in the Mares-
chal case illustrates the practice.146 An illegitimate child was 
acknowledged in Switzerland by his Swiss mother's decla-
ration on the birth register. Under Swiss law, an illegitimate 
relationship was created between the child and the mother, 
and the child acquired Swiss nationality.147 French conflicts 
law would have recognized this state of affairs, had not the 
father who was of French nationality ultimately also ac-
knowledged the child in a document sufficient under French 
law. Because this entailed a question of French nationality, 
the court examined the entire situation from the viewpoint of 
French municipal law, under which the mother's recognition 
was found insuffi'cient. Accordingly, the father's was the first 
and decisive acknowledgment, and the child was deemed a 
French national. This doctrine subjects the determination of 
private law questions relating to acknowledgment, to con-
siderations derived from a nationality law instead of the law 
of conflicts.148 
of nationality laws are collected by MAKAROV, Quellen, Index under VIII 
(I) (d). 
1 45 See, as to German law LEWALD 8 no. xo; MELCHIOR 253 § 169. 
146 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, 1930) D.I930.I.II3, S.I930.1.321. See infra p. 
663, n. 40. 
147 Swiss C. C. art. 324; cf. BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I 230, 232. 
1 48 COLIN, Note D.I92I.I.I and in his report to the Court of Cassation, 
Clunet 1923, 89, 93; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE no. 349 A. The principle of the 
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That this is not a foregone conclusion is demonstrated by 
the German law respecting legitimation, which, only if valid 
under the German laws,149 including German conflicts rules/50 
is a ground for acquiring German nationality, and not in-
versely. The conflicts rules operate independently and de-
termine whether there is German citizenship. 
2. Determination of Domicil 
Variety of domicil concepts. In much of the literature, the 
diversity of domicil concepts is emphasized.151 It is opportune 
to note just what the differences are. Primarily, the British 
doctrine of domicil is to be distinguished from that of all 
other systems; it is more or less unique, first, because of the 
abnormal place occupied by the domicil of origin, second, be-
cause of the prevalence of tendentious casuistry. The English 
writers, recognizing that the decisions of the House of Lords 
have done much to alienate the legal concept of domicil from 
its natural lines,152 are frankly unhappy with the artificial 
character of their doctrine and its arbitrary results. On the 
Mareschal case is now for the preliminary question in filiation embodied 
in the French Code of Nationality of 1945, art. 27. 
149 German Nationality Law of July 22, 1913, § 5· 
150 RAAPE 562. 
151 See the surveys given by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recueil 1928 
III 121; LEVASSEUR, Le domicile et sa determination en droit international 
prive (1931); WERNER voN STEIGER, Der Wohnsitz als Anknupfungsbegriff 
im internationalen Privatrecht (Bern, 1934) II9; VITTORIO TEDESCHI, II domi-
cilio nel diritto internazionale privato ( 1933) and the same author's review of 
STEIGER'S book, IO Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 1067; see also NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1934) 89-92. On the differences of municipal conceptions of domicil see the 
comparative study by VITTORIO TEDESCHI, Del domicilio ( 1936). 
152 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (Nov. 
1935) 4, 5· In the Winans case, [1904] A.C. 287, KEITH recalls, the propositus 
had not found a domicil in England during 37 years; Ramsay, in Ramsay v. 
Liverpool [1930] A.C. 588, lived from 1891 or 1892 to 1927 in Liverpool and 
ordered himself buried there, but the Lords unanimously declared him domi-
ciled in Scotland and seemed astonished that another view should be taken. 
By request of the Lord Chancellor, the newly appointed Private International 
Law Committee in its First Report of February 1954 (Cmd. 9068) proposed 
a Code of the Law of Domicile as guidance for future legislation which 
would remedy the oddities; the text is reprinted by SCHMITTHOFF 491. 
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other hand, in some countries, such as Denmark, 153 the notion 
of domicil is undeveloped. 
Apart from these anomalies, however, it should not be 
supposed that in the doctrines of the great majority of coun-
tries there exists no common simple idea of domicil, at least 
at bottom. It would be unfortunate to press to such conclu-
sion the multitude of learned definitions of domicil.154 All 
countries deriving their laws from Roman conceptions agree 
in requiring both physical presence or actual abode (resi-
dence) and intention to maintain this residence for an indefi-
nite time on the part of the person concerned. The American 
law shares this view, although terminology and definitions 
sometimes vary. Despite the frequent use of the term "resi-
dence" in American statutes involving questions of status, 155 
it is the general opinion that an appropriate intention is also 
required; in the Restatement, it is made plain that the proper 
term is "domicil." 156 
The apparent divergence of cases concerning the domicil 
of choice is due not so much to national diversities as to the 
broad latitude of discretion which the courts all over the 
world seem to reserve to themselves in determining where a 
person is or was domiciled. In part, this is attributable to the 
desire of the courts to decide individual cases in accordance 
with what they regard as fair justice; the individualized exer-
cise of such discretion has often given the appearance of an 
arbitrary or inconsistent handling of the problem.157 But in 
153 HOECK, Personalstatut 6, but see BoRUM 93. 
154 MAHAIM, reporter to the Institute of International Law, I93 I, has col-
lected fifty different definitions of domicil given in the world literature. See 
Annuaire I93I II 180. He thinks this shows, against the current belief, that 
the concept of domicil is far from being similar in all countries. On the con-
trary, it shows that the literature has spoiled a fairly uniform subject by scho-
lastic definitions. 
155 I BEALE 110 § 10.3; 4 Proceedings American Law Institute (1926) 348. 
156 Cf. Restatement § 9 e and the use of the term "domicil" as indicated by 
the Index sub "domicil." 
1 57 For instance, Englishmen and Americans are declared to be domiciled 
152 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
part the courts also seem to react against the exaggerated 
generalization by which one basic notion of domicil appar-
ently has been adopted for such different fields as jurisdiction 
and venue, taxation, poor relief, exercise of civil rights, vot-
ing, and conflicts law.158 
Where an individual is not free to establish his domicil but 
is subject to the interference of legal rules, differences are 
more deeply rooted. Thus, the domicil of dependent persons, 
particularly of married women, gives rise to problems.159 
Again, the former singular provision of the French Civil 
Code (art. 13) that a foreigner had to obtain authorization 
by the French government to have a domicil in France, 
greatly disturbed the international order. A British subject 
who was permanently located in Paris but had not obtained 
such authorization, for the purposes of the French courts, 
was not there domiciled, although so regarded under Ger-
man, Italian, and even English standards. Thus, the English 
courts declared that Mrs. Annesley acquired a domicil of 
choice in France, although she never had applied for govern-
ment permission.160 By law of 1927, this peculiar doctrine 
was repealed, and the French courts proceeded in accordance 
in France (see NIBOYET 610) or in Switzerland (as in the decision of the 
Trib. Zurich, Oct. 25, 1935, 32 S]Z. 202 no. 41 and others of the same tribu-
nal) in order to assume jurisdiction for divorce. The same occurs daily in this 
country. Thus, for example in the famous case of Gould v. Gould ( 1923) 23 5 
N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 the matrimonial domicil for obvious reasons was de-
clared to be in New York, although the divorce decree of Paris was recog-
nized (infra p. 507, n. 40). 
158 This is well known; cf. 3 Proceedings American Law Institute (1925) 
224, esp. W. W. CooK, ibid. 226; CounERT, "Some Considerations in the Law 
of Domicil," 36 Yale L. ]. (1927) 949; Restatement, New York Annotations 
6. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Florida (1939) 
306 u. s. 428. 
159 For illustration take the case of German RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR. 
1939, no. 376 (the legal domicil of a child whose legitimacy is attacked, but 
is not yet avoided, is determined according to the conflict law of legal pa-
ternity (EG. BGB. art. 19), whereas the court of appeal had applied the 
lex fori). See in respect of the wife, below, pp. 333 ff., of the child, below, 
p. 648. 
160 In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. See also the dis-
cussion in Harral v. Harral ( 1884) 39 N. ]. Eq. 279· 
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with the ordinary concept of domicil. In 1938, a French de-
cree had required an alien to possess a police identification 
card allowing him to stay in France for more than one year, 
in order to acquire, exercise, or enjoy statutory rights pre-
supposing French domicil or residence; 161 the celebration of 
marriage was expressly subjected to it.161" This requirement 
has been abolished under present law,162 except that a tem-
porary foreign resident needs a prefectural authorization 
for marriage in France.163 
Finally, the dogmas that every person must have a domi-
cil, and that no person can have more than one domicil at a 
time 164-in force in British countries, the United States, 
France, Switzerland, Argentina, etc.-have been discarded 
in the German Code as contrary to the realities of life.165 
Despite these embarrassing variances, it should not be im-
possible to arrive at a reasonable unification of the conditions 
under which domicil may be acquired. This is demonstrated 
by those bilateral international treaties that incorporate a 
definition of domicil in their text, as well as by the determina-
tions of domicil by international courts for the specific pur-
pose of treaties lacking such definition.166 A far-reaching uni-
161 Decret-loi {Nov. 12, 1938) J. Off. 12-13 Nov. 1938, art. 1; SrREY 
I939·4·Io8o, D.I939·4·I62-I63, Clunet 1939, 315. 
1 611l Art. 7 of the decree. Cf. TAGER, "Statut des etrangers," Clunet 1939. 278, 
288, critical of the marriage prohibition and the immature character of the 
decree. 
162 Ordinance of Nov. 2, 1945, J. Off. Nov. 1945, 35 Revue Crit. ( 194o-46) 
144· 
163 Art. 12 of the Ordinance and Decree of Feb. 21, 1946, J. Off. 22 Feb. 
1946, 35 Revue Crit. (194o-46) 319. But a violation of the provision does 
not affect the validity of the marriage, cf. BATIFFOL, Traite 189 n. 12. 
164 NEUNER regards this dogma as the chief reason for the confusion com-
plained about by the lawyers of the common law countries, see NEUNER, 
"Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 
479 at 494· 
165 BGB. § 7· For Denmark BoRUM 93· 
166 Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of May 25, 1926, 
Serie A no. 7, 79; Arbitral Decision (July ro, 1924) of President Kaecken-
beeck, 33 Z.int.R. (1924-1925) 321; cf. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 105-112. 
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fication has been achieved in this country, as a result of the 
insertion of the topic in the law of conflicts instead of regard-
ing it as a matter of domestic law. The rules provided in 
sections I I to 4I of the Restatement are uniform rules of 
private law, transferred into conflict of laws. The British 
common law countries and the countries unified by the Trea-
ties of Montevideo have attained an analogous result. 
Which law decides? As the answer to the question of 
domicil thus may vary, the question arises under what law a 
court should define the elements constituting domicil.167 This 
problem is of evident interest in the countries where domicil 
is the general test of status rights, but it is also of importance 
elsewhere; for instance, in France and other countries suc-
cession to movables upon death depends on the law of the 
last domicil of the deceased. That this problem usually is 
identified by writers and courts with the question under which 
law domicil (or residence) required for judicial jurisdiction 
must be determined, is unfortunate. In consequence, the ap-
plication of the lex fori, natural where jurisdiction is con-
cerned, has been advocated as if it were equally natural in 
matters of choice of law. 
Lex fori. Thus, the English courts, after some vacillations, 
now take it for granted that they have to apply the English 
concept whenever they determine an individual's domiciU68 
The same approach seems to prevail in the United States/69 
where it has been adopted in the Restatement.170 The courts 
of the Netherlands likewise determine domicil in accordance 
167 See literature, supra n. 151. 
1 6 8 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, 227; In re Annesley, 
Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692; Fleming v. Horniman ( 1928) 44 
T.L.R. 315; GRAVESON 77; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 212; in the latest edition the 
relevant section is missing, apparently by accident, as the author gives only 
four, instead of the promised five, general rules (p. z66). 
169 Harral v. Wallis (1883) 37 N. ]. Eq. 458; Harral v. Harral (r884) 39 
N. ]. Eq. 279. Cf. x BEALE § ro.r; GooDRICH 52. 
110 Restatement § ro. 
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with the concept of the forum and refuse to apply the na-
tional law of the person, because they believe that the defini-
tiOn of domicil does not pertain to the functions of the per-
sonallaw.111 
In a broad way, the same result has been reached through 
the theory that the determination of a person's domicil is a 
problem of "characterization" and therefore must be an-
swered in accordance with the lex fori. 172 This means that the 
conflicts rule of the forum referring to the law of the domicil 
necessarily refers to the law of the place considered to be 
the domicil under the private law of the forum. If, for in-
stance, an American citizen resides in Paris, a French court 
would determine at what place he is domiciled solely in ac-
cordance with the French concept of domicil, as indicated by 
examination of the French law. 
Yet, in the common opinion,173 it is not inconsistent with 
this theory that, to use the same example, the American and 
not the French definition of domicil should be decisive for 
171 H.R. (Jan. 5, 1917) W.10073· It must be noted, however, that the case 
dealt with jurisdiction, in a suit against a ward of German nationality; for 
this purpose the minor was considered domiciled with his Dutch guardian, 
according to BW. art. 78, irrespective of German law; recently Rb. Amster-
dam (Apr. 9, 1926) Clunet 1928, 1296; Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 26, 1926) 
Clunet 1928, 1293; Rb. Dordrecht (Dec. 9, 1936) W. 1937, no. 921 (domicil 
by operation of law for a minor foreigner in the Netherlands with his 
guardian, BW. art. 78); see also Rb. Almelo (May 13, 1936) W. 1937, no. 
258 (German illegitimate child, but domicil for the purpose of the child's 
bastardy proceedings). 
172 See MELCHIOR 177 n. 7; DE NovA, 30 Rivista (1938) 388, at 399· 
LEWALD, Regles Genchales des conflits de lois 91 n. 23 (with other citations). 
173 See particularly KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 66; also in 30 ]he rings J ahrb. ( 1891) 
76; NIBOYET 686 no. 565 and 3 Traite no. 1002; BATIFFOL, Traite 458; 2 
ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 58 If. no. 14 sub. (3) (with restrictions, n. 15) ; and 
among the French decisions Cass. (req.) (Dec. 30, 1929) D. H. 1930.65; Trib. 
sup. Colmar (Nov. 30, 1921) Clunet 1922, 379; App. Colmar (Jan. 14, 1925) 
Clunet 1925, 1044; Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 901. Cf. 
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 625. RG. (June 2, 1932) 136 RGZ. 361, 363; RG. 
(Apr. 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, 
no. 89 (British subject died in Freiburg; his domicil has to be ascertained 
according to British rules relative to British subjects born in India). Contra: 
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE no. 261. 
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the problem of renvoi. Where an American citizen lives in 
France at the time of his death, a French (or German) court 
in determining succession to his movables, will consult first 
his national law, i.e., the American, which is deemed to refer 
to the inheritance law of the last "domicil." To comply with 
this reference, the court must ascertain whether the last resi-
dence constitutes a domicil in the meaning of the American 
rule, because this is the rule (of back reference, loi ren-
voyante) to be applied.174 This construction of domicil is not 
considered an exception to the supposed principle of char-
acterization according to the lex fori, for in this case it is the 
American conflicts rule, not that of the forum, that applies 
and with it the American concept of domicil. 
Is it not strange, however, that, to determine the status of 
a person according to his domiciliary law, a court in State X, 
when in doubt whether such person is domiciled in Y or Z, 
should follow its own internal law in localizing the domi-
cil? 175 
Even in the French school of thought, in which the doc-
trine of characterization of legal concepts according to the 
law of the forum has gained its strongest foothold, other 
theories have been advanced in startling variety. Some of the 
older authors, emphasizing the nationality principle, have 
proposed that domicil be defined in accordance with the na-
tional law of the individual.176 Recent discussions have put 
174 Great Britain: In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692, 
707. 
France: Affaire Forgo, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, 1882) Clunet 1883, 64; Cour 
Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924. 410; Trib. Civ. Seine (Dec. 19, 1927) 
Revue 1928, 511. But there are controversies in literature and in the courts. 
See J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 167 at 184. 
NrBOYET 610 thinks even that in most cases domicil of Englishmen was as-
sumed in contrast to English conceptions. 
175 In contrast to the domiciliary principle itself, see NIEMEYER, Das IPR. 
des BGB. 69; NEUNER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 90. 
176WEISS, 3 Traite 321; VALERY 113 no. 116; cf. LEVASSEUR, op. cit. supra 
n. 151. Some writers claim that the Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902, 
art. 5 no. 2 has adopted this view, and some decisions, including German RG. 
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forward two further points of contact. One opinion is that 
the law of the place of actual residence should be consulted 
to determine whether such residence constitutes domicil; this 
law is sometimes called the terri to rial law 177 and is favored 
as such by neo-territorialists such as Niboyet.178 Another 
opinion, or rather formulation of the same trend, postulates 
that the law of domicil which should govern under the choice 
of law rule of the forum should determine also where the 
domicil is.179 In fact, the Swiss rule referring the status of a 
Swiss domiciled abroad to the legislation of the domicil is 
said to imply the notion of domicil in the foreign law.180 
A similar interpretation-on doubtful grounds-has been 
given to the Argentine domiciliary rule by the court of Paris; 
in the eyes of the Argentine legislator, the domicil acquired 
by an Argentine national in Paris, if not authorized by the 
French authorities and therefore not recognized under the 
then French law, is insufficient to determine the law appli-
cable to his inheritance.181 Actual residence in the foreign 
country is presupposed, however, in such cases. In these po-
lemics, the main argument against the lex fori is that domicil, 
like nationality, establishing a social and political tie between 
an individual and a state, should be construed under the law 
(Apr. 5, 1921) 102 RGZ. 82, 84, have followed these writers. See MELCHIOR 
180 n. 3 j 3 FRANKENSTEIN 520. 
177 I BROCHER 247 If. His theory was advocated also by I ZITELMANN 83, 
178, and adopted by the C6digo Bustamante arts. 22 and 25, the Guatemalan 
laws on Foreigner~ of Jan. 25, 1936, art. 18, and on Judicial Power of Aug. 
3, 1936, art. XX, as well as (in respect of jurisdiction) by the Swedish Law 
of July 8, 1904 with amendments, c. 7 § 3· 
178 See infra n. 183. 
179 STEIGER, op. cit. supra n. 151, especially at 161; TEDESCHI recognizes this 
law as determining domicil for certain status questions as a broad exception 
to the lex fori doctrine. 
180 Swiss NAG. art. 28; HUBER-MUTZNER 403. 
181 Argentina: C. C. art. 3283 (new 3317); Cour Paris (May 10, 1929) Clu-
net 1930, 405, Revue 1930, 126, affirmed by Cass. (March 7, 1938) Revue 
Crit. 1938, 472, Nouv. Revue, 1938, 143 j cf. J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, "Le 
renvoi et !'affaire de Marchi della Costa," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 
167. 
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of that state. Particularly, it has been considered strange to 
determine an individual's personal status on the ground of 
his domicil in a country which does not recognize him as one 
of its domiciliaries. This is the argument anticipated in 
Westlake's statement that "no one can acquire a personal 
law in the teeth of that law itself," 182 a consideration which 
has much impressed Niboyet, formerly the strongest advo-
cate of the lex fori doctrine.183 
A draft treaty worked out by the League of Nations 184 at-
tempted to eliminate the "conflict of the conflict of laws relat-
ing to domicil" by combining the theory of "territoriality" 
with the lex fori principle. A similar spirit is shown in the 
rules adopted in 1931 by the Institute of International 
Law,185 according to which the courts in each country deter-
mine under its own domestic legislation whether an individ-
ual is or is not domiciled therein; the Institute also provides 
for the case where two or more foreign laws conflict in re-
spect of domicil and declares that, between two or more 
voluntary domicils, the place of actual residence, if any, 
should be preferred. The Institute has shown a possible solu-
tion through this auxiliary conflicts rule. Further progress 
toward unification of "domicil," considered as a connecting 
factor, will perhaps be reached if future writers not only 
distinguish the concept as a category of status law from 
other meanings of domicil, but also differentiate rules dealing 
182 WESTLAKE § 254· 
183 NmoYET in S. 1929.2.162; S. 1930.2.129; Revue Crit. 1935, 762; and 
among others I Traite (1938) nos. 514-515, 552 ff. 
184 See Publ., League of Nations C.343·M.IOI.1928.V: BARBOSA DE MAGAL-
HAES, Memorandum, p. 14 and Draft Convention for the Settlement of Con-
flicts of Laws in the Matter of Domicil, p. 17 art. 2: Questions connected with 
change of domicil except such as concern a person's capacity at law or the 
existence of a domicil by operation of law shall be settled in conformity with 
the law of the court if the latter be that of one of the States concerned, other-
wise, in accordance with the law of the place in which it is claimed that the 
last domicil was acquired. Cf. also Draft by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 
Recueil 1928 III 138. 
185 Annuaire 1931 II 239· 
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with capacity of contracting, succession upon death, recogni-
tion of foreign judgments, etc., in order to ascertain which 
kind of domicil is a desirable connecting factor for each of 
these separate matters.186 
V. CHANGE OF PERSONAL LAW 
Under the system of personal law, a person's status is 
changed whenever he changes his nationality or, where the 
domicil principle prevails, when he changes his domicil. 
I. Change of Nationality 
In the countries that determine personal status in accord-
ance with the law of the country of which the individual is a 
national, the problem arises how a change of nationality 
affects an individual's status as a person of full age. Under 
German law, infancy is terminated upon an individual's com-
pleting his twenty-first year of life.187 In Illinois a woman is 
regarded as of age when she has completed her eighteenth 
year .188 When a nineteen-year-old American girl from Illinois 
is naturalized in Germany, is she again reduced to the status 
of infancy? Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Introductory Law 
to the German Civil Code contains an express provision by 
which this result is prevented.188a Even though she is now 
subject to German law as her personal law, the girl continues 
186 Cf. FRANCIS, "The Domicil of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. J. (1929) 335, 
341 and TEDESCHI, Domicilio 8. GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in 
Matrimonial Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) 19, 26 ff. thinks a 
worldwide definition of domicil for the exclusive purpose of jurisdiction for 
divorce quite possible. 
187 German BGB. § 2; in Eastern Germany the age of majority has been 
reduced to 18 years (Law of May 17, 1950). 
188 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, 3 § 283. 
1 88a This rule has been adopted in several other countries: 
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of 1948, s. 2. 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 42 par. 2. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23 par. 2. 
Poland: Law on International Private Law of 1926, art. 1 par. 2. 
China: Law of Aug. 5, 1918, art. 5 par. 3· 
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to be treated as of age by the German courts. Can the same 
result be reached without such a provision of the new per-
sonal law, for instance under article 3 of the Japanese Law 
of I 898, which, although following literally the German 
article 7, has omitted the said paragraph 2? This question 
has been answered in the affirmative/89 but it has been ob-
jected that full age does not constitute a vested right and 
would have to be reacquired under the new statute.190 
2. Change of Domicil 
Since domicil can be changed more easily than nationality, 
the problem is even more acute in those countries where an 
individual's personal status is determined in accordance with 
the law of the country where he is domiciled. That a once 
acquired status as a person of age is preserved in spite of a 
change of domicil to a country where infancy is terminated 
at a later age, has been recognized in the conflict of laws of 
several countries,191 as well as in one of the Scandinavian 
treaties 192 and in the Treaty of Montevideo.193 
189 Austrian decisions, see WALKER 128 n. 42 j I BAR § I44 j NIEMEYER, Das 
IPR. des BGB. 126; ROLIN, 2 Principes I96 n. 655; PoULLET 319 n. 2. 
190 WEISS, 3 Traite 344 j I FRANKENSTEIN 426 n. 82 j RAAPE 79 j and French, 
Italian and other German writers quoted by these authors. 
191 Argentina: C. C. art. I39· 
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power (Aug. 3, I936) art. 
XVIII; Law on Foreigners (Jan. 25, I936) art. IS. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI par. 2. 
In German interzonal law applying the law of the domicil or the residence 
in questions of personal status, full capacity once acquired under East Ger-
man law at IS years (supra n. I87) has been preserved after establishment 
in West Germany in spite of the there prevailing age limit of 2I years: 
KG. (Berlin-West) (March 29, I951) IZRspr. I945-53 no. 33; OLG. Dussel-
dorf (June I2, 1951) IZRspr. 1945-53 no. 35· 
1 92 Convention on Private International Law regarding Marriage, Adop-
tion, and Guardianship, Feb. 6, I 93 I, Final Protocol sec. 2 ( 126 League of 
Nations Treaty Series 148). 
1 93 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 2, provides that change of 
domicil does not affect capacity acquired by emancipation or coming of age. 
The new text of 1940 reads to the effect that change of domicil does not affect 
capacity. 
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In the United States, however, capacity is generally inde-
pendent of domicil; in the exceptional case where domicil is 
determinative, it seems that the actual domicil alone is taken 
into consideration. 
VI. RATIONALE 194 
1. Tradition 
Before modern states arose and developed the concept of 
allegiance, the only and obvious test of personal law was 
domicil, either of origin or of choice, special considerations 
applying to dependent persons. 
This test is still important in those states where private 
law is divided into different systems. Domicil is still the na-
~ural criterion in the British Empire and in the United States, 
as it formerly was in France before the Revolution, in Italy 
before I 866, and in the old German Empire and in most 
parts of the second German Empire before the Civil Code 
took effect on January I, I900. It goes too far, however, to 
pretend that the principle of nationality is absolutely im-
practicable for a country that lacks uniformity of private law 
throughout its territory.195 In such a country, domicil is the 
best element of contact in the relations between the several 
territories, but in the relations of the country as a whole to 
foreign countries either test may be used. As a matter of fact, 
in I926, Poland chose the domicil test for interlocal relations 
among her several territories under Warsaw-Polish, Rus-
sian, German, Austrian, and Hungarian laws, but declared 
nationality to be decisive for problems of personal law in 
international relations. Thus, a foreigner domiciled in 
194 Mere reference is made to the selected bibliography and the treatment 
of old and recent so-called "theoretical arguments," by 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 
28 ff. no. 9· 
195 See I BAR § 9I at 267, 268 discussing WHARTON §§ 20 ff., whose argu-
ments against nationality have been reassumed, however, by POLLOCK, Book 
Revue, 3 I Law Q. Rev. ( I9I 5) 106 and 3 BEALE I934· 
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Poland stands under his national personal law, and a Polish 
citizen living abroad has to obey the laws which Poland ap-
plies to all her nationals as well as the law of that Polish 
territory where he had his last domicil, or in the absence of 
any former domicil, the laws of the state capital. Such a sys-
tem would be theoretically conceivable for other composite 
countries. In the United States especially, despite the fact 
that states constitute the territories of private law, the con-
stitutional circumstances are somewhat analogous, consider-
ing that state citizenship has become subordinate to federal 
nationality; the American system has been determined, how-
ever, by other elements. 
2. Political Considerations 
An important role has been played not only by tradition 
but also by political considerations which have influenced the 
law-making agencies of the various countries, consciously as 
well as unconsciously. 
The unilateral rule of article 3, paragraph 3 of the French 
Code, although reflecting traditions of the old coutumes, 
represented the idea that a French citizen should enjoy the 
achievements of the great Revolution wherever he might 
happen to be and that he should be bound everywhere by its 
laws by virtue either of tacit agreement or simply by natural 
law. Mancini held the idea that, in contrast to the strict 
territoriality of public law and public policy, the needs of an 
individual were served best by rules of family, inheritance, 
and status law of universal application; since the laws deal-
ing with these topics are the product of all those factors that 
determine a people's national character, the laws of a per-
son's national community should be considered most suitable 
for him wherever he may live. These notions of the French 
revolutionists and of Mancini were widely discussed; they 
appealed to the trend of nationalism of the nineteenth cen-
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tury; and they were widely adopted in the numerous national 
codifications of the period. When the German Civil Code 
was enacted in 1896, the test of nationality had won such a 
firm hold that the traditional system of domicil could be dis-
carded almost without discussion. Whenever new waves of 
national feeling were stirred up in the twentieth century, they 
resulted almost invariably in the adoption of the principle of 
nationality as best fitted to protect the needs of the national 
community.196 
3· Economic Considerations; Migrations 
While these ideological arguments have been working in 
favor of the principle of nationality, the domicil principle has 
found support in the desire of immigration countries to in-
corporate new immigrants into the legal life of their country 
as soon as possible, and thereby to avoid the difficulties that 
would arise if each new immigrant prior to naturalization 
were to be judged in accordance with the laws of his home 
country. These considerations have been of crucial influence 
in the United States, 197 as well as in Switzerland and Argen-
tina.198 They have been gaining ground in Brazil: 199 the new 
Introductory Law of September 4, 1942, has radically sub-
stituted the principle of domicil for that of nationality, pre-
196 Cf. PILLAUT, Revue 1916, 14, 32, and see National-Socialist writers such 
as REu in 57 RVerwBI. (1936) 521 and HoRST MuLLER in DJZ. 1936, col. 
1065. LoRENZEN, in a Book Review, 33 Am. ]. Int. Law (1939) 427 observes 
that RAAPE'S recent manual on German international private law greatly ex-
tends the principle of nationality. 
197 See 3 BEALE 1935. 
198 Argentina, which had adopted the principle of nationality in 1857 and 
re-affirmed it in 1862, later went over to the domiciliary law in the C. C. of 
!869. 
199 RoDRIGO OCTAVIO, 0 direito positivo e a sociedade internacional (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1917) n3, quoted by 1 V1co 365 no. 424; Report of the Brazilian 
Delegate (EsPINOLA) to the Third Commission of the Sixth Panamerican Con-
ference, see Diario de Ia Sexta Conferencia Internacional Americana (Ha-
bana, 1928) no. 30 p. 420; cf. BusTAMANTE, La nacionalidad y el domicilio 
(1929). 
164 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
viously incorporated in the code.200 A few other South Ameri-
can countries have changed in recent years from nationality 
to domicil, obviously yielding to the influence of immigration 
policy.201 
Especially in France, where considerable masses of for-
eigners had come to live before the outbreak of World War 
II, the advantages of the domiciliary system for an immigra-
tion country began to be appreciated. Characteristic of the 
change of mind is the attitude of the treaties edited by Nibo-
yet. As late as 1928, he reprinted the opinion of Pillet 202 
explaining the French doctrine as follows: 
The French sovereignty has no interest in subjecting all in-
dividuals in France to the provisions of the Civil Code in 
matters of status and capacity. It has, on the other hand, a 
marked interest not to let its nationals evade the operations 
of its laws ... 
But at the same time he declared 203 the problem to be more 
political than doctrinal and shortly thereafter became the 
leader of a movement aiming to control all inhabitants of 
France by French law. Extended discussions of the Comite 
Fram;ais de Droit International Prive were devoted to this 
200 Lei de Introduc;ao, 1942 Decreto-Lei no. 4657, art. 7· 
201 Guatemala had the nationality rule in its Law on Foreigners of 1894, 
art. 48, 2d sentence, and adopted the principle of domicil in the C. C. of 1926, 
libro I, art. 12, from which the provisions on conflicts law were transferred 
in 1936 to the Constitutive Law of Judicial Power, and more recently to the 
Law on Foreigners of 1936, arts. 17 and x8. See MATOS nos. 136, 172. 
In Peru, the Civil Code of 1852 had no express rule but was often inter-
preted in the sense of nationality test. Despite Peru's participation in the 
Montevideo Treaties of x889, the Commercial Code of 1902 seemed to con-
firm this theory, art. xs, following art. 15 of the Spanish Commercial Code 
and determining the capacity of foreigners according to their lex patriae. 
Draft and text of the Civil Code of 1936 have followed the domiciliary sys-
tem; cf. supra pp. 128 ff. 
202 NIBOYET 699. See moreover PILLET, 2 Manuel (ed. x) sxs: how would 
we conceive that an individual minor in his country of origin could become 
capable or incapable according to the countries where he would be con-
tracting? 
203 NIBOYET 702 n. 587. 
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endeavor, which almost all French experts seem to ap-
prove.204 
Countries from which large portions of the population 
emigrate, are attracted, on the other hand, by a principle 
which tends to preserve the ties between the emigrant and his 
home country. Great Britain furnishes a striking illustration 
of this tendency, namely, the doctrine of domicil of origin, 
which has often been compared with the bonds effected by the 
principle of nationality, a doctrine maintained and developed 
to satisfy the natural desire of a home country from which 
innumerable colonizers have gone out into the world. Even 
in the United States where in theory only one kind of domicil 
is known, courts usually have been reluctant to recognize 
that an American citizen has transferred his domicil to a 
foreign country, especially when there are assets in this coun-
try to be distributed or taxes to be assessed. 205 This, in prac-
tice, is a domicil of origin. 
Similar considerations have contributed to the popularity 
of the nationality principle itself in Germany and Italy, from 
which millions emigrated to the New World in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. However, this circumstance 
should not be overestimated. Until very recent times, neither 
Germany nor Italy pursued any consistent policy in preserv-
ing relations with their emigrants. Until 1913, a German 
citizen living abroad even lost his citizenship after ten years, 
zo4 See Travaux du Comite fran<;ais de droit int. prive, Annees 1-4 ( 1934-
1937) and in Revue Crit. 1939, 171, report on the meeting of May 23, 1938, 
concurring "le statut de l'etranger." These studies started significantly with 
an Exposition by M. Louis-Lucas on the territoriality of law and the new 
tendencies towards it. NIBOYET, Traite Vo)s. I and 2 j LEREBOURs-PIGEON-
NIERE 248; BARBEY, Le Conflit 215, and respecting the question of capacity, 
see below. 
zos CouoERT, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 Yale L. J. 
(1927) 949, 961; comments in 37 Yale L. J. (1928) II27, II29, and par-
ticularly the cases commented upon by CoUDERT: Matter of Spencer, N. Y. 
L. J. June 2, 1908 (not reported); United States Trust Co. of New York v. 
Hart (1912) 150 App. Div. 413, 135 N.Y. Supp. 81, aff'd (1913) 208 N. Y. 
617, 102 N. E. 1115. 
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unless he had himself expressed his desire to retain allegiance 
by formally registering with the German consulate. 206 
Wherever in those countries the principle of nationality 
did not satisfy nationalistic tendencies, there could scarcely 
have resulted a change from the principle of nationality to 
that of domicil but rather an extension of the application of 
the principle that "laws of public safety and police" apply to 
every person sojourning within the territory of the forum. 
By such an order of ideas, the principle of nationality is 
maintained for nationals abroad and narrowed with respect 
to foreigners living in one's own territory. This unhappy 
result has been achieved in the Latin American codifications 
indicated above. 207 
4· Practicability 
Respecting the practicability of the alternative tests, it has 
often been alleged that citizenship is not changed so easily 
nor so often as domicil or residence, and in consequence that 
a law based on nationality could not be evaded so smoothly 
as a law based upon domicil. The former is therefore said 
to be better fitted to govern the conditions of such transac-
tions as marriage, adoption, or testament, than a law which 
the propositus can voluntarily renounce. Moreover, nation-
ality is credited with being a relatively clear and simple con-
cept compared with the uncertainties and multiformity of 
domicil, especially in its British varieties. Recent critics in 
England have admitted that the English conception is "both 
artificial and complex." 208 The force of this argument is 
somewhat questionable, in view of the complexity of modern 
206 German Law on Nationality of 1870 (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz), re-
placed by Law of July 22, 1913. 
zo1 See supra pp. 126-129. 
zos FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 
Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 85. 
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citizenship laws and the circumstance that the British domicil 
of origin is not a domicil at all. On the other hand, it has 
been argued in favor of the principle of domicil that it is 
closer to facts and more consistent with the principle of terri-
toriality. 209 But neither are these considerations in themselves 
advantages. It is noteworthy, however, that, after the first 
World War, the practical difficulties caused by the considera-
tion of strange or obscure foreign laws under the principle 
of nationality were acutely felt in Germany. For this reason, 
the same suggestions were made, as in France for reasons of 
immigration policy, that the local law should again govern 
the status of domiciled foreigners. 210 
So far as outside parties are concerned, either system 
opens the door to prejudicial mistakes respecting the legal 
capacity of foreigners. 
The perplexity of the situation is illustrated by the strange 
fact that while many Continental writers are quite set upon 
restoring the principle of domicil, 211 it has been said in 
England that "the best course would seem to be to adopt the 
doctrine of nationality as applied on the Continent." 212 All 
agree, however, that for the time being there is no hope of 
any such radical modifications. It may naturally be concluded 
that efforts should be directed to fundamental improvement 
of both criteria. 
209 NIBOYET, in 2 Melanges offerts a M. Mahaim 679 ("chant de Ia terre") 
quoted by VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 294, 296. 
210 See 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 390 on proceedings of the law commission of the 
Prussian Chamber of Representatives (particularly p. 396 on marriage re-
quirements, see infra p. 314) and 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 633 an opinion of 
Schilling recommending retention of the domicil principle for the Baltic 
States. 
211 Also in the Netherlands, an address by Kollewijn in Batavia (1929) 
against the "degenerated" principle of nationality is regarded as a charac-
teristic sign; cf. OFFERHAUS, in Gedenkbo_ek 1838-1938, 705. 
212 FosTER, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. Cf. supra p. u6, n. 23. 
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5. Efforts to Reach a Modus Vivendi Between the Two 
Principles 
The contrast between the two systems of determining per-
sonal status is deeply rooted in traditions and policies, and 
the near future holds no prospect of its elimination. It ap-
pears therefore the more necessary to devise ways and means 
to achieve practicable decisions in individual cases in spite of 
the coexistence of the two different systems. 
(a) The most effective means has proved to be the renvoi, 
of which, in fact, the chief field of application is status and 
capacity to engage in transactions. 
(b) The Hague Conferences simply adopted the principle 
of nationality; the Treaty of Montevideo adhered to the 
domicil principle. During the making of the C6digo Busta-
mante, serious but inadequate proposals were made to bridge 
the gulf: 213 
First, the principle of the Hague Convention on Marriage 
that the national law should govern except where it refers to 
another law (renvoi); second, an analogous idea, advocated 
by the Uruguayan delegate, Varela, that the law of domicil 
should govern, except where it refers to another law, par-
ticularly to that of nationality; and third, the notable sug-
gestion of De Bustamante that every contracting state shall 
apply to a national of another state that law which is applied 
to him by the state to which he belongs. Cubans would thus 
be treated in all states according to the national principle, 
and Argentinians according to the law of domiciJ.214 This 
would give nationality a certain preference in the outcome, 
quite as the renvoi theory does, and evidently produce an 
adequate solution. 
213 BusTAMANTE, Tres Conferencias sobre derecho internacional privado 
(1929) 46 ff. 
214 BusTAMANTE, La Nacionalidad y el domicilio (1927) 61. In twenty dif-
ferent situations ten times nationality, and ten times domicil would result as 
test ( pp. 64, 67). 
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More recently, however, at the Scandinavian Convention 
of February, I 93 I, establishing conflict of laws rules for 
matrimonial relations, adoption, and guardianship, 215 the 
problem was more successfully resolved. Sweden and Finland 
apply nationality as the test, while Denmark, Norway, and 
Iceland retain domicil as controlling. To regulate the rela-
tions between the five countries, the Convention admits the 
law of domicil in the first instance and secondarily the law 
of nationality. Article I provides, for instance, that where a 
national of one of the participant states is domiciled in one 
of the other states for at least two years, his marriage is gov-
erned by the law of the state of domicil; otherwise, the law 
of the state to which he belongs controls. 
At its meetings in Cambridge, I93I, and Oslo, I932, the 
Institute of International Law, formerly a strong supporter 
of the principle of nationality, attempted a compromise with 
a marked tendency toward the Anglo-American doctrine; 
but the issue did not appear hopeful. 216 
The Hague Conference, in I 9 5 I, has adopted a Con-
vention for the regulation of the conflicts between the na-
tional law and the law of the domicil. It provides, in essence, 
that the reference of the national law of a person to the law 
of his domicil is binding for the domiciliary state and for 
third countries (art. I) ; if both the domiciliary and the na-
tional law declare the same law applicable, this reference is 
binding on third countries (arts. 2, 3). Thus, harmony be-
tween the two rival principles is sought by resort to renvoi 
though the term itself has been carefully avoided. 
(c) The following case illustrates a recurrent problem, 
which particularly needs efficient relief: 
215 Cf. BLOCH, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 627. 
216 See BRIERLY, observations on the Draft mentioned above, n. 184, Publ. 
of League of Nations C.343.M.Io1. 1928. V p. 19. From the British angle, 
GuiTERIDGE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1938) 15; cf. TEDESCHI, Domi-
cilio 17. 
170 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
A marriage between German parties was dissolved by a 
divorce decree of an American court. Subsequently, the hus-
band became an American citizen and married another wife 
in this country. The judgment not being recognized in Ger-
many because of alleged lack of reciprocity of recognition, 
it seemed certain that, in Germany, the second marriage 
would be held invalid, the issue thereof illegitimate, and as 
such not entitled to share in the husband's estate. However, 
the court of appeals in Berlin upheld the validity of the sec-
ond marriage for several reasons, of which the most effective 
seems to have been the court's desire not to upset a factual 
situation that had been established in the United States.217 
Judgments of this kind, if more frequent, would hollow out 
the extraterritorial effect of the personal law. But the prob-
lem is comprehensive. States with nationality as the test ex-
tend their regulations beyond their frontiers to their citizens 
abroad, more often than not colliding with the states of im-
migration imposing different rules upon the same persons.218 
Even if this extension of authority, so much resented in Latin 
America, were justified in itself, it should certainly not be 
allowed to produce effects beyond the time of acquisition of 
a new nationality by a former citizen of the forum. But even 
without a change of nationality, it is shocking that the na-
tional law should lay hold of a man who abandoned his coun-
try many years ago, and of his children and grandchildren, 
who live in different surroundings and never think of them-
selves as subject to any law other than that of their new 
country. If the principle of nationality is to survive, its claim 
should cease at least when the propositus has established 
217 KG. (Jan. 13, 1925) JW. 1925, 2146; cf. MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
745, also MELCHIOR, Grundlagen 414 § 279· See, moreover, LG. Berlin (Aug. 
6, 1934) 7 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 28 (a German national was divorced and 
remarried in Czechoslovakia; the court recognized the divorce only because 
of the foilowing remarriage); contra: MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1936, 335; EcK-
STEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 33· 
218 This is seen by FEDOZZI 230, arguing with CAVAGLIERI 145. 
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himself in a new country and has founded new family rela-
tions, or simply when considerable time has elapsed. The 
Harvard Research in International Law in its Draft Con-
vention on Nationality has proposed to restrict the acquisi-
tion of nationality by birth (jure sanguinis) to the second 
generation of an emigrant.219 This solution would be of some 
help, but the pretensions of the old personal law should be 
limited even more strictly. 
6. Conclusion 
We may well conclude that both systems of testing the per-
sonal law are seriously defective. The principle of national-
ity, however, suffers not merely from its complicated nature. 
We shall see that its unpopularity, so conspicuous in the 
French literature, has reached critical proportions in court 
decisions and legislation, in particular with respect to divorce. 
There is one more circumstance apt to destroy what use-
fulness nationality may still have as a criterion for status. 
Many millions of people have emigrated in the course of the 
war, in the estimate of some experts as many as thirty mil-
lions in Europe alone, and others will do so; millions have 
also lost their former citizenship or will not be able to prove 
to which state they belong. In European countries where the 
nationality principle had its origin, a formidable intermixture 
of populations is about to render it obsolete. Moreover, 
should federations be created, the relation of individuals to 
the federal governments will be so important as to offset the 
ties of nationality. 
Thus, domicil, the dominant concept of the English-speak-
ing part of the world and the emergency concept consid-
ered above in connection with the cases of apatrides, holders 
of several nationalities, citizens of composite empires, etc., in 
Europe, might resume its old importance, if only it were not 
of such uncertain nature. 
219 23 Am. J. Int. Law Spec. Supp. (Harvard Law School) (1929) 13, art. 4· 
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Can the domiciliary test be improved? It should be possi-
ble to obviate at least the clandestine establishment of a 
domicil of choice, which renders doubtful the determination 
of so many cases. In Europe, it would seem quite feasible to 
require that any voluntary change of domicil be reported to 
a public authority empowered to investigate. In European 
countries, residence and domicil of individuals are constantly 
being controlled by official agencies for the purposes of de-
fense, police, and taxation. Little innovation is necessary to 
establish the personal law by a formal record. In this coun-
try, such intrusive bureaucratism is probably out of the ques-
tion. But the divorce statutes present an alternative method 
of assuring that one party is actually domiciled at the forum; 
they usually require, not a public record of the establishment 
of domicil, but the lapse of a certain period, ordinarily a 
year, during which domicil must have existed. 220 Very re-
markably, the Polish Interlocal Law of 1926 has generally 
provided that a person changing his domicil from one part 
of Poland to another, only after the lapse of one year, be-
comes subject to the law of his new domicil with respect to 
his capacity, his family relations and his inheritance. 221 An 
analogous idea appeared in the above-mentioned French de-
cree of 1938 requiring that in order to avail themselves of 
their French domicil or residence, foreigners should possess 
police permits to sojourn in the country for more than a 
year.222 However questionable this novelty, a product of 
prewar apprehensions, may appear, it is true that the exist-
ence of a voluntary domicil can be better ascertained, if a 
period of factual residence is added to the ordinary requi-
sites, as in the American divorce law, or if the individual has 
secured official authority to reside more than a year in the 
country, as prescribed in the French emergency decree. 
220 See 2 VERNIER § 82; infra pp. 437-440, 495· 
221 Law on interlocal private law of Aug. 2, 1926, art. 2. 
222 See supra p. I53· 
CHAPTER 5 
Specific Applications of the Personal Law 
I. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
I N the conflict of laws, especially in civil law countries, the sphere of application of the personal law is exten-sive. The branches in which the personal law is of the 
greatest importance are the law of family relations and that 
part of the law of contracts and other transactions which re-
gards capacity. The application of the personal law to these 
branches of the law is to be discussed separately. The present 
chapter is concerned only with its application to the remain-
ing personal relations. 
r. General Capacity to Have Rights and Duties 
While in the days of slavery personality was not enjoyed 
by all human beings/ it is now taken for granted that every 
human being is a person and as such capable of having rights 
and duties. However, some exceptions still persist. Under 
the canon law of the Roman C1atholic Church, an individual 
is deemed to lose his personality upon joining certain monas-
tic orders. In a few countries, this rule of the canon law is 
still recognized as exerting an analogous effect in the tem-
poral order of affairs. 2 The German Reichsgericht once de-
1 Restatement § 120 comment d. 
2 For instance: in Ecuador C. C. arts. 92-94. In the Chilean C. C., arts. 
95-97 have been canceled by Law no. 7,612 of Oct. II, 1943, art. 2. 
In Argentina the canon law rule is expressly denied recognition C. C. art. 
103· 
In Austria a monk was held incapable of acquiring any new rights; the 
assets owned by him at the time of his entry into the order were placed under 
curatorship, I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ( 1925) 161 § 70. 
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cided, applying the rules of the then prevailing principle of 
domicil, that the personality of a woman who had become a 
nun in a Russian convent was extinguished to exactly the 
same extent that it was under her personal law, i.e., the law 
of the place of the convent.3 
A few countries and states, among them several of the 
United States, have retained the old punishment of civil 
death. The meaning of this term is quite doubtful under the 
modern statutes. Constituting a penal measure, such a dimi-
nution of a person's legal status is generally disregarded by 
other states or countries.4 
Capacity of having rights and duties includes capacity to 
sue and be sued in the sense of what the Continental doctrine 
terms capacity of being a party 5 or of "standing in court." 6 
As individuals generally have full personality, they enjoy 
such capacity, while it may be wanting in the case of unin-
corporated associations. It seems that procedural rules 
everywhere acknowledge that capacity to sue and to be sued 
in this sense is determined by the personal law, in this coun-
try the law of domiciV The question is entirely distinguish-
able from that of the procedural capacity of a person, i.e., to 
effectuate procedural acts on his own behalf or on behalf of 
another person, a capacity that is affected by incompetence.8 
For a long time, Continental authors have discussed so-
called "special capacities." 9 This term covers a variety of 
s RG. (July 13, 1893) 32 RGZ. 173, 175 (capacity of a Russian Catholic nun 
to be a party to a German lawsuit, decided according to the law of the place 
of her nunnery). 
4 For details see Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1939) 288. 
5 See, for instance, German Code of Civil Procedure,§ so: Capable of being 
a party to a lawsuit is he who is capable of having rights. 
6 "Stare in judicio" (Roman law), "ester en justice" (French law), "capac-
ity to stand in judgment" (Louisiana lawyers). 
7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 17 (b). 
8 Cf. German Code of Civil Procedure, § 52 and infra p. 197. 
9 Cf. 8AVIGNY § 364; for French theories of BOULLENOIS and FROLAND see 
2 LAINE 2071 211; for a theory of BROCHER cf. GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 70. 
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different problems which preferably should be discussed in-
dividually. 
The term "special capacity" has been used, first, to indi-
cate those characteristics which an individual must possess 
in order to qualify, for instance, for the office of guardian or 
administrator or for membership in a cooperative association 
or for eligibility as a member of a board of a corporation. 
Such requirements, not affecting the individual's general per-
sonal standard, are regulated by that law which determines 
the other incidents of the legal relation in question.10 Hence, 
a person's capacity to serve as administrator of a decedent's 
estate is determined by the law of the state in whose court 
the estate is being administered, and a person's capacity to 
be a member of a corporation is determined by the law of 
the state of incorporation. 
The term "special capacities" is used, secondly, as refer-
ring to the numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by a coun-
try's citizens as opposed to resident or sojourning aliens. As 
said before, this vast topic, traditionally covered in the 
French books on private international law, exceeds the 
boundaries of the law of conflicts and pertains to internal 
administrative law. 
The term "special capacities" is employed, finally, to desig-
nate requirements for certain transactions, such as that of a 
certain age for marrying or that the parties be not married 
to each other as a condition for the validity of a gift. Where 
such requisites are not regarded as mere applications of the 
personal law, they must be considered separately. 
2. Beginning and End of Personality 
The determination of the exact moment at which an indi-
vidual's personality begins 11 is generally referred to the 
10 German courts, see LEWALD 39, no. 43, NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) § zo; 
GuTZWILLER I626. 
11 The various municipal laws are not all alike in this respect. § I of the 
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personal law, which also determines the legal status of a 
child en ventre sa mere.12 
Difficult problems of conflict of laws are caused by the 
differences of municipal laws with respect to absentees. The 
two world wars have given this subject ominous importance. 
Most laws follow one or another of three different systems: 
First: the rebuttable presumption of the common law, ac-
cording to which an individual is presumed to be dead when 
he has been absent without being heard of for a stated num-
ber of years, for instance, seven years; 
Second: the French system, according to which a person's 
unexplained absence for a stated period of time is judicially 
investigated· and established and certain effects similar to 
those of death are incurred; 13 
Third: the German system, of much influence upon recent 
legislations, according to which the legal effects of death take 
place when and only when a judicial decree has been issued 
providing that the absentee shall be regarded as dead ( decla-
ration of death) and as having died at a certain moment.14 
German Civil Code provides, for instance, that an individual's personality 
(Rechtsfiihigkeit) begins with the completion of his birth. According to the 
Civil Code of Spain (C. C. art. 30), however, an individual is not recognized 
as a person until he has lived at least twenty-four hours. 
1 2 Art. 28 of the C6digo Bustamante reads: 
"Personal law shall be applied for the purpose of deciding whether birth 
determines personality and whether the unborn child shall be deemed as born 
for all purposes favorable to him, as well as for the purpose of viability and 
the effects of priority of birth in the case of double or multiple childbirth." 
(Translation in 22 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. {1928) 276). Brazil C. C., Intro-
ductory Law, art. 7 par. r. See also HUBER-MUTZNER 410. 
On the other hand, art. 53 P.G.R. of Liechtenstein applies the law of that 
principality to persons born within its territory, in matters governed by 
Liechtenstein law. Application of the territorial law is also advocated by 
GEMMA, Revue 1930, 48, and by FEDOZZI 370. 
1 3 This system prevails in most countries whose private laws follow the 
general pattern of the French Code, including Italy. For Switzerland, where 
it has been modified in several respects, see below n. 16. 
14 German BGB. §§ 13-19, War emergency laws of 1916, 1917, and 1925, 
all abrogated now by Law of Jan. 15, 1951. Although French writers had 
disapproved of this institution, it was imitated in both World Wars for 
persons missing in war and was, after World War II, generally adopted 
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A workable solution of some of the most important prob-
lems of conflict of laws respecting absentees has been pro-
vided by article 9 of the Introductory Law to the German 
Civil Code, as modified by the Law of January I5, I95I, 
§ I 2, which may be summarized as follows: 
(I) An absentee is declared dead by a German court in 
accordance with German law, if he was a German citizen at 
the time of his disappearance ( § I 2 par. I ) ; a foreign decla-
ration of death will not be recognized in such case by a Ger-
man court.14a 
( 2) Upon the application of a spouse, an absentee of 
foreign or without nationality is declared dead by a German 
court in accordance with German law, if the spouse is domi-
ciled in Germany and is a German national or, in case of a 
wife, was a German national before her marriage ( § I 2 
par. 3) ; these provisions are designed to enable the spouse 
to remarry. 
(3) Irrespective of whether or not he has been a resident 
of Germany, a foreign absentee is declared dead pursuant 
to German law with respect to such of his assets as are situ-
ated in Germany and to legal relations governed by German 
law (§r2par.2). 
( 4) An absentee, who had lost his German nationality 
without acquiring another, is declared dead by a German 
court under German law, if there exists a legitimate interest 
(§ I2 par. 4). 
into the C. C. (arts. 87-92, as amended by Ordinance of Oct. 30, 1945); see 
AUBIN, 15 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1949/50) 545· Shortly before World War II in 1939, 
Germany and Italy modified their laws on absentees according to the model 
of the rules concerning persons missing in war; see R. ScHMIDT, "Das neue 
italienische Verschollenheitsrecht," 13 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1940) 103. Italy (C. C. 48-
73) as well as Spain (C. C. I81-198, as amended by law of Sept. 8, 1939), 
while retaining the declaration of absence, recently have added judicial dec-
laration of death. Recent changes and emergency laws are collected by 
ScHNITZER 284. 
l4a LG. Kreu2nach (April 4, 1950) IPRspr. 1950/51 No. 7· Czechoslovakia: 
Code of Civil Procedure (1950) § 638 (d). 
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These rules have been used as a model in several countries, 
either for statutory enactments 15 or in judicial practice.16 
In Austria, rule ( 3) has been interpreted quite liberally for 
the benefit of refugees so as to give a stateless spouse of a 
missing person an opportunity to remarry.H 
The principles that problems of the law of absentees 
should be determined in accordance with the personal law of 
the absentee, and that jurisdiction for judicial action belongs 
primarily to the state of which he is a national or domiciliary, 
as the case may be, have been recognized in France 18 and 
Italy 19 and in many other countries.20 Hence, for instance, the 
15 Austria: Law on the declaration of death of 1950, § 12. 
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of 1948, §§ 3-5; Code 
of Civil Procedure (1950) art. 617. 
Greece : C. C. art. 6. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 57 par. 2. 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 4· 
China: Law of 1918, art. 8. 
] a pan: Law of 1898, art. 6. 
Siam: Law on Private International Law of 1939, art. II par. 2. 
16 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (July 13, 1939) cited by VAN HILLE, 66 Rev. 
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 758, 760. 
Switzerland: particularly, the third rule stated above is followed, see App. 
Basel-Stadt (Feb. 19, 1932) 30 S]Z. (1933-1934) 269 no. 53 (a man born in 
Basel, naturalized a citizen of Minnesota, not heard of since 1906; assets in-
herited by him in 1910 were taken in public deposit; in absence of a written 
rule, the judge decides as in the case of a Swiss citizen); cf. Just. Dep. I, 
BBl. 1933, II 75 no. 9, 30 SJZ. 120 no. 94i FRITZSCHE and PESTALOZZI, 9 
Z. ausl.PR. (1935) 702; SCHNITZER 139· On other controversial points see 
BECK, NAG. 424. 
17 The Supreme Court has considered the marriage of stateless persons, 
even if only the wife has residence in the country, as a legal relationship 
under Austrian law, thus enabling Austrian courts to pronounce a declara-
tion of death: OGH. (May 26, 1948) 21 SZ. (1946-48) no. 96. 
18 Trib. civ. Seine (April24, 1931) Clunet 1932, 83, Revue 1931, 504. Swiss 
law was applied not only with respect to the family relations of a Swiss ab-
sentee but also with respect to his property. The decision has been criticized 
by}. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 436, 437· 
A declaration of death under French law can be pronounced for for-
eigners, if they have disappeared on French territory or on a French ship 
or plane (C. C. art. 88 par. 5, as amended by ordinance of Oct. 30, 1945). 
19 See FEDOZZI 271; no decisions seem to have been published, however. 
20 The Belgian Trib. Antwerp (July 13, 1939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44 
no. 8 excepts the first period of absence from being exclusively governed by 
the Polish law, but contra the opinion of the State Attorney Van Hille and the 
note, ibid. 
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Austrian law was applied in both Germany and Switzerland 
to determine whether the former Austrian Archduke Johann, 
who had become a ship's captain, had assumed the name of 
Johann Orth and had disappeared without being heard of, 
was to be regarded dead. 21 Local rules are in force, however, 
practically everywhere, providing for temporary care and 
custody of the property of a foreign absentee.22 
Under the principle of personal law, a court recognizing 
a declaration of death pronounced by the competent national 
court, will also recognize restrictions imposed upon the 
effects of such a declaration. Thus, the wife of a Czechoslo-
vakian national declared dead in Czechoslovakia was not 
permitted to remarry in Germany, since an additional decree 
was necessary to dissolve the marriage under Czechoslo-
vakian, though not under German, law.23 
The approach which regards a man as either alive or dead 
for all purposes is more satisfactory than to regard the same 
person as alive for some purposes and as dead for others. 
For instance, whether a missing heir or legatee is to be re-
garded as dead can more consistently be answered in ac-
cordance with his personal law than in accordance with the 
laws governing the descent or the distribution or the adminis-
The Hungarian-Czechoslovakian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of March 
6, 1951, art. 22, and the Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of Aug. 8, 1953, art. 22, 
adhere so strictly to the nationality principle that, even in the exceptional 
cases in which the jurisdiction of a court of the other Contracting Party is 
admitted, this court has to apply the missing person's national law; see 
DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 491; cf. also the Czech-East German 
Treaty on Judicial Assistance of Sept. n, 1956, art. 26. 
21 German RG. (June 28, 1893) 4 Z.int.R. ( 1894) 72; Swiss BG. (Jan. 22, 
1897) 23 BGE. I 166, 171. The remarriage of the wife of a missing Russian 
husband was held invalid by a German court because the Russian absentee 
was not declared dead and was deemed to be living under Russian Jaw; 
OLG. Kiel (Nov. 30, 1926) Schlesw.-Holst. Anz. 1927, I45· See also LEWALD 
4I no. 47 and NussBAUM, D. IPR. 117. 
22 See I VICO 433 no. 499 with respect to the countries of Latin America. 
28 Czechoslovakian Law of June 30, I92I, art. V; KG. (Sept. 25, I93I) 
IPRspr. I932, no. 12; cf. WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (I934) 238 n. I. 
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tration of assets, possibly lying in different jurisdictions.24 
Limited international co-operation in clearing the fate of 
innumerable persons who had disappeared during World 
War II was achieved by the United Nations Convention on 
the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons from April 6, 
1950.24a Without containing conflicts rules, the convention 
only provides for the notification of every proceeding insti-
tuted under its terms to an International Bureau (art. 9) 
and for the recognition of the ensuing declarations of death 
as prima facie evidence of death in the contracting countries 
(art. 5). 
There also are different rules in the case where two or 
more persons perish in a common disaster: some laws pre-
sume that the deaths have taken place in a certain order, 
others reverse that order, and in a third group no presump-
tion exists. Is this problem a question of the personal law? 
Writers are in disagreement.25 The Brazilian Law suggests 
24 The law governing the distribution of the estate has been applied in the 
following cases: German RG. (]an. 7, 1890) 25 RGZ. 142, Clunet 1892, II91; 
KG. (May 31, 1897) 9 Z.int. R. (1899) 468, Clunet 1900, 163; OLG. Ham-
burg (Nov. 27, 1896) Hans.GZ.Beibl. 1897, 243; OLG. Colmar (June 12, 
1912) Els. Lothr. J. Z. 1913, 38. The personal law of the absentee has been 
applied by Ob. Trib. Stuttgart (July 8-10, 1862) 15 Seuff. Arch. 321; Bay. 
ObLG. (May 17, 1890) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. 50 no. 17 (a man who had emi-
grated to the United States in 1869 and was declared dead in 1886, was 
considered to have inherited a share in the meantime, as he was presumed 
living at the time of the succession under the law of his last German domi-
cil). A third solution was adopted by OLG. Dresden (Dec. 20, 1909) 66 
Seuff. Arch. 68, 70. The application of the lex successionis has been approved 
by LEWALD 41 no. 46, and M. WoLFF, IPR. 97, and disapproved by Nuss-
BAUM, D. IPR. II7. 
24a 119 U. N. Treaty Series 99, ratified by Belgium, China (National Re-
public), Germany (Federal Republic), Guatemala, Israel, and Pakistan. 
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, United Nations Convention on the Declaration of Death 
of Missing Persons (New York 1951). 
25 Cf. WEISS, 4 Traite 572 and DESPAGNET 1046 no. 365 (advocating per-
sonal law); 2 BAR § 365, p. 3II, tr. by GILLESPIE 805 (law of succession on 
death); VALERY 1194 no. 842 and NUSSBAUM D. IPR. II7, n. 2 (lex fori). 
Recently studies of FRAGISTAS, "Die Kommorientenvermutung im interna-
tionalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Laun (1953) 693-705 (personal law); DE 
NovA, "La commorienza in diritto internazionale privato," Festschrift Le-
wald (1953) 339-347, II Giur. Comp. DIP (1954) 263-269 (lex causae). 
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application of the national law; the C6digo Bustamante also 
applies the national law, but only to the field of distribution 
of estates, a limitation of the principle which has been criti-
cized.26 Similarly, the English case In re Cohn determined 
survivorship according to the law governing the succession. 26a 
3· Name 
(a) Individual name. Beale has stated that the deter-
mination of an individual's personal name is not regarded in 
common law countries as a problem of status, since a person 
is traditionally free to assume a name and to change it at 
his discretion. 27 However, today most American states allow 
special court proceedings to aid and confirm a change of 
name, and a name thus acquired cannot again be changed 
without the intervention of the court.28 Moreover, the right 
to use a name is governed by important legal rules.29 In civil 
countries it is well recognized that a person's name is deter-
mined by law and that, therefore, problems of conflict of 
laws can arise with respect to the determination of an indi-
vidual's name and to the manner and extent of his protec-
tion against abuse of his name. Traditionally, these ques-
tions are decided in accordance with the individual's personal 
law,30 except such as are controlled by imperative local regu-
lations. 31 
26 C6digo Bustamante art. 29; cf. the criticism by PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39 
Recueil 1932 I 555, 622, 671. 
2 Sa In re Cohn [1945] Ch. 5· 
27 Linton v. First National Bank (1882) 10 Fed. 894; Application of Lip-
schutz ( 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 264. Cf. 2 BEALE § 120.3. 
28 COHEN, "The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names,'' 2 Conn. 
B. J. (1928) IIo, II5 n. 14; Note, 16 Chi. Kent Rev. (1937) 65, 66 n. 15. 
29 See 65 C. J, S. Names 23 § 13. 
30 Germany: RG. (April II, 1892) 29 RGZ. 123, 127; RG. (Dec. 12, 1918) 
95 RGZ. 268, 272. KG. (April 22, 1927) IPRspr. 1927, no. 19. KG. (April 15, 
1932) JW. 1932, 2818, IPRspr. 1932, no. II. Manner and extent of protec-
tion of a foreigner's name are governed by German law: BGH. (Jan. 15, 
1953) 8 BGHZ. 318. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 28; BG. (Oct. 24, 1907) 33 BGE. I 770, 776; BG. 
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Thus, it has been held by German courts that an individ-
ual's right to use a title of nobility is to be determined by his 
nationallaw.32 Such titles having been entirely abolished in 
Czechoslovakia, a citizen of that country is denied the right 
to call himself a count in Germany. On the other hand, the 
Reichsgericht has held a Swiss citizen entitled in accordance 
with Swiss custom to append to his own name the titled name 
("von B") of his wife.33 Whether a foreigner's change of 
name is recognized depends on the recognition or non-recog-
nition of such change of name by the country of which he is 
a national.34 
In suits for damages for abuse of a person's name, or in 
suits for an injunction against such abuse, a tendency exists, 
(July I4, I9Io) 36 BGE. I 39I, 395; BG. (Nov. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 387, 388. 
G!ESKER-ZELLER, Der Name in Internationalen Privatrecht (in Festschrift fiir 
Georg Cohn (Ziirich, I9I5) I67 ff.); HUBER-MUTZNER 419. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 28, I935) D.H. I935· 276; aff'd by Cour 
Paris (Dec. 15, I936) D. H. I937·72, Revue Crit. I937, 690 (Prince Colloredo-
Mansfield, right of divorced wife to carry the name of her former husband). 
Italy: FEDOZZI 362, quoting a decision of Cass. pen. Feb. I7, I928. 
Brazil: C. C., Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 par. 1. 
Albania: Law on personal names of May 21, I948, art. 4 par. 1. 
Yugoslavia: Law on personal names of Dec. I, I947, § 4 par. 1. 
31 The reported judgment of the court of Paris (n. go) supposes French 
laws respecting names possibly to have public interest but discounts expressly 
any influence of French public policy. 
An Austrian prohibition on using any Austrian or foreign titles of nobility 
was held inapplicable to an Austrian woman who by marriage had acquired 
her German husband's name "von B." and afterwards reacquired Austrian 
citizenship. The Austrian OGH. (May 28, 1952) 25 SZ. (I952) no. 147, So 
Clunet ( 1953) 166, qualified the title of nobility according to German law as 
part of the surname; in accord, the Austrian Administrative Court (July 14, 
1954) 9 Erkenntnisse des Verwaltungsgerichthofs, Neue Folge, 49 (no. 3476 
[A.]). ' 
32 KG. (Sept. 19, 1904) I5 Z.int.R. (1905) 329; KG. (Dec. I9, I907) 19 
Z.int.R. (I909) 244; KG. (April 15, 1932) JW. I932, 28I8, IPRspr. I932, 
no. 11. 
33 RG. (Dec. I2, 19I8) 95 RGZ. 268, 272. 
34 Switzerland: The Justice Department refuses, in the case of a child of 
Swiss nationality (BBl. 1907, I 539), and recognizes in the case of a German 
child (BBl. 1921, III 836), the name given to the child by a German step-
father according to a German institution unknown to Swiss law (viz., the 
cantonal law in 1907 or federal law in 192I). 
Dutch decisions; see VAN HASSELT § I. 
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however, to resort to the local law, or to the law applicable 
to delictual actions, even where the personal law provides 
actions on other theories. In Germany it has been held, for 
reasons of public policy, that the measure of damages in a 
foreigner's action for wrongful appropriation of his name, 
is not higher than in an analogous action by a German na-
tional.35 It has also been suggested that it should never be 
lower.36 
Within the realm of application of the personal law, 
doubts have arisen with respect to families whose members 
are not all of the same nationality. Where, for instance, a 
wife's nationality is different from that of her husband, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has held her name to be determined 
by her own nationallaw, 37 while in Germany the general rule 
governing marital status presumably applies, and the wife's 
name is determined in accordance with the national law of 
the husband. 38 
(b) Commercial name (firm). In Germany 39 and Swit-
zerland,40 it is held that the firm or official name of a com-
mercial enterprise is determined by the law of the principal 
35 KG. (April 29, 1920) JW. 1921, 39; KG. (April 8, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1915, 
1327; RG. (Nov. 29, 1920) roo RGZ. 182, 185 (both referring to the "Ger-
vais" case). Cf. EG. art. 12 restricting tort actions against German nationals 
to what may be claimed under German law. 
36 RAAPE, IPR. 6o6; see also J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 437· 
37 BG. (July 14, 1910) 36 BGE. I 391, 395; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. 
15. 
3 8 GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 183; RAAPE 290; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 125. 
The Reichsgericht (Nov. 23, 1927) II9 RGZ. 44 has applied in an analogous 
way to the name of an illegitimate child the law governing illegitimate rela-
tionship rather than the child's personal law. An obscure rule is in force in 
Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 45· 
The Albanian Law on personal names of May 21, 1948, art. 4 par. 2, en-
titles and obliges a foreign wife who has agreed with her Albanian husband, 
according to Albanian law, to retain her maiden name to use it by placing it 
before her husband's name; similarly, but preserving the priority of the 
husband's name, Yugoslavia: Law on personal names of Dec. r, 1947, § 4 
par. 2. 
39 RG. (Oct. 2, r886) 18 RGZ. 28; RG. (Nov. 13, 1897) 40 RGZ. 61, 64; 
RG. (May 31, 1900) 46 RGZ. 125, 132. 40 2 MElLI 262 § 167; tr. by KUHN 450. Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 1044. 
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establishment. On the other hand, in Belgium, national and 
foreign firms are equally protected under the locallaw.41 In 
France, a foreigner is held not to be entitled to any protec-
tion of his commercial name, unless such protection is pro-
vided by treaty or reciprocity is otherwise assured.42 The 
most important treaty, to which France, together with the 
majority of the commercial countries of the world, is a party, 
is that of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property.43 Under article 8 of this convention, the commer-
cial name of a citizen or corporation of any signatory coun-
try is protected in every other signatory country without any 
preliminary registration, deposit, or other formality being 
required. 
4· Status as Merchant 
In most of the countries of the European Continent and 
of Latin America, merchants are subject to duties which are 
not incumbent upon other individuals and, correspondingly, 
entitled to special privileges not enjoyed by non-merchants. 
Special rules also apply to numerous types of contracts where 
the parties, or in certain cases one of the parties, belong to 
the class of merchants. Wherever such special rules are in 
force, the determination of a person's status as merchant or 
non-merchant is generally regarded as a problem of personal 
law. However, in consonance with the traditions of the law 
merchant, in the determination of the personal law national-
ity is disregarded in favor of the law of the "commercial 
41 Cass. beige (Dec. 26, 1876) Pasicrisie 1877.1.54; POULLET 150 no. 150. 
Cf. also Argentina: Camara Federal de Ia Capital (May 12, 1941), aff'd by 
Supreme Court (May 22, 1942), 192 Fallos de Ia Corte Suprema 451,464. 
42 Decisions in Clunet 1902, 304; Trib. Bordeaux (Aug. 4, 1902) Clunet 
1903, 866. In the Netherlands, however, protection to a foreign commercial 
name depends on a Dutch Law of July 5, 1921 (S.842) cf. the liberal decision 
of H. R. (May 31, 1927) W. 11675, VAN HASSELT 653; to the contrary effect 
Kg. Amsterdam (Sept. 30, 1924) NJ. 1925, 142. 
43 English text in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 834. 
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domicil," i.e., of the place where the business is established.44 
The French Committee for Private International Law, after 
full discussion, recently voted a legislative motion to amend 
the French law accordingly.45 
Distinguishable from the quality of being a merchant is 
the capacity of carrying on a business as a prerequisite to be-
coming a merchant; this question is commonly regarded as 
governed by the law determining the legal acts of minors, 
married women, insane persons, etc.46 
Insofar as the character of a transaction as commercial or 
non-commercial ("civil") is determined by elements other 
than the status of the parties, the law that governs the con-
tract in general is held to be decisive.47 
S· Infancy 
Another situation regarded by civil law lawyers as per-
taining to status is that of infancy. An infant's capacity to 
engage in transactions is limited; he is subject to parental 
power or guardianship; his domicil is fixed by operation of 
44 Germany and Italy: dominant opinion cf. FICKER in 4 Rechtsvergl. 
Handwiirterb. 462. 
Poland: Law of I926, art. 2. 
Switzerland: cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 420. 
Argentina: cf. 3 V1co, nos. 22I, 243, etc. 
Treaty of Montevideo on international commercial law of I889, art. 2; 
Treaty of Montevideo on international terrestrial commercial law, text of 
I940, art. 2. More detailed provisions in C6digo Bustamante arts. 232 ff. 
Other opinions:2 BAR §290 (2) at I30 and in I Ehrenberg's Handbuch des 
gesamten Handelsrechts (I9I3) 330; MELCHIOR I5I § 105; NusSBAUM, D. 
IPR. 211; ScHNITZER, Handelsr. I34, 151; ARMIN JON, Precis de droit interna-
tional prive commercial (1948) 32, 37· 
45 Travaux du Comite fran.;ais de droit international prive, Seconde annee 
( 1935) 132, on the capacity to be a merchant in international relations (text 
of proposition at 169). See also the resolution of the Institute of International 
Law in Cambridge (1931), 36 Annuaire II 1931, 181, on NIBOYET's proposal. 
Against the unfortunate application of the lex fori in the Hague Draft of 
1925 on Bankruptcy, see NIBOYET 519, no. 426. 
4 6 BAR, I Ehrenberg's Handbuch 343; 3 VIco, nos. 234, 237· 
47 DIENA, I Dir. Commer. Int. 62; contra: ARMIN JON, supra n. 44, 22 
(lex fori). 
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law; his position as a party to a lawsuit is peculiar; and a 
variety of other special rules apply to him. Hence, the per-
sonal law determines the age at which infancy generally 
terminates, as well as the events which may affect the indi-
vidual's position during infancy. 
A basically similar view obtains in England and has some-
times guided American courts, for instance, in affirming the 
power and duty of the domiciliary state to decree custodian-
ship 48 or to terminate guardianship 49 over infants. It has oc-
casionally been recognized that attainment of majority at the 
domicil is sufficient to terminate ancillary administration of 
a minor's property in another jurisdiction.50 Story, however, 
speaking of the disabilities of minors as well as of other in-
capacities, associated himself with those among the statutists 
who, in this then much debated question, 51 instead of conceiv-
ing infancy or majority as aspects of personal status, re-
garded incapacity to take part in legal transactions as inci-
dental to specific contracts or other acts.52 As indicated 
below, this has become the general doctrine of this country. 
(See Chapter 6.) 
In the Continental discussion, the two following points 
have attracted interest: 
(I) In certain jurisdictions, marriage ends the period of 
infancy, whether of females or of both males and females, 
either unconditionally or with certain provisos. This is il-
lustrated by the statutes of twelve American jurisdictions 53 
as well as by a number of European laws.54 Under the Euro-
48 Griffin v. Griffin ( 1920) 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598, 604. 
49 In re Honeyman (1922) 117 N. Y. Misc. 653, 192 N. Y. S. 910. 
5o For cases see 2 BEALE 663 n. 2. 
51 See STORY, throughout c. IV; 1 FoELIX (ed. 3) c. II 181. 
52 STORY § 103. 
53 5 VERNIER § 271. 
54 The Netherlands: BW. art. 385. 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 21 par. 3· 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 14 par. 2. 
Turkey: C. C. art. II par. 2. 
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pean conflicts rule, such attainment of majority by mar-
riage depends upon the personal law of the infant. Since, for 
instance, under Hungarian law women reach majority by 
marriage, a seventeen-year-old Hungarian girl who marries 
an American and, by this fact, neither acquires American 
citizenship nor loses Hungarian citizenship, will be regarded 
as being of full age by every court applying the nationality 
test.55 On the other hand, a young Englishman marrying in 
Italy is not emancipated, as the Italian rule on emancipation 
does not apply to his status. 56 The case of a bride who ac-
quires her husband's nationality on marriage under the na-
tionality law of the husband's country is more doubtful. If 
a Swiss girl of seventeen marries a German and thereby 
changes her nationality, is the Swiss rule, "Marriage imports 
majority," able to terminate her infancy, although she aban-
dons her Swiss personal law at the very moment of her 
marriage? Affirmation of this question is favored in recent 
German literature.57 
( 2) Under the German and related systems the status of 
a person of full age may be granted to an infant by decree 
of a court or an administrative agency-"declaration of 
majority" "8-whereas in France, Italy, Spain, etc., less effec-
55 RAAPE 69. 
56 DIENA, 2 Prine. II5· 
57 WALKER I28 n. 39, 788; WAHLE, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (I928) I42, mentwnmg 
Austrian decisions to this effect; RAAPE 77; M. WoLFF, IPR. IOI. Contra: I 
FRANKENSTEIN 423, 3 FRANKENSTEIN 235 n. 3I; LEWALD 57; BECK, NAG. 
I75 no. 72. 
As to the effect of a newly acquired nationality of the bride, see RG. (Jan. 
10, I9I8) 9I RGZ. 403, 407 dealing with the question of whether guardianship 
over a German girl ended by her marrying a Russian in Czarist times. It 
seems that the court classified the question as one of the effects of marriage; 
this is why it quoted EG. arts. I4 and I5 and the Hague Convention of July 
I7, I905 on Marriage Effects, arts. I and 2. 
58 Germany: BGB. §§ 3-5. 
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ I74, 252. 
The Netherlands: BW. arts. 473 ff. 
Brazil: C. C. art. 9; cf. PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil I932 I 622. 
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tive forms of "emancipation" are provided. 59 Similarly, at 
common law and under certain American statutes, a judicial 
decree may eliminate a part of a minor's disabilities.60 At 
civil law, jurisdiction to render such a determination is gen-
erally held to rest with the country which furnishes the per-
sonal law of the infant.61 This law also determines whether 
emancipation is possible at all, for what causes it may be 
conferred, and what effect it produces; it decides in particular 
whether the minor thus emancipated enjoys unlimited legal 
capacity or whether he needs special authorization or con-
sent in particular situations.62 As will be discussed in detail 
below, the general rule of capacity in this country forms part 
of the law of the contract, while in the Continental system 
it refers to the personal law. 
II. PuBLIC PoLICY 
Foreign law in the field of "status" is more often denied 
application on account of local policy considerations than in 
any other field of law. Regrettable as the disharmony caused 
thereby may be, it is a common trait of existing laws, a trait 
nowhere more distinct than in France where, to quote Julliot 
de la Morandiere, each day the application of the personal 
law is progressively restricted in favor of French law.63 
59 France: C. C. art. 477· 
Italy: C. C. (I865} art. 3II; C. C. (I942) arts. 390ff. 
Spain: C. C. art. 322. 
60 5 VERNIER § 282. 
61 On general principles, it would not appear unthinkable for a decree of 
emancipation to be rendered by a court of a country not that of the nation-
ality, in accordance with the substantive law of the infant's national law. On 
this question I FRANKENSTEIN 427; STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. 7; RAAPE 9I 
(who thinks that could be done where the procedure required by the personal 
law limits the cooperation of an authority to mere recordation (blosse Beur-
kundung). 
62 DIENA, 2 Prine. II4; 0. VON GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht (Leipzig, 
I895) 22I ff.: WEISS, 3 Traite 342, and following these writers Swiss BG. 
(May 23, I9I2) 38 BGE. II I, 3 (the declaration of majority is governed by 
the national law). 
63 Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil (I939-I94D) 2I8. 
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However, a peculiar doctrine has been expressed by Dicey 
and repeated in America by Beale and the Restatement 
( § I 20), that a foreign status of a kind unknown at the 
forum (English or American law respectively) will not be 
recognized. 64 No other authority exists for this proposition 
than a few English cases which have been critically destroyed 
by Cheshire.65 
Thus, prodigality is "not a status at common law." 66 If a 
Frenchman domiciled in France is judicially declared a spend-
thrift by a French court, American courts will certainly 
recognize those effects of the decree which relate to transac-
tions carried on in France.67 But the question is whether an 
American court will ascribe effects to the French decree with 
respect to American transactions. In France, for instance, 
the spendthrift can bring a lawsuit only through a committee 
(family council). Can he sue without any guardian in the 
United States or in England? No doubt, appointment of a 
conservator in one American jurisdiction under a local stat-
ute, has been said to be inoperative on transactions in an-
other jurisdiction, a statute being bare of extraterritorial 
meaning under an ancient statutist doctrine.68 Whatever the 
actual merits of this antique rule, a French interdiction of a 
prodigal does intend to restrict the capacity of the individual 
everywhere. Dicey and Beale derive their thesis that such 
decree can not be recognized in a common law jurisdiction 
from an English decision, Worms v. De V aldor,69 in which 
64 DICEY 53 I Rule I36 (I); 2 BEALE § I20.I; contra: DICEY (-WELSH), 
rule I II, p. 46 5, 467. 
65 CHESHIRE I 56. He thinks that In re Selot's Trust [I9o2] I Ch. 488 is to 
be explained upon other grounds and that Worms v. De Valdor (I88o) 49 
L. J. N. S. {Ch.) 26I has been decided wrongly. 
66 2 BEALE § I20.8. 
67 Restatement § I2o comment c; 2 BEALE §I20.I: "The existence of the 
foreign status is a fact and should be recognized as a fact by a court in 
any state." 
68 Gates v. Bingham {I88I) 49 Conn. 275· 
69 {I88o) 49 L. J. N. S. {Ch.) 26I; followed in In re Selot's Trust [I902] 
I Ch. 488. 
190 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
Frey, J., erroneously reasoned that the French adjudication 
of prodigality did not change the status of the person, al-
though he asserted in addition "that if a change of status 
were effected by an order of a French court, this (English) 
court would not take notice of a personal disqualification 
caused by such change of status." No such problem is known 
in civil law. A French decree declaring an individual of 
French nationality and domicil a spendthrift is recognized 
in any other country, including Guatemala 70 and Chile, 71 as 
affecting the individual's personal status. The principle has 
been well formulated by the Swiss Department of Justice 
with respect to foreign declarations of death, which are un-
known to Swiss law; if not contrary to public policy, the 
foreign decree must be granted the same effect as conferred 
upon it by the foreign law. 72 
With respect to legitimation and adoption, the implica-
tions of the Dicey-Beale theory are even more serious. Is 
such an act, performed abroad, not to be recognized by a 
court whose domestic law has not yet introduced the institu-
tion of legitimation or adoption? If such institutions are 
known to the forum, but the particular variety adopted by 
the foreign law is not, should the effect of the foreign act be 
limited to that given locally to the most nearly related type, 
rather than simply recognized to the same extent as in the 
foreign jurisdiction? 78 American cases show a strong tend-
ency to limit recognition of the foreign institution. An 
analogous opinion is widely held in the case of a foreign 
business organization whose exact type is not included in the 
70 See MATOS nos. 218, 219. 
71 Chile: App. Santiago (Nov. 7, 1934) 34 Revista Der. ]. y Cien. Soc. 
(1937) II sec. 2, 14 (interdiction by judgment of the Italian Court of Genoa; 
exequatur granted by the Supreme Court). 
72 BBl. 1916, II 522 no. 5· 
73 See GOODRICH § 146; 8TUMBERG 338; see also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 
no. 340. But see FALCONBRIDGE, Case Note, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, 39· 
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domestic commercial order.74 Or, in accordance with a recent 
suggestion, should the "status" created in a foreign country 
be recognized but its specific "effects" or "incidents" be re-
served for close inspection under the light of the internal law 
of the forum? 75 This line of thought seems to result directly 
or indirectly in an extensive application of public policy, 
much as French courts and writers invest the provisions of 
the Code N apolion with the dignity of international public 
order. 76 A foreign adoption of an infant was not recognized 
in France before such act was permitted in France in 1923 by 
an internallaw.77 The Codigo Bustamante declares that none 
of its provisions relating to adoption will apply to states 
whose legislations do not provide for adoptions.78 All such 
rules are indefensible, inasmuch as they deny effect to foreign 
institutions without an urgent national interest in the par-
ticular case, a point clear to most French writers but often 
ignored by courts. Why should a country's own civil code 
rule the world? 
On the other hand, English courts, before the Legitimacy 
Act of I 926, did not hesitate to recognize legitimation by 
subsequent marriage executed under foreign domiciliary 
law/9 and at present they recognize California legitimations 
by recognition, though unknown to English statutes.80 Argen-
tine courts have treated foreign adoptions in the same way, 
their internal law notwithstanding.81 The Portuguese Su-
74 This will be discussed in the second volume. 
75 This theory has been proposed by TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy 
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 691 at 708. 
76 Cf. NIBOYET nos. 382, 66o and note in Nouv. Revue 1935, 425. 
77 See App. Paris (Jan. 2, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 1936.1.551. 
78 Codigo Bustamante art. 77· 
79 In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 25 L. J. (Ch.) 621, 2 K. & ]. 595· 
80 In re Luck [1940] A. C. Ch. D. 864. 
81 2 V1co no. 172; ROGER, 6 Repert. 683, no. 44· Camara Civil 2a de Ia 
Capital (Dec. 22, 1948) 54 La Ley 413. By law no. 13,252 of Sept. 23, 1948 
adoption has been introduced into Argentine law; cf. R. GoLDSCHMIDT, 17 
Z.ausl.PR. (1952) 26o, 261. 
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preme Court, recognizing a Brazilian adoption under anal-
ogous circumstances, held it a constant international rule 
that the non-existence of an institution in the lex fori does 
not prevent the rights flowing from it from being given 
effect. 82 The legal situation of a French illegitimate child 
recognized by a parent is enforced in Germany where this 
type of status is unknown.83 The prevailing opinion certainly 
favors simple recognition of foreign legal situations without 
provincial restraint. 
A third problem is illustrated in the Restatement by an 
English case, Atkinson v. Anderson: 84 
"By the law of state X, the inheritance tax imposed upon 
'strangers in blood' who inherit is at a higher rate than that 
imposed upon inheriting relatives and the term 'strangers in 
blood' is construed as including natural illegitimate children. 
The status of 'recognized natural child' exists in state Y but 
not in X. A dies domiciled in Y, bequeathing chattels in state 
X to C, who, according to the law of Y, is A's recognized 
natural child. C, on taking the chattels in state X, pays a 
succession tax as a stranger in blood." 85 
However, this is an interpretation of a tax law and not a 
problem of international private law. It may well appear 
that an inheritance tax statute is intended to apply a higher 
tax rate to all illegitimate children. In such case, it would 
make no difference whether such children are or are not 
"recognized." Hence, the English decision in the case of 
Atkinson v. Anderson may be an entirely correct interpreta-
tion of the English tax statute, but it is not at all necessary 
to resort for its justification to a general theory of non-recog-
nition of a foreign status unknown to the lex fori. For ex-
82 Sup. Trib. Lisbon (May 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 424, 427. 
83 Prussian Minist. Ord. of Aug. 29, 1924 (StAZ. 1924, 198): cf. RAAPE 
522. Law of Civil Status,§ 29a (as amended by Law of May 18, 1957). 
8 4 Restatement § 120 comment b; 2 BEALE § 120.1 relies on Atkinson v. 
Anderson (1882) 21 Ch. D. 100. 
85 (1882) 21 Ch. D. 100. 
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ample, the Argentine tax on gratuitous transfer of property 
has been held applicable to a foreign adopted person "by 
simple interpretation of the tax statute" without regard to 
a conflicts rule. 86 
86 App. Buenos Aires (Dec. 10, 1926) 23 J. A. 856. 
In a similar case, the Dutch Supreme Court has classified a German 
adopted child as "child" and not as "foster child" in the sense of the Dutch 
Inheritance Tax Statutes (adoption then being unknown in the Netherlands) 
taking into account the effects of adoption under German law, H.R. (Dec. 
20, 1950) N. J. 1950 no. 40. 
CHAPTER 6 
Capacity 
I. OBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION 
T HE laws of the various countries differ widely with respect both to the grounds on which certain indi-viduals are denied normal competence and to the 
scope of the disabilities imposed. Also, the term, "capacity," 
is not used with quite the same meaning everywhere. For the 
purpose of the conflict of laws, distinction should be made 
between a general rule of capacity and numerous exceptions 
thereto defined by special rules. 
The purpose of the general rule is to determine the law 
that is to govern a person's ability to bind himself by contract 
with other parties or by unilateral acts. In most countries, the 
general rule applies also to dispositions of property, though 
in some the law governing title to property, especially tangi-
ble assets, movable and immovable, extends to capacity.1 
The most important qualifications of the general rule are as 
follows: 
(a) The personal characteristics necessary to hold a per-
1 For the United States see 2 BEALE n8o § 333·3; GooDRICH § 148. Also 
art. 10 of the Argentine C. C. seems to have been drafted in accordance with 
STORY §§ 102 and 424, and, following this model, to determine capacity with 
respect to immovables by the law of the situs; this has been demonstrated by 
CHAVARRI 76 nos. 67 ff., contrary to various opinions hitherto held. Expressly 
in this sense the Siamese law on private international law of 1939, art. IO 
par. 3· For Hungary, VON SzLADITS in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 28 explains that 
every woman, whether of Hungarian or foreign nationality or domicil, has 
free disposition of immovables on Hungarian soil. This subject is very diffi-
cult and cannot be treated here. A comparative discussion of cases in CLAR-
ENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of Laws," I Int. Camp. Law Q, (1952) 
446, 467. 
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son liable in tort are generally subject to the law governing 
tort. 2 
(b) The effects upon property interests of such events as 
marriage, bankruptcy, or appointment of a committee are 
the object of special conflict of laws rules. 3 
(c) Questions pertaining to the borderline zone between 
the law of capacity as a general topic and the law of distri-
bution of estates, must be discussed in connection with the 
latter subject. But it may be noted that the provisions in the 
French law designed to protect minor heirs in the distribu-
tion of a decedent's estate have been declared to be a part of 
the personal law of the heirs and therefore to be inapplicable 
to foreign heirs.4 In the United States, provisions that pro-
tect infants against the effects of statutes of non-claim ap-
parently are considered part of the procedural law of the 
state where the assets are administered; 5 the parallel with 
the French law is, of course, not perfect. 
(d) Capacity to marry and to engage in other transac-
tions of family law constitutes a particular topic to be dis-
cussed below. 
In numerous countries, married women are still subject 
to restrictions of various kinds upon the legal effectiveness 
of their promises. The Restatement classifies the problem to 
what extent a married woman is subject to such restrictions as 
a problem of the law of contracts, which, both in accord with 
the general approach of the Restatement and in agreement 
2 To be treated in succeeding volume. 
3 Restatement §§ 237, 238, 289, 290; Germany: M. WoLFF, IPR. 101. 
4 Cass. (civ.) (April 13, 1932) 8.1932.1.361 and Note by AUDINET; 
D.1932.1.89 with Note by BASDEVANT; Revue 1932, 549 Cf. J. DONNEDIEU 
DE VABRES 507. The estate of the late Robert of Bourbon, Duke of Parma, 
was distributed in accordance with the family statute of the house of Haps-
burg-Lorraine, which was recognized as his personal law by Austria, the 
country of which he was a national. Hence, the French Supreme Court held 
that his family statute determined what protection was to be extended to 
minor heirs. 
5 Cf. Restatement § 498. 
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with the majority of decisions, is declared to be determined 
by the law of the place of contracting.6 There is respectable 
authority, however, for the view that the state where a mar-
ried woman is domiciled is justified in holding her incapable 
of contracting under its own rules, even where the contract 
was made in another state under whose law such contract 
would be binding upon her. 7 
Recognizing that limitations on the contractual capacity 
of married women are closely connected with the structure 
of the family and are motivated to a large extent by a desire 
either to protect families against financial ruin or to safe-
guard the dominating position of the husband as family 
head, the European laws tend toward classifying the problem 
of contractual capacity of married women as a problem of 
the law of family relations. Consequently, the law by which 
these problems are determined is that applying generally to 
the personal relations between husband and wife. This law 
need not necessarily be the personal law of the wife. 8 
(e) The legal consequences of insanity are determined by 
the personal law. Under the system of domicil, however, the 
voluntary acquisition of domicil by an insane non-resident 
presents difficulties,u and the claim of the law of the domicil 
to govern transactions in such situations has been doubted.10 
(f) The capacity of an individual to determine the con-
duct of a lawsuit to which he is a party, as distinguished from 
capacity to be a party, which has been treated above,11 seems 
to be considered in this country as a matter of procedural 
law and governed, in consequence, by the internal law of the 
6 Restatement § 333 comment. 
1 Union Trust Co. v. Grosman ( 1918) 245 U. S. 412, per Holmes, J.; 
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1936, 597, 619-621. 
s See infra pp. 325-326. 
9 CHESHIRE 424. 
1° CHESHIRE 426 proposes the law with which the transaction of an insane 
person is most closely connected. 
11 See supra p. 174. 
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forum. 12 In the eyes of a Continental lawyer, this is a ques-
tion of capacity to exercise rights, and therefore the answer 
depends on the personal law. Thus, it has been decided in the 
Netherlands that Swiss law governs the question whether a 
Swiss married woman can bring a lawsuit in a Dutch court 
without the consent of her husband.13 In an analogous way, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal has declared that the power to 
do so affects capacity and therefore in the case of Swiss na-
tionals is to be governed by the Swiss federal statutes rather 
than by the cantonal laws of procedure.14 However, as an ex-
ception to this rule the German Code of Civil Procedure 
declares that a foreigner lacking procedural capacity under 
his national law is deemed to have it when he would possess 
it under the law of the court.15 
II. THE LAw GovERNING CAPACITY 
r. Capacity Governed by the Law of the Place of Con-
tracting 
The notion that the permanent characteristics of an indi-
vidual are all to be regarded as incidents of his "status" and, 
therefore, all governed by the individual's personal law, is 
not current in the United States. 
In this country, excepting Louisiana, the almost universal 
rule, clearly supported by commercial expediency, is, as 
stated by Goodrich, that the capacity of married women-
which is typically involved in capacity cases-is governed by 
the lex loci contractus.16 "Some authorities seem to hold that 
12 See Restatement § 588 and cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 17 
(b) and (c). 
13 Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.1II63, N. ]. 1924, II8. Belgium: 
Trib. comm. Bruxelles (Oct. 30, 1890) Pasicrisie 1891.3·5· 
14 BG. (Dec. 27, 1916) 42 BGE. II 553, 555; BG. (April 7, 1922) 48 BGE. 
I 24, 29. 
15 German C. Civ. Proc. §55; KG. (March 3, 1936) ]W. 1936, 3570 
(English minor), see infra p. 201, n. 38. 
16 GOODRICH 313; Restatement § 333a; Milliken v. Pratt (1878) 125 Mass. 
374, 28 Am. Rep. 241. 
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capacity is to be determined by the 'law of the contract,'" 17 
which may be different from the law of the place of con-
tracting; but "many courts hold that capacity is governed by 
the lex loci contractus, even while they assert that some other 
law may govern the obligation and validity (in other re-
spects) of the contract." 18 At present, it is true that some 
courts of agricultural states are inclined to protect married 
women domiciled in the forum against their out-of-state 
creditors. This is scarcely a domiciliary rule; it represents 
rather a public policy of the forum in preference to a recog-
nized conflicts rule. But the law of the domicil also has its 
advocates, especially when it agrees with the lex fori. 19 
In the less frequent cases relative to the capacity of in-
fants, the law of the place where the infant acts is generally 
applied. 20 Minor 21 explains the rule by the particular char-
acter of the infant's disability, evidenced by the fact that his 
contract is not void but only voidable; the infant is not in-
capable "in his person" but has a privilege to disaffirm the 
contract. Beale 22 denies the existence of a status of minority 
at common law because "the effects of minority are not so 
uniform or clearly fixed as to be described as the incidents of 
a status." These are obscure arguments. The true reason of 
the rule, commercial expediency, has been well indicated by 
Story himself 23 and has been accepted by the courts as neces-
sary in a country where a large part of the population is 
constantly moving from one state to another. 
In consequence of the rule, an individual reaching full age 
17 GOODRICH 313, excluding the possible influence of the intention of the 
parties, because a circulus 'llitiosus would result. 
18 2 BEALE § 333·3 at 1177. 
19 Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman ( 1918) 245 U. S. 412; STUMBERG 241; 
and supra p. 111, n. 7· 
20 GOODRICH 314. 
21 MINOR § 72; cf. §§ 5, II. 
22 2 BEALE § 120.11. 
23 STORY § 102 a, b, quoting Burge; cf. § 76 at p. 97, n. 2. 
CAPACITY 199 
at his domicil, for instance at the completion of his eight-
eenth year or by marriage, is nevertheless treated as an 
infant, even at his domicil, with respect to transactions exe-
cuted in a state where full age is attained only at twenty-one 
years of age.24 Capacity for the purpose of contracts relative 
to immovables, correspondingly, is governed by the lex 
situs .25 And a decree based on a local statute, which in part 
removes an infant's disabilities for certain purposes, does not 
enlarge his capacity for acts in another state. 26 
The American view 27 has been keenly observed in recent 
years in Europe 28 and has served as a major argument for 
the opponents of the traditional European approach. 
The notion that capacity should not be separated from 
other problems of validity of contracts was once advocated 
by a few statutists, such as John Voet 29 and Bijnkershoek,30 
24 O'Dell v. Rogers (I878) 44 Wis. I36 at I8I (majority of a woman con-
ferred by marriage). 
25 Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75· 
26 State v. Bunce ( 1866) 65 Mo. 349 (authorization of Arkansas court); 
Philpott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (1884) 85 Mo. 164 (emancipation 
in Texas); Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 35I, 119 S. W. 75 (author-
ization in Oklahoma to sell). 
"
7 Beauchamp v. Bertig ( 1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75; Deason v. 
Jones (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 45 Pac. (2d) I025. This approach is 
consistently followed by the Restatement; capacity to contract is declared to 
be determined by the law of the place of contracting (§ 333); capacity to 
transfer land and chattels by the law of the situs (§§ 2I6 and 255, respec-
tively), capacity to marry by the law of the place where the marriage is 
celebrated ( §§ 121 ff.) ; see also the statement about capacity to be held re-
sponsible for a tort implied in § 379· With respect to the theoretical basis of 
BEALE's opinion, see his Summary, §55, 522, and the criticism by WIGNY, 
Essai I9, 103. 
28 The American cases down to 1933 have been collected and analyzed 
by RuooLF MUELLER, "Die Geschiiftsfiihigkeit nattirlicher Personen in der 
international-privatrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Vereinigten Staaten," 8 
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 885. 
29 See STORY § 54 a. 
30 BIJNKERSHOEK ( 1673-1743), I Observationes Tumultuariae (edited by 
MEIJERS, DE BLJ"!COURT and BoDENSTEIN, 1926) no. ]I expressly invokes 
Joannes Voet. He applied the lex loci actus as to capacity to marry; see LEE, 
"Bijnkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae," 17 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1935) 
38 at 43· 
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and applied during the first half of the nineteenth century in 
Denmark.31 
The rule that capacity to contract is simply determined by 
the law of the place of contracting is also said to prevail in 
the Soviet Union.32 
2. Capacity Governed by Personal Law 
Outside of the United States and the Soviet Union, prob-
lems of capacity are generally treated as belonging to the 
domain of personal law. Even in the United States, this ap-
proach is followed in Louisiana,33 although it appears weak-
ened recently.34 A peculiar position is occupied by Swit-
zerland, where problems of capacity are determined by the 
national law of the individual,35 while problems of personal 
status in general are referred to the law of the domicil. 
Since Mancini's time, the European rule has been justified 
upon the ground that the country of nationality is the one best 
qualified to determine whether and to what extent restrictions 
should be imposed upon the individual citizen in his own and 
his family's interest. Rules determining capacity are re-
garded as the very core of the rules that permanently deter-
mine an individual's legal status. It is obvious, of course, that 
incapacities accompanying an individual wherever he goes 
may endanger others who bona fide enter into transactions 
with him, but the principle is based upon the consideration 
that anyone who engages in a transaction with another must 
ascertain at his own risk whether such other party has suffi-
a1 See BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 21. 
32 See MAKAROV, Precis 190; but see supra p. 129 n. 77a. 
33 Marks v. Loewenberg (1918) 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444i Lorio v. Gladney 
(1920) 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365; National City Bank of Chicago v. Barringer 
( 1918) 143 La. 14, 78 So. 134· 
34 See as to capacity to sue Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 202 La. 505, 
12 So. (2d) 253, Note, 18 Tul. L. Rev. (1943) 319, 321. 
35 BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 741; BG. (May 23, 1912) 38 BGE. 
II 1, 4i BG. (Feb. 7, 1934) 61 BGE. II 12, 17 (2). 
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cient legal capacity, or, as stated in the Roman maxim, Qui 
cum alia contrahit, vel est vel debet esse non ignarus condi-
cionis eius (Dig. so.q.19). (He who contracts with an-
other either knows or ought to know the other's condition.) 
In interstate or international transactions, the results of this 
maxim are even harsher than in transactions involving par-
ties both subject to the same law. While it may often be diffi-
cult to ascertain whether an individual is under age, married, 
or of unsound mind, it may be more difficult to find out that 
he is a foreigner and that his capacity is restricted by his 
personal law. 
As a matter of fact, in order to alleviate embarrassments 
to national business life, exceptions to the rule have been 
found necessary for transactions contracted wholly within 
the territory of the forum. 
(a) In the famous Louisiana decision, Saul v. His Credi-
tors, it was recognized that a foreigner twenty-two years of 
age, a minor under the law of his domicil, could not plead 
this foreign law against a contract entered into by him in the 
state.36 The same rule was adopted occasionally in other 
jurisdictions at a time when the law of domicil was held to 
govern capacity.37 
(b) In the Prussian and other German codes since the 
eighteenth century, the validity of transactions in which con-
sideration is given and the capacity of standing in court, were 
in one way or another declared independent of foreign-
created disabilities.38 By the German law (EG. art. 7 par. 
36 Saul v. His Creditors (I827) 5 Mart. N.S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 2I2, dis-
cussed by LIVERMORE, Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the 
Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations 32 § I7; 
STORY § 76 j I WHARTON § I I4 ff. 
37 See in particular Woodward v. Woodward (I889) 87 Tenn. 644, II 
s. w. 892, 897· 
38 Prussian Allg. Landrecht of I794. Einleitung §§ 35, 38, 39 provides that 
the rules of the Code shall be applied to foreign-domiciled persons engaging 
in contracts within the territory if these rules are more favorable to the 
validity of the contract than the laws of the domicil; cf. DERNBURG, I Lehr-
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3), it is provided that a foreigner who engages in a transac-
tion in Germany is considered to have the same capacity as 
he would have if he were a German, even if his capacity be 
more limited under his own national law. This provision, de-
signed to protect German business, is not applicable to trans-
actions concerned with land outside of Germany, family 
relations, or inheritance, but applies to donations between 
living persons.39 Moreover, this provision is strictly limited 
to transactions made within Germany, and does not protect 
anyone when he contracts in a foreign country. Varying pro-
visions of this type have been adopted in numerous codes.40 
Another kind of rule of more general scope was contained 
in article 84 of the German Bills of Exchange Law of 1848, 
and now appears in the Geneva Conflicts Rules on Bills of 
buch des Preussischen Privatrechts (ed. r, 1875) 46; Prussian Allg. Gerichts-
ordnung of 1793, I § 5: the capacity of a foreigner to stand in court is de-
termined by the law of his domicil, § 6: but if he has completed his 25th 
year, it is immaterial whether the law of his domicil, or of the situs of the 
res, or particular acts that have not been presented to the court determine 
a later coming of age. 
Baden: C. C. of r8o8, art. 3 (a). 
Saxony: C. C. of r863, § 8. 
Germany: Code of Civil Procedure (1877) §53· 
Greece: C. C. of 1856, art. 4 par. 2. 
39 After removal of doubts, the Italian C. C. ( 1938) Disp. Pre!. art. 7 par. 
2, C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17 par. 2 states the same rule, see Relazione 
1938, no. 7· 
40 Switzerland: art. 7b, par. 1 of NAG. provides that a foreigner who has 
engaged in a transaction in Switzerland cannot plead his lack of capacity if 
he would have capacity under Swiss law. 
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 9· 
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17 par. 2. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 3 par. 2. 
Iran: C. C. art. 962. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 24. 
Montenegro: C. C. art. 788. 
Siam: Law of 1939, art. ro par. 2. 
Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of Aug. 8, 1953, art. 
21, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1956) 487, 489. 
For Hungary see SZLADITS, 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 25, 27. 
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Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930.41 Article 2 reads 
as follows: 
"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of ex-
change or· promissory note shall be determined by his na-
tional law. If this national law provides that the law of 
another country is competent in the matter, this latter law 
shall be applied. 
"A person who lacks capacity, according to the law speci-
fied in the preceding paragraph, is nevertheless bound, if his 
signature has been given in any territory in which according 
to the law in force there, he would have the requisite ca-
pacity." 
Under these provisions the signature is valid not only in 
the country where it has been made but also in every other 
country signatory to the Convention. The country of which 
the signer is a national is allowed, however, to treat the sig-
nature as invalid.42 
Under neither of these provisions does it matter by what 
law the contract is generally governed, of what country the 
parties are nationals, or where they are domiciled. Nor is it 
relevant whether the incapacity of the foreigner was known 
or unknown to the other party. A purely objective test is 
believed best to serve the interests of commerce; this policy 
of disregarding individual circumstances in laws intended to 
protect trade was consistently carried out in German law 
before 1933. 
(c) A subjective test is applied in France, however, as 
established by the Court of Cassation in the celebrated 
Lizardi case.43 A twenty-two-year-old Mexican, being still 
a minor under Mexican law, bought jewels in Paris; he 
would have been of full age had he been a Frenchman. The 
41 See supra p. 38. 
42 Germany has availed herself of this permission: German Bills of Ex· 
change Act of June 21, 1933, art. 91 par. 2, 2d sentence. 
4 3 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 16, 1861) S.186I.I.305. 
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court, considering that the seller had acted "in good faith 
and without negligence or imprudence," declared the buyer 
bound by his contract. This decision has been followed con-
sistently by the French courts.44 Under this so-called "doc-
trine of national interest," protection is given against excus-
able ignorance of foreign incapacities, dependent upon the 
circumstances of each individual case.45 Accordingly, the 
courts are disinclined to accord the benefit of the doctrine to 
bankers or other businessmen who can reasonably be ex-
pected to investigate the personal status of their customers. 
Relief is generally granted, on the other hand, against a for-
eigner who fraudulently represents that he has his capacity.46 
This French approach is well-known throughout the Latin 
countries, but opinions are divided.47 
More emphatically than the French courts, the Swedish 
Law of 1904, as amended June 27, 1924 (c. 4 § 5), provides 
44 Cour Paris (Feb. 8, I883) Clunet I883, 29I; Trib. civ. ~eine (July I, 
I886) Clunet I887, I78; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, I89I) D.I892.I.29; Cour 
Paris (July 22, I933) Gaz.Pal.J933·2.724, Clunet I934, 9IO. In the last-men-
tioned case, a contract was made in France by a Rumanian married woman, 
who exhibited to the other party an instrument purporting to be a judicially 
legalized general power of attorney of her husband. The instrument was in-
effective under Rumanian law. The court characterized the conduct of both 
spouses as "truly tortious" ("un veritable quasi-delit"). }. DONNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 509 in discussing this case, notes an increasing tendency of the courts 
to limit exceptions from the application of the personal law to such grave 
situations. 
45 This "serious defect" of the French solution has been admitted by 2 
ARMINJON no. 2I. 
46 France: SuRVILLE, Clunet I<J09, 625. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (April 2I, I892) 7I Sent. 504. 
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 866, I04I. 
47 Especially in Italy, the doctrine was not adopted by the courts and has 
been advocated by only a few writers, such as ANZILOITI I 53 no. 2; I FIORE 
no. 449· Now the German model has been followed, supra n. 39· In Belgium, 
PERROUD's hostile attitude (Clunet 1905, 305) has been followed by the 
authors of Novelles Belges, I D. Civ. 221 no. I57· 
Recently, the French rule has been adopted by the new Civil Codes of 
Egypt ( I948), art. II par. I, and Syria ( 1949), art. I2 par. I; cf. SZASZY, 
Droit international prive compare (1940) 235· Also the Benelux Convention, 
art. 2 par. 2. Even an English writer has been impressed by it, CLARENCE 
SMITH, I Int. Comp. Law Q. (I952) 470, supra n. I. 
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that transactions shall be valid in cases where the other party 
has not known of and has been unable to ascertain the in-
capacity.48 
(d) A combination of the German and the French rules 
has been undertaken in article 3 of the Polish Law of 1926 
on private international law, prescribing that the capacity 
of a foreigner who lacks capacity under his personal law and 
who in Poland has entered into a transaction intended to 
have effect in Poland, is to be determined in accordance with 
Polish law when such determination is necessary for the 
security of honest commerce. This provision is as compli-
cated and impracticable as that recently proposed by the 
Institute of International Law. 49 
(e) These various exceptions to the principle of the per-
sonal law have resulted in widespread doubts on the pro-
priety of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the only exception 
basically affecting the principle is the provision of the Uni-
form Geneva Conflicts Rules noted above. Other existing 
exceptions are intended strictly to protect businessmen (and 
not even all of them) operating in the state of the forum, 
while the rule shields the forum's own nationals who engage 
in transactions abroad.50 Indeed, a German court would 
allow the plea of incapacity of a twenty-year-old Frenchman 
who contracts an obligation in Switzerland (because of the 
principle of nationality), although he would be barred from 
such a plea in a Swiss court (because of the Swiss provision, 
48 The provision does not apply, however, against a foreigner who is a na-
tional of a state which is a signatory to the Hague Convention of June 12, 
1902 (Ord. of Oct. 10, 1924). 
In Norway, the domiciliary law is applied without exception. See CHRIS-
TIANSEN, 6 Repert. 573 no. 99· 
49 Resolution of Cambridge 1931, Annuaire 1931, II 69-93, 237; cf. on 
Resolution of Oslo 1932, BAAK in Revue 1932, 820. 
50 See for instance Trib. civ. Seine (June 30, 191'9) Clunet 1920, 184 (a 
Frenchman who was placed under guardianship in France entered upon a 
contract abroad; when he was sued in France his defense of incapacity was 
sustained). Cf. also for Bulgaria, GHENov, 6 Repert. 189 no. 48. 
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analogous to the German exception) . 51 On widely different 
theories, writers have criticized the exceptions as well as 
their limits. 52 
3. Mixed Systems 
(a) English law. No English decision has decisively 
settled the question whether an individual's capacity to con-
tract is to be determined in accordance with his personal law, 
i.e., the law of his domicil, or in accordance with the "proper 
law of the contract." Dicta can be quoted for either ap-
proach.53 The text writers increasingly tend toward advo-
cating the application of the proper law of the contract inso-
far as mercantile transactions are concerned.54 This opinion 
has been followed by a Canadian court. 55 Both Cheshire, who 
is the most vigorous advocate of this view among the text 
writers, and the Saskatchewan court seem to be influenced 
by American ideas. There remains, however, a twofold 
difference from the American rule: on the one hand, not all 
contracts are exempted from the law of the domicil; on the 
other hand, the law of the place of contracting is not fol-
lowed unless it governs the whole of the contract. We shall 
51 RAAPE 84, 85; PLANCK, 6 Kommentar zum BGB. ( ed. I) art. 7, no. 6 (d). 
52 Cf. NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 125; WALKER III ff.; LEWALD 59, no. 
74; M. WOLFF, IPR. I04. Only NEUBECKER 62 believed that the exception 
stated by EG. art. 7 par. 3 could be extended by interpretation. 
53 For application of the domiciliary law: Udny v. Udny (I869) L. R. I Sc. 
App. 44I, 457; Sottomayor v. De Barros (no. I) (I877) 3 P. D. C. A. I, 5; 
Cooper v. Cooper (I888) I3 App. Cas. 88. 
For application of the proper law of the contract: Sottomayor v. De Barros 
(no. 2) (I879) 5 P. D. 94, IOO, per Sir James Hannen; Ogden v. Ogden 
[I908] P. (C. A.) 46; Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67; Simonin v. Mallac 
(I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, per Sir Cresswell Cresswell. Cf. also ALLEN, "Status 
and Capacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. (I930) 277 at 294,309. 
54 DICEY 637 Rule I58 Exc. I, now DICEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 6I9 Rule I39; 
WESTLAKE 40; CHESHIRE 223, who cites the Scotch case of M'Feetridge v. 
Stewarts and Lloyds [I9I3] S. C. (H. L.) 773, and the old and doubtful 
English case of Male v. Roberts (I8oo) 3 Esp. I63. 55 Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville [I933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask.). 
Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I55, I56. There seems no doubt, on 
the other hand, that the law of the domicil governs capacity for engaging in 
other transactions, see I JoHNSON I83. 
CAPACITY 207 
have to examme this latter point when discussing the law 
governing contracts. 
(b) Former Italian system. The rule that an individual's 
capacity is determined by his personal law is clearly estab-
lished by the Italian Civil Code. 5 6 Hence, a contract made by 
a married woman of Italian nationality is held valid by the 
Italian courts, even if made in a country where a married 
woman cannot contract without her husband's authoriza-
tion,57 and her husband happens to be a national of that coun-
try. So far as mercantile transactions are concerned, how-
ever, article 58 of the Commercial Code of I 8 8 2 provided 
that capacity of the parties is determined by the law of the 
place of contracting.58 The coexistence of these two different 
rules raised some minor problems that might have been over-
come. But the fact that the two rules are theoretically an-
tagonistic was much stressed. Recent critics have expressed 
their preference for the rule of the Commercial Code which 
is based upon the consideration that commercial transactions 
are concluded speedily and without the felt necessity of in-
quiring into the other party's nationality and capacity.59 
Nevertheless, the commercial rule has been sacrificed to the 
nationality principle in the recently recast legislation.60 
Ill. PROBLEMS RAISED BY INCAPACITATING PROVISIONS 
OF THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING 
A peculiar problem arises when a person who is fully capa-
ble under his personal law makes a contract in a foreign coun-
56 Italy: C. C. (r865) Disp. Pre!. art. 6; C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17 
par. r. 57 DIENA, Clunet 1920, 77. Under Italian law a married woman as such is 
no longer subject to any incapacity {Law no. II76 of July 17, 1919). 
5B See DrENA, Clunet 1920, 79. 
59 See FoRMIGGINI, 29 Rivista ( 1937) 39, 40 n. r; he criticizes art. 2 of 
the Geneva Convention, where the national law is adopted as the general 
rule (see supra pp. 202-203), as a step backwards. 
60 Art. 58 of the Comm. C. has been repealed by art. II2 of the R. D. of 
April 24, 1939, containing provisions for the introduction of the First Book 
of the Civil Code. 
208 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
try where persons of his class are not capable of contracting. 
This case presents no difficulty to a court which follows the 
personal law principle, as his personal law gives this indi-
vidual capacity. 
What, however, is the position in a court applying the law 
of the place of contracting? Does it consider the contract 
invalid? 
This question has been discussed in connection with the 
former Italian commercial rule (C. Comm. art. 58), which 
established the principle of the lex loci contractus, as well as 
with reference to the exceptional rule contained in the 
Uniform Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention. By pre-
vailing opinion, it has been answered in favor of the validity 
of the transaction, in view of the basic function of the na-
tionallaw.61 
The considerations involved may be illustrated by the fol-
lowing hypothetical case : 
A Swiss national, twenty years old, having his domicil in 
Geneva, Switzerland, goes on a trip and buys a car on the in-
stallment plan: 
(a) in Paris; 
(b) in London; 
(c) in New York. 
Being of full age under Swiss law, he is considered of age in 
France under the nationality principle and in England under 
the domiciliary principle (if applied), in respect to all three 
contracts. Therefore, he would probably pe held capable also 
by an American court in cases (a) and '(b), although this 
decision would amount to a sort of renvoi. In the third case, 
the propositus is incapable under the law of the place of con-
tracting. It would hardly be correct within the meaning of the 
theory of vested rights to consider the full age required by 
61 FoRMIGGINI, 29 Rivista (1937) at 46 n. 2, supra n. 59· 
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the young man in his country as a "right." Such an approach 
has been refuted in analogous situations.62 In the case of a 
married woman who is incapable under the law of the place 
of acting, but capable under her domiciliary law, the Ameri-
can authorities tend to hold her incapable,63 and contracts of 
a person of full age in his own state, who acts in a state where 
he is regarded as a minor, seem generally to be held voida-
ble,64 except under the domiciliary system of Louisiana.65 
A similar question arises where an American who is 
domiciled in the United States and is more than twenty-one 
years old, contracted an obligation in Chile, while the old 
law was in force under which minority lasted until the com-
pletion of the twenty-fifth year.68 
Must an American court prefer in these cases the place of 
contracting to the domicil? Lorenzen's 67 suggestion that 
capacity should be determined by domicil in international 
transactions, as contrasted with interstate business, would do 
justice in these situations. 
IV. CoNCLUSIONs 
The proper approach to capacity problems in conflict of 
laws has been repeatedly discussed in recent years in Europe, 
and an approximation toward the American system of lex loci 
62 See change of domicil, supra p. 160, n. 190. 63 Burr v. Beckler ( 1914) 264 Ill. 230, 106 N. E. 206; Nichols & Shepard 
Co. v. Marshall (1899) 108 Ia. 518, 79 N. \V. 282; Pearl v. Hansborough 
(1848) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; criticized in II Col. L. Rev. (19II) 157; 
DeFur v. DeFur (1928) 156 Tenn. 634, 4 S. W. (2d) 341. Cf. 2 BEALE 674 
n. 3· 64 See I WHARTON § II4 and cases supra n. 27, probably not allowing the 
doubt expressed by I Wharton § usa after n. 5· 
6 5 Saul v. His Creditors (1827) 5 Mart. N. S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 212, states 
the case expressly, as similarly did Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87 
Tenn. 644, II S. W. 892, 897. 66 C. C. art. 26, modified by Law no. 7,612 of Oct. u, I943· 67 LoRENZEN, "Uniformity Between Latin America and the United States 
in the Rules of Private International Law Relating to Commercial Con-
tracts," I5 Tul. L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 168, 170. 
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contractus has been advocated in various quarters. In particu-
lar, Batiffol who studied American conflict of laws in the 
United States, recommended in 1934 in the newly founded 
French Committee of Conflicts of Laws, a cautious applica-
tion of other criteria than nationality. 68 Some critics of the 
present European system have expressed themselves in favor 
of the proper law of the contract or, for special cases, that of 
the place of contracting, while others have wished to substi-
tute the law of domicil for the national law. 
The main argument against subjecting capacity to the law 
of the place of contracting or to the proper law of the con-
tract is that either alternative greatly facilitates evasion of 
the statutory disabilities imposed by the domiciliary or na-
tional law. In addition, the domiciliary or national courts 
employing either conflicts rule are confronted by the dilemma 
whether to observe this rule and sanction evasions or to en-
force their statutory provisions on grounds of public policy. 
Such a casuistic approach causes a great deal of uncertainty. 
In this country, the uncertainty is somewhat mitigated by 
the circumstance that a sizable majority of the courts un-
qualifiedly prefer the law of the place of contracting to any 
domiciliary policy. Dissenting cases exist, however, and there 
is increasing emphasis on the interests of the domiciliary 
state. Moreover, if the advice of Cook were to be heeded, the 
picture would change. He recommends that statutes restrict-
ing the capacity of married women be examined to determine 
whether they involve only married women domiciled and 
acting within the state, or also foreign domiciled women act-
ing in the state, or acts of locally domiciled women out of the 
state, or all these categories. 69 This suggestion seems to favor 
68 Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit intern~tional prive, Premiere an-
nee, 1934, 21-66. Cf. BARBEY, Le Con flit 35; BATIF~OL 325 no. 363 ff. Contra: 
J. DoNNEOIEU DE VABRES 510, who defends the French case law, described 
above, p. 203, as infinitely more flexible and more richly detailed than the 
American system. 
69 CooK, Legal Bases 438 ff. 
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as narrow as possible a construction of the statutory prohibi-
tions. Its effect would probably reduce the scope of the re-
strictions upon capacity, whether under the law of the place 
of contracting or under the law of domicil, whichever is ap-
plied. Nevertheless, statutes do not easily lend themselves to 
such construction; although the results may be beneficent, 
this method of inquiry would considerably complicate the 
task of the courts and, at least for the time being, render it 
more difficult to ascertain the validity of contracts. 
A retrospective view of these various attempts to solve this 
old and not yet liquidated problem, indicates a compromise 
useful in all countries and adequate to all interests concerned, 
which also promises more definite results than those reached 
thus far in the two opposite camps. The transactions in which 
an incompetent individual participates should, by reference to 
an objective criterion, be divided into two groups: one in 
which local interests prevail sufficiently to justify the applica-
tion of the law of the contract; another in which the domicil-
iary or national protective policies are entitled to be effectu-
ated everywhere by means of the personal law. For the 
purpose of conflicts rules, business contracts already are dis-
tinguished from transactions regulating family relations and 
decedents' estates in the statutes of Germany, Switzerland, 
Poland, Italy, etc., as well as in the English doctrine, though 
particulars vary. Following this lead, capacity to engage in 
transactions should be determined, consistently and without 
exceptions, by the law governing personal status, when fam-
ily relations and other personal matters are concerned, and 
by the law governing the contract in general, when exchange 
of property or services is involved. This approach, which 
would need to be elaborated more specifically, could be fur-
ther refined by a carefully developed distinction between 
those incapacities which businessmen may justly be expected 
to investigate, and disabilities which may justifiably be ig-
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nored. Where the interests of third parties empirically ap-
pear worthy of protection, there should be no room whatever 
;for interference by the personal law. !7ice versa, the Ameri-
can rule extends the law of the place of contracting beyond 
any possible justification. It is even applied to the capacity to 
marry. 
The law thus in part replacing the personal law should 
conveniently be the law governing the contracts as a whole 
rather than the law of the place of contracting.70 This is evi-
dent in the case where a contract is clearly localized in a 
place other than that of execution. 
70 Lorenzen's suggestion (supra n. 67) of a compromise between North and 
South American laws also tends toward the law governing the validity of 
contracts in general, rather than that of the place of contracting. He assumes, 
moreover, that the domicil of persons engaged in international trade is suffi-
ciently stable to furnish a standard. The proposition above may not be far 
away from his idea. 
PART THREE 
MARRIAGE 
CHAPTER 7 
Marriage 1 
I. ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY 
No American case seems to be in point. We have to deal, 
therefore, with foreign conflicts rules only. 
I. Groups of Conflicts Rules 
U NTIL recently the problems arising out of an en-gagement to marry have received little attention in the conflict of laws. Insofar as they have been 
dealt with at alVa their treatment has suffered from diver-
gency of classification in the various municipal laws. 
Numerous countries treat a betrothal as a contract per-
taining to the field of family relations and similar to the con-
tract of marriage itself. Where this notion prevails, as for 
instance, in England, Germany, Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, and the Scandinavian countries, the choice of law rules 
concerning the subject matter have been developed by anal-
1 For surveys on the substantive marriage laws see: HERMAN CoHN, The 
Foreign Laws of Marriage and Divorce, Part I, The Countries of the Euro-
pean Continent (Tel-Aviv, 1937); LESKE-LOEWENFELD, Rechtsverfolgung im 
internationalen Verkehr, vol. IV, 1. Teil, Das Eherecht der europiiischen 
Staaten und ihrer Kolonien (Berlin, ed. 2, 1932-1937); BERGMANN, Inter-
nationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., ed. 3, 1952-
1953) ; Articles "Ehe," "Ehehindernisse," "Eheliches Giiterrecht," "Ehe-
scheidung und Ehetrennung," "Eheschliessung," "Ehevertrag," by different 
authors, in 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (Berlin, 1929-1938); EVERSLEY's 
Law of the Domestic Relations, ed. 6 by ALEXANDER CAIRNS (London, 1951) ; 
LE BRAS, Divorce et Separation de corps dans le monde contemporain (Paris, 
1952); IRELAND and GALINDEZ, Divorce in the Americas (Buffalo, N. Y., 
1947). 
Ia A comprehensive survey of the conflicts problems involved by DE NovA, 
"Gli sponsali in diritto internazionale privata," 8o Foro Ita!. ( 1955) IV 
25-38. 
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ogy to those relating to marriage. 2 Formal requirements are 
accordingly treated as being determined by the law of the 
place of celebration/a whereas the intrinsic validity of an 
engagement to marry is determined in accordance with the 
personal law of the parties.3 Sometimes, however, an old 
view is still followed, according to which engagement and 
marriage are treated like ordinary contracts; consequently 
the conflicts rule concerning rescission of contracts is applied.4 
The personal law is also applied for the determination of 
the consequences of a breach of engagement. In this respect 
the difficulties that arise wherever the parties have different 
personal laws are particularly noticeable, for the various 
national laws attach widely different consequences to a breach 
of promise to marry. Now here, it is true, will a promise to 
marry be enforced by a decree o'f specific performance, 5 but 
2 In the United States also, the action f~r breach of promise is recognized 
as being "in form at least ex contractu," although damages are awarded as 
in tort matters. See DAGGEIT, Legal Essays 44, 78. 
In Italy the contract theory has been defended by FUNAIOLI, 9 Annuario 
Dir. Comp. (1934) 3, 383; 5 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 55. 
2a Trib. Sondrio (Feb. 21, 1953) 79 Foro Ita!. ( 1954) I 408, Rivista 1954, 
613. 
a Germany: the rule has been applied in all cases; for particular applica-
tions see footnotes infra n. 6 and n. 7· 
Switzerland: App. Ziirich (May x, 1905) Bl.fZiirch.Rspr. (1905) 247 no. 
159 (in the absence of a federal conflicts rule resorting to the former 
Ziiricher Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch). 
The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Dec. 2, 1925) W.11568, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 
531; Rb. den Haag (April 11, 1935) W.1936, no. 409, II Z.ausl. PR. (1937) 
204. 
Iceland: Law of domicil, EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761. 
4 Switzerland: the law of the place of performance, identified with the 
common domicil of the parties and, in the absence of such, the intended first 
marital domicil; see BECK, NAG. 177 no. 76, followed by App. Luzern (Oct. 
19, 1938) 36 S]Z. (1938-1939) 219 no. 150. 
England: Intention of the parties, indicated by intended matrimonial home; 
see Hansen v. Dixon [1906] 93 L.T.R. 32; Kremezi v. Ridgway [1949] I All 
E. R. 662. 
5 Even the mere unenforceable obligation to marry has disappeared from 
the canon law, still in force in several countries in Latin America and 
formerly in Eastern Europe, under the Codex Juris Canonici, c. 1017 § 3, 
which instead grants damages for rescission of an engagement without just 
cause. 
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with respect to the duty to pay damages the laws vary from 
non-recognition of any such duty to recognition of a duty to 
pay compensatory damages for special injury, damages for 
mental pain and suffering, or even punitive damages. In this 
wide variety of domestic laws, the two solutions most fre-
quently advocated are to determine the extent of either 
party's liability ( 1) by his own personal law 6 and ( 2) as 
limited to the extent to which liability is recognized by the 
personal laws of both.7 Both opinions are influenced largely 
by a regard for the law of the forum, for in most cases the 
personal law of the defendant is that of the forum. 8 
The majority of the countries following the French sys-
tem, consider liability for breach of promise to marry to per-
tain to tort law. Consequently, in conflicts cases the law of the 
place of the wrong is held to be applicable,9 but no clear rules 
exist for the determination of the place of the wrong in such 
instances.10 
The C6digo Bustamante 11 and other recent codifications 12 
simply declare the law of the forum to be applicable. 
6 OLG. Kiiln (Dec. 4, I925) Leipz.Z.I926, 6o2, IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 63; 
KG. (Feb. 23, I933) IPRspr. I9341 no. 4I; particularly KG. (Feb. 7, I938) 
]W.I938, I715, Nouv. Revue I939, 26o; KG. (Jan. u, I939) Dt. RECHT I939, 
I012. See also ZrTELMANN 801; M. WoLFF, IPR. 185; RAAPE 266, 270 (contra, 
however, in IPR. 266). 
1 OLG. Miinchen (March I3, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. 69; KG. (May 2, 
1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 66; LG. Hamburg (Nov. 5, 1954) NJW. I955, 548; 
see also NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. I) I9; M. WoLFF, Familienrecht ( I928) § 7; 
(but seen. 6, supra); LEWALD 77; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 272 n. 8. 
8 Cf. the dicta quoted by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 46 n. 34; ibid. 47 n. 42. The 
Kammergericht, however, in its decision of Feb. 23, I933, supra n. 6, applied 
the personal law of the Turkish defendant without regard to the law of the 
forum. 
9 Trib. civ. Valenciennes (Dec. I9, I935) Nouv. Revue I936, 325 (French 
law applied to Polish parties living in France as the law of the place of 
wrong, and Polish personal law rejected). 
10 In France receipt of a "letter of rupture" by the fiancee regarded as de· 
cisive: Trib. civ. Seine (June I6, I936) Gaz. Pal. I936.2.744. 
11 Codigo Bustamante art. 39· 
12 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, on certain family relations of international 
character, § 46; Siam: Law on Private International Law of I939, §IS. In 
the English case of Hansen v. Dixon (I906) 23 T. L. R. 56, English law was 
applied with scant justification. 
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2. Cases 
The functioning of the various choice of law rules may be 
illustrated by the following cases, one hypothetical and one 
real. 
(a) A Frenchman, engaged to marry a French girl, re-
pudiates his promise, while 'both he and his fiancee are 
temporarily residing in Germany. 
If an action for breach of promise is brought against him 
in a French court, German municipal law, as the law of the 
place of the wrong, would have to be applied. The fact, how-
ever, that the German law treats liability for breach of prom-
ise to marry in the fourth book of the Civil Code, which is 
entitled "Family Law," has led a text writer 13 to believe that 
French courts, in view of their treatment of breach of prom-
ise to marry as a tort, would apply not the rules applicable 
under the German classification, but rather the German rules 
on torts. Strange consequences would result from this view. 
The defendant could be held liable, only if shown to have 
been aware that his conduct would cause pecuniary damage 
to his fiancee and, furthermore, his behavior constituted a 
violation of good morals. Then the additional question might 
be raised whether this is to be determined by German or 
French standards. Obviously, the French court would do bet-
ter to apply the rules of family law provided for the case in 
the German Civil Code. 
If the case arose in a German court, the German judge 
would have to apply French law as the personal law of the 
parties; but inasmuch as the French law would regard the 
question as one of tort and refer it to the German law as the 
law of the place of the wrong, the German court would ac-
cept the renvoi so as to apply the provisions of the fourth 
book of the German Civil Code. Thus, although the courts in 
13 RAAPE 267. 
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France and Germany would start from different premises, the 
decision would be the same in both.14 
(b) An American citizen domiciled in New York, while 
temporarily residing in Germany, seduced a German girl by 
promising to marry her and subsequently repudiated his 
promise. The German court denied the girl's action, holding 
that the German conflict of laws rules referred to the law of 
New York as the personal law of the defendant, under which 
actions for breach of promise to marry are not recognized.15 
3· Public Policy 
In those countries where choice of law rules refer the 
courts to some foreign law, the lex fori is frequently resorted 
to in order to prevent the enforcement of liabilities regarded 
as contrary to the public policy of the forum. In the Nether-
lands, for instance, damages allowed by German law for 
breach of the contract to marry could not be recovered unless 
the marriage banns, a prerequisite to such suits in theN ether-
lands, had been published.16 Enforcement of penalties agreed 
14 Decisions, subjecting one party to a law recognizing liability and the 
other to one which does not, were considered inequitable, by M. WOLFF, IPR. 
( ed. I) II 5; contra, RAAPE, loc. cit. This latter author's more recent book 
(Internationales Privatrecht 266) proposes use of the choice of law rule 
applicable to obligations neither contractual nor delictual, i.e., roughly the 
quasi-contractual obligations of the common law, as once used by the Reichs-
gericht, (Oct. 21, 1887) 20 RGZ. 333 and (Feb. 28, 1889) 23 RGZ. 172, and 
by the Trib. Baselstadt (Sept. 9, 1891) II z. Schweiz.R. N.F. 64. There is, 
however, no choice of law rule generally recognized that can be used for the 
purpose. RAAPE's own suggestion is to apply the domiciliary law of the in-
nocent or, alternatively, the female party. This, indeed, would be a universal 
ru~ . 
15 New York Laws 1935, ch. 263 amending C.P.A. by inserting art. (2a). 
The German case is KG. (Jan. n, 1939) Dt. Recht, 1939, 1012. 
16 Dutch BW. art. I13 par. 2. See Hof s'Hertogenbosch (Jan. 5, 1932) 
W.12416, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 204; Rb. Rotterdam (May 12, 1922) W.10996 
and (July 27, 1932) W.12584, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 204. These decisions were 
criticized by VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1927, 108 j ibid. 1924, 123, at 125 and 
OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek t838-1938, 713, but recommended for Italian law by 
FEDOZZI 401. 
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upon in the contract of engagement is generally denied.11 
Some countries consider damages for breach of promise to 
marry, whether based on domestic or foreign law, as con-
trary to public policy.18 Even where public policy is resorted 
to more sparingly, doubts have been expressed with respect 
to such enormously high claims as are allowed in England 
and in some American states.19 A recent Finnish statute ex-
pressly limits the amount recoverable to that allowed by both 
the plaintiff's personal law and the law of Finland. 20 On the 
other hand, a foreign law occasionally has been denied appli-
cation because it failed to recognize a claim for damages for 
breach of promise to marry, 21 to that extent frustrating the 
elimination of such suits by the so-called "heart balm" stat-
utes. Almost all these applications of public policy are obvi-
ously arbitrary. 
4· Conclusion 
An Anglo-American writer recently suggested application 
of the foreign characterization of a breach of promise where 
the foreign systems of law applicable to the situation concur 
in characterizing it (as breach of contract or as tort), but 
17 Penalties are still used in Greece; see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 274. They are 
considered contrary to public policy by the German KG. (Jan 23, 1901) z 
ROLG. 132, II Z.int.R. (1902) 99, Clunet 1902, 629 and by most other courts. 
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 45· 
18 Norway: see LUNDH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 717. 
More often it is alleged that the law of the forum fixes the maximum dam-
ages that can be awarded, e.g.: 
Italy: FEDOZZI 401. 
Iceland: EYJ6LFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761. 
19 Against awarding: NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 131 n. 2; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 
274 n. 15; contra: DEMERTZES, Family Law 91, § 24, cited by STREIT-VAL· 
LINDAS; RAAPE 271. 
2o Law of Dec. s, 1929, § 46. 
21 OGL. Koln, cit. supra n. 6; contra: M. WoLFF, IPR. 185 n. 4· The de-
cision of the Kammergericht of 1939 (supra n. 6), declares expressly that 
the American statute denying a claim for seduction of a betrothed woman is 
not contrary to the international public policy of the court, though contrary 
to the German Civil Code. 
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where the engagement and the breach occur in two foreign 
jurisdictions having different characterizations, that the 
forum should apply its own characterization.22 This excep-
tion to the author's theory of lex fori characterization is in-
consistent with any general theory, nor does it help in the 
more important cases. 
It would be preferable for the conflicts rule to be free 
from interfering substantive law; the rule should simply re-
fer the rights and obligations flowing from an engagement to 
the law of the place regarded under the circumstances as the 
center of the social relation between the parties at the time of 
engagement. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 
Experience has shown that marriage must be defined in 
the conflict of laws in broader terms than those in which it is 
understood, legally and sociologically, 23 in the several sys-
tems of municipal law. Two groups of cases have been given 
practical consideration. 
r. Soviet Marriage 
In 1929 a man was sued in the Probate Division of the 
English High Court for separate maintenance by a woman 
with whom he had entered into an agreement of marriage in 
the Soviet Union. The defendant contended that this so-
called marriage did not correspond with the English notion 
of marriage because, under the Soviet law at the time in ques-
tion, such a marriage could be dissolved by the simple uni-
22 RoBERTSON, Characterization 76-78, 177. 
23 On the relation between the sociological and the legal concept of mar-
riage and the function of law with respect to the regulation of sex relations, 
see LLEWELLYN, "Behind the Law of Divorce," 32 Col. L. Rev. (1932) 1281, 
33 Col. L. Rev. ( 1933) 249· 
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lateral act of either party without the necessity of any reason 
being specified. Following this argument, Hill, J., held that 
the relation existing between the parties was not such as to 
constitute a marriage and, therefore, that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover. The Court of Appeals reversed this 
decision on the grounds that, although Soviet law may thus 
permit the relation to be voluntarily dissolved, the parties 
may be presumed to have intended it to be permanent. Thus, 
the relation created in the Soviet Union was not considered 
to be fundamentally different from the English notion of 
marriage.24 The Supreme Court of Hungary, on the contrary, 
declared a Soviet marriage not in accord with humanity and 
ethics, constituting nothing more than concubinage. 25 
In virtual agreement with the English Court of Appeals, 
the Reichsgericht recognized first a "recorded"26 and later 
a "non-recorded" Soviet marriage, 27 considering it essential 
that, although the Soviet law does not recognize any mutual 
rights and duties between the spouses, yet they have intended 
to unite themselves for a life to be lived in common. The 
court, indeed, has felt it impossible to deny validity to all 
Russian marital unions. 
The possibility that a marriage of non-Russians, and es-
pecially of persons subject to the law of the forum, might 
occur without formalities, was not at issue. This matter and 
the common law marriage will be discussed in connection with 
the formalities requisite for marriage. 
24 Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P. 85; [1930] P. (C. A.) 217; Ken-
ward v. Kenward [1951] P. (C. A.) 124, 134 per Evershed, M. R. 
25 Hungarian Royal Court (Feb. 23, 1926) P. III r6r6/1926, German trans-
lation in Z.f.Ostrecht 1927, 62o; cf. 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 783, Clunet 1929, 
1202; Hungarian Royal Court (Nov. 6, 1928) P. III 8411/27, cf. ]W. 1931• 
167. In 1945, the Hungarian Decree no. 86oo expressly validated the Soviet 
marriages. ARAT6, "Die Anerkennung der Sowjetehen in Ungaro," 15 
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1949/50) 439-456. 
26 RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) ]W. 1931, 1334 no. 1. Similarly Brazil: App. Rio 
de Janeiro (June 10, 1932) Clunet 1932, 1124. 
27 RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 257, 262, 265. 
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2. Polygamous Marriage 
Polygamous marriages formerly were absolutely excluded 
from recognition, inasmuch as English doctrine limits the 
notion of marriage to "Christian marriage," which is neces-
sarily monogamous. On numerous occasions, however, Brit-
ish courts have had to concern themselves with the polyga-
mous marriages of Mohammedans, Hindus, Chinese, and 
other peoples not belonging to the realm of Western civiliza-
tion,28 while in the United States Indian tribal marriages and 
those formerly practiced by the Mormons have been recog-
nized. Whereas the celebration of such unions within the 
forum is rigidly prohibited, it is neither workable nor con-
venient to deny that foreign marriages of such a nature func-
tion within the territories of the peoples concerned.29 More-
over, there is not sufficient public interest to do so in cases 
where the existence or nonexistence of a foreign marriage is 
only a consideration preliminary to the decision of a problem 
of property law, tax law, or some other matter not immedi-
ately affecting the mores of the forum. 30 
III. FoRMAL REQUIREMENTS oF MARRIAGE 
r. Survey of Problems: Requirements of Form and In-
trinsic Validity Distinguished 
It has been customary from old times to permit foreigners 
to marry; the churches have not made distinction on account 
28 For details see 2 BEALE § 12I.I and CHEATHAM, Cases 871 no. 5· 
29 See the basic exposition by KAHN, I Abhandl. I6I ff. 
30 See GooDRICH 370. The cases are discussed by BECKETT, "The Recog-
nition of Polygamous Marriages under English Law," 48 Law Q. Rev. 
(1932) 341; cf. FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of 
Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88; more recently, a com-
prehensive paper by MoRRIS, "The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in 
English Law," Festschrift M. Wolff {1952) 287-336, 66 Harv. L. Rev. (1952/ 
53) 96I-IOI2. An interesting discussion has been held in Canada: see FAL-
CON BRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R I9 and contra: I JoHNSON 312. The 
view adopted in the text, as explained by FALCON BRIDGE in Rivista Dir. Priv. 
(1932) I 297-307, now Essays 779 et seq., has been recommended for Italian 
use by FEDOZZI 456. 
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of nationality in the administration of marriage ceremonies. 
It was a singular exception to this usage that the French de-
cree of 1938, mentioned earlier, disallowed the marriage of 
foreigners unless they possessed a police permit of sojourn 
for more than a year.31 On the other hand, nationals may 
marry abroad, although they may have to observe certain 
prescriptions of their national laws. 
In legal systems outside of the United States, conflict rules 
distinguish the form and the intrinsic validity of marriage. 
The former is referred to the law of the place of celebration 
and the latter to the personal law of the parties. This differ-
ence is steadily gaining in favor in the literature of the 
United States. 
Generally defined, the terms "formal requirements" and 
"formalities" of marriage mean the external conduct re-
quired of the parties or of third persons, especially public 
officers, necessary to the formation of a legally valid mar-
riage. These formal requirements are distinguished from the 
substantive conditions for validity such as age, race, religious 
affiliation, or health of the parties. 
The purpose of the distinction in the conflict of laws is ob-
vious. On the one hand, the personal law of the parties leaves 
the determination of formalities to the law of the place of 
celebration but reserves to itself the determination of the 
intrinsic conditions of marriage. On the other hand, the law 
of the place of celebration scrupulously takes into considera-
tion the requirements of the personal law as to intrinsic con-
ditions but disregards its prescriptions as to form. 
The borderline between the two categories, however, is 
not traced uniformly in the various systems of municipal law. 
Although differences of such classification in the conflict of 
at Circular letter of the Garde des Sceaux of Dec. 13, 1938. concerning the 
marriage of foreigners in France, ]. Off. Jan. 6, 1939; cf. Nouv. Revue 1938, 
935 and supra p. 153, n. r6_ra. 
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laws systems are not accentuated, there is sometimes a tend-
ency to classify certain conditions precedent as substantive 
merely for the purpose of giving these conditions extraterri-
torial effect. This is a natural tendency where social policies 
or ecclesiastical conceptions are regarded as too important 
to be sacrificed in any instance, irrespective of where the mar-
riage may be celebrated. Internationally relevant rules, how-
ever, should be expressed in an adequate common language. 
To deal with such divergences in classification, two methods 
are available. One is to let each court accept as formality 
what internal law regards as such; the ensuing chaos evoked 
criticism long ago. 32 The other is to define the notion of for-
malities in a universally acceptable sense. As a matter of fact, 
although there seem to be four principal points which have 
occasioned difficulties for an international understanding, it 
does not appear that agreement to eliminate them would be 
impossible. These are controversial matters: 
(a) Proclamation of banns and similar proceedings pre-
liminary to the celebration of a marriage were occasionally 
classified in early times as sub~tantive requirements. But it is 
now generally agreed that they are to be regarded as mere 
formalities. The same opinion prevails with respect to rec-
ordation and similar acts required under some laws when 
parties have married abroad. 
(b) Except in England, the requirement of parental con-
sent to the marriage of a minor is universally characterized 
as closely connected with the intrinsic requirement of consent 
of the party. The English qualification itself is open to criti-
cism.33 
(c) Classification of the requirement of freedom from mis-
82 NIEMEYER in 26 Z.int.R. ( 1916) 3, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, 22 Z.int.R. 
(1912) 364, and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 130, who attempt various other solutions. 
NIBOYET 732, however, follows the lex fori, though he is exclusively con-
cerned with the point mentioned, infra p. 231. 
sa See below, p. 287. 
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take has caused some writers difficulty.34 Their doubts can be 
resolved easily when two different situations are kept sepa-
rate. On the one hand, due form requires that the parties 
make their declarations at the time and in the words or by 
the conduct demanded by the applicable law. If, for instance, 
A says "no" but is understood to have said "yes," the law 
governing "formalities" should be resorted to in order to de-
termine whether there exists a validly declared consent. On 
the other hand, whether a declaration of intention must be 
supported by an intention in fact or whether the declaration 
is to be considered valid even where the intention of the party 
does not coincide with his expression, is a matter which con-
cerns the essentials rather than the formalities of the con-
tract. Thus, if both parties use the correct ceremony but have 
secretly agreed to be married only nominally (simulation), 
the law governing substantial requirements should determine 
whether or not they are bound in marriage. This has been 
denied by canon and English law but affirmed by Italian law 
and the German Code before its amendment.35 
(d) The last and most discussed problem concerns the re-
quirement made in some, but not all, of the states which still 
regard marriage as an essentially religious institution: that 
their subjects observe the religious ceremony even when they 
celebrate marriages abroad. In these countries, dependence 
on the religious rites is considered to affect the capacity of 
the parties and, hence, to be properly a matter of the per-
sonal law. In the rest of the world, comprising by far the 
majority of states, the religious celebration, whether indis-
34 CHESHIRE 354 classifies a "fundamental mistake" as pertaining to for-
malities and hence refers it to the law of the place of celebration, while he 
classifies "capacity" only as personal law. This reasoning neglects the essen-
tial distinction between intention and declaration of intention. In accordance 
with the text, e.g., ]EMOLO, Matrimonio 97· 
35 See infra p. 294· 
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pensable or not, is treated as a formality. This point will be 
examined later.36 
The domain of formality as distinguished from that of 
procedure has been considered with respect to the rebuttable 
presumption of British law that a man and a woman having 
cohabited and having enjoyed the reputation of being mar-
ried are deemed to have been duly married. A presumption 
of this kind has been characterized as relating merely to the 
manner of proof and therefore as a rule of procedure of the 
forum.37 A contrary decision of British Columbia, however, 
has been defended 38 and seems to be the right answer. If the 
core of a law suit depends on whether a man and woman 
have been merely regarded as married in the eyes of their 
community or whether they were, by being so regarded or 
otherwise, legally married, then the essential elements con-
stituting marriage are involved. Moreover, it would be im-
practical to try to submit to different conflicts rules the ex-
istence of a marriage by repute and the choice of facts 
determining the existence of such a marriage. 
2. Locus Regit Actum 
Formalities of marriage have been, from the middle ages, 
a particularly important field for the application of the 
maxim locus regit actum, a maxim not everywhere under-
stood in quite the same sense nor applied with entire consist-
ency. We may distinguish in the following survey three types 
of provisions: 
(a) Compulsory rule. In one group of countries, including 
the United States,39 England, Denmark, and Japan,40 the law 
86 See infra p. 23 I ; cf. pp. 2 50 ff. 
87 See particularly FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 2I4, but Essays 3I4. 
38 Leong Sow Nom v. Chin Yee You (I934) 49 B. C. R. 244, [I934] 3 
W. W. R. 686, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP, no. 90, with approving note by CANSACCHI 
2I3. 
39 For the state statutes see I VERNIER § 32; for the cases 2 BEALE 67I ff. 
40 England: Berthiaume v. Dastous [I930] A. C. 79· 
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of the place where a marriage is celebrated is decisive, ir-
respective of whether the marriage be concluded within or 
without the territory of the forum. No other law is allowed 
any influence on the formalities of marriage. The personal 
laws of the parties are irrelevant, and the parties have no 
choice other than to select the place of celebration. In coun-
tries following this principle, the marriage ceremonies of 
their own countries or churches are not available to the par-
ties, unless these formalities happen to coincide with those 
permitted at the place where they are being married. 
Illustration: Under Danish matrimonial law a marriage 
may be celebrated before a minister of some religious de-
nomination. But a marriage of two Danish subjects before a 
minister of their church in Berlin will not be recognized in 
Denmark because in Germany civil marriage is compulsory.41 
(b) Optional rule. Most countries adhere to a double 
system: parties celebrating a marriage within the forum 
must comply with the domestic formalities; parties marrying 
abroad must observe either the formalities prescribed at the 
place of contracting or those of the personal law or laws.42 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 218 no. 38; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 745 n. 78. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 13 par. 1 sentence 2. 
The Austrian Supreme Court has held the same way beginning with a de-
cision of March 11, 1913, 50 GlU. NF. 6345; see decisions of Sept. 20, 1927, 
9 SZ. no. 127; Oct. 24, 1934, Zentralblatt 1935, no. 1; May 21, 1937, 66 J. Bl. 
(1937) 296; even after the conclusion of the Austrian Concordat with the 
Holy See, a marriage celebrated before a Catholic clergyman in a country 
where civil marriage ceremony is compulsory, is invalid in Austria; this de-
cision, however, adds: "at least if one party is a foreign national." Cf. 
WALKER 666. 
Presumably Liechtenstein, where Austrian marriage law is still in force, 
follows the same doctrine, but it has been ranged within the group described 
under (b) by an official German handbook; see BERGMANN, Der Auslander 
im Deutschen Recht (1934) 66 n. 70. 
41 See BORUM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 219 no. 40. See another example 
under (b). 
4 2 Instead of the personal law, a former system had the law of the place of 
"performance," which was understood as the intended matrimonial domicil, 
as an alternative to the local law. In this sense the Law of the Baltic Prov., 
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This system also is adopted in article 7 of the Hague Con-
vention on Marriage. Where the parties are of different na-
tionalities, in accordance with the opinion prevailing in most 
countries,43 the Convention provides, however, that a mar-
riage not complying with the formal requirements in the 
country of celebration must satisfy the national laws of both 
parties in order to be recognized by other participant states.44 
The practical difference between the two systems described 
so far may be illustrated by a case decided a few years ago by 
the Privy Council. Two Catholics domiciled in the Province 
of Quebec participated in a marriage ceremony before a 
Catholic priest in Paris. The marriage was void in France but 
would have been good if performed in Quebec. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, speaking as the final appel-
late court of Canada, felt itself compelled to hold the mar-
riage invalid.45 If, however, the parties had been Swedes 
marrying in Paris before a minister of the Swedish Estab-
lished Church, their marriage would have been held valid in 
Sweden.46 
An analogous question is apt to arise when a marriage by 
mere consent is invalid under the local law but may or may 
not be recognized by a personal law which admits such mar-
riages.47 
in trod. art. XXXVI was applied in 1928 in Latvia; cf. BERENT in 4 Leske,-
Loewenfeld I 576 n. 211. 43 See, e.g., Austrian OGH. (May 2I, 1937) I9 SZ. no. I66 (Austria was 
not a participant in the Hague Convention). 44 An illustration of the difficulties arising from this rule is the decision of 
the German Reichsgericht (April 6, 1919) 88 RGZ. I9I· 45 Berthiaume v. Dastous (1929) [1930] A. C. 79, [1930] I D. L. R. 849, 
99 L. ]. (P. C.) 66. Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 8. 
For the same reason Italian courts and writers consider a religious mar-
riage of Italian Catholics in France invalid, even after the Concordat; see 
BALLADORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 211 against an isolated decision of Trib. 
Milano (April 27, I938) cited by him. 46 Sweden: Law of I904 with amendments, c. r § 8 par. I. 
The problem is well known in Latin America; cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 
110 no. I97· 47 A third case where a marriage invalid under the local law could satisfy 
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(c) Rule modified by religious requirements. The prin-
ciple, locus regit actum} compulsory in every case under the 
first system described above, (a), and optional in foreign 
marriages under the second system described above, (b), is 
profoundly modified in a group of countries emphasizing the 
importance of religious rites. This group of countries, which 
is characterized by strong ties between the state and an es-
tablished church, formerly included Turkey, Czarist Russia, 
Bulgaria, parts of Poland, Lithuania and Yugoslavia.48 To-
day it embraces Israel in part, Greece, Egypt, 49 Malta, Cy-
prus,50 Iran, and after 1938 with respect to Catholics also 
Spain.~1 
Since in these countries a religious ceremony is required, a 
marriage celebrated abroad by civil ceremony is not recog-
nized. In Greece it was doubted whether this rule applied to 
citizens other than those of the Greek Orthodox faith, but 
it is now agreed that it includes Roman Catholics, Moslems, 
and Jews. 52 Moreover, it is held sufficient that one of the 
the requirements of the personal law is construed, quite hypothetically it 
seems, by BEcK, NAG. art. 7 f no. 36, and RAAPE 251 {b) par. 3· 
48 For details of the former very complex legal situations, see the reports 
in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I: on Serbia, by PERITCH at 982, {see also PERITCH in 
40 Bull. Inst. Int. {1939) I, 186, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. {1940) 1); on Croatia-
Slavonia, by LOVRIC at 1034; on Bosnia-Herzegovina, by EISNER at roso; on 
Montenegro, by EISNER at 1056. 
49 Under their own law however, Moslems and Oriental Jews may marry 
simply before witnesses of their people without any religious ceremony; see 
GOADBY 148. 
5 0 For Cyprus see the facts in the English case of Papadopoulos [1930] P. 
55 {infra n. 68); where only one party, however, is of the Greek Orthodox 
faith and the other a member of another church, certain difficulties have been 
cleared away by the Marriage (Validation and Amendment) Law, No. 3 of 
1937, s-4 and s.s (e). 
51 Law of March 12, 1938; C. C. art. 42 allows marriage before the munici-
pal judge to non-Catholic and such Catholic parties who declare not to 
practice the Roman Catholic religion. 
52 See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 319 n. 36, who quotes the former opinions (317 
n. 32). 
The rule was generally applied in former Russia too; see MAKAROV in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 488, as well as under the Marriage Law of 1836 of the 
Kingdom of Poland until 1926. See infra n. 56. 
On Lithuania see Z.f.Ostrecht 1931, 65; RoTENBERG in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I sos. 
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parties be of the Orthodox creed in order to necessitate the 
attendance of a priest (pope) of this denomination. 53 
Grave complications are bound to occur when a national 
of a country where such an imperative rule is in force at-
tempts to marry in a country where observance of a civil 
ceremony is indispensable. 54 The only certain way for the 
parties in such case to effect a valid marriage is to go through 
both ceremonies, the civil one prescribed by the local law and 
the religious rite required by the personal law. 55 
It is noteworthy that this conflict is often designated by 
theorists as an insoluble conflict of qualifications. In connec-
tion with the idea that marriage is a sacrament to be ad-
ministered in the proper way and with the attendance of the 
persons required by the particular denomination, it has been 
denied that these religious conditions of marriage can be 
treated like other forms of contract; rather must they be con-
sidered part of the personal status of the party concerned. 
This position was once taken by the Czarist Russian Church, 56 
and it is so firmly rooted in Greece that in the new Civil Code 
the necessity of a religious ceremony was not formulated as 
an exception to the maxim locus regit actum, since this maxim, 
applying to formalities only, does not include the necessity 
ss See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 310, 320 and the evidence in the case of 
Stathatos v. Stathatos ( 1912) [1913] P. 46. 
For Bulgaria see KG. (Jan. 19, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 16. 
54 See infra p. 2 so If. 
55 Civil officials are required so to advise the parties in Prussia; see BERG-
MANN, Der Auslander im Deutsch en Recht ( 1934) 66 n. 70. 
In Switzerland the parties must even give assurance that the religious 
ceremony will follow; see GMtiR, Familienrecht art. n8 n. 6. 
56 Decision of the Civil Department of Cassation (April 15, 1898) Deci-
sions 1899, no. 39· This conception was maintained in Eastern Poland until 
the Polish Law on international private law of 1926, which made the law 
of the place of celebration govern the form of foreign marriages. But it 
took a decision of the Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Meeting on April 12, 
1929 (Z.f.Ostrecht 1930, 512) to state that "forms" include the ecclesiastical 
manner of marriage; for details see OsTROWICZ, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 445 
n. 252; WERMINSKI, Note, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 106. 
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of a religious ceremony regarded as a substantive condition. 57 
Formerly as well as recently, 58 some Western writers, too, 
have been greatly impressed by this characterization. For a 
time, French courts considered a civil marriage celebrated in 
France by a Greek Orthodox or Catholic foreigner, if not 
recognized in his homeland, invalid even under French law. 59 
But no such concessions to foreign laws are made any longer 
by any country requiring its own subjects to observe a civil 
marriage ceremony. The true reason for this attitude is not, 
or at least should not be, any method of characterization.60 
By classification as "mere" form, the secular ceremony is not 
degraded but, on the contrary, is emphasized as the ob-
jective of an intransigent public policy, quite as cogent as 
the mandatory requirement of a religious ceremony. Indeed, 
those countries that regard ecclesiastical acts either of mar-
riage or divorce, even in the case of foreigners, as private 
transactions without legal effect so far as the state is con-
cerned, have been accused of intolerance. 61 Nevertheless, 
while, on the one hand, the dominant American conflict rules 
concerning marriage minimize the personal law of the par-
ties, it certainly is not clear, on the other hand, why the 
forum should yield to the pretensions of foreign countries to 
regulate local marriage ceremonies. 
The problem of classification in this case is not more than 
a mere question of terminology. For the purpose of technical 
understanding in matters of international law, it is submitted, 
religious marriage, including the participation or mere pres-
57 MARIDAKIS, 11 Z.ausl.PR. ( I937) 121. For complete literature see z 
STREIT-V ALLINDAS 3 I 8. 
58 UNGER, I System 2IO; 2 FIORE no. 528; PERROuri, Clunet I922, 5; I 
FRANKENSTEIN 524; 3 ibid. I33; RAAPE 253· Contra: I BAR § I69; WALKER 
662 n. 55, and in I KLANG's Kommentar 3 37; NEUMANN-ETTENREICH and 
SATTER in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 206 and particularly BALOGH, 57 Recueil I936 
III 685-702. 
59 See infra p. 23 5 n. 69. 
60 NIBOYET 731 no. 623 applies this very method. 
61 3 FRANKENSTEIN I37· 
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ence of an ecclesiastical officer, like any secular solemnization, 
constitutes a formality in which the contract is "clothed." 
This conception is traditional in almost the whole world and 
has been confirmed for the Catholic Church by the Codex 
Juris Canonici, which clearly distinguishes form of celebra-
tion (c.I094-II03) from impediments (c.ro3s-ro8o) and 
defects of consent (c.ro8r-ro93).62 For international ter-
minology, such a common denominator of formalities is the 
only convenient one. Formalities have more than one function 
-among others, those of guaranteeing the finality and seri-
ousness of the solemnized act, of publicizing the marriage, 
and of furnishing trustworthy evidence of its occurrence. All 
such purposes are common to any kind of marriage cere-
mony. Furthermore, the fact that an omission of the pre-
scribed words or acts may adversely affect the validity of the 
transaction is not peculiar to religious marriage. At any 
rate, the policy of Greece and the other countries enumer-
ated above on page 230, is sufficiently summarized by saying 
that these countries regard the religious form as essential for 
all marriages of their nationals. 
3· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Do-
mestic Marriages 
General rule. In spite of doubts occasionally expressed, the 
almost general rule is that a marriage celebrated within the 
territory of the forum is invalid, unless the formalities pre-
scribed by the matrimonial law of the forum are satisfied. 
62 The same classification has, quite naturally, now been confirmed by the 
Italian writers on the Catholic marriage with civil effects, established by the 
Concordat of 1929 with the Holy See, Bosco, "Le Nuove leggi sui matrimo-
nio," 22 Rivista 1930, 363, 372: FEDOZZI 418 n. 2. To the same effect in other 
Catholic countries, see in 6 Repert.; for Austria: KuNz, no nos. 199-201; for 
Belgium: J ANNE 149 nos. 46-48; for Brazil: BEVILAQUA 166 no. 39. This means 
that a purely ecclesiastical ceremony of Austrian Catholics in Italy was in-
valid in Austria, despite canon marriage being the prescribed form in the 
Austrian Allg. BGB.; see for instance OGH. {May 21, 1937) 66 J.BI. (1937) 
296, and below, p. 251, n. I37· 
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The forms of marriage which a state places at the disposition 
of the parties are available to foreigners and citizens alike, 
but no other forms are allowed. If the law of the place of 
celebration leaves the parties free to choose between solem-
nization by a minister of the gospel or a priest and solem-
nization by a civil officer, a judge, or a civil commissioner, as 
is done in almost all Anglo-American countries, Sweden, 
Italy,63 and others, foreigners can easily satisfy both the local 
and the personal law by choosing that ceremony which will 
be recognized by their personal laws. Hardships may arise 
where civil marriage is compulsory at the place of celebra-
tion. 
The rule that the domestic formalities are exclusive is ex-
pressly contained in the following statutes, among others: 
Germany, EG. art. I3 par. 3· 
Italy, C. C. (I 86 5) art. I03; C. C. (I 942) art. II 6. 
Poland, Law of I926, art. I3 par. r. 
Sweden, Law of 1904, c. I § 4 par. r. 
Switzerland, NAG. art. 7c par. 2.64 
Brazil, Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7 § I. 
Ordinarily the rule is treated as unquestionable and justi-
fied as being required by elementary public policy.65 Every 
state is said to have decided, after careful deliberation, 
whether marriages shall be solemnized in religious or tem-
poral form, or parties shall be permitted to marry without 
any formality at all. From this point of view, it is understand-
6 3 The form of marriage ceremony provided for by the Italian Concordat 
with the Holy See, viz., an ecclesiastical marriage recorded by the state civil 
registrar, is available to foreigners, according to the general opinion, which 
is contested, however, by BALLADORE-PALLIERI, 175 and Dir. Int. Eccles. 220; 
MoNACo, L'efficacia IZ9; MoRELLI, Elementi 106. 
64 To this effect BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453; Just. Dep. April 30, 
1924, BBl. 1924, II 25; BBl. 1940, 1462 no. 9 (no marriage by proxy for 
foreigners prevented from entering Switzerland); HuBER-MUTZNER 434; 
contra: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7c no. 26. 
65 Cf. 2 FIORE no. 541; RoLIN, Principes 79 ff. nos. 576, 578, 581; TRfAs DE 
BES, 6 Repert. 252 no. 101; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 109 no. 196. 
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able that states should not wish to see exceptions made within 
their territories in favor of aliens. Not quite so obvious, how-
ever, is the necessity of permitting foreigners to avail them-
selves of local ceremonies which are at variance with their 
personal laws. Doubtless, it is believed appropriate to render 
marriage possible for alien residents. 
An exception to the general rule requiring marriages cele-
brated within the country to comply with the prescribed 
formalities is that of foreigners in Greece who are permitted, 
according to an old doctrine, to avail themselves of all public 
solemnizations provided for by their personal laws. This rule 
permits all sorts of religious and consular marriages, exclud-
ing, however, simple consensual contracts of the common law 
or Soviet type.66 
Ill us !rations: 
(a) P alidity of marriage in municipal form: In the Eng-
lish case of Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos, P., domiciled in 
Cyprus and belonging to the Greek Orthodox church, mar-
ried a woman of French nationality before a registrar in 
London in compliance with the formalities of English law. 
His marriage was held valid in England, although it was not 
recognized in Cyprus because not celebrated in a church by a 
priest of the Orthodox church.67 
There is abundant authority to the same effect in other 
countries.68 
66 Cf. 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 306, 3I 5· 
61 [1930] P. 55· 
68 Belgium: Cass. (Jan. 19, 1852) Pasicrisie 1852. I. 85; Antwerp (July 3, 
1939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44· 
France: In a series of decisions beginning with App. Douai {Nov. 18, 1903) 
Clunet 1904, 394, down to a particularly objectionable decision of the Trib. 
of Metz {Oct. 30, 1929) StAZ. 1930, 198, the marriage has been held invalid 
if the formalities of the personal law were not observed. More recently, how· 
ever, the trend favoring territoriality rather than the personal law has won 
the upper hand, and it is now well established that a marriage celebrated in 
France in accordance with the French formalities is valid, while a marriage 
celebrated in France in accordance with religious formalities is invalid. See 
Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1912), aff'd Cour Paris (Dec. 22, 1921) in Clunet, 
1922, 135; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 7, 1922), aff'd Cour Paris {Nov. 17, 1922) 
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(b) Invalidity of religious marriages not provided for by 
the municipal law: Thus, in a German case, Jewish subjects 
of Czarist Russia went through a religious ceremony in Ger-
many before a rabbi. Although good in Russia, the marriage 
was held nonexistent in Germany, as no ceremony was per-
formed before a civil officer. 69 Similarly, a marriage was cele-
brated in Germany according to religious formalities by a 
Greek and a Serbian subject. Although valid in both Greece 
and Serbia, the marriage was held nonexistent in Germany.70 
(c) Invalidity of common law marriage: Two American 
citizens from New York live together as husband and wife in 
Belgium without a marriage ceremony. Belgian courts will 
hold the marriage invalid. 71 
Apparent exceptions. Obviously, it is not inconsistent with 
the rule of compliance with local formalities for France and 
Spain to authorize or compel 72 their nationals in their re-
spective colonies to marry in compliance with the formalities 
of the mother country. 
Neither is it an exception, when a French court applies 
Spanish law in deciding whether or not a French woman has 
acquired Spanish nationality by marrying a Spanish citizen 
Clunet 1923, 85; Trib. civ. Nice (June 26, 1923) Clunet 1924, 670. All writers 
agree. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922) 105 
RGZ. 363; OLG. Dresden (March 13, 19II) 7 Siichs. Arch. (1912) 272 and 
OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 46. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453· 
69 OLG. Miinchen (March 10, 1921) 42 ROLG. 98. To the same effect: 
RG. (2d criminal section, Dec. 10, 1912) 18 DJZ. 1913, 588; Bay. ObLG. 
(March 22, 1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (]an. 31, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925·3.129. 
Switzerland: BECK, NAG. art. 7c no. 86. 
70 RG. (3d criminal section, Feb. 16, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1914, 869. 
71 Belgium: POULLET 425 no. 365. 
72 In French Morocco, the Dahir of II-13 of August, 1913, declared that 
Frenchmen and foreigners are unable to marry except in accordance with 
the formalities permitted by their national law or those which will eventually 
be determined for l'etat civil in the French Protectorate. The latter formali-
ties have been determined by the Dahirs of Sept. 4, 1915, and Sept. 13, 1922, 
to be identical with those of the Civil Code. Since then, the French form of 
marriage is compulsory for French nationals, as the Court of Cassation held 
in two decisions of March 3, 1937, Revue Crit. 1938, 86, 88. 
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in France. The court may find that the marriage is invalid 
under Spanish law because the religious ceremony was not ob-
served and that therefore the wife has not become a Spanish 
citizen, although it is certain that the marriage is valid in 
France.13 
The Japanese Civil Code limits its own provision to the 
marriage of nationals without mentioning the marriage of 
foreigners. Probably, foreign parties may use any formalities 
agreeing with their national law or laws. 74 
Consular marriages performed within the forum. Where a 
consular or diplomatic agent is endowed by the state repre-
sented by him-the sending state-75 with the power of of-
ficiating at marriages, a marriage performed before him is 
valid in the receiving state only if the latter state has agreed 
to his acting in this capacity. Numerous marriages celebrated 
in an embassy or consulate have been declared invalid by the 
courts of the countries involved, because this function of the 
diplomatic agent or a priest officiating in a legation was not 
recognized.' 6 Hence, for instance, a marriage celebrated by 
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I920) Clunet I92o, I98; (Nov. I9, I920) Clu-
net I92I, I84; (March 29, I928) Clunet I929, 402. Comments expressing 
controversial opinions by PERROUD, Note, Clunet I929, 404, and J. DoNNEDIEU 
DE VABRES 455· See supra p. I48. 
74 See BATY, "The Private International Law of Japan," in I Melanges 
Streit (I939) I03 at 106. 
75 Where a marriage was celebrated before the consul of Guatemala in 
Paris and it appeared that, according to the law of Guatemala, representa-
tives of that state had no authority to officiate at marriages, the act was de-
clared null also under French law. Trib. civ. Seine {March IS, I932) Revue 
Crit. 1935, 436. 
76 Austria (one party Austrian): OGH. (Aug. I7, I88o) 18 GIU. no. 8o66, 
Clunet 188I, 171. 
Belgium (one party Belgian): Trib. Antwerp (Aug. 4, 1877) Clunet 1881, 
84. 
France (one party French): Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, 1872) S.1872.2.248, 
Clunet 1874, 71; Trib. civ. Seine (Sept. 2, 1920) Revue 1921, 165 n. 2; (June 
21, 1873) Clunet 1874, 73; cf. infra n. 83, and Note AuniNET, S.1924.2.65. See 
also the case of Hay v. Northcote [1900] 2 Ch. 262, 69 L. ]. (Ch.) 586, where 
the English court, though referring to a French judgment which had de-
clared the marriage void, held it valid under English law. 
Italy: App. Firenze (July 31, 1877) Ann. Giur. Ital. 1877, 3, 283 (an 
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two British subjects before a British consul in Switzerland is 
held nonexistent in Switzerland,77 though it is considered 
good in England. 18 
Although some states are unwilling to consent to this func-
tion of diplomatic agents, numerous treaties embody agree-
ments to recognize consular marriages performed within ter-
ritory of the forum.19 In some countries, consent is deemed to 
be given even without any express declaration. This is the 
case in Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Peru, 
Rumania, Spain, Turkey, and elsewhere,80 particularly in 
France, where by "traditional customary law" 81 foreigners 
American man and an Italian woman at an American consulate); see also 
Trib. Roma (May 6, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1936, I, 2, 465. 
Switzerland: Just. Dep. BBl. 1924, II 25, no. 5; Answer of Federal Council 
to the British Legation, BBl. 19II, I 431, no. 12, where it is added that the 
British Legation in a note showed its willingness to make British consuls in 
Switzerland conform to the Swiss conception. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, 1899) 66 Sent. 169 (Frenchman at the Angli-
can Church of Puerto Rico, then a Spanish colony). 
Argentina: Camara Civil xa de Buenos Aires (Aug. 9, 1948) 194 Gac. del 
Foro (1948) 625, 629 (a Hungarian woman and an Ecuadorian man before 
the Ecuadorian consul). 
Brazil (one party Brazilian): Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 9, 1943) 98 Rivista 
Forense ( 1944) 614. 
See, furthermore, Rb. Rotterdam (June 17, 1935) W. 1936, no. 633 (Egyp-
tian consul). Decisions relating to Portuguese, Turkish, and Russian con-
sulates j cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 170 n. 176. 
11 Just. Dep. BBl. 1924 II 25; SCHNITZER 326. 
18 British Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, § 1. 
19 See infra p. 257; see also the Colombian Law, No. 266, of Dec. 21, 1938. 
80 Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 29, 1852) Pasicrisie 1852.2.237; Note, 
Clunet 1907, 335, 339; PouLLET 426 no. 366. 
The Bolivian Law of December 15, 1939; continues to recognize marriages 
celebrated by diplomatic or consular agents of foreign powers, but requires 
recording in the register of civil status. 
Brazil: Lei de Introdu~;iio (1942) art. 7 § 2. 
Bulgaria: Law on Persons and Family of Aug. 5, 1949, art. 3 par. 3· 
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 315. 
Peru: customary law for Catholics and Congressional Act of Dec. 23, 1897, 
art. 7 for non-Catholics (on the condition of subsequent registration). 
Rumania: Trib.Ilfov (March 21, 1890); see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 66 no. 
183. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Feb. 21, 1935) 217 Sent. 567 implicitly: see TRfAs DE 
BEs 8 5 no. n8. 
Turkey: see SALEM, 7 Repert. 267 no. 218. 
81 WEiss, 3 Traite 563. 
MARRIAGE 239 
belonging to the same country are permitted to marry before 
their consul. This liberal exception to the French system does 
not extend, however, to religious marriages before a priest 
or chaplain attached to a diplomatic mission, sanctioned in 
former times by the so-called freedom of the Chapel. Hence, 
French courts have invalidated a marriage celebrated before 
an Orthodox priest of the Greek legation in Paris and a mar-
riage celebrated before a Protestant minister authorized by 
the King of Sweden.82 
The validity of consular marriages as determined by the 
law of the sending state will be discussed in connection with 
other foreign marriages.83 
4· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to For-
eign Marriages 
In general. All states, except those which require a re-
ligious marriage for their nationals abroad and, to a certain 
extent, Spain, recognize as valid a foreign marriage celebrated 
in compliance with the formalities prescribed by the local 
law.84 Such compliance is compulsory according to the Eng-
82 France: Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux, Aug. 27, I879, Bull. Off. Min. 
Just. I879, I46; Trib. civ. Seine {June 6, I893) Clunet I893, 88o; Trib. civ. 
Angers (July 27, I896) and App. Angers (May 3I, I898) Clunet I898, 9II; 
Cass. (civ.) (July 30, I9oo) S.I902.I.225, D.I90I.I.3I7, Clunet I9oo, 969; 
App. Douai (Feb. 2, I899) Clunet I899, 825. The marriage of two Greeks, 
celebrated according to their religious formalities at their legation, was held 
valid by Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, I920) Revue I92I, 226, but the judgment 
was reversed, Cour Paris (March I, I922) S.I924.2.65; cf. ARMIN JON, Revue 
I926, I69; AuorNET, II Recueil I926 I 209. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, I889) 66 Sent. 169 (French parties in the 
Anglican chapel of Puerto Rico). 
83 lnfra pp. 255-259. 
84 In most countries this rule is not questioned. 
In Soviet Russia the statutes are interpreted to the same effect by FREUND 
in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366, with some reservations, however. 
In Spain the Supreme Court held on May I, I9I9, I46 Sent. I76 and again 
on April 26, I929, I88 Sent. I286 concerning Spanish couples having married 
in Argentina and Habana respectively, that non-Catholic Spaniards may 
marry only in accordance with Spanish formalities before a Spanish consul or 
vice-consul; LASALA LLANAS I07 and TRIAS DE BEs, in 3I Recueil I930 I 654, 
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lish and American conflicts rules but optional under the laws 
of most other countries. 
The local form, including the proper officer 85 and the 
proper ceremony, must be observed in its entirety as de. 
termined by the law of the place of celebration.86 In Mo-
rocco, Egypt, and parts of China, religious ceremonies are 
customary but dependent on certain conditions with which 
foreigners accordingly have to comply in order to satisfy 
their national laws. On the other hand, Swiss authorities rec-
ognize a Japanese temporary marriage (the famous Mad-
ame Butterfly marriage), entered into by a Swiss national, as 
valid without time restriction, the Swiss law disapproving 
such restriction. 87 
Under the Concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Holy 
See, Italians may marry in Italy either in accordance with the 
Civil Code or in accordance with the ecclesiastical ( "ca-
nonic") formalities, provided, however, that the ecclesiastical 
marriage is recorded by an Italian civil officer.88 Since this al-
673, and in his Sistema espafiol de derecho civil internacional, nos. II I, 112 
state this to be the actual law, but restrict the unwelcome rule to the cases 
where both parties are of Spanish nationality, or the man is a Spaniard and 
the woman is not a national of the country of celebration. Moreover, in a 
country prohibiting consular marriage the parties are believed to be free 
to choose the local ceremony. GoLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 287 thinks that non-
Catholic Spaniards may use a civil local form abroad if they have received 
a certificate of acatholicy from the competent Spanish diplomatic agent or 
Catholic parish. 
For Eastern Poland, see supra n. 56, and for Turkey, SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 
no. 221; but cf. GouLE, Mariage, 8 Repert. nos. 41, 288, and 382. 
85 Where a French Catholic woman married an orthodox Serb in a Catholic 
church in Yugoslavia, the marriage was held invalid in France, because ac-
cording to the local law it should have been celebrated before an orthodox 
priest; see Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 650. 
The American decision in In re Lando's Estate (1910) 112 Minn. 257, 127 
N.W.1125, is based upon the same principle. The court was mistaken, how-
ever, when it interpreted EG. art. 13 par. 3, as permitting a marriage in 
Germany before a minister of a religious community. Cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl. 
PR. (1927) 865 n. r. 
86 2 BEALE § 121.4; § 122.1. 
87 Just. Dep., BBl. 1925, II 143. 
88 Hence, an unrecorded religious ceremony performed in Italy will not be 
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ternative does not exist outside of Italy, a marriage of Italian 
nationals abroad before a Catholic priest is not valid, even 
under the Italian conflicts law, unless it has been performed 
in accordance with the formalities established by the forum. 89 
Special problems: (a) Common law marriages. Since some 
formal marriage ceremony is required in almost every 
European country, 90 the question has been presented whether 
the principle of locus regit actum could be extended to a com-
mon law marriage of nationals of a European country cele-
brated in a jurisdiction where common law marriage has not 
been abolished. Despite objections, the validity of common 
law marriages celebrated in the United States has been up-
held not only by English courts 91 but also for their respective 
nationals by the courts of Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Italy. 92 Gretna Green marriages, too, have been recognized 
in England 93 and other countries. 94 
considered sufficient by a foreign court; cf. Austrian OGH. (May 21, 1937) 
19 SZ. no. 166. 
89 See Bosco, 2Z Rivista (1930) 469 ff.; FEDOZZI 419 ff. 
90 Except until recently in Soviet Russia and in Scotland. 
91 Rooker v. Rooker ( 1863) 3 Sw. & Tr. 526; In re Green, Noyes v. Pitkin 
(1909) 25 T. L. R. 222. 1 JOHNSON 299, however, has express doubts concern-
ing the validity of such marriages celebrated by domiciliaries of Quebec who 
go abroad for this purpose. 
92 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 13, 1886) J.d. Trib. 1886, col. 311; App. 
Bruxelles (July 29, 1909) Clunet 1912, 583; POULLET 419 no. 360; WIGNY, 
58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1931) 341 at 346. 
France: Continually so held since Cass. (req.) (Dec. 20, 1841) S.1842.1.32I; 
see WErss, 3 Traite 531; Cass. (req.) (Jan. 13, 1857) S.I857-I.8I; Trib. 
civ. Seine (April 20, 1891) Clunet 1891, 932; Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 3, 1894) 
Clunet 1895, 374; Trib. civ. Seine (]an. 17, 1924) Revue 1925, 226; Cour 
Paris (Nov. 20, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1050. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, 1932) 138 RGZ. 214, 218, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at 
25; LG. Tiibingen (July 25, 1934) ]W. 1934, 2802, IPRspr. 1934, no. 57 
at 130; RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 257 at 262, ]W. 1938, 1716. 
Italy: Trib. Ariano (Feb. 4, 1898) and App. Napoli (March 31, 1898) 
cited by FEDOZZI at 426 n. I, who himself requires that the conclusion of the 
marriage be proved by an act of consent, excluding inference from the sub-
sequent conduct of the parties. Trib. S. Angelo dei Lombardi (March 4, 1940) 
32 Rivista (1940) 476. 
93 Compton v. Bearcroft ( 1769) 2 Hag. Con. 444; Bach v. Bach [1927] 
43 T. L. R. 493 (by implication). 
94 Prussian Obertribunal (Jan. 15, 1855) 29 Entsch. Kgl. Ob. Trib. 380 
no. 51. 
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Furthermore, recorded marriages entered into by non-
Russians in Soviet Russia have been recognized in other juris-
dictions,95 and even non-recorded marriages have been de-
clared valid by the German Reichsgericht on the ground that 
it was often difficult for German parties resident in Russia 
to reach a German consulate.96 The court stated, however, 
that strict proof that the marriage was a true marriage and 
intended to be permanent was necessary in each case.97 
(b) Tribal marriage. As a rule, marriages of white per-
sons, in accordance with the formalities of uncivilized native 
tribes, are not recognized. 98 Colonial practice has, however, 
recognized various exceptions.99 
(c) Marriage by proxy. Marriage by proxy, where per-
mitted by the law of the place where the proxy participates 
in the marriage ceremony, has been recognized in the United 
States and in England.100 A Turkish immigrant to the United 
States, for instance, was allowed to marry by proxy a woman 
living in his native country, thus enabling her to join him in 
95 Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (1931) no. V. 10.644, 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 448. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1927) Revue 1928, 332 (Spanish man 
and Russian woman). 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. 1931, 1334, IPRspr. 1931, no. 57; RG. 
(Oct. 26, 1932) 138 RGZ. 214 at 217, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at 25. 
Switzerland: see BECK, NAG. 222 no. 12. 
96 RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 262 at 265. 
97 138 RGZ. at 218; 157 RGZ. at 266. 
9BJn re Bethell, Bethell v. Hildyard (1888) 38 Ch.D. 220. Contra: Cour 
Paris (April 24, 1926) D.1927.2.9 held void a marriage of a French explorer 
in Mongolia and an American girl before a Belgian Catholic missionary, as 
Mongols do not use religious marriages. This was, however, an unusual case 
due to the remote place, see EsCARRA, ibid.; infra n. 179. 
99 On French practice in Indo-China and Tunisia, cf. J. DoNNEDIHU DE 
VABRES 447· On marriages of white persons and Indians in the United States 
and Canada see GooDRICH 372; r JOHNSON 32o-327. On the very precarious 
position of a white woman marrying a native in the British Empire or even 
a member of an Oriental religion or of a Hindu caste, cf. memorandum of the 
British Foreign Office transmitted by the British Consul in Berlin, printed in 
StAZ. 1923, 31; see also 2 BERGMANN (ed. 2) 75· 
100 See Restatement § 124. See LORENZEN, "Marriage by Proxy and the Con· 
flict of Laws," 32 Harv. L. Rev. (1919) 473, 484; Barrons v. United States 
et al. (1951) 191 F. (2d) 92; Apt v. Apt [1947] P. 127, affirmed by the Court 
of Appeal [1948] P. 83. 
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this country.101 A similar case was that of a German prisoner 
of war in Morocco who married by proxy an Austrian wo-
man in Austria.102 Although section 124 of the Restatement 
requires only that the absent party consent to the marriage, 
Continental courts seem to require also that this consent be 
expressed in advance in an instrument in writing, stating the 
name of the other party. Provisions to this effect are con-
tained in many codes, as for instance the Austrian and the 
Cuban 103 and, for soldiers, in the new Italian Code.104 
If these precautions are taken, there is no room for the 
objection that marriage by proxy does not fulfill the require-
ment of consent. The party for whom the proxy acts must 
observe the regular form of consent. The proxy himself is no 
more than a messenger, and whether or not a party may 
express his consent by messenger is clearly a matter of for-
mality.105 
101 Cf. GooDRICH 353; United States ex rei. Modianos v. Tuttle ( I926) 12 
F. (2d) 927; see also Clunet I929, 205. It is true that according to s. 28 (n.) 
of the Immigration Act of May 26, I924, the terms "wife" and "husband" do 
not refer to a proxy or picture marriage, but on the interpretation see HAcK-
WORTH, 2 Digest of International Law ( I94I) 367 s. I64. On the contrary, 
Canadian federal and province authorities do not recognize any marriage by 
proxy for the purpose of immigration; see note of the Canadian Government 
to the German Government, 2 BERGMANN ( ed. 2) 78. 
102 Opinion of the Saxon Government of May 24, I9I6, cited by LEWALD 86 
no. 117. 
1 0 3 AIIg. BGB. § 76, first sentence, abrogated in I938. 
Cuba: C. C. art. 87. 
In the Netherlands, BW. art. I 34 requires royal permission. DEUC.HLER, 
"Die Handschuhehe im internationalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Raape ( I948) 
83-92, 83 enumerates 27 countries. 
104 C. C. ( I942) art. I 11. 
See also the German war-time provisions of I9I6 and I939· 
105 Cf. RAAPE I76, 255; but also 3 FRANKENSTEIN I 54· Apt v. Apt [I947J 
P. I27, I47· 
German writers are divided, whether to regard as places of the marriage 
ceremony both the place where the proxy has been authorized by the 
absent spouse and the place where the proxy participates in the ceremony 
(DEUCHLER, Festschrift Raape, supra n. I04, 83-92; RAAPE, IPR. 242; LG. 
Kiel (May 20, 1946) IPRspr. I945-I949 no. I9, IS Z.ausi.PR. (I949/5o) 578; 
LG. Hamburg (July I4, I954) StAZ. 1955, 61) or whether only the place of 
the ceremony is relevant (NEUHAus, 15 Z.ausi.PR. (1949/50) 58o; BEITZKE, 
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Prevention of secret marriages. Elaborate precautions 
have been taken in the municipal laws of Western and Cen-
tral Europe to prevent prohibited and secret marriages. Mar-
riages may not be celebrated without prior publication of 
banns, and after celebration all marriages must be recorded 
by civil officers. These acts, both that preceding and that fol-
lowing the main ceremony, are regarded as formalities 106 
and, therefore, as a general principle, are governed by the 
law of the state of celebration.101 
(a) .Provisions by the state of celebration. To prevent 
prohibited and secret marriages numerous countries en-
deavor to make sure that the marriage is not prohibited by 
the personal law of the parties. Thus, banns are required to 
be published not only at the place of celebration but also in 
the country or countries where the parties reside or have re-
sided at some time prior to their marriage. Foreigners are 
commonly not permitted to marry unless they can show a 
certificate of their own country that no impediment to the 
marriage is known.108 
(b) Banns prescribed by the personal law. In addition, 
some countries have established analogous provisions for 
their nationals abroad. Under the French Civil Code, which 
contains the prototype of all such regulations, a French na-
tional who intends to marry in a foreign land must, under 
3 Jahrb. Int. Recht (1954) 162; M. WoLFF, IPR. 193; also DE NovA, 11 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. (1954) 144; Apt v. Apt [1948] P. 83, 85, 88). 
In Brazil, the admissibility of marriage by proxy is regarded as a question 
of consent, subject, therefore, to the personal law of each of the future 
spouses, AZEVEDO, 92 Revista Forense (1942) 61. 
106 It is not true, as often alleged, that banns are considered part of the 
formalities only in Germany but not in France. 
101 This principle is followed in Switzerland by the regulation of banns in 
the case of a foreign marriage of Swiss nationals; no banns are required 
unless the authorities at the place of celebration ask for a Swiss certificate 
showing no known impediment to marry, in which event banns are published 
for the purpose of granting the certificate. See BBl. 1899, I 361 no. 4; id. 
1912, I 507 no. 15; BEcK, NAG. art. 7c no. 95· 
108 See below, p. 307. 
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certain circumstances, have banns published in France, par-
ticularly if he has resided in France in the six months pre-
ceding his marriage/09 The Code itself imposes no sanction 
for the performance of this duty. The courts, however, have 
pronounced null the marriages of parties who intended to 
keep their marriage a secret in France or who intended to 
evade the prohibitions of French law.110 
Although the provisions of the French Code have been 
copied by Italy, the Netherlands, anti other countries, few of 
these countries 111 have followed the French decisions di-
rected against fraude a la loi, since the French courts have 
interpreted these provisions in their peculiar manner and 
have assumed discretionary powers of doubtful validity. 
In reconciling these variations, the Hague Convention on 
Marriage provided that the requirements of the national 
law concerning publication must be observed, with the pro-
viso that omission of publication does not invalidate the mar-
riage except in a state whose law has been violated.112 
IOU C. C. art,. r70 and 63. 
11° Cass. (req.) (March 28, 1854) S.r854.1.295; Cass. {req.) (Nov. 20, 
r866) S.r866.I.H2i Cass. {req.) (March 8, 1875) S.r875·1.171; Cass (civ.) 
(June 15, r887) S.r89o.r.446; Cass. {req.) (July 5, 1905) Clunet 1906, 1145, 
S.r9o6.r.r41, Revue 1905, 714; Cass (req.) (Jan. 3, 1906) Clunet 1906, 1149, 
Revue 1907, 2rr; and particularly Cass. (civ.) (July 13, 1926) S.r926.r.263. 
Cf. on this peculiar practice NIBOYET 725 ff. no. 6r6; Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 9, 
1953) 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 389. 
111 To the same effect as the French decisions: 
Belgium: C. C. art. 170 as amended by law of July 12, 1931, art. 13. (Seems 
clearly to require observance of the local foreign formalities only.) 
Quebec: Durocher v. Degre ( 1901) 20 S. C. 456, criticized by Charbonneau, 
J., in Hebert v. Clouatre ( 1912) 41 S. C. 249, 258 ff. 
Contra: Italy: C. C. (r865) art. roo par. 2; C. C. (1942) art. 115; the 
consequence of omission is not nullity but only a penalty, Cass. Napoli (June 
26, r883) Legge r884.r.r4; App. Messina (Nov. 9, 1927) cited by FEDOZZI 
419 n. 2; Trib. Pesaro (June 14, 1928) 21 Rivista (1929) 420. Cass. (Aug. 2, 
1935) Rivista Dir. Pubbl. 1936, II 204. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 138 requiring banns is generally understood as 
meaning banns in the Netherlands. Non-compliance was believed to result in 
a nullity but not since the decision of the H. R. (May 31, 1872) W. 3484 and 
the Law of July 7, 1906, S. no. 162, art. 6. 
112 Hague Convention on Marriage of 1902, art. 5 par. 3, followed by 
Sweden, Law of 1904, with subsequent amendments, c. r § 4 par. 2. 
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(c) Recordation prescribed by the personal law. A French 
national who had married abroad, moreover, had to have his 
marriage recorded at his French place of residence within 
three months after his return to France.113 This provision of 
the French Code has likewise been widely imitated.114 No 
sanction is provided, 115 except that the Portuguese provision 
that a foreign marriage can be proved only if recorded in 
compliance with law 116 has had some following.117 
A steadily increasing number of states in this country re-
quire residents who go elsewhere to be married and who 
return to reside within the state, to file a certificate of their 
marriage with the proper officer.118 
In the Soviet Union, a circular of the Commissariat of 
Justice of the U.S.S.R. required all Soviet nationals marry-
113 French C. C. art. I7I, no cause of nullity; App. Aix (Dec. 20, I900) 
Clunet I903, 639; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 27, I92I) Clunet I92I, 940. The 
provision was abrogated by law of March Io, I938. 
114 Belgium: C. C. art. I71. 
Haiti: C. C. art. I 56. 
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. IOI, abrogated by the new C. C. (I942). 
Eritrea: C. C. art. 112. 
Monaco: C. C. art. I39· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I39· 
Neth. Indies: C. C. art. 84. 
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. Io6, 525. 
Venezuela: C. C. (I942) art. 103. 
115 See for Belgium: App. Liege (April 8, I925) Clunet I926, 502; Italy: 
Cass. Palermo (Aug. 5, I905) Foro Ital. I905, I, I443; I Rivista (1906) 586; 
App. Mc;ossina (Nov. 9, I927) see supra n. 112. 
116 Portugal: C. C. art. 2479 and Law of Dec. 25, I9IO, arts. 6o, 6I. CUNHA 
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 685 explains that the marriage is considered valid 
as to effects in the country of celebration, and with respect to bigamy even 
in Portugal. 
117 The similar view of the former C. C. of Peru, art. 159, has been aban-
doned in the C. C. of 1936; cf. APARICIO y GoMEZ, 2 Codigo Civil, Concor-
dancias 324 and 356 (14). 
Mexico: C. C. for the Federal District and Federal Territories art. I6I 
par. 2 is characteristic of laws declaring that the civil effect of the marriage 
is retroactive to the time of the celebration only if it is recorded within 
three months. 
118 Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) c. I66 § 7; New Hampshire Rev. Laws (I955) 
sec. 457.30; North Carolina Gen. Stats. (1950) § 51-2; Vermont Stats. (1947) 
sec. 4I35; Virginia Code (1950) §20.29; West Virginia Code Ann. (1955) 
c. 48 § 4692· 
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ing abroad to have their marriages recorded at the office of 
the diplomatic or consular representative of the U.S.S.R. But 
the code of only one Soviet Republic, the Ukraine, has ex-
pressly declared compliance with this provision essential for 
recognition of the marriage.119 
Defective celebration. The law of the place of celebration 
establishes the formalities and what constitutes failure to 
comply with them. It is universally agreed that the same law 
also determines the effect of such failure of compliance on the 
validity or invalidity of the marriage. 
It is interesting that this principle is more firmly settled 
than two broader principles of which it would seem to be an 
application. 
First, it is fairly well established, although not without 
some opposition, that the same law determines the causes as 
well as the effects of the nullity of a marriage.120 This broader 
rule, which includes formal and substantive requirements for 
marriage, has been adopted by the Restatement§ 136: 
"The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the 
law which determined the validity of the marriage with re-
spect to the matter on account of which the marriage is al-
leged to be null." 
In England these problems are ordinarily discussed under 
the heading of jurisdiction. If, however, a marriage has been 
celebrated abroad, English courts are prepared to respect the 
119 Circular letter of July 6, 1923, no. 144, The Weekly for Soviet Justice 
622; Ukrainian Family Law of 1926, art. 105; this provision seems not to 
apply, however, unless both parties are Soviet citizens. Cf. FREUND, 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 366-9. Dr. V. Gsovski states that the requirement is not in any 
recent Soviet code and seems not to have been enforced. 
120 Germany: RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161, IPRspr. 1931, no. 23; 
OLG. Dusseldorf (Oct. 31, 1922) JW. 1923, 191; KG. (Jan. 29, 1934) DJZ. 
1934, II58, IPRspr. 1934, no. 16. 
France: Ch. civ. Douai (March 28, 1928) Clunet 1929, 400; Ch. civ. 
Montpellier (June 21, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1062, cited by Gouu!, 9 Repert. 
82 no. 423· 
The Netherlands: see MuLDER 38, 109. 
Switzerland: see GAUTSCHI, 27 SJZ. (1930-1931) 321. 325. 
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jurisdiction of the forum loci actus, and therefore the result 
now stated for the first time in modern form by Cheshire is 
the same as that in other countries.121 
Second, the results of a formally defective transaction of 
any kind are said to be determined by the law whose formal-
ities have not been properly observed.122 
Although both general rules, and particularly the second, 
have been opposed on the ground that either the law of the 
forum or the lex causae should prevail, in the particular case 
of a formally defective marriage the rule is virtually un-
challenged.123 The forms of marriage vary too much, indeed, 
for one jurisdiction to determine the sanctions for violating 
the formal requirements of another. 
Consequently, the law of the place of celebration deter-
mines whether or not a defect is material to the validity of 
the marriage and, if so, whether it renders the marriage non-
existent, void, voidable, or annullable (whatever may be 
meant by these terms) ; whether an omission can be cured 
by some additional act, as for instance, recording or factual 
121 See Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. 641; CHESHIRE 
353-358. 
122 See GooDRICH § 109; 2 ARMIN JON, no. 49· 
128 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 115, RAAPE 183, I FRANKENSTEIN 561, 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 183, and MANNL, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 786, have advocated 
the lex causae. RAAPE 186, and MANNL, however, admit that this theory is 
impracticable for marriages, and it has been formally rejected "at least with 
respect to the conclusion of marriage" by the Reichsgericht (June 22, 1931) 
133 RGZ. 161, 165. Likewise, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 461 seems to agree 
that the Court of Montpellier (supra n. 121) was right, although he defends 
the predominance of the personal law in determining sanctions for defects in 
marriages in general. In still another opinion, it was thought that the law 
more favorable to the marriage should be followed, but no decision seems 
to have applied this illogical thesis. 
However, a Jewish religious court in Palestine upheld a marriage, cele-
brated according to Jewish rites in Germany and therefore invalid under 
German law, after the parties moved to Palestine, Neussihin v. Neussihin, 4 
Law Reports of Palestine ( 1937) 373; cf. Tennenbaum v. Tennenbaum, 13 
ibid. (1946) 201 and the note by TEDESCHI in II Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954) 
463. 
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cohabitation; 124 and whether or not an annulment has retro-
active effect.125 
There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. The most sig-
nificant exist in Switzerland. According to article I 3 I of the 
Swiss Civil Code, no marriage may be annulled on the 
ground of a formal defect, if it has been celebrated before a 
public marriage officer. Nor may a Swiss court annul a mar-
riage, unless the ground of nullity is also recognized by Swiss 
municipal law. 126 Thus, a Swiss court will not annul a for-
eign marriage of Swiss nationals celebrated before a public 
officer, although a formal defect invalidates the marriage 
under the local law, nor will a foreign annulment in such case 
be recognized in Switzerland.127 
Another exception exists in France. On the theory of "pos-
session of status" (possession d' hat), article I 96 of the Civil 
Code prohibits an annulment on the ground of formal defect, 
when the marriage is commonly reputed to exist and the 
record of celebration before a civil officer can be produced. 
While the Court of Cassation has refused to apply this pro-
vision to marriages celebrated abroad/28 there is a tendency 
to extend it to all marriages celebrated before a French civil 
officer and to all marriages of French nationals.129 
124 In Starkowski v. Attorney General [1952] P. 135, affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal [1952] P. 302 and the House of Lords [1954] A. C. 155, the 
retroactive validation of a religious marriage in Austria by virtue of recor-
dation under a special Austrian Order was recognized, though the parties 
before the recording had acquired domicil in England. Reference was made 
to Cour Bordeaux (Feb. 5, 1883) 10 Clunet (1883) 621, 623. Cf. Rb. Middel-
burg (Aug. 8, 1951) N. J. 1952 no. 508. 
12s RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161, 165. 
126 NAG. art. 7 f par. 2. 
127 BECK, NAG. art. 7 f no. 172. 
128 Cass. (req.) (May 9, 1905) D.1905.1·367, Revue 1905, 349; followed 
by Cour Paris (May 15, 1931) Gaz.Pal.I931.2.262; Trib. civ. Seine (March 
15, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436. 
129 PILLET, I Traite 563 no. 265; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONN!ERE (ed. 4) 388 n. I. 
Exceptional: Cour Paris (March 13, 1954) Gaz. Pal. 154 I 308 (marriage of 
French woman with an Englishman before the English consul in Spain). 
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Where the conflicts rule of the national law makes observ-
ance of the local ceremonies optional, a celebration, defective 
under the law of the place of celebration, may be considered 
valid in the homeland. 
Evasion of formalities. Apart from the requirements of 
some countries concerning publication and recording by their 
nationals (see above at page 244), parties are generally 
free to choose for an intended marriage a place anywhere in 
the world and may thus avoid the formalities prescribed in 
their own country: 
"No exception is made to the principle even where the sole 
object of the parties in marrying in a foreign country has 
been to evade some troublesome formal requirement of their 
lex domicilii." 180 
This is a rule well recognized in England and in all other 
countries not prescribing compulsory religious marriage. 
An occasional exception exists where, as in Arkansas,131 a 
marriage out of the state is not recognized, unless the parties 
actually resided in the foreign state or country at the time of 
the marriage. 
5. Religious Ceremony Considered Essential by the Personal 
Law 
Point of view of the personal law: (a) Foreign civil mar-
riage. Those countries which consider marriage essentially a 
religious institution, such as Greece, Liechtenstein, et cet-
era, 132 treat as null and void a marriage celebrated abroad 
by one of their own subjects in accordance with civil formali-
ties. This rule has been expressed repeatedly by the highest 
authorities of Czarist Russia 183 as well as by the attorney 
18° CHESHIRE 323. 
131 Ark. Stats. ( 1947) sec. 55-uo. 
1 3 2 See supra p. 230. 
133 Decisions of the Cassation Departments, penal, x889, no. 2; civil, 1899, 
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general of Greece/34 who in an opinion stated that such a 
marriage is simply nonexistent, i.e., that anyone may invoke 
its validity, no decree of nullity being necessary. 
The Hague Convention on Marriage (art. 5 par. 2) ex-
pressly reserved to the states prescribing religious formali-
ties the right to treat marriages celebrated abroad by their 
nationals in disregard of such prescriptions as invalid. 
(b) Foreign religious marriage. Under Greek law a 
Greek national may marry abroad in accordance with the for-
malities of his church, no matter what the local law pro-
vides.135 A similar rule was in force for subjects of Czarist 
Russia.136 In other countries, such as Croatia, which was 
governed by the older Austrian law, a foreign marriage of 
Catholic nationals had to comply with the formalities es-
tablished by the Catholic church at the place of celebration.137 
Point of view of the local law. Where a Greek national 
marries before a civil officer in Germany and does not go 
through an additional religious ceremony, the marriage is 
valid in Germany and invalid in Greece.138 This situation is 
apt to give rise to puzzling problems under the law of the 
country where the celebration took place, i.e., Germany. It 
has been held that such a "limping marriage" (matrimonium 
no. 39; of the first Plenary Meeting of the Senate, Aug. u, 191 I; Circular of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Representatives in Germany of 
February 25, 1889, no. 1384; Decree of the Consistorium of St. Petersburg, 
May 20, I9Il; cited according to MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 488 n. 105. 
134 Opinion of Mr. GIDOPOULos, procurator at the Areopague, to the Min-
istry of Justice, no. 54 (Dec. 28, 1936) Clunet 1937, 902; for the literature 
and cases in point see 2 STREIT-VALL!NDAS 317 n. 32. 
135 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 321: a Greek may marry a Bulgarian girl before an 
Orthodox priest in Germany. 
136 MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfe\d I 488; MAKAROV, Precis 325. 
137 See LovRu\ 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 1031, 1034. After World War II, a 
uniform, secularized marriage law was introduced in all Yugoslavia (Law 
of April 3, 1946). 
This seems to be the rule in Colombia also, as art. I2 of Law 57 of April 
I 5, 1887, declares that marriages celebrated according to the Catholic rites 
produce a\1 civil and legal effects. Cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III no. 202. 
138 See supra n. 69. 
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claudicans) can be dissolved by a German decree of divorce, 
although generally divorce presupposes a marriage valid 
under the personal law of the parties.139 In this case, the 
grounds for divorce are fixed exclusively by German law. But 
many related questions are open to discussion. What hap-
pens if one of the parties marries another person in Greece? 
Is he or she punishable for bigamy in Germany? And shall it 
be held that remarriage is allowed even in Germany, since 
German law provides that a person's capacity to marry is de-
termined by his national law? 140 Prevailing German opinion 
is to the effect that the marriage ought to be binding in Ger-
many in every respect, the personal law notwithstanding.141 
Furthermore, if the female party to the marriage was a Ger-
man national, she formerly, on account of the marriage, lost 
her German nationality,141a though she did not acquire that 
of Greece. 
While the same basic principle with regard to an English 
marriage was clearly adopted in English precedents such as 
the Papadopoulos case, a strange modification was caused by 
recognizing a marriage annulment pronounced at the hus-
band's foreign domicil for the mere reason that the marriage 
lacks the proper ecclesiastic form. 141b Hence, after such for-
eign annulment, the wife cannot obtain her rights as a spouse 
nor can she sue for divorce.142 This attitude of the English 
courts has been influential in Canada and Scotland.143 
139 Cf. KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. 1934, 619. 
140 EG. art. 13 par. J, 
141 See LEWALD III no. 158; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 162; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 214; 
RAAPE, IPR. 284. 
Contra: RAAPE 383, 400· 
141a According to West German practice under the Bonn Constitution 
( 1949) art. 3 par. 2 and art. II7 and under the East German Order of 
August 30, 1954, § 2 par. x, the wife today would retain her German citi-
zenship. 
141b In Chapelle v. Chapelle (1949) [1950] P. 134, Willmer, J., did not 
recognize a Maltese nullity decree because only the husband was domiciled 
in Malta. 
142 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," x6 Bell Yard 
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Another problem concerns the consequences of such a mar-
riage, valid under the law of the place of celebration and in-
valid under the personal law. Are marital property rights 
and other incidents of the marriage governed by the personal 
law of the parties,144 although this law treats the parties as 
not married? The more reasonable answer seems to be in 
the affirmative,145 because this is just the normal consequence 
of considering the parties married. 
Point of view of third countries. What is the position of a 
third country when a conflict arises between the state of cele-
bration and the national or domiciliary state of the parties? 
The answer is clear when the third state adopts locus regit 
actum as the absolute binding rule, which is the case in Great 
Britain and the United States. A marriage celebrated by a 
Greek citizen before a city recorder in San Francisco 146 is 
certain to be recognized in England. On the other hand, a 
religious marriage of the same man celebrated in France 
would be considered invalid in the United States, because it 
is invalid in France. 
Where, however, a court must follow the national law of 
the parties, ascribing to the law of the place of celebration 
only an optional role, it is doubtful which law is applicable 
when they are in conflict. Prevailing opinion favors the solu-
tion afforded by article 5 of the Hague Convention on Mar-
riage according to which a marriage formally valid at the 
place of celebration is formally valid in all third countries, 
the national country alone being entitled to consider it void 
( 1935) 15. Today, sec. 18 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, provides for 
the jurisdiction of an English court; see infra p. 500. 
143 See infra p. 453· 
144 Cf. EG. arts. 14 ff. 
145 See RAAPE IPR. 284, in conflict with KG. (May 3, 1937) JW. 1937, 
2523, Bay. OLG. {April 20, 1955) 45 Rev. Crit. (1956) 86, and several 
writers. 
146 Case of OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 15, 1926) Hans.GZ. 1927, Beibl. 4, 
IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 28. 
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because of the lack of a religious ceremony. On the basis of 
this rule, the Reichsgericht recognized as valid in Germany 
a marriage celebrated before a civil officer in Brazil between 
a Turkish national of Roman Catholic faith and a stateless 
woman who had once been a national of Prussia, non-recog-
nition of the marriage under existing Turkish law notwith-
standing.147 It also upheld a marriage entered into before a 
Norwegian civil officer by a Greek national of Orthodox 
faith and a Norwegian woman.148 The Swedish statute and 
the C6digo Bustamante have adopted the same rule/49 and 
French and Belgian decisions are to the same effect.150 
In the opposite case of a marriage invalid in form under 
the law of the place of celebration, article 7 of the Hague 
Convention provides that it "may" be recognized by third 
countries, if the formalities of the national law or laws of 
both parties are satisfied. A marriage celebrated in accord-
ance with the religious ceremony prescribed by the personal 
law, but not in compliance with the civil formalities of the 
place of celebration, is regarded as valid in France, Germany, 
and the other countries following the optional rule.151 
141 RG. (April 6, 1916) 88 RGZ. 191. 
148 RG. (Oct. 1, 1925) ]W. 1926, 375, IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 27. See also 
OLG. Karlsruhe (April 18, I9I7) 35 ROLG. 343; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 15, 
I926), supra n. I46. 
Contra: RAAPE 253, 172; 3 FRANKENSTEIN I60. 149 Sweden: Law of I904 with amendments, c. I § 6. 
C6digo Bustamante art. 4I. 
150 Belgium: Antwerp (April 20, I927) Clunet I928, 488; (Pole whose 
national law required religious ceremony and Belgian woman marrying be-
fore the registrar in London): Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3I, I925) Clunet 
I926, soo. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. IS, I922) Clunet I922, 396; Trib. civ. Seine 
(June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332; Trib civ. Seine (April 27, I933) Revue 
Crit. 1935, 759· 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 f, whereby marriages celebrated abroad are valid 
if in accordance with the law of the place of celebration, is applied also to 
foreigners by STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. w, and others, but interpreted other-
wise by BECK, NAG. 230 no. 48. 
151 France: PILLET, I Traite 552 no. 259; BASDEVANT, Revue I9D8, 284 (on 
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Except for this instance of reference to the personal law, 
the few countries which require their subjects to follow a 
religious ceremony even when marrying abroad find them-
selves isolated. Their requirements are observed neither by 
the countries of celebration 151a nor by third countries. The 
difficulties involved are illustrated by such cases as the recent 
sequel to the famous Papadopoulos case, which revealed a 
first marriage in England and a second in Greece, the man 
being married to two women for ten years.152 
6. Other Tests 
Foreign consular marriage: (a) In general. We have had 
occasion to deal with the position of the forum as concerns 
marriages at which a consular or diplomatic agent of a for-
eign power has officiated within the territory of the forum. 153 
Consent by the receiving country to such official action of a 
foreign representative is indicated either by liberal custom, as 
for instance, in France or Greece, or by an express clause of 
an international treaty. Now we are concerned with the 
status of a "consular" (or "diplomatic") marriage in the 
sending state. 
Recently, the institution of consular marriage has been 
used primarily by Europeans and Americans marrying in 
Oriental countries, where marriage forms depend on the vari-
ous religious denominations or national groups. Treaties al-
occasion of an Austrian decision) ; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I 202 If., LERE-
BOURs-PIGEONNIERE 35I no. 325. 
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. I; art. II par. I. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Dec. IS, 1913) Revue 1914, 6II, approved by 
PoULLET 428 no. 367. 
151a Cour Alexandrie (April 9, 1950) 6 Revue egypt. (I95o) 236, holding 
void one of the numerous marriages between Orthodox Greeks and Catholic 
Italians, celebrated in Egypt before a Catholic minister, has not been fol-
lowed: Trib. Alexandrie (June 23, I953, Feb. 23, I954) 9 Revue egypt. 
( 1953) I 58, 10 ibid. I5I, the latter invoking the ordre public. 
152 Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos (no. 2) (I935) [1936] P. 108; cf. supra 
n. 68 for the first Papadopoulos case [I93o] P. 55· 
153 Supra pp. 237-239· 
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lowing representatives of Western powers to exercise non-
litigious jurisdiction have partly superseded the old system of 
capitulations. The recent increase in provisions concerning 
consular marriages, however, seems to indicate other needs. 
Switzerland, for instance, though generally prohibiting con-
sular marriages, specially authorizes her representatives to 
officiate when located in remote countries or when Swiss na-
tionals are unable to marry according to local formalities and 
the country of celebration is not likely to object.154 Thus, re-
lief might be given a Swiss couple who had obtained a di-
vorce in Switzerland and wished to remarry each other in 
Spain, since Spain, ignoring the divorce, could make no 
technical ceremony of remarriage available to them, al-
though a form of reconciliation is in such case provided.155 
A remarkable concession for the sake of international co-
operation was made by the participant states in the Hague 
Convention on Marriage. By article 6, paragraph 1, second 
sentence, the signatory powers bound themselves not to op-
pose a diplomatic marriage, even though it would offend their 
own laws on remarriage or religious impediments. Thus, if 
both parties are aliens, the second marriage of a divorce or 
even the marriage of an ordained Catholic priest is valid, 
although it would otherwise be considered repugnant to local 
policy.156 In England, also, foreign marriages of aliens, cele-
brated before the consul of their common country, are re-
garded as valid, notwithstanding their invalidity according 
to the law of the place of celebration. This concession to the 
154 Cf. Swiss Rev. Consular Regulation of Oct. 26, 1923, art. 63. This was, 
indeed, the situation in Peru for non-Catholics until the Law of Dec. 23, 
1897· 
Cf. German RG. (June 9, 1883) 9 RGZ. 393 at 402. 
And in Turkey for parties of different religions until the Civil Code of 
1926; see SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no. 220. 
155 BBl. 1919, IV. 310, no. 21. 
156 WALKER 656, and others very inappropriately call this concession 
strange. 
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law of nationality is masked by the fiction that the parties 
have met on extraterritorial territory.157 
(b) Authority granted by the sending state. As a condi-
tion of consular marriage, the solemnizing official must be 
empowered by his own state to officiate at marriages in gen-
eral or at specific marriages. Such authority is given either by 
law, as in Great Britain, France, and Italy/58 or by admin-
istrative acts based on legislation, as in Germany.159 A few 
states do not allow their agents any such function.16° Con-
sular officers of the United States are authorized to witness 
and certify marriages if the parties are domiciliaries of the 
District of Columbia, a territory, Massachusetts, or Con-
necticut, or if they are United States citizens domiciled 
abroad.161 Other countries require either that both parties be 
their subjects 162 or that at least one party belong to the send-
157 See FosTER, 65 Recueil I938 III 444, no. 25. 
158 Great Britain: Foreign Marriage Act, I892, I947· 
France: C. C. art. 48; Decree of Oct. 26, I939· 
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. 368; Law on Consular Jurisdiction (Jan. 28, I866) 
art. 29, 3 6-41. 
159 Germany: Laws of May 4, I87o, §I; Feb. 6, I875, § 85; Law on Con-
sular Jurisdiction of April 7, I900, § 36 par. 2. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 4I par. 3; Rev. Consular Regulation (supra n. I 54). 
160 Austria was in this group, see WALKER 647 (whose mention of Sweden 
and Portugal, however, is wrong). 
Argentina seems disinclined to allow diplomatic marriages; see ENNIS, 
Derecho lnternacional Privado (I953) I93 n. 4· Likewise: Guatemala, cf. 
Trib. civ. Seine (March I5, I932) Revue Crit. I935, 436; El Salvador, cf. I5 
Bull. Inst. Int. (I926) I6o. Venezuela: TOVAR-LANGE, Los Matrimonies Cele-
brados en Embajadas, Legaciones o Consulados (I948). On Colombia see 
RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III, § 200 n. I; on Peru, ROGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 53· 
A survey in NASCIMENTO, "El Matrimonio Consular," 57 Revista Der. Int. 
(1950) I7I. 
161 Congressional Act of I86o, Rev. Stat. § 4082, 22 U. S. C. II72 (I949), 
Code of Fed. Regulations, Title 22 § I09. I4, 15 (I949); Mass. Gen. Laws 
(I932) II c. 207 §43; Conn. Gen. Stat. (I930) c. 276, § 5I50. The solemni-
zation of marriages is expressly forbidden by the State Department, Code of 
Fed. Regulations 22 § I09.I3 (I949); cf. PARRY, "A Conflict Myth: The 
American 'Consular' Marriage," 67 Harv. L. Rev. (I953/54) II87-I2I2. 
162 The Netherlands: Consular Law of July 25, I87I, as redrafted on July 
IS, I887; Spain: C. C. art. IOO par. 3; Portugal: Law of Dec. 25, I9IO, art. 
58 § 2, etc. 
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ing state.163 Still others permit consular marriage even of 
foreign couples; Great Britain does so when the country of 
celebration consents and both parties are nationals of the 
same country/64 
Illustration: France, not having authorized a celebration 
of marriage between a French party and a Bulgarian party 
before a French consul in Bulgaria, declares such marriage 
invalid in France; 165 it is therefore invalid in Bulgaria too. 
States should not be entirely free, however, and most 
states do not feel free, to fix the permissibility of consular 
marriages. In case both parties are not nationals of the send-
ing state or, at least, where one party is a subject of the re-
ceiving state, the consent of the latter istate should be re-
quired. A satisfactory rule has been laid down by the Hague 
Convention on Marriage, article 6 paragraph I, first sen-
tence: 
"In respect of formalities the marriage is to be recognized 
everywhere, if it is concluded before a diplomatic or consular 
representative in conformance with the laws of his country, 
provided that neither of the spouses is a citizen of the state 
where the marriage is celebrated and that this state does not 
oppose the celebration." 166 
163 France: C. C. art. 170 pars. 2 and 3, as completed by the Decree of 
March 8, 1937 ( Clunet 1937, 649), listing remote non-Christian countries 
only; Germany: (supra n. 159) including denizens; Great Britain: Foreign 
Marriages Order in Council, 1913, arts. I, 2. Switzerland: Bundesrat requires 
as to marriages in China that the husband be a national, BEcK, NAG. 223 
no. 19. The Belgian law of July 12, 1931, art 7 par. 2 permits by exception 
marriages between Belgian men and foreign women "in the countries where 
the local legislation prevents the celebration of marriages of the kind." Per-
haps the idea is related to that prevailing in Switzerland (supra n. 154). 
164 See Bailet v. Bailet (1901] 17 T. L. R. 317. 
165 Cf. Trib. civ. Seine (May 7, I937) with note in Clunet I938, 522, 525: 
Trib. civ. Seine (March IS, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436 (marriage cele-
brated before Guatemalan consul in Paris, who acted without authorization 
from his government, declared void). 
1 6 6 This provision is supplemented by arts. 6 and 7· Sweden: Law of 1904 
with amendments, c. I § 7 adopted the same solution. Great Britain and Bel-
gium, supra n. 163; and Italy: Consular Law of Jan. z8, I866, art. 29, take 
into consideration the consent of the receiving state. 
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Section 126 of the Restatement requires more simply that 
the marriage should be performed "in accordance with the 
law of the country where it takes place or with a treaty to 
which that country is a party." 
Unfortunately many states are not so considerate.161 
A peculiar feature of a few laws is that a religious minister 
may be authorized to ofliciate.168 
The treaties are as varied as the statutes or customs of the 
sending states. Usually they require either that both parties 
belong to the sending state 169 or that one be a national or 
domiciliary of the sending state, the other belonging to a 
third state.170 
(c) Law of third states. Except for article 6, paragraph 
I, of the Hague Convention, courts will, according to the 
principle of lex loci celebrationis, follow closely the position 
taken by the local law.171 In this regard, section I 26 of the 
Restatement expresses a rule of universally settled law. But 
it must be borne in mind that most countries are satisfied 
when the marriage form agrees with their own municipal 
lG 7 Particularly Great Britain (cf. Hay v. Northcote, supra n. 76), al-
though Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, s. 19, instructs the officer to refuse to 
perform the marriage if the celebration would be contrary to the rules of 
international private law or to the principles of international comity. 
168 Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (1949) c. 365 § 7303. 
Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. I, § 5 par. 2, § 8. 
Norway: Laws of May 19, 1922 and of June 2I, I935· 
Denmark: Order of June 12, I950. 
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, sec. 3 par. 2, sec. 6 par. 2. 
169 See, for instance, the treaties of Germany with Italy (May 4, I89I), 
Soviet Union (Oct. 12, I925), Panama (Nov. 2I, I927), Lithuania (Oct. 30, 
I928), South Africa (Sept. I, I928), Bulgaria (June 4, I929), Turkey (May 
28, 1929), and Haiti (MarchIo, I93o), the treaties with Bulgaria (art. I9) 
and Turkey (art. 18) containing marriage regulations and the others confer-
ring the right of the most favored nation. Recently the consular treaty be-
tween Greece and Lebanon (Oct. 6, 1948) 87 U. N. Treaty Series 35I, art. I9 
par. 2. 
170 See, for instance, the three consular conventions between the three Baltic 
States of July 12, I92I (11 League of Nations Treaties (I922) 87, 99; 25 
ibid. (I924) 299) art. I5. 
171 This is the widely prevailing opinion; contra: 2 ZITELMANN 6I3 and 
LEWALD in STRUPP, I Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatic 264. 
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prescriptions. Hence, if both parties belong to the same state, 
it suffices to observe the regulations of this state and, if they 
are subjects of different states, to comply with the formalities 
of both states.171a 
(d) Ceremony. Respecting details of the ceremony, the 
rules of the sending state are customarily followed in a 
diplomatic marriage,172 although Soviet law does not respect 
this custom.173 
Marriage on the high seas. Insofar as the law of the place 
of celebration is competent, marriages on board ship on the 
high seas are governed by the law of the flag. 174 This rule 
seems to be universally accepted. Most domestic laws, how-
ever, are reluctant to authorize such marriages on their own 
vessels. Great Britain allows captains of vessels to officiate, 
provided the parties were unable to take advantage of a local 
law or consular intervention.175 In the United States, it is 
generally held that the marriage is valid, if in conformance 
with the law of the shipowner's domicil. 176 To be sure, the 
law of the flag may permit marriage by mere consent.177 
Marriage in remote places. The validity of a marriage per 
verba de praesenti has been admitted where there was no 
means of solemnizing the marriage under some local law, 
e.g., in the Far East,178 although there is less doubt about its 
validity if an ordained priest or minister is present.179 
171a Cf. Cour Paris (March 13, 1954) Gaz. Pal. 1954 I 308. 
172 C6digo Bustamante art. 42. 
173 See MAKAROV, Precis 328. 
174 Restatement §§ 127 and 45· 
175 Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, § 12; and Foreign Marriages Order in 
Council, 1913, art. 20(2); R. v. Anderson (1868) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 161. 
176 See GooDRICH 355· 
177 Cf. Fisher v. Fisher (1929) 250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460. See HAcK-
WORTH, 2 Digest of International Law ( 1941) 371 § 165. 
178 See with respect to Japan: BATY, op. cit. supra n. 75 at xo6-109; China: 
Wolfenden v. Wolfenden [1946] P. 61; Singapore: Isaac Penhas v. Tan Soo 
Eng [1953] A.C. 304. 
179 England: Lord Campbell in R. v. Millis ( 1843-1 844) 10 Cl. & Fin. 534, 
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Military marriages abroad. Soldiers serving abroad in 
time of peace or war, if allowed to marry at all, usually en-
joy special privileges. There may be a special marriage of-
ficer, or soldiers may be allowed to marry by proxy or even 
by their own written declaration filed at the marriage office 
of the bride.180 
In France it is provided that only French soldiers with 
brides of French nationality may appear before a civil officer 
of the army, while foreigners have to comply with the local 
formalities. 181 Military marriages abroad with a foreign wo-
man have been held invalid by local courts as well as in third 
countries for lack of compliance with the local form.182 
IV. CoNCLUSIONs 
This subject has presented an excellent illustration of the 
thesis that a uniform conflicts rule is easily obtainable despite 
fundamental differences in municipal legal systems-pro-
786; Catterall v. Catterall (I847) I Rob. Ecc. 580. Cf., on the ecclesiastical 
form, Culling v. Culling, Law Rep. [I896] P. u6. 
Canada: Re Sheran (I899) 4 Terr. L. R. 83; cf. Connolly v. Woolrich & 
Johnson (I867) II L. C. J. I97, I R. L. (K. B.) 253 (involving the Indian 
marriage of a white man with an Indian woman). See also I JoHNSON 32I. 
180 The method last mentioned was introduced by a recent German regula-
tion of Nov. 4, I939, RGBI.I 2I63, §§ 13, I4: marriage in the absence of the 
husband, which consists of separate declarations of the parties without proxy. 
181 C. C. art. 93 par. 3, as amended by Law of Dec. 20, I922. The British 
regulations do not apply to all parts of the army. E.g., the Foreign Marriages 
(China) Order in Council, I938, excludes the solemnization by a marriage 
officer in China of marriages between parties either of whom is serving in 
China in His Majesty's Naval or Military Forces or the Royal Air Force. 
182 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 9, I949) 79 Clunet (I952) 304 (marriage of 
German officer with Belgian woman before German military court in Bel-
gium); Bezirksgericht Andelfingen (Switzerland) (May I8, I949) 46 SJZ. 
(I9SO) I4I (marriage of German officer with Swiss woman before German 
military court in Rumania). Contra: The Court of Appeal saved the ceremony 
of a Polish officer with a Polish woman celebrated before a Polish army 
chaplain in Italy and invalid there as well as under the Polish law of the 
parties' domicil as a "Common Law marriage": Taczanowska v. Taczanow-
ski [1957] 2 All E.R. 563. 
Marriages before the occupation authorities were expressly authorized in 
Germany by Law of the Control Council no. 52 of April 2I, I947 (Marriage 
Law of I946, § ISa) and were validated in Austria (Law of May 2I, I947). 
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vided that these differences do not prevent mutual tolerance. 
The only serious disturbance in this harmony is attributable 
to the attachment of a few countries to the traditional claims 
of certain religious denominations. In view of the general de-
velopment in the last century and a half, such perseverance is 
hardly justifiable, although it reflects deserved gratitude for 
the civilizatory work of the churches during many centuries. 
Catholic countries such as Austria, Italy, Colombia, and Ec-
uador, which at present have or had a short while since mar-
riage rules largely accommodated to the conceptions of the 
Roman Church, nevertheless agree in the conviction that 
their nationals should not be prevented from using the mar-
riage ceremonies that are legal in foreign countries. The 
Spanish Supreme Court, criticized by the literature, requires 
Spanish nationals to marry at the consulates, but not on the 
ground of religious law. 
It may be hoped that the period of readjustment follow-
ing the present war will stimulate reconsideration of these 
basic problems of international relations. 
CHAPTER 8 
Substantive Requirements for Marriage 
I. SURVEY 
r. Terminology 
I N THE traditional language of the canon law and most modern codifications, marriage requirements not con-cerned with formalities are labeled "impediments ( ob-
stacles) to marriage." According to their effect upon the 
validity of the marriage, they are divided into impediments 
merely capable of postponing its celebration-impedimenta 
impedientia, directory requirements-and those rendering 
the marriage void or voidable-impedimenta dirimentia, 
mandatory requirements. This division is well known in 
every law. ( Cf. Restatement §§ 9, I 22.) 
The term "requirements," which is frequently used today, 
is more convenient and more correct, because it includes the 
conditions of consent to marry, while "impediments" fails to 
include defects of consent. 
"Capacity" to marry far from covers the whole concept. 
It denotes the general ability of a person to marry at all, for 
instance as defined by requirements of age and parental con-
sent, but it does not refer clearly to an individual's being per-
mitted to marry a specific person or a person of a determi-
nate class. Nor does the term, capacity, include the require-
ment of sufficient consent of the parties; for this reason, in 
the text of the Hague Convention on Marriage, article I, the 
words "The capacity to contract marriage" were replaced by 
"The right to contract marriage." 1 As short terms, however, 
both terms are and may be used. 
1 For this discussion see decision of the German RG. (Dec. 15, 1930) 
IPRspr. 1931, no. 58 at 119. 
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2. Two Rival Basic Principles 
Not only are the municipal rules on intrinsic requirements 
of marriage extremely different, but also the rules relating to 
the conflict of municipal laws are confusingly varied. A few 
observations may help us to find our way. 
There are two main principles, both coming from the 
statutists: 
(a) One principle, represented in its purest form by the 
dominant conflicts law of the United States, points to the law 
of the place of celebration; a marriage good where con-
tracted is good everywhere, and vice versa. The practice of 
applying this maxim, 2 which clearly originated in the ordi-
nary contract theory,S to the substantive requirements of a 
contract creating a status, was in defiance of the traditional 
doctrine of status. The reason for this custom is perhaps that 
the machinery of marriage licensing has seemed inadequate 
to meet the unknown laws of the respective domicils of the 
parties. And an avowed purpose of the principle has always 
been to make marriage possible for persons who could not 
marry under their domiciliary laws. 
(b) In the European systems, the personal law of the 
parties controls the intrinsic requirements. Under this system 
the personal law may be determined either by the domicil or 
by the nationality of the parties, as the status rule may be. 
Illustration: A sixteen-year-old girl of Serbo-Yugoslavian 
nationality is married in Michigan. She has capacity to marry 
under rule (a) and also according to English law based on 
domicil (under rule b) but is incapable according to her na-
tional law applied under rule b. 
By certain regulations, however, both these points of con-
tact, and sometimes even that of the place of celebration as a 
2 ULRICH HUBER, De conflictu legum in diversis imperiis, no. 8 (GUTHRIE, 
translation of SAVIGNY 512) "Si licitum est eo loco, ubi contractum et cele-
bratum est, ubique validum erit effectumque habebit." 
a See JoHANN STEPHAN PuTTER, 3 Auserlesene Rechtsfiille, part I (Gottin-
gen, 1777) §§ 11-1 5· 
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third element, are combined with each other, with obscure 
complexities resulting from the combination. Other serious 
complications are bound to arise under this system when the 
personal laws of the parties are different. 
3· Influence of Public Policy 
Both basic principles have proved one-sided, each being 
closely limited by numerous exceptions. Whatever principle 
a country may have adopted, there will be a marked tendency 
not to apply a foreign marriage rule which conflicts with the 
matrimonial law of the forum. Marriage is one of the favor-
ite objects of tenacious local custom and of more or less 
singular enactments. Once almost every town in Central Eu-
rope had its own law of marriage. Although centralizing 
states have always succeeded in unifying a multitude of mat-
rimonial systems with almost no resistance except for the 
claims of churches, still each existing international private 
law is influenced (and if we except the United States, even 
greatly influenced) by the idea that its domestic rules alone 
are morally justified and form an indispensable gift to its 
own subjects. If we observe how varied marriage laws are 
and how antiquated or arbitrary many of them appear, we 
understand the reluctance of states to recognize each other's 
laws. 
The matter is further complicated because more than one 
country may be involved, and in consequence different coun-
tries may apply their own public policies. There is the country 
where the parties intend to marry, the country which consid-
ers one or both of the spouses its subjects, the country where 
a lawsuit for annulment is brought, the country where recog-
nition of the marriage or recognition or execution of an an-
nulment is sought, and there may be other countries inter-
ested in the status of children. 
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The question of public policy depends on which of the two 
basic principles mentioned is adopted. 
Under the main principle accepted in the United States, 
the substantive requirements for marriage are determined by 
the law of the state where the marriage is to be or has been 
celebrated. But apart from certain elementary exceptions, 
such as the rejection of polygamous and incestuous bonds, 
there has appeared a "substantial" and "growing" body of 
cases to protect the law of the domicil of the parties.4 More-
over, important legislative attempts have been initiated to 
curb "evasions" of the domiciliary policy of marriage. 
In various other countries on the American continent, 
where the same basic principle prevails, the influence of the 
personal law has made itself felt even more pronouncedly. 
Conversely, in a country allowing foreigners to marry only 
if the marriage is not prohibited by their domiciliary or na-
tional laws, additional requirements are established to satisfy 
local public policy (prohibitory public policy) and certain 
foreign prohibitions are disregarded as offending the local 
order (permissive public policy). 
The phenomena mentioned above will be treated in the fol-
lowing pages. The situation arising when the validity of a 
marriage is examined in a lawsuit or when a foreign judg-
ment on its validity or invalidity is presented for recognition, 
will be dealt with separately, since the problem is essentially 
the same for intrinsic and formal requirements. 
4· Ecclesiastical Courts 
A particular position is taken by ecclesiastical courts of all 
faiths. As the churches claim universal efficacy for their rul-
ings, the tribunals constituted by them apply their own laws 
4 See Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1913) 536 and GoODRICH 356; BEALE and 
others, "Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1931) 501, 527, n. S5, 
notice "a growing consciousness of the power of the domicil." 
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exclusively, irrespective of whether the marriage is cele-
brated in one country or another. Conflicts rules are lacking, 
and in some parts of the world the resultant confusions are 
considerable. 5 
II. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION 
1. The Principle 
The United States. In the United States,6 the law of the 
place of celebration has greater influence on the substantive 
requirements of marriage than in any other country. In this 
country, this law is applied by the marriage officials and 
judges of the state where the marriage is to be or has been 
celebrated, by the courts of the state or states where the par-
ties had their domicils at the time of the marriage, and finally 
by the courts of any other state. In other words, from the 
standpoint of the domiciliary state or the standpoint of the 
state of celebration, the rule is the same for domestic and 
foreign marriages and for domiciliaries as well as for for-
eigners. 
Philippines. The Civil Code of I 949 (art. 7 I), under 
strong American influence, provides for the validity of all 
marriages if valid where contracted abroad. However, for-
eigners celebrating marriage in the Philippines have to com-
ply with the requirements of their nationallaw.6a 
Argentina and others. The law of the place of celebration 
has also been adopted in a group of Latin-American coun-
tries but its application is greatly restricted, as each of these 
countries requires those persons whom it regards as its sub-
5 On Bulgaria, cf. DANEFF, 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (I938) 5; on Palestine, 
GOADBY 143 ff., and supra p. 248 n. I24· 
6 Restatement § I2I. Cf. BisHoP, 1 New Commentaries on Marriage 
§§ 84I ff.; I WHARTON § I65a; MINOR § 73; 2 BEALE §§ 121.21 I2I.6, I2I.7; 
KESSLER, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 858 n. 5· 
sa C. C. ( 1949) art. 66 implicitly by requiring a certificate of legal capacity 
to marry by the respective diplomatic or consular official before a marriage 
license can be issued; cf. SALONGA 239· 
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jects (by domicil or nationality, respectively) when marrying 
abroad to observe all its prescriptions or a large number of 
them. This group includes Argentina, 7 Guatemala, 8 Para-
guay, Peru, and Costa Rica.9 In this spirit the Treaty of 
Montevideo of 1889 (art. II), recast in 1940 (art. 13 par. 
I), formulates the principle as follows: 
The capacity of persons to contract marriage, the form and 
the existence and the validity of the marriage act, are deter-
mined by the law of the place where it is celebrated. 
The article enumerates a number of essential defects on ac-
count of which annulment may be sought, provisions with 
which we shall deal later. The main rule for substantive re-
quirements seems, however, unqualified with respect to the 
marriage of two foreigners. In this case, the rule is applied 
regardless of whether the marriage takes place within or 
without the country. The same result was implicitly adopted 
by the Civil Code of Mexico for the Federal District 10 but 
has not been repeated in the Code of 1932. 
Chile and others. In another group of Latin-American 
countries, a formula has been adopted similar to that of 
Chile, as follows : 
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with 
the laws thereof, or with the Chilean laws, shall have in 
Chile the same effects as if it had been celebrated on Chilean 
territory. (C.C. art. 119 par. r.) 
Apparently, an option is granted between local and national 
law with respect to formalities as well as other requirements. 
7 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 2, relating not merely to for-
malities as some writers have suggested; see ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 99; 2 
Vrco no. 13; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 277 and 2 Manual 30. 
8 Guatemala: Law on Foreigners ( 1936) art. 36. See MATOS no. 228 at 
342, 343· 
9 Paraguay: Marriage Law {1898) art. 2; 
Peru: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. V, par. 2; 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9 {by implication) ; see ORTIZ 294· 
1° C. C. (1884) art. 174; (1928) art. 161. 
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But the more recent Chilean Law on Civil Marriage, of 
January ro, r884 (art. 15 par. r), simply states: 
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with 
the laws thereof shall have in Chile the same effects as if it 
had been celebrated on Chilean territory. 
This text seems to indicate that requirements, both formal 
and substantive, are controlled by the local law alone, 
whereas Chilean subjects, according to an additional para-
graph, must in addition obey the "prescriptions" or (in a 
more recent wording) the "prohibitions" of the Chilean mar-
riage law. 
This group of countries,11 therefore, seems to join the 
group discussed above. 
Brazil's recent law ( 1942), going over to the domiciliary 
principle, contains two provisions: 12 In the case of any mar-
riage celebrated in Brazil, Brazilian law is applicable to man-
datory requirements ( impedimentos dirimentes) and for-
malities. In case the parties have different domicils, the va-
lidity of the marriage is governed by the law of the first 
marital domicil. In the light of the foregoing parallels the 
language suggests that marriages celebrated in Brazil are 
exclusively governed by Brazilian law-correspondingly 
with the rule in this country-but that capacity to marry in 
foreign countries is determined according to the common 
domicil of the parties rather than to the place of celebration. 
The only available comment by a Brazilian author, however, 
transfers from the system of the Hague Convention to the 
11 Ecuador: C. C. art. I04 par. I is similar to the older Chilean text; it is 
added, as it was formerly in the Argentine C. C. art. I64, that any annul-
ment of a foreign marriage by an ecclesiastical authority must be respected. 
Uruguay: C. C. (I868 as amended I893 and I9I4) art. IOI, par. 1 and Act 
of May 22, I885, are certainly to the same effect, as Uruguay is a participant 
in the Montevideo Treaty. 
12 Lei de Introdm;ao ( I942) art. 7 §§ I and 3· 
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new rules the consideration of the impediments established 
by the nationallaws.13 
The obscurity of drafting in all these enactments is re-
grettable. 
Denmark. In Denmark, likewise, the primary rule refers 
to the law of the place of celebration. This rule is not exclu-
sive, however, since a marriage official may not preside at 
the marriage of two nonresident foreigners, if some impedi-
ment established by one of the domiciliary laws is proved to 
him.14 But where a person domiciled in Denmark enters upon 
a marriage in a foreign country, the Danish law does not 
claim any influence, unless a strong public policy, such as 
that regarding bigamy or incest, requires attention.15 
C6digo Bustamante. A singular application of the law of 
the place of celebration is made by article 48 of the C6digo 
Bustamante. While this code invokes as a general principle 
the personal law of the parties, article 48 provides that coer-
cion, fear, and abduction as causes of nullity of marriage are 
governed by the law of the place of celebration. 
Switzerland. Whereas the American rule, as conceived by 
the Restatement, refers exclusively to the municipal law of 
the place of celebration, in Switzerland a parallel rule is es-
tablished 16 for foreign marriages of Swiss nationals, with 
the distinct implication that, above all, the conflict law of the 
place of celebration shall decide what legal order applies to 
the case. This rule, which indicates an unusually broad-
minded policy, has not always been correctly applied by non-
Swiss courts. Taking into account the diversity of conflict 
13 ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 820 no. 203. In the sense of the text apparently 
TENORIO, Lei de Introduc;;ao ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro (ed. 2, 1955) 268 If. 
14 BORUM, Personalstatutet 424, 427, 440; see also HOECK, Personalstatut 
16; BoRuM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 218 nos. 34 and 37; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746. (These writers do not entirely agree with each 
other.) 
15 BoRUM, Personalstatutet 457; 6 Repert. 218 no. 37· 
1a NAG. art. 7 f. 
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laws, Swiss conflicts law gives way to any other conflicts rule 
of the foreign domicil. As a matter of fact, the draftsmen 
realized that in the statistical majority of cases the foreign 
conflicts rule would, on the basis of the nationality principle, 
refer the case to Swiss matrimonial law to govern the sub-
stantive requirements for Swiss nationals. The decision, how-
ever, is left to the local law, the intention being to rule out 
any conflict with the law applicable under the local conflicts 
rule. It follows that a marriage of Swiss nationals in the 
United States, if good at the place of celebration, is good 
under Swiss law too. It is immaterial whether the parties are 
domiciled at the foreign place of celebration.11 
There is much doubt, however, whether this rule applies 
only where both parties are Swiss nationals or whether the 
local law governs mixed marriages as well. Sometimes the 
courts have extended the rule to the latter case/8 but gen-
erally it is argued that only where both spouses are Swiss can 
the Swiss concession succeed in avoiding conflicts; where an-
other legal order is involved, the nationality principle is pre-
ferred.19 
Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia applies her marriage laws to 
all persons, including foreigners, who marry within the 
U.S.S.R.20 
2. Exceptions: Prohibitive Public Policy 
The United States: Policy of the forum. Exceptions to the 
rule that a marriage validly contracted at the place of cele-
bration is valid everywhere are made by common law practice 
as well as by statute. 
1 7 BECK, NAG. 23I no. so, ibid. 275 nos. IS-23. 
18 BG. (Dec. IS, IS75) I BGE. IOI; BG. (March IS, IS76) 2 BGE. 32; 
BG. (Oct. 2S, ISS1) 7 BGE. 65S, 662. 19 BG. (Nov. II, I954) So BGE. I 427 (foreign husband); BECK, NAG. 
220 nos. 10 and II; HuBER-MUTZNER 427 n. I7I. 
20 See FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366; MAKAROV, Precis 327; LUNZ 
30I. 
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A marriage is held invalid when it is, in the opinion of the 
forum, contrary to the general principles of Christendom. 
The only applications concern polygamous and incestuous 
marriages, and both are dealt with discriminately. Practical 
cases of polygamy are those of the so-called "progressive" 
sort, viz., where a party has gone through a second marriage 
after a divorce recognized at the place where granted but not 
recognized at the forum.21 Incest is not a characteristic of 
every marriage between near relatives prohibited at the 
forum; but such has been assumed in a few cases of marriage 
between nephew and aunt 22 or even the widow of a nephew 
and an uncle. 23 The decisions respecting marriages of first 
cousins are in conflict.24 
A further exception is made by common law on behalf of 
"a distinctive national policy of the forum." On this ground, 
miscegenation is considered a cause of invalidity in all South-
ern and some Northern and Western states. 25 
Policy of domicil. Though the subject of endless contro-
versy, a few other requirements established by the law of the 
domicil of a party have been enforced regardless of the local 
law; thus the provisions of Oklahoma and New York about 
nonage 26 and certain prohibitions against remarriage. 27 The 
21 Restatement § 132 comment a; 2 BEALE § 132.1. 
22 Restatement § 132 comment b; Campbell v. Crampton (C.C.N.D., N.Y., 
r88o) 2 Fed. 417; State v. Brown (1890) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747; 
Laughran v. Laughran (1934) 292 U.S. 216. England: (uncle and niece) De 
Wilton v. Montefiore [1900] 69 L. J. (Ch.) 717, [1900] 2 Ch. 481. 
23 Osoinach v. Watkins (1938) 235 Ala. 564, r8o So. 577· 
24 For validity: In re Miller's Est. (1927) 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428; 
Schofield v. Schofield (1912) 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564. For voidness: Weinberg 
v. Weinberg (1927) 242 Ill. App. 414; Johnson v. Johnson (1910) 57 Wash. 
89, ro6 Pac. 500. 
25 Restatement § 132 comment c; Dupre v. Boulard ( 1855) ro La. Ann. 411; 
State v. Bell ( 1872) 7 Tenn. (Baxt.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549; Kinney v. Com-
monwealth (1878) 30 Va. (Grat.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 69o; Eggers v. Olson 
(1924) 104 Okla. 297; 231 Pac. 483. Cf. Jackson v. Jackson (1895) 82 Md. 
17, 33 At!. 317. Denying extraterritorial effect: The Inhabitants of Medway 
v. The Inhabitants of Needham (1819) r6 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131. 
26 Ross v. Bryant ( 1923) 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364, criticized in 23 Col. 
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Restatement does not hesitate to generalize in this respect; 
every time a state makes it clear that it regards a prohibition 
as arising out of a "strong public policy"-what in Europe 
is called extraterritorial or international public order-the 
prohibition limits the rule that the local law governs. If this 
extension of the force of the law of domicil were accepted 
unanimously, the situation would be somewhat clarified. Un-
der no theory, however, would the law of the place of cele-
bration be excluded in any jurisdiction by a domiciliary pro-
hibition that, though of mandatory character or of public 
interest, is not held to be clearly of primary importance.28 
Under the common law, apart from the general function 
of public policy, the fact that the parties attempt to elude 
their domiciliary prohibitions is immaterial. The law of the 
place of celebration is applicable, as Judge McSherry stated 
in Jackson v. Jackson, "even when they have left their own 
State to marry elsewhere for the purpose of avoiding the 
laws of the domicil." 29 Thus, infants domiciled in Wisconsin, 
marrying validly in Minnesota, are considered validly mar-
L. Rev. (1923) 782; Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) 206 N.Y. 341, 99 
N. E. 845 (where, however, the parties had not cohabited). Contrary result in 
Massachusetts: Levy v. Downing (1913) 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638. 
27 Cf. Restatement §§ 130, 131; 2 BEALE § 130.1; STUMBERG 286. 
28 Cf. Restatement§ 132 comment a; Sturgis v. Sturgis (1908) 51 Ore. 10, 
93 Pac. 696, on marriage without parental consent. Fensterwald v. Burk 
( 1916) 129 Md. 131, 98 At!. 358, on the prohibition in Maryland of marriage 
between uncle and niece. 
~ 9 (1895) 82 Md. 17, 29; cf. Fensterwald v. Burk (1916) 129 Md. 131, 
cited above in note 28. Danelli v. Danelli (1868) 4 Ky. (Bush) 51 (widow 
and brother of late husband marrying in Switzerland contrary to their domi-
ciliary Austrian law); Stevenson v. Gray (1856) 17 Ky. (B. Mon.) 193, and 
BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage § 843. A similar statement in 
McDonald v. McDonald ( 1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 Pac. (2d) 163, that the 
intention of the parties to evade a requirement is entirely immaterial, has 
shocked BATIFFOL1 the distinguished French writer, in spite of his familiarity 
with American conflicts law; see his spirited comment on this case in 32 Revue 
Crit. 1937, 16o, 167 ff. French law especially is accustomed to repression of 
fraude a la loi. 
Contra the general rule, e.g., Pennsylvania, see In re Stull's Estate (1898) 
183 Pa. 625, 39 Alt. 16, Maurer v. Maurer (1948) 163 Pa. Super. 264, 6o 
A. (2d) 440. 
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ried in Iowa, although the marriage is invalid because of 
nonage in Wisconsin under its evasion clause.30 In the same 
spirit, the Civil Code of Argentina, article I 59, expressly es-
tablishes the law of the place of celebration as governing, 
"even where the marrying parties have left their domicil in 
order not to be subjected to the formalities and laws there 
in force." 
By statute, however, specific provisions against evasion 
have now been introduced in seventeen states.81 Five of these 
states 32 have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act 
of I 9 I 2, section I of which reads as follows: 
"If any person residing and intending to continue to reside 
in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting 
marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another 
state or country and there contract marriage prohibited and 
declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall 
be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same 
effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered 
into in this state." 
This provision presupposes prohibitions rendering the mar-
riage void under the home law; if it be understood as refer-
ring solely to voidness ab initio, the provision may be criti-
cized as ineffectual.33 At least it is not confined to single 
enumerated prohibitions as are some other evasion stat-
utes; 34 hence, it would not be impossible to bring child mar-
30 Boehm v. Rohlfs (1937) 224 Iowa 226, 231, 276 N. W. 105, xo8. 
81 HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN and BROWN, Cases 258, distinguish the stat-
utes enacting a subjective test of evasion, those enacting an objective test of 
evasion, including the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, and those covering all 
ceremonies between persons who intend to live in the state. 
3 2 Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
33 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (1929) 196. As a matter 
of fact, it seems that not every mandatory requirement is given extraterri-
torial effect even in interpreting the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act; see 
Lyannes v. Lyannes (1920) 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683; cf. KESSLER, 1 
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1927) 858, 861. 
34 E.g., miscegenation (Montana), capacity (Connecticut), blood relation-
ship (West Virginia). 
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riages under its protection, though no such decision is 
known.35 Nor does the Uniform Act require, as three states' 
enactments do, 36 that the parties intend to evade a prohibi-
tion. 
The Uniform Act has extended its scope remarkably by 
adding section 2, whereby an evasive marriage is prohibited 
by the state of celebration itself. Further repression of eva-
sive marriages can obviously be accomplished by reciproca-
tion among the states sharing the policy of preventing eva-
sion; in fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has declared 
void a marriage celebrated in Indiana in defiance of the mar-
riage prohibition and the evasion statute of Illinois, the par-
ties being domiciled in Illinois. And other cases seem to pro-
mote this approach,37 which has been properly construed as a 
renvoi to the conflicts rule of the domiciP8 
Under common law principles also, bigamy, incest, and 
miscegenation, when subject to a "strong" domiciliary policy, 
are sufficient cause for annulment in the courts of any third 
state having the same distinctive public policy. The Restate-
ment again achieves a broad generalization. According to 
section 132, wherever a statute at the domicil makes a mar-
35 Recently all jurisdictions have established statutory rules on age. Evasion 
of such provisions was one of the principal purposes of marriage out of the 
state; cf. the enumeration of motives for such marriages by GOODRICH 357· 
There are still marked variances among the statutes. 
36 Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1952) § 44-209. 
Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 166 § 9 (intention of returning). 
West Va. Code (1955) c. 48 § 4695 [17]. 
37 Hall v. Industrial Commission ( 1917) 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312; 
note that Wisconsin has adopted the same Uniform Act as Illinois. In L. 
Meisenhelder v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company ( 1927) 170 
Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, a Kentucky marriage between first cousins, valid 
where celebrated, invalid at the domicil in Illinois under the evasion statute 
in force there, was held invalid in Minnesota. See also People v. Steere 
(1915) 184 Mich. 556, 151 N. W. 617, criticized in 13 Mich. L. Rev. (1915) 
592, but cf. GooDRICH 365 n. 57· See for comment TAINTOR, "Effects of Extra-
State Marriage Ceremonies," 10 Miss. L. J. (1938) 105. 
38 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) n65 at II99 ff. 
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riage void even though celebrated in another state, the mar-
riage is void-not only at the domicil but also in all third 
states and even in the state of celebration, for section 13 2 
says "everywhere." 39 
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section 3, provides 
the following additional precaution: the licensing official 
must ascertain that a party residing in another state is not 
prohibited from marrying by the laws of the jurisdiction 
where he resides.40 Yet no independent verification of the 
allegations of candidates is usual.41 
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section r, prohibit-
ing the parties from going "into another state or country," 
was probably intended to be applicable in any country as part 
of a domiciliary law. Under this assumption, the marriage, 
celebrated in Florida, of an American or an Englishman 
domiciled in Illinois with his first cousin, is invalid under the 
laws not only of Illinois but also of France, where the prin-
ciple of nationality requires the application of the law indi-
cated by the national law of the person.42 
It may be noted that, except for miscegenation, the notion 
of evasion apparently is not extended to the case of parties 
effectively changing their domicil, i.e., abandoning their old 
place of residence and establishing themselves for the time 
being at the foreign place where they have their wedding. If, 
for instance, the parties are forbidden at their domicil to 
marry within a certain time under the sanction of nullity, 
they may transfer their domicil to another state and validly 
39 It has been repeatedly stated that no support can be found in the cases 
for this view, cf. e.g., VARTANIAN, Foreign Marriages-Recognition, II7 
A. L. R. ( 1938) 186, 188. 
40 Improved in Wyoming Comp. Stat. (1920) § 4960, amended by L. 1931, 
c. 99 § 1; Rev. Stat. Ann. (1945) §so-ro6. 
41 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State ( 1929) 197, regretting 
this and other deficiencies, advocate an efficient verification of assertions, state 
supervision, and interstate exchange of records. 
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marry under its law.43 The marriage will be recognized even 
in the former jurisdiction.44 
Denmark. A foreign marriage of Danish domiciliaries is 
annulled when it contravenes the prohibitions against biga-
mous or incestuous marriages. 45 
Philippines. The principle of lex loci celebrationis is ex-
pressly limited by a broad reservation against bigamous, 
polygamous or incestuous marriages, to be qualified accord-
ing to Philippine law.46 
Latin-American countries. Restrictions of much greater 
significance are imposed on the principle lex loci celebrationis 
in the Latin-American countries mentioned above (p. 267). 
In some of these countries, the entire body of domestic 
prohibitions is declared compulsory on subjects marrying 
abroad.47 In others, a broad catalogue of requirements is 
similarly prescribed.48 The Treaty of Montevideo of I 889, 
article I r, recast in I 940, article I 3, had the task of limiting 
the influence of public policy in the mutual relations of the 
participant states. This convention, however, still reserved 
to every state the right to consider void a marriage valid 
where celebrated, in the event of any of the following 
defects: 
(a) Defect of age in one of the parties, the minimum re-
quired being fourteen years completed by the man and 
twelve by the woman; 
42 Cf. KESSLER, r Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 858, 863. 
43 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1933) 210 Wis. 543, 246 N. W. 68o. 
44 State v. Fenn ( 1907) 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417; Pierce v. Pierce ( 1910) 
58 Wash. 622, 109 Pac. 45; GOODRICH 358 n. 30. 
45 See BoRUM, Personalstatutet 451 and 6 Repert. 218 no. 37· 
46 C. C. ( 1949) art. 71. 
4 7 Chile: C. C. art. 119 par. 2. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9· 
Ecuador: C. C. art. 104 par. 2. 
48 Argentina: Civil Marriage Law ( r888) art. 2. Cf. ROMERO DEL PRADO, 
Der. Int. Priv. 280 and 2 Manual 32. 
Mexico: Formerly C. C. (r884) art. I75· 
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(b) Relationship between the spouses in direct line by 
blood or affinity, either legitimate or illegitimate; 
(c) Relationship between the spouses of legitimate or il-
legitimate brother and sister; 
(d) Having caused the death of one of the spouses of a 
former marriage as perpetrator or accomplice in order 
to marry the surviving spouse; 49 
(e) A former marriage not legally dissolved. 
Analogous reservations as made by some states, e.g., Ar-
gentina (C. C. art. I 59), are evidently meant to apply only 
to their own subjects. The reservations contained in the Con-
vention of Montevideo, on the contrary, seem to be standard 
requirements, common to all participant states, which may be 
raised by any participant state in any case of a foreign mar-
riage. If this assumption is correct, the influence of public 
policy has been correspondingly unified to a considerable ex-
tent. 
In Ecuador (C. C. art. I04 par. I), a foreign marriage 
that is valid at the place of celebration is recognized, al-
though, however, invalidation by an ecclesiastical court must 
be respected. 50 
Switzerland. Swiss law is applicable in cases of evasion, 
where the parties marry in a foreign place with evident in-
tention to evade the grounds of nullity of Swiss law.51 The 
three premises for this rule are that only an artificial contact 
with the foreign place of celebration existed, that mandatory 
requirements have been evaded, and that both parties knew 
the facts and manifestly intended to evade the Swiss prohibi-
tions. All these three conditions are seldom proved in a single 
49 The case of a married person causing the death of his or her own spouse, 
must obviously be included. 
50 No analogous consequence of th~ state's connection with the Catholic 
church exists in Italy or Spain. 
51 NAG. art. 7 f par. I. 
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case.52 A tacit fourth condition for the application of this 
rule seems to be Swiss nationality or at least Swiss domicil of 
both parties; 53 if the parties have in fact, and not merely 
fictitiously transferred their domicil from Switzerland to a 
foreign place, the provision is inoperative, just as the Ameri-
can evasion rules. 
Apart from the rule just mentioned on evasion, which may 
or may not be included in the idea of international public 
policy, Swiss courts reserve to themselves the discretionary 
power to consider a marriage void on grounds of public 
policy. The Federal Tribunal, emphasizing the necessity of 
such stringent national policy, has recently denied recogni-
tion to a foreign remarriage of a Swiss citizen who was still 
married under Swiss law.54 However, not all grounds for in-
validity, opposed to the marriage of foreigners in Switzer-
land, are applicable to the foreign marriage of a Swiss sub-
ject.55 Particularly, the provisions preventing marriage be-
tween uncle and niece and aunt and nephew do not have the 
effect of invalidating a marriage celebrated abroad, although 
in such cases Swiss certificates that the candidates are capable 
of intermarrying are not issued. 56 
3· Exceptions: Permissive Public Policy 
The United States. In the United States, it is a fairly well 
settled policy that foreign penal restrictions upon freedom 
are not recognized. This principle applies to penal legislative 
52 In the practice of the Federal Tribunal there is just one decision, BG. 
(Jan. 19, 1934) 6o BGE. II I, Clunet 1938, 984, where a lunatic and his 
bride traveled to Brighton, England, to marry there, and NAG. art. 7 f was 
invoked ad abundantiam. 
53 Cf. SCHNITZER 322, and BECK, NAG. 241 no. 88, having different opin-
ions. BECK, NAG. 241 no. 85, and others suggest that the husband must be 
a Swiss citizen; I have disregarded this arbitrary opinion. 
54 BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74· 
55 BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 56 and ibid. 262 no. I 54· 
56 BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 57. 
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prohibitions on remarriage; extraterritorial effect is denied 
to such prohibitions everywhere, even when they are estab-
lished by the domiciliary state. 5 7 Disregard of racial prohibi-
tions 58 falls in the same category. 
Switzerland. Swiss law has established the following im-
portant general limitations on recognition of foreign mar-
riage prohibitions: 
A marriage contracted abroad, which is invalid according to 
the law of the place of its celebration, may be declared in-
valid in Switzerland only if it also is invalid under Swiss 
law.59 
The idea is that the domestic legal order is not interested in 
annulling a marriage that satisfies Swiss requirements. It is 
doubtful, however, to what group of persons this provision 
is intended to apply.60 
III. PERSONAL LAW 
I. The Primary Principle 
Law of the domicil. The law of the domicil of either party 
governs marriage requirements in Great Britain, according 
to prevailing opinion, and in the British Empire, Norway, 
and, as has been mentioned, to some extent in Denmark.6 ' 
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law also has estab-
lished this as a primary rule. 
The position of British law, it is true, is not quite clear. 
English courts are accustomed to think in terms of jurisdic-
tion rather than to distinguish competency of tribunal and 
applicable law. They are supposed to recognize, however, 
foreign judgments affecting the status of Englishmen domi-
57 Commonwealth v. Lane ( 1873) II3 Mass. 458; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall 
(1881) 86 N.Y. 18; State v. Shattuck (1897) 69 Vt. 403, 38 At!. 81. 
For further details see STUMBERG 286 ff. 
58 State v. Tutty (C. C. S. D. Ga., 1890) 41 Fed. 753· 
59 NAG. art. 7 f par. 2. 
60 See discussion by BECK, NAG. 258 no. 143, and SCHNITZER 322. 
61 Cf. supra p. 270; for Denmark, supra p. 277, n. 45· 
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ciled within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. N everthe-
less, in Wilton v. M ontefiore (I 900), 62 a marriage between 
a Jewish maternal uncle and his niece domiciled in England 
was declared void, although it was alleged to be valid by 
both Jewish custom and the law of the place of celebration. 
In Sottomayor v. De Barros (I 877) ,63 it was held that a 
marriage of first cousins domiciled in Portugal, prohibited 
from marrying there, is to be deemed invalid also in the eyes 
of an English court; a contrary result was reached in the 
second case of Sottomayor v. De Barros in I879, 64 solely be-
cause it had then been established that the bridegroom had 
his domicil in England when the parties married in England. 
On the basis of this latter case, many writers have believed 
that English courts would always apply domestic law, if the 
marriage is celebrated in England and one party, or at least 
the bridegroom, is domiciled there, irrespective of any inca-
pacity by which the other party may have been affected under 
his own domiciliary law.65 Thus, whereas a domiciled Eng-
lishman marrying abroad would remain subject to the Eng-
lish rules on capacity, the foreign grounds of incapacity of a 
person domiciled abroad would be disregarded. This alleged 
rule has acquired world-wide notoriety; it has been labelled a 
badge of "insular pride and complacency." 66 In fact, apart 
from the unclear grounds of the court in the second Sotto-
mayor decision and the entirely discredited case of Ogden v. 
Ogden,S1 there is no reasonable support for such a unilateral 
62 [I9oo] 2 Ch. D. 48I. 
63 [I877] 3 P. D. I. 
64 [I879] 5 P. D. 94· 
65 WESTLAKE §§ 2I, 25; DICEY, Rule I69 Exc. I; 6 HALSBURY 376; less 
decidedly, FOOTE I25. 
66 CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 228; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of 
Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law { I935) 84, 88. See, e.g., BATY, 
"Capacity and Form of Marriage," 26 Yale L. J. {I9I7) 444; GooDRICH 368 
n. 70; and more recently GRAVESON, "Matrimonial Domicil and the Contract 
of Marriage," 20 Jour. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55, 65; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 6o n. I7. 
67 [I908] P. 46; cf. infra pp. 288-289 and n. 95· 
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English doctrine. 68 That the place of celebration has no im-
portance 69 was expressly stated in the second Sottomayor 
case. 
Cheshire criticizes the rule from another point of view, 
suggesting that only the "matrimonial domicil" should be 
decisive. We shall discuss the merits of this doctrine shortly. 
At any rate, Cheshire himself believes that only the• second 
Sottomayor case is in his favor; he admits that Sir James 
Hannen did not base his decision upon the fact that England 
was the matrimonial home and, further, that the grounds of 
decision are unsatisfactory.70 In any event, recent English 
decisions,71 overlooking Cheshire's opinion, adopt with better 
foundation the prevailing doctrine that the domicil of either 
party determines the capacity to marry. 
N ationallaw. In the rest of the world, 72 the national law 
of either party governs intrinsic marriage requirements. The 
68 In Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67 the prohibition against intermarriage 
between a Hindu Brahman and a foreigner was disregarded, but this dis-
ability was one that the person affected could discard at wiii (CHESHIRE 
299). Moreover, it was considered inappropriate to assert such a prohibition 
against an English marriage to an English partner, obviously because repug-
nant to public policy to do so. 
69 However, BECKETI, "The Question of Classification ('qualification') in 
Private International Law," I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46 advo-
cates the American principle. 
7° CHESHIRE 3I6; contra, see GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55, 
cited supra n. 66. 
n In re Paine, In re Williams, Griffith v. Waterhouse [I940] I Ch. D. 46, 
[I939] I08 L. J. (Ch.) 427 per Bennett J., cf. Note, 56 Law Q. Rev. (I940) 
22. BENTWICH, "Recent English Cases on Domicile in Matters of Personal 
Status," 52 Juridical Review (I940) 284, 288 (English prohibition applied to 
marriage in Germany of a man domiciled in Germany and his late first wife's 
sister, previously domiciled in England). Pugh v. Pugh [I95I] P. 482, 493 
et seq. (Englishman of full age, domiciled in England "incapable" of marry-
ing a IS year old Hungarian girl). 
72 Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § 6. OGH. (I907) 44 GIU.NF. no. 38n; 
WALKER 597> 598. 
Belgium: C. C. art. I70 ter, as established by Law of July I2, I93I, art. I4· 
Bulgaria: Law of Aug. 5, I949, art. 24 par. 2. 
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of March u, I948, 
§ IO. 
Egypt: C. C. ( I948) art. I2. 
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929 on Family Relations of International Nature, 
sec. I (Finns abroad); sec. 2 par. I (foreigners in Finland). 
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Hague Convention on Marriage of 1902, article r, and the 
Codigo Bustamante, article 36 (for states following the na-
tionality principle), adopted this rule, while the Scandinavian 
Convention on Family Law acknowledges it as a subsidiary 
rule. 
If, within a state, religious law determines the personal 
law, the substantive requirements of marriage are usually 
included. 78 
Renvoi. In the conflict of domicil and nationality principles 
or of either of them with the law of the place of celebration, 
renvoi is accepted in most European countries.74 
France: C. C. arts. 3 and I70. 
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. I. 
Greece: C. C. (I8S6) art. 4 par. 3; C. C. (I94o) art. I3· 
Haiti: C. C. art. ISS (Haitians abroad). 
Honduras: C. C. arts. I37-I39· 
Hungary: Law no. IV /I952 art. 6 par. I; Decree-Law no. 23/I952 § I6. 
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. IOO par. I; C. C. (I942) art. 115 (Italians abroad); 
art. 116 (foreigners in Italy). 
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I70. 
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I 38. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I38; H. R. (Jan. 6, I911) W. 9125. 
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. I02 and I03· 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. I2 par. I. 
Portugal: Code of Civil Register of Dec. 22, I9321 arts. 3 IS, 3I6; Regul. 
Consular, D. no. 6462 of March 7, I92o, arts. I43, I44; see CUNHA GoN-
<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 678. 
Spain: C. C. art. 9; Trib. Supr. (July Io, I9I6) I37 Sent. IOS (Spaniards 
abroad). Spanish Morocco, Dahir de Ia condici6n civil de los espafioles y 
extranjeros, art. IO. 
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904 with amendments, c. I §§ I, 2, c. 7 § 4a. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7c (for marriage within the state). 
Syria: C. C. (I949) art. I3. 
Turkey: 7 Repert. 264 no. 209. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. 9· 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I3· 
Siam: Law of March IO, I9391 § I9. 
Philippines: C. C. (I949) art. 66 (foreigners in the Philippines). 
73 The rule that religious law governs the requirements for marriage is in 
accordance not only with Catholic canon and Greek Orthodox law but also 
"with Ottoman and Oriental tradition" in Palestine, as GoADBY, I 52, declares; 
he cites, id., n. 8, Re Alison's Trusts (I874) 3I L. T. 638 (marriage in 
Persia of an Armenian Christian woman held invalid under Armenian canon 
law) and Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, infra p. 293, n. 118. 
74 France: Cour Paris (March 23, I888) Clunet I889, 638; cf. WEISS, 3 
Traite 478 n. 2. 
Germany: EG. art. 27; RG. (Feb. IS, I9I2) 78 RGZ. 234, for further 
MARRIAGE 
Illustrations: ( i) Two Swiss parties domiciled in Switzer-
land married in Brighton, England. Swiss law (NAG. art. 
7f) refers the validity of the marriage to the English con-
flicts law, which, in turn, refers the question to the Swiss do-
mestic law. Hence, Swiss law was applied by the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal.75 
(ii) An American citizen domiciled in Germany married a 
German woman, apparently in Germany. The German court 
applied German law to the requirements for both parties, on 
the erroneous basis that the American law referred the man's 
capacity to marry to the law of his domicil; but the court 
could have reached the same result through the application 
of the American principle of lex loci celebrationis.76 
Contrary to its general attitude, the Hague Convention of 
I 902, article 1, in deference to the aforementioned Swiss 
rule, allowed an "express" reference of the national law to 
another law, thus affirming the Swiss rule while condemning 
renvoi in general. 
2. Problems Arising when Parties are Subject to Different 
Personal Laws 
Each law applied separately. The general doctrine is that 
each party must be free from prohibitions to marry the other 
party, this to be decided, in a country following the domi-
ciliary principle, separately according to the law of the domi-
cil of each party and, in a country following the nationality 
principle, separately according to the national law of each 
party. It must be noted, however, that this doctrine has had 
and still has opponents. 
Minority opinions. Savigny/7 at the time when the domi-
renvoi; Bay. OLG. (Jan. x8, 1918) JW. 1918, 375; KG. (March 22, 1906) 
32 J ahrb. FG. A 28. On certain controversies see RAAPE 260. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7f, based on art. 54 of the Swiss Constitution. 
75 BG. (Jan. x8, 1934) 6o BGE. II x. 
76 OLG. Dresden (Jan. 15, 1912) 26 ROLG. 2II. 
77 SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by GUTHRIE 291. 
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ciliary principle was unchallenged, pleaded for the law of the 
first matrimonial domicil, which he identified with the domi-
cil of the future husband, unless the parties had in fact estab-
lished their domicil at another place or intended to do so. 
Savigny was followed by many writers of the early and later 
nineteenth century,78 but his view has finally been abandoned, 
since long ago objections were made that it is unfair and an-
tiquated to disregard the personal law of the bride.79 It is 
also frequently urged that the validity of the marriage can-
not be tested by the law of the place where the parties estab-
lish their domicil after their marriage. Nevertheless, Chesh-
ire explicitly invokes Savigny's theory for his resurrection of 
the same opinion.80 
The Marriage Act of Hungary provided that in any case 
where a Hungarian man marries a foreign woman, either at 
home or abroad, her personal law is to be considered only 
with respect to her age and capacity to consent, while in all 
other respects the validity of the marriage is to be tested ex-
clusively by Hungarian law.81 The Civil Code of Honduras 
even makes Honduran law obligatory on the capacity of both 
parties to marry abroad, when one party is a citizen. 82 By 
such laws, the influence of domestic public policy, described 
below, is certainly exaggerated. 
Another opinion, now discredited, urged the application 
of the more severe of the two laws involved.83 At present, 
78 RoTH, I System 288; GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht 236- these two 
fascinated by old German law; WINDSCHEID, I Pandekten {ed. 9) § 35 no. 4· 
The rule was partly accepted by I BAR § I6o and is now advocated by BAR-
TIN, 2 Principes I23. 
79 WALKER 569. 
8° CHESHIRE 3IO. Cf. also GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55, 68, 
supra n. 66. Contra: GooDRICH 367. 
81 Marriage Law of I894, §§no, III, abrogated by Law no. IV/x952. 
82 Art. I38. 
83 ARMIN JON, 2 Precis 457 no. 2I4. Occasionally certain impediments usually 
considered involving only one spouse are given a broader interpretation 
affecting both spouses. See, e.g., 2 ZITELMANN 609 n. 300, KG. {Dec. 2I, I936) 
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the only doctrine of importance is the general doctrine first 
stated. 
Doctrine of unilateral prohibitions. To apply to either 
party his or her personal law has proved delicate. Following 
the canon law and Savigny,84 a distinction has been drawn be-
tween unilateral and bilateral prohibitions, although no set-
tled definition of these terms exists nor even seems necessary. 
Roughly speaking, some provisions of matrimonial law con-
cern only one person, while others apply to both parties or 
generally to the conclusion of the marriage. In the first case, 
one of the parties lacks capacity, and this party alone is pro-
hibited from marrying (unilateral) ; in the second case, the 
prohibition resulting from the disqualification of one of the 
parties includes both. 
In consonance with the personal law, each requirement 
must be observed just as it would have to be observed in the 
homeland. Illustration is provided by the following four im-
portant unilateral prohibitions (a-d). A fifth example (e) 
leads to the related question of the party who may bring suit 
for annulment, the determination of which also depends on 
the personallaw.85 
(a) Age required for marriage. 86 In all countries follow-
ing the system of nationality, an Italian girl may marry on 
attaining fourteen years of age, a German at sixteen, a Ser-
bian at seventeen, and a Greek, Spanish, or Northern Irish 
girl at twelve. It is immaterial what the law of the other 
party prescribes. 
(b) Consent in form but not in fact; defective intention. 
Defects affecting consent to marriage, such as consent in-
JW. 1937, 2039 and Pugh v. Pugh [1951] P. 482, 493 (supra 11. 71); see 
contra RAAPE, IPR. 230, 233 n. 7· 
84 SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by W. GUTHRIE 291; "Denkschrift," 14 Z.int.R. (1904) 
524, 525. KuRT STEINLE, Die zweiseitigen Ehehindernisse im internationalen 
Privatrecht, Thesis (Munich, 1939). 
85 For other cases in French practice, see J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 439 ff. 
86 Germany: RG. (Dec. :u, 1916) JW. 1917, 364. 
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duced by error, fraud, or duress, are exclusively determined 
by the law of the spouse whose intention is alleged to be viti-
ated. The law of the partner is immaterial.B7 
Illustration: A Belgian man married a German woman. 
He was mistaken as to her virginity. The man is not allowed 
to avail himself of the German provision that a marriage 
may be attacked upon the ground of error concerning the 
personal characteristics of the other spouse, but is limited to 
the Belgian provision which regards only an error in physi-
cal identity of the other spouse as relevant. 88 
(c) Consent of parents or guardians. The consent of par-
ents or guardians required for a marriage of parties who 
have not reached a certain age, such as twenty-one, 89 and, 
according to some laws, the duty of the child to notify his 
parents of his intended marriage ("acts of respect"), 90 all 
come under the general rule regarding the capacity of the 
child or ward to marry. This is one of the requirements 
87 France: Cases of mistake: Trib. civ. Strasbourg {Dec. 21, 1920) Clune! 
1921, 933; App. Dijon (March 20, 1922) Clunet 1922, 409; Trib. civ. Seine 
(June II, 1929) Revue 1930, 45S. For duress see AUDINET, "Les Conflits 
de lois en matiere de mariage et de divorce," II Recueil 1926 I 175 at rSo. 
Germany: RG. {May 3, 1917) Warn. Jahrbuch 1917, no. 210; RG. (Oct. 
6, 1927) Revue 1930, 129; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, n. 65; RG. 
(Feb. 16, 1931) ]W. 1931, 1340, and many decisions of lower courts col-
lected by 3 FRANKENSTEIN S2 n. S6. In the case RG. (Feb. 6, 1930) JW. 1930, 
1003, IPRspr. 1930, no. 64, the error of a Swiss husband was decided under 
the Swiss Civil Code instead of the Swiss conflicts rule {NAG. art. 7 f), call-
ing for the application of the German Civil Code; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 59 
n. 13· 
Italy: Cass. Torino (July 31, rS83) Giur. Ita!. rSS3, I 617, Sirey rSS6.4.1 
Switzerland: OG. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 64 ZBJV. (1927) rSs. 
England: Way v. Way and three other cases [1950] P. 71, 7S, affirmed in 
Kenward v. Kenward [1951] P. {C.A.) 124, 133 per Evershed, M.R. 
88 German Marriage Law of 1946, § 32 {even broader than BGB. § 1333); 
Belgian C. C. art. 1So; cf. Cass. Belg. (July 17, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1·370, 
emphasizing that not even "dol," fraudulent misrepresentation, justifies an 
action for avoiding the marriage, the same as in France, see Chambres 
Reunies (April 24, 1S62) D.1862.1.153· 
89 E.g., France: C. C. arts. 14S, rsS, 159; Germany: BGB. §§ 1303-I308, 
Marriage Law of 1946, §§ 3 ff.; Quebec: C. C. art. II9. 
9° France: C. C. art. 151. Belgium and Luxemburg: C. C. art. 151. 
Spain: C. C. art. 47· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 99· 
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called, according to the French doctrine, "formes habili-
tantes," understood in France to have nothing to do with 
formalities. These requirements are governed by the same 
law that is competent to declare a party incapable of marry-
ing by his own will alone. Continental opinion has it that 
these requirements are ruled by the national law and not by 
the law of the place of celebration.91 For example, the op-
position of an American father to the marriage of his daugh-
ter, likewise an American national, has been rejected because 
of her nationallaw.92 
This conception also seemed accepted for a time in Eng-
land. English courts applied in accordance with their mean-
ing foreign statutes requiring the consent of parents or simi-
lar acts, that is, the statutes were construed as in the coun-
tries of their enactment, either as postponing the marriage or 
as threatening its validity.93 At present, however, such per-
mission is ordinarily regarded in England as a formal re-
quirement and governed, for this reason, by the law of the 
place where the marriage is celebrated.94 It is again primarily 
91 France: Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 4, I88o) Clunet I88o, 478; Trib. civ. 
Seine (Dec. 2I, I88s) Clunet I886, 448; Trib. civ. Seine (July 28, I 90S) 
Clunet I906, ns2; Trib. civ. Seine (June IS, I9Io) Clunet I9II, 212; Trib. 
civ. Seine (Jan. 10, I9I7) Clunet I9I8, II92; Trib. civ. Seine (March 8, I920) 
Clunet I92o, 206; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. I7, I926) Clunet I928, 404. Simi-
larly, on consent of council of family and tutor ad hoc for a natural child, 
Trib. superieur Papeete (June 28, I909) Clunet I9IO, I67; ratification of 
marriage by parents, Cour Paris (May IS, I9I7) Clunet I9I71 I4I3; Trib. 
civ. Seine (Jan. I8, I923) Clunet I924, n7. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364; somewhat confused KG. 
(March 22, I9o6) 32 J ahrb. F.G. A 28. 
Greece: Law of May 28-29, I887, see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 29I n. 27. 
Quebec: Agnew v. Gober (I907) 32 Que. S. C. 266, (I9I9) 38 Que. S. C. 
3I3 (judgment revised); cf. I JoHNSON 283, 287. 
92 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 30, I923) Revue I922-I923, 494· 
93 Postponing impediments: Simonin v. M allac (I 86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; 
Gretna Green cases: see Brook v. Brook ( I86I) 9 H.L. I93; prohibitory im-
pediment: Sussex Peerage Case (I844) II CI. & F. 85. 
94 DICEY, Rule 760, 765; WESTLAKE §§ I8, 25; FOOTE IOI; also FOSTER, 
"Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law (I935) 84, 90 (although sharply disapproving of this view); 3 
FRANKENSTEIN 85, and many other Continental writers. More hopeful of 
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the decision of Ogden v. Ogden which led to this change, a 
"very much discredited" authority indeed.95 A better rule 
would perhaps have been found, were it not for the mislead-
ing habit of English courts and writers, even such critics of 
current opinion as Cheshire and Beckett, customarily con-
trasting mandatory requirements with formal instead of with 
directory requirements. Instead of saying that in English 
family law the want of parental consent does not invalidate 
a marriage, every writer asserts that consent is a formal re-
quirement in English matrimonial law; 96 therefore, discus-
sion continues whether it is such also in English conflicts law. 
Hence, it is not certain that ( 1) a marriage official in Eng-
land is empowered to officiate at an attempted marriage of 
foreigners that he knows is prohibited at their domicil be-
cause of lack of permission and that ( 2) a marriage cele-
brated in England would be held valid in the absence of pa-
rental permission, if this is an essential requisite under the 
domiciliary law for the validity of the marriage. These as-
sumptions would be necessary, if it were true that the power 
given parents in Continental codes to interfere with their 
future better advised decisions: BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1936) 
+6, n-8o, supra n. 69. 
Recently, the problem has been, if possible, still more confused by the ques-
tion whether the matter pertains to "primary" or "secondary" characteriza-
tion, see CHESHIRE 55-59; ROBERTSON, Characterization 239-245, CORMACK, 
"Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Con-
flict of Laws," I.J- So. Cal. L. Rev. 221 at 235; an unfortunate controversy, 
see also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 Can. Bar 
Rev. ( 1941) 311, 338, now Essays 74 ff. 
95 [rgo8] P. 46, criticized by the Privy Council in Attorney General for 
Alberta v. Cook [1926] A. C. 444, 455; by the House of Lords in Salvesen v. 
Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. 641, 646; by WESTLAKE § 25, 
CHESHIRE 58 f., BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1936) 46, So ff., supra 
n. 69; FALCON BRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. 235, 247, Essays 76; ROBERTSON, Charac-
terization 242, and many others. Only I BEALE 510, 2 BEALE 674, 679 n. 3, 
1103, approves this decision. 
96 CHESHIRE ( ed. 4) 57, 306, but correctly ed. 5, p. 56 ff.; FosTER, 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 90, supra n. 94· This formulation is also to be 
found in the critical report of FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 89, 
Essays 76, on the basis of a particular theory of classification against which 
CANSACCHI, ibid., protests. 
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children's marriages "cannot be tolerated in England or the 
United States," as Wharton once asserted.97 But at present 
nobody seems to envisage such a public policy. Dean Falcon-
bridge hopes that English and Ontario courts will recognize 
the nullity of French and Quebec marriages in the absence of 
the requisite parental consent.98 
Less radical, an unusual provision of the Civil Code of 
Venezuela, article 134, had declared, apparently on grounds 
of public policy (and not because of wrong classification), 
that lack of permission or lack of an "act of respect" does 
not invalidate a marriage, unless such permission or "act of 
respect" is required in the interests of ascendants or guardi-
ans.9sa 
The formality of notification, of course, is adjusted every-
where to the modes available locally.99 
Although form and substance need not be distinguished in 
the United States, since the law of the place of celebration 
governs both, on grounds of public policy the domiciliary law 
is occasionally taken into consideration with respect to pa-
rental consent.100 No such attention would be given to a mere 
formality. 
(d) Prohibition against remarriage. A prohibition to con-
tract a new marriage, not because of another existing mar-
riage but as an effect of a former dissolved marriage, is con-
sidered a unilateral incapacity. 
Illustrations: (i) An Italian married a widow, a citizen of 
Fiume, where Hungarian law was in force, before the expira-
tion of the ten months' period prescribed by Hungarian law, 
97 I WHARTON § 253 at 573· 
98 Annotation [I932] 4 D.L.R. I at 35· 
9Ba In the C. C. of I942, art. Io6, this provision has been changed into the 
usual rule requiring parental consent in the case of minor foreigners accord-
ing to their national law. 
99 CuNHA GoNc;:ALVEB, I Direito Civil 679. 
too Cf. the survey of cases given in Sturgis v. Sturgis ( I908) 5I Ore. w, 
93 Pac. 696 and GoODRICH 3 64. 
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the widow having obtained, however, a dispensation under 
Hungarian law granted to her upon a finding that she was 
not pregnant. The Italian Tribunal of Alba recognized the 
marriage,101 although Italian law did not admit such dispen-
sation from its corresponding impediment. 
(ii) A Belgian divorcee domiciled in Paris was held bound 
by the three hundred days' delay of the Belgian Civil Code 
(arts. 22 8, 296) and ineligible for dispensation under the 
analogous French provision.102 On the other hand, when the 
French provision is more severe than that of the national 
law, French courts are likely to insist upon the former.103 
(e) Impotence. Because of a personal characteristic of 
one party, a statute may give to the other an exclusive right 
to have marriage annulled. This is often assumed to be the 
case when a spouse is found to be impotent,104 although this 
is not the only nor the most modern view. In consequence, it 
has been contended 105 that if, e.g., a Brazilian, married to a 
woman of French nationality, was affected by this condi-
tion, the wife could not avail herself of Brazilian law, and 
French law would afford her no relief on this ground. 
Doctrine of bilateral prohibitions. Many obstacles involve 
both parties, even if founded on the qualities of one party. 
In this event, each party may avail himself of the remedy of-
fered, irrespective of whether it is established by his own per-
sonal law. In other words, the personal law of either spouse 
decides whether a prohibition concerns one party or both; if 
both, the ensuing conflicts rule gives full international weight 
to the decision of the personal law. 
(a) Social policy. Of such a bilateral nature are the enact-
1o1 Trib. civ. Alba (Feb. 27, I922) Giur. Ital. I922, I, 2, ISS· 
102 Cour Paris (Nov. 30, I934) Revue Crit. I93S, 486; cf. BATIFFOL, 
ibid. 6I6. 
103 See infra n. I s2. 
104 This was the justified construction of Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I07, but 
has been changed by C. C. ( I938) art. I2I, C. C. ( I942) art. I23· 
105 KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 63. 
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ments that forbid bigamy/06 marriage between near rela-
tives, 107 miscegenetic marriages/08 marriages of lunatics, 
syphilitics, epileptics, drunkards, persons afflicted with con-
tagious diseases, and the like.109 Insanity falls into this cate-
gory only when treated from the viewpoint of eugenics, not 
when considered a defect of consent.110 
(b) Adultery. Doubts have been expressed concerning the 
scope of statutes under which, in the case of an adultery 
stated in a divorce decree, adulterer and paramour are for-
bidden to marry each other.111 
The German prohibition was considered bilateral under 
the Civil Code,112 and the oflicial comment on the recent 
Marriage Act has confirmed this interpretation.113 This 
means that both guilty persons are involved in the prohibi-
tion, and therefore the marriage is forbidden if the unmar-
ried accomplice is a German, even though the adulterous 
spouse may be non-German. 
Illustration: A German was divorced on the ground of 
adultery, then became a Polish national and wished to marry 
his paramour. The Prussian Ministry of Justice held that the 
unmarried woman, who was still a German citizen, needed a 
dispensation.114 
106 See RG. (April 22, I932) I36 RGZ. I42, I44-I45 and RG. (June 8, 
I936) I5I RGZ. 3I3, 3I7. 
107 E.g., under Swiss C. C. art. IOO no. I, uncle and niece are prohibited 
from marrying if either one is a Swiss. 
Swedish Marriage Law of I920, c. 2 §§ 7, 8. 
Great Britain: Mette v. Mette (I859) I Sw. & Tr. 4I6. 
108 Twenty-eight states of the United States, formerly Germany, Italy, etc. 
109 Many states of the United States; Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and an 
ever-increasing number of other countries. 
110 See RAAPE, IPR. 233 n. 7, in opposition to KG. (Dec. 2I, I936) JW. I9371 
2039· 
111 E.g., Belgium: C. C. art. 298, as amended by Law of April I6, I935 
(limiting the period of prohibition to three years). 
Germany: BGB. § I3I21 Marriage Law of I946, § 6. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 89. 
112 RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. ( ed. I) 144. 
113 Ordinance of July 27, 1938, RGBI. I 923 § 5(5); RAAPE, IPR. 232. 
114 StAZ. 1934, 292. 
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After the substitution, in East German law, of specific 
grounds for divorce by one general clause, 114a West German 
practice has settled that the mere mentioning of adultery in 
the reasons of an East German divorce decision does not 
create the impediment.114b 
In the Netherlands, this question is unsettled, but the 
courts treat the impediment as an obligatory policy of good 
morals, precluding marriage within the state by any guilty 
party mentioned in a divorce decree,115 no matter whether 
the judgment be domestic or foreign and whether or not the 
personalla w so provides.116 In both Germany and the N eth-
erlands, however, a marriage concluded in spite of the pro-
hibition is not annullable. 
(c) Impediments connected with religion. The famous 
Austrian religious impediments were intended to be bilat-
eral117 and were so applied in the countries where they were 
in force. The same is true for the impediment of difference 
of faith as it still exists in Egypt 118 and elsewhere.119 
lHa Decree of Nov. 24, 1955, § 8. 
114b LG. Bielefeld (Sept. 28, 1956) NJW. 1957, 64; Ministry of the Interior 
of Hesse, Order of ] an. 31, 1957, StAZ. 1957, 68. 
115 H.R. (April 16, 1908) W. 8718, KOSTER&-BELLEMANS 135, Clunet 1912, 
293 and H.R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, criticized by ScHOLTEN, N. ]. 
1936, 1013 and ASSER-SCHOLTEN, Familierecht 64. This criticism probably 
affects also the decision of Rb. Haag (Feb. 1, 1935) W. 12974, whereby the 
prohibition does not concern a foreign woman who has received a dispensa-
tion from an analogous impediment under her own law. 
116 Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 12, 1936) W. 1937, no. 270. 
117 See the explicit exposition by WALKER 6o2 ff.; it may be remembered 
that these impediments were not applied if the parties married abroad and 
did not intend to go to Austria. Similarly, Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1916) 
137 Sent. 105. 
118 Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, Mixed Trib. (June n, 1913) 
3 Gaz. Trib. Mixtes no. 428 (Egyptian woman, forbidden under Moslem law 
to marry foreign Christian; marriage internationally invalid) ; Trib. Cairo 
(Oct. 6, 1953) 10 Revue egypt. (1954) 148. 
119 Poland: Supr. Ct. (July 22, 1924) Revue 1925, 440; Supr. Ct. {Nov. n, 
1933) Z.f. Ostrecht 1934-1935, 444· 
Czarist Russia and Lithuania: BuCHLER in StAZ. 1929, 192 to the effect that 
Christians as well as Jews are prohibited by their respective religious laws 
recognized by the state. 
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The Spanish provision, now again in force, whereby no 
one is allowed to marry a divorced person, also is a bilateral 
prohibition directed against both parties to the intended mar-
riage. Thus, under Spanish law, a French divorced woman 
cannot marry a Spanish bachelor.119a In France, however, not 
less than three different opinions have been expressed: 120 
that the prohibition is unilateral but as such makes the mar-
riage invalid; 121 that it is bilateral but the capacity of the 
woman depends on French law alone; 122 and that Spanish 
law is primarily applicable but eliminated by French public 
policy.123 
(d) Sham marriages. An obvious but notable example of 
a twofold defect is presented by the case of parties who go 
through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other 
than that of creating a true marriage. Legislation that re-
gards marriage essentially as a contract, is inclined to deny 
validity to simulated consent to marry; thus canon law/24 as 
well as French, Scotch, English,125 and probably American 
opinion/26 consider the marriage in such case void. Modern 
codifications presume that a public formal declaration of 
119a Trib. Supr. (May 12, I944) Revista Critica de Derecho Immobiliario 
I944, 754, also in GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema (ed. I) 554· 
120 Special literature: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, in "Conflit de lois nouveau," Revue 
I92I, 4I, 47 ff; SERIN, Les con flits des lois dans les rapports Franco-Espagnols 
en matiere de mariage, de divorce et de separation de corps (Toulouse, 
I929). 
121 Trib. civ. Montpellier (March I8, I920) S.I921.2.n, Revue I92I, 79, 
Clunet 1920, 633. 
122 App. Aix (Jan. 24, I924) Gaz.PaLI924.I·507, Revue 1924, 99, 277, Clunet 
I924, 670 (cumulating the various rationes decidendi) ; BATIFFOL, Traite no. 
370. 
123 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 1919) S.I92I.2.9, Revue I9I9, 543· Recently 
prevailing opinion has favored this interpretation. Cf. AumNET, n Recueil 
I926 l I75 1 I82; J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 443· 
Contra: Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (Dec. I4, I955) 46 Rev. Crit. (I957) 68. 
124 Codex Juris Canonici c. I086 § 2. 
125 M'Innes v. More (H.L. 1785) 3 Craig. & St. 40; Taylor v. Kello (I787) 
3 Craig. & St. s6; also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (I8II) 2 Hag. Con. 54. IOI, 
I6I Eng. Rep. 665, 802 and H. v. H. [1953] 2 All E. R. I229· 
126 Cf. BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage §§ 328 ff. 
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marriage should not be disavowed by revealing an intention 
to misuse the marriage institution. But recently in Germany, 
marriage for the sole purpose of procuring a name for the 
woman 127 or merely to give her the nationality of the hus-
band,128 has been excepted and considered void. In Switzer-
land similar rules were advocated 129 that have been adopted 
in a changed practice of the Federal Court and the Swiss 
Government and have recently been enacted.130 The United 
States has reacted against sham marriages designed to facili-
tate immigration; the Federal Act of May 14, 1937, simply 
orders deportation. 130a In all these cases it is sufficient that 
one personal law establish the invalidity. 
Illustration: During World War I, a French girl married 
an American in Turkey with the understanding that she 
should escape internment in a camp and that the marriage 
should serve no other purpose. The Tribunal of Grenoble de-
clared this marriage void according to French law, regard-
less of the law of the domicil of the American husband.181 
Time element. It is well settled that the applicable per-
sonal law is the personal law as of the time of the celebration 
of the marriage 132-not that to which a party is subject at a 
time prior to or subsequent to the marriage. 
127 BGB. § 1325a (Law of Nov. 23, 1933), Marriage Law of 1946, § 19. 
128 Marriage Law of 1938, § 23 par. I; and RG. (April 7, 1938) 92 Seuff. 
Arch. 311 no. 129. The provision was abrogated by the Marriage Law of 
1946. 
129 See EGGER in Festgabe fur Fritz Fleiner (1937) 85; RICHARD, "Les 
mariages fictifs," 66 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1937) 337· 
130 BG. (November 9, 1939) 65 BGE. II 133 and (Oct. x8, 1940) 66 BGE. 
II 225. In both cases a Swiss citizen had married a German woman threat-
ened by expulsion because of her behavior; the courts stated in both cases 
that the woman had not intended permanent marital community. The rule is 
now embodied in C. C. art. 120 no. 4 (added by law of Sept. 29, 1952). The 
Federal Council, by order of Dec. 20, 1940, article 2, par. 2 has even author-
ized the Just. Dep. to annul nationality acquired by such marriages; see 
38 SJZ. (I94I) I73· 
13oa U.S. Code (1953) 8 § I25I (c). 
181 Trib. civ. Grenoble (July II, 1923) cited by J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 
440 n. I. Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 291 n. 28; RG. (Dec. IS, 1930) JW. 1931, 
1340. 
132 Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, I9o8) JW. 1909, 78; RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3 
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Consequently, a defect inhering in a marriage at its incep-
tion is not cured by the acquisition of a new domicil or a new 
nationality; a void marriage remains void. 
Exceptions have been made, however, in favor of validity. 
Thus, the German Reichsgericht in a recent case 133 had to 
deal with a marriage void under Austrian law on the ground 
of disparity of cult (Christians and non-Christians), the 
parties having changed their Austrian nationality for that of 
Italy. The court saw no reason why it should invalidate a 
marriage considered valid in the new homeland because of 
public policy contrary to the impediment. Likewise the Kam-
mergericht in Berlin stated recently 134 that, if both husband 
and wife voluntarily acquired a new citizenship, their mar-
riage could not be declared void on a ground not recognized 
as an impediment under their new law.135 
Conversely, a valid marriage is not affected by a change 
of personal law; for instance, where a former French Catho-
lic priest married and afterwards became a citizen of Spain, 
the marriage would not be invalidated under French law and 
probably not under Spanish law. 
RGZ. 38; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, no. 65; RG. (Dec. 15, 1930) 
JW. 1931, 1340; 46 Z.int.R. (1932) 14; RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161, 
and others. 
France: App. Chambery (Feb. 7, 1885) Gaz.Pai.I885.1.703, Clunet 1888, 
796. 
133 RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, JW. 1932, 227. In this case the 
Reichsgericht went so far as to reverse the principle, holding that the deci-
sive time should be that when the action for annulment is brought. But this 
can hardly be taken literally in view of the general rule illustrated in the 
preceding note. 
134 KG. (Aug. 5, 1937) JW. 1938, 855 (marriage celebrated in 1916 before 
the German consulate in Adana, Chile, between a German woman and a 
Russian who afterwards became a Chilean subject; error as to the personal 
qualities of the husband entitled her to sue for nullity under German BGB. 
§ 1333 but not under Chilean Law of Jan. 10, 1884, art. 33; she was held to 
be deprived of the right under German law if she had become a Chilean na-
tional on her own application; if only the husband had applied, her citi-
zenship would depend on the validity of the marriage. In a note MASSFELLER, 
without protesting, expresses doubts). 
135 BARTIN 2 Principes 122 suggests that a defect that can be cured ac-
cording to prior law should be eliminated by a new law not retaining the 
impediment but that an "absolute" voidness cannot be cured. 
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A far-reaching deviation from this principle is implied by 
the C6digo Bustamante, article 40, whereby any country is 
entitled to deny recognition to a marriage, if the marriage is 
contrary to certain expressly enumerated prohibitions of the 
forum. This provision, taken literally, would entitle Brazil to 
declare void a marriage celebrated validly in Chile between 
an uncle and his niece, 136 if the parties became citizens of Bra-
zil and perhaps even if they did not. Such an application of 
public policy would be unreasonable, unless the court believed 
the continuance of the marriage within the forum to be as 
shocking as did the Ohio Supreme Court in the famous case 
of State v. Brown.137 
3· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration 
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention on Mar-
riage reduces the prohibitory effect of domestic marriage im-
pediments to a few fundamental points. This was the main 
achievement of the Hague treaty. It includes five prohibi-
tions, entitling the participant states to prevent the celebra-
tion of marriages on grounds, not of the personal law of the 
parties, but of its own local law: 
(a) Absolute prohibition on account of relationship or 
affinity; 
(b) Absolute prohibition between parties to adultery, 
provided the marriage of one of them has been 
dissolved on the ground of this adultery; 
(c) Absolute prohibition between persons who have been 
convicted of a joint attempt upon the life of the 
spouse of one of them; 
(d) Prohibitions concerning a former marriage; 
(e) Religious prohibitions. 
The grounds for the first three prohibitions listed above are 
136 Argued by M. WoLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 403. 
137 (1890) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747· 
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contained in article 2, paragraph r ; the last two are implied 
in article 2, paragraph 4· 
An absolute prohibition is a prohibition which is not dis-
pensable. In case of adultery, for instance, dispensation may 
be granted in Germany; Swiss parties, their national law in-
cluding no prohibition at all to marriage on account of adul-
tery, may therefore marry in Germany. The Dutch courts, 
however, consider adultery an absolute obstacle both for na-
tionals and foreigners. 188 
In the countries that have been or still are members of the 
Convention, every prohibition of local law has been exam-
ined in this way to meet the test of article 2. The Convention 
goes still further in limiting the local prohibitory rules. If a 
marriage has been celebrated in violation of one of the pro-
hibitions listed above but is valid according to the personal 
law of the parties, it is valid everywhere with the exception 
that it may be considered invalid in the state of celebration 
(not in a third state) in the cases mentioned in (d) and (e) , 
not (a)- (c) above.139 
Hungary, for instance, may forbid an ordained Catholic 
priest of Belgian nationality to marry within Hungarian ter-
ritory; if he succeeds in doing so, however, Hungary may 
consider the marriage void, but it is valid in Belgium and 
therefore in all other participant states. 
No prohibition other than those mentioned above is 
proper ground for preventing a marriage of nationals of an-
other member state. Hence, an Italian girl fourteen years old 
or a Rumanian girl of fifteen may marry in Switzerland or 
Sweden, where the age limits are seventeen and eighteen 
respectively. 
138 Settled doctrine, see H. R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, and cf. 
II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 205. 
139 The Polish Law on international private law of 1926, art. 12 par. 2, was 
drafted less clearly; see Pol. Supr. Ct. (Jan. 7, 1931) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
(1940) no. 104, with a critical note by RENCKI. 
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C6digo Bustamante. The C6digo Bustamante, article 38, 
permits the local law to avail itself of (all) its prohibitions 
which are not dispensable. Article 40 adds a rule for mar-
riages already celebrated, whereby "the contracting states," 
i.e., as it seems each of them, may refuse recognition to a 
marriage conflicting: 
With their provisions relative to the necessity of dissolution 
of a former marriage, to the degree of consanguinity or af-
finity, in respect to which there exists an absolute impedi-
ment, to the prohibition of marriage established in respect to 
those guilty of adultery by reason of which the marriage of 
one of them has been dissolved, to the same prohibition in 
respect to one guilty of an attempt against the life of one of 
the spouses for the purpose of marrying the survivor, and 
to any other excusable grounds of annulment. 
Trend. International literature, long critical of unlimited 
local policy, has encouraged the trend towards restricting its 
influence. This tendency is exhibited in the Polish Statute of 
I926 (art. I2 par. 2) which confines the cases of overriding 
local policy to four enumerated impediments. That the Ital-
ian Civil Code of I 8 6 5 (art. I 02 par. 2) reserved to the lo-
cal law every prohibition contained therein (arts. 5 5-69), 
was considered an "excessive and irrational" rule,140 needing 
a restrictive interpretation,141 although hardly seeming to 
permit it.112 The new Code no longer tries to override the 
nationality principle 143 to such an extent and enumerates the 
prohibitions that are intended to apply to foreigners. 144 It is 
true that foreign Catholics desiring a canon law marriage 
140 UnrNA, 6 Repert. 513, no. 139; UnrNA, Elementi 177, no. 127. 
141 Cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. 128. 
142 ANZILOTII ( 1919) 236; UDINA, EJementi 178, no. 1271 n. 2. 
143 Relazione del Guardasigilli on. Solmi (Report of the Minister of Jus-
tice) in C. C., book I, Progetto definitivo (1936) 54· 
144 C. C. (1938) art. II4 par. 2, C. C. (1942) art. u6 par. 2. The Minister 
of Justice declined to include Italian provisions on nonage in the list of 
inderogable impediments, where the personal law does not infringe public 
policy. See Relazione 1938 no. 78. 
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with civil effect must comply not only with civil requirements 
but with all those established by the canon law and their na-
tionallaws.145 In Spain, a similar position seems to be taken, 
all the Spanish requirements for Catholic marriage being 
added to those of the nationallaws.146 
Another example of increased understanding is that of a 
recent Greek decision confining to Greek subjects the old pro-
hibition of marriage between Christians and non-Chris-
tians.147 
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Relations 148 in-
corporates chiefly nondispensable prohibitions arising out of 
relationship and affinity, and the Finnish law of 1929 149 enu-
merates only relationship, affinity, and existing marriage as 
obstacles under local policy. 
But exaggerated mandatory local requirements are still 
frequent. The period of delay instituted for women after the 
dissolution of a former marriage figures in the list of com-
pulsory prescriptions of local policy in Switzerland, 150 the 
Netherlands/51 and France.152 The most recent civil code, 
145 FEDOZZI 425· 
146 Spanish Trib. Supr. (July IO, I9I6) I37 Sent. IOS. Cf. TRIAS DE BES, 3I 
Recueil I930 I 674. 147 Court of Athens (I937) no. 2462, Clunet I938, 902, on the ground of 
Cod. Just. L. I, 9, 6 of A. D. 388; Basilica L. I Tit. I, 38, and Rule 72 of 
the H. Synod. of Troullos. 148 Final Protocol no. I. According to no. 2 of the Final Protocol, persons 
who have acquired full age by marriage under Finnish Jaw or by dissolution 
of marriage under Icelandic law, may be prevented from marrying unless 
.they are twenty-one years old. 
149 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, on Family Relations of International Na-
ture, § 2 par. 2, and § 6 par. 3· 150 See Swiss C. C. art. I03 and BECK, NAG. I67 n. 53· 151 The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. II, I925) N.J. I926, 39I (Rus-
sian bride); H. R. (June 2, I936) W. 1936, no. IOI3 (applying Hague Con-
vention on Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 2). A convenient exception was made 
for a Norwegian woman, first separated under the Norwegian Marriage 
Law of May 3I, I9I8, § 43, and then divorced more than a year later: Rb. 
Rotterdam (Feb. 2, I937) W. I937, no. 482. 152 France: C. C. art. 228; Cour Paris (Feb. I3, I872) S.I873.2.II2, D.1873. 
2.I6o, (public policy "of decency") ; WEISS, 3 Traite 486; PouLLET 407 no. 
350. The same doubtful assertion was made even under the Hague Conven-
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that of Venezuela, has retained its long and exacting list.153 
Thus, the result is the same as when the law of the place of 
celebration is taken as decisive, and therefore all require-
ments of the local law as well as of the personal law impede 
the marriage of foreigners/54 
Effect of treaties and conventions. Has the adherence of a 
state to a treaty, such as the Hague or the Montevideo treat-
ies, or a state's participation in the Scandinavian Convention, 
any effect beyond the scope of the treaty, generally limiting 
the realm of unyielding public policy? Some Italian deci-
sions 155 and a few writers 156 have answered this question af-
firmatively with respect to the Hague Convention. They ar-
gue that states, having once subscribed in a treaty, for 
example, to the principle that the domestic age limit is altera-
ble for foreigners, can no longer allege the contrary with re-
spect to nationals of non-member states. Such a construction 
of an international treaty is not only untenable but would in-
deed endanger the conclusion of future treaties. Treaties are 
binding upon states only within their limits. 
4· Permissive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration 
The Hague Convention. According to article 3 of the 
Hague Convention, the law of the place of celebration may 
permit the marriage of foreigners contrary to their national 
laws, if these prohibitions are based exclusively on grounds 
tion on Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 3· Prevailing opinion contra in Switzer-
land, cf. BECK, NAG. 289 no. 17. In France this doctrine has been elab-
orated; the foreign law may be applied when it requires an even longer 
delay. Cass. {Nov. 27, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1934, 796 (Swiss delay for di-
vorced women; no curtailment by dispensation); Cour Paris {Nov. 30, 1934) 
Nouv. Revue 1935, 49, Clunet 1935, 927. 
153 Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 132, C. C. (1942) art. 104 referring to all 
mandatory requirements valid for nationals. 
154 See supra n. 47· 
155 See infra n. 157. 
156 WEISS, 3 Traite 478 n. 2; PouLLET 410; AuDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 
174, 186; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 113 n. 202; ibid. 195· 
Contra German RG. (Dec. 21, 1916) JW. 1917, 364; M. WoLFF, IPR. 191. 
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of a religious nature. The other states are entitled to deny to 
a marriage contracted under such circumstances recognition 
as a valid marriage. 
Which impediments are of religious nature? The question 
has been extensively discussed in the countries whose liberal 
doctrine denies recognition to foreign discriminations on ac-
count of religion. In agreement with the dominant opinion 
of these countries, the commentators on the Convention 
ascribe religious character to prohibitions based on: 
(a) Difference of religion ( disparitas cultus) ,157 such as 
the canon law prohibition of marriages between 
Christians and non-Christians in Spain and Greece, 
formerly also in Austria, Poland, and Bulgaria; 
the prohibition of marriages between Christians 
and pagans in Sweden; between Moslems and non-
Moslems according to the laws of Islam; and be-
tween Jews and non-Jews under Jewish law. 
(b) The relation between godfather and godchild (cog-
nati spiritualis) under canon law 158 and in Ru-
mama. 
(c) The vows of priests or monks, endowed with civil 
157 Not recognized: by enacted law in Venezuela, C. C. (194-2) art. 105; by 
the courts in: 
France: Cour Paris (Nov. 17, 1922) S.1924.2.65, Clunet 1923, 85, Revue 
1923, 437 (Serbian). 
Switzerland: Kreisschreiben (June 30, 1928) n. 13, 25 SJZ. 183. 
Italy: Trib. Livorno (May 5, 1894) Clunet 1898, 415 (Jewish law); Trib. 
Torino (Oct. 18, 1910) Clunet 1912, 288, and Corte di Venezia (Dec. 7, 
1910) Clunet I9II, 1326 (Austrian); App. Trento (March 8, 1928) Foro 
Ita!. Rep. 1928, II7I, no. 27 (Austrian); Cass. (May 19, 1943) Foro Ita!. 
1943 I 930 (Austrian); Cass. (Aug. I, 1946) II Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954) 
12 (Greek). 
Germany: A much cited decision of the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 6, 1908) 18 
Z.int.R. ( 1908) 541 is to the same effect, but the prohibition was recognized 
by the OLG. Karlsruhe (March 28, 1917) 35 ROLG. 358 (marriage cele-
brated in London); and finally by the RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, 
418 and RG. (Oct. 10, 1935) 148 RGZ. 383. Cf. RAAPE 239· 
158 Cf. the controversy between SATIER, 32 Z.int.R. (1924) 69 n. 88, and 
3 FRANKENSTEIN II4 n. 204. 
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effect in Spain and formerly in Austria, parts of 
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary.159 
It is doubtful, however, whether article 3 applies to a for-
mer marriage still considered existent for religious reasons 
despite a divorce (Italy 160 and for Catholics, Spain, for-
merly also Austria and the Warsaw district). 
No other prohibition established by the national law of a 
party may be neglected, not even the politically inspired im-
pediments which the Western tradition is accustomed to dis-
regard.lGl Thus, military deserters and conscientious objec-
tors from Austria and Germany, prevented from producing 
a certificate of ability to marry, had to be refused the right 
to marry in other member states.162 To France this result 
seemed so intolerable with respect to the emigrants from 
Alsace and Lorraine, that France left the Hague Convention 
on May 31, 1914, followed by Belgium on May 31, 1919. 
The Hague Conferences of 1925 and 1928 tried in vain to 
win these countries back by permitting a member state to 
ignore prohibitions arising from military obligation or from 
the status of a prince who needs the consent of the head of 
his house. 
The Swiss authorities apply these prohibitions as well as 
the provisions of an Italian law of r 93 8 requiring govern-
mental authorization for the marriage of an Italian to a per-
159 Not recognized in France (contra: AUDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 174, 
184). 
Great Britain, cf. DICEY, Rule 169 Exc. 2. 
Italy: Cass. Roma (July 31, 1924) Monitore 1924, 727. 
160 Viewed as a religious impediment by WALKER s87, sSS; SATTER, Note 
opposing App. Liege (Feb. 2, 1937) 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 13 n. II. Many 
writers think that art. 3, compared with art. 2 par. 3, and art. 6 par. x, ex-
cludes the impediment of former marriage from the conception of religious 
impediments. 
161 See supra pp. II4, 279· 
162 Cf. Swiss Fed. Dep. of Justice, BBl. 1917, III 575, no. 14: canton govern-
ments may grant license to marry (under NAG. art. 7e par. 2 to foreign ob-
jectors and deserters only if they are subjects of states having not adhered 
or having left the Hague Convention). 
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son of other nationality.163 On the same ground, German 
writers claimed that the German legislation on difference of 
race must be recognized by all other participants in the 
Convention.164 
It is, of course, left to the law of the place of the intended 
celebration whether or not it will respect a religious prohibi-
tion of the homeland. Switzerland, e.g., respects such prohi-
bitions in the case of non-resident foreigners, while it ignores 
them in the case of domiciliaries.165 Third states are equally 
free to determine their position. 
In general. Outside of the Hague Convention and apart 
from the religious prohibitions which have already been 
dealt with, all political and penal prohibitions of a foreign 
country are generally ignored. This liberal doctrine underlies 
the Civil Code of V enezuela/66 which expressly rejects pro-
hibitions of marriage founded on differences of race, class, 
or religion.167 
In view of the American discussions of the effect of remar-
riage prohibitions, it may be noted that the situation in other 
163 Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. I940, I463 no. 13, referring to art. 2 of the Italian 
Law of Nov. I7, I938, abrogated by Decree-Law of Jan. 20, I944, art. I. 
164 Cf. the summary by RAAPE, 2 IPR. (ed. I) I59, I62. Cf. RowsoN, "Some 
Private International Law Problems Arising out of European Racial Legis-
lation, I933-I945.'' 10 Mod. Law Rev. (I947) 345, 355 ff. 
165 BEcK, NAG. 293 no. I2. 
166 Venezuela: C. C. (I9I6} art. I33, C. C. (I942) art. I05. 
167 Hindu caste: Chetti v. Chetti [1909] P. 67. Racial prohibitions: Trib. 
civ. Pontoise (Aug. 6, I884} Clunet I885, 296. The Danish Minister of 
Justice, by Circular of Oct. I2, I937, informed interested officials that the 
German racial laws were applicable if no party was domiciled in Denmark. 
This seemed to indicate that a contrary policy was expected in the case where 
at least one party was a domiciliary; cf. RAAPE, 2 IPR. ( ed. I) I6o n. 2, who 
also notes the reaction of other countries to the German "law for the protec-
tion of German blood" of Sept. 15, I935· 
An interesting combination of considerations may be illustrated by a South-
African decision. In the Roman-Dutch law, the old rule of lex loci contractus 
still obtains. In addition, the facts that the bride was domiciled and the mar-
riage was celebrated in the forum, Natal, formed grounds to disregard the in-
ability of the man, under the common law of his domicil in Transvaal, to 
marry his late wife's sister. Friedman v. Friedman's Executors ( 1922) 43 
Natal Law Rep. 259, at 264, 266. 
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countries depends on analogous considerations. The first 
problem is to determine whether the law forbidding remar-
riage is intended to be applied abroad and, if so, to what 
marriages.168 A prohibition meant to be applied extraterri-
torially may not be applied by another country because it is 
regarded as penaU69 Otherwise, it applies as part of the per-
sonallaw.170 
Relation to the forum. The subject under discussion fur-
nishes significant applications of the general doctrine of pub-
lic policy. To enforce a domestic policy upon a case subject 
to foreign law, a strong tie between the case and the forum 
should be present. Thus, Swiss law quite appropriately en-
titles a foreigner domiciled in Switzerland to invoke the 
Swiss Federal Constitution, as opposed to his national law, in 
protection of his right to marry. Political or racial prohibi-
tions, even if not specifically eliminated by the Constitution, 
will be disregarded on behalf of a resident forei~er. A non-
168 For instance, German courts have discussed at length whether by the 
enigmatic provision of the Argentine Civil Marriage Law ( 1888) art. 82, 
parties who have married in Argentina and have been divorced abroad are 
prohibited from remarrying only in Argentina or everywhere. See infra p. 
464, n. 178. · 
169 England: Scott v. Att. Gen. ( 1886) 11 P.D. 128 declared inoperative the 
South African restriction on remarriage by the guilty party. 
France: Trib. civ. Marseiiles (Nov. 25, 1925) Clunet 1926, 388 refused 
recognition to a Serbian episcopal decree of divorce, because it contained a 
clause making remarriage dependent on the bishop's consent, which the court 
deemed inseparable, but the court should have recognized the divorce without 
the remarriage clause, see Note in Gaz. Pal. 1926. 1. 442; in accord Trib. civ. 
Seine (May 14, 1956) Clunet 1957, 146. 
Germany: KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 refused to apply the delay 
for remarriage imposed by a Swiss court in accordance with arts. 104 and 150 
of the Swiss C. C. because of its penal ("somewhat disgracing") character. 
Switzerland: Prohibition of remarriage declared in a divorce decree by a 
Yugoslav bishop is not recognized, Just. Dep., BBl. 1928, II 309. 170 England: Warter v. Warter (1890) 15 P.D. 152 per Sir James Hannen, 
Pres., recognizes a six months' delay after decree under the Indian Divorce 
Act, No. 4 of 1869. But in Miller v. Teale ( 1954) 29 A.L.J. 91, decided by 
the High Court of Australia, the three months' delay is regarded as an 
incidence of the foreign divorce decree, the law of the spouse's domicil at 
the time of the second marriage ceremony being expressly discarded. See also 
supra p. 290. 
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domiciled alien has no such right; on the contrary, the can-
tonal authorities are required to prevent him from entering 
into a marriage not recognized by his homeland.111 
Some codes, it may be remembered,172 following the ex-
ample of section 4 of the Austrian Civil Code, are restricted 
in their external effect to transactions intended to have effect 
within the territory of the personal law. The Austrian Su-
preme Court declared valid, despite Austrian impediments, 
a marriage celebrated abroad by an Austrian citizen, in the 
absence of intention to return to Austria immediately. This 
rule was applied even to former Catholic priests and to mar-
riages between Christians and J ews.173 Thus, a foreign court 
had no need to resort to its own public policy to allow such 
a marnage. 
Consequences of a state's acts. A permissive policy of the 
country of celebration may be based upon reasons different 
from tho~e thus far mentioned. Shall the forum permit a 
party locally divorced, which divorce is not recognized by his 
personal law, to remarry? This problem arose in Germany 
out of two apparently conflicting rules, viz., one determining 
according to the personal law whether a person is married or 
unmarried (EG. art. 13 par. I) and the other ascribing full 
credit to a domestic divorce decree.174 The second rule ought 
to be enforced, if the authority of the state is to be main-
171 HuBER-MUTZNER 430, gives a clear picture; BECK, NAG. 205 no. 49· 
172 SuPra p. 126, n. 55· 
173 OGH. (May 24, 1907) Spruch-Repertorium no. 198, 10 GIU.NF. no. 
3787 and OGH. (July 17, 1906) 9 GIU.NF. no. 3485 (Austrian Catholic 
marrying an Austrian Jewess in New York). Singular distinctions were de-
veloped. For instance, the Austrian prohibitions upon marriage were main-
tained where an Austrian abroad had a job, the loss of which would force 
him to return to Austria, OGH. (Oct. 28, 1936) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) IZO 
no. so; See also OGH. (July 23, 1937) 56 Zentralblatt (1937) 889. 
1 7 4 Two opinions correspond to these two rules. The first opinion, stressing 
the conflicts rule of EG. art. 13, was advocated by LEWALD n8; RAAPE 404; 
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 57· The second opinion: KG. 
(March 13, 19n) 24 ROLG. 19; REICHEL, 124 Arch. Civ. Prax. zoo; MASS-
FELLER, St.AZ. 1938, II21 IIS; Dt. }ustiz 1939, 1236ff. 
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tained consistently. A state is not supposed to dissolve a mar-
riage and yet deny the parties the advantage of the dissolu-
tion. In Switzerland, however, the majority opinion 4bas 
taken this very position; 175 hence, a marriage between an 
Italian and a Swiss woman may be dissolved in Switzerland, 
but the right of remarriage is enjoyed only by the woman.176 
5. Sanctions for the Fulfillment of Intrinsic Requirements 
Certificate of ability to marry. Officials issuing marriage 
licenses or presiding at marriage ceremonies are in an un-
favorable position to ascertain the impediments of a foreign 
candidate. A large number of countries, therefore, require 
foreign nationals or domiciliaries to exhibit a certificate is-
sued by a competent officer in the country from which they 
come, to the effect that to his best knowledge no impediment 
is known to the prospective marriage.177 Accordingly, in a 
great number of states, measures have been taken, and offices 
have been designated,178 for the issuing of appropriate certifi-
cates to be used abroad.179 The Hague Convention on Mar-
riage, article 4, paragraph I, prescribed this precaution to 
the extent that the Convention adopted the rule of national 
law. Some important countries are unwilling to issue such cer-
175 BBl. I922, II 582 no. 14 (Spaniard); BECK, NAG. 464 no. 223; contra 
Regierungstrat Zurich, S]Z I952, 376. 
176 See for fuller discussion infra pp. 557-559. 
177 E.g., Austria: Hofkanzleidekret of Dec. 22, I8I4, Justizgesetzsammlung 
No. III8, now Marriage Law of I938, § I4. 
Finland: Gen. Ord. of Dec. 28, I929, 1 BERGMANN (Finland p. 11). 
Germany: BGB. § I3I5 par. 2, Marriage Law of I946, § 10. Cf. RAAPE 264, 
on the complicated case of a foreign annulment not recognized. 
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. 103, C. C. (I938) art. 114 par. I, C. C. (I942) art. 
116 par. I, not abolished as had been proposed. 
Sweden: Royal Ord. of Dec. 3, 19I5. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7e, BEcK, NAG. 185, 200. 
178 BoscHAN in 5 Z.ausl.PR. (193I) 332 n. 2 gives a list of offices declared 
competent in numerous states. 
179 In some countries banns are issued before giving the certificates, as in 
Luxemburg, and Switzerland. 
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tificates; 180 therefore, either dispensation in the country of 
celebration is frequently obtained,181 or "certificates of cus-
t~" are produced.182 
The underlying idea of this institution is clearly demon-
strated in Switzerland; foreign citizens intending to marry 
within the country must apply to the government of the can-
ton for permission and, with the constitutional exception of 
domiciled foreigners/ 83 are not permitted to marry unless it 
is shown that the marriage would be recognized in the 
homeland.184 
Dispensation. Dispensation, likewise, is governed by the 
personal law. Not the law of the place of celebration but 
the personal law determines what officials are competent to 
grant dispensation from any prohibition to marry.185 
180 This is true particularly for Great Britain (excepting treaties concluded 
on the basis of the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906) though in practice 
consular certificates even without statutory authority are issued (CHESHIRE 
327) and almost all the states of the United States, except perhaps Wyoming, 
where a provision corresponding to § 3 of the Uniform Marriage Evasion 
Act is in force. (L. 1935. ch. 3 §I, Compiled Statutes, 1945. sec. 5o-I06, 107). 
On the difficulties caused by this attitude see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of Inter-
national Law ( 1941) 356 § 161. 
In France a "certificat de non-opposition" may be issued, but it is not rec-
ognized as equivalent to a certificate of "no impediment." 
181 E.g., Switzerland in all cases of Americans, Federal Council, BBl. 1887, 
III 700; Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, II 581 no. 13, in view of the recognition, in 
the United States, of Swiss marriages celebrated according to Swiss law. 
Germany: Allg. Verfiigung des Reichsministers der Justiz, Feb. 4, 1936, 
Dt. Justiz 1936, 208 and Durchfiihrungs VO. no. I zum Ehegesetz of July 27, 
1938, § 8; Runderlass des Bundesinnenministers, June 16, 1952, StAZ. 1952, 
201. 
1 8 2 Mostly through the diplomatic service of the country of celebration; 
see Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1938, II 498 no. 7· 
183 Swiss Federal Constitution art. 54 par. 3; NAG. art. 7e. Where the 
bridegroom is of Swiss nationality, authorization is unnecessary, Just. Dep., 
BBl. 1925, II 143 no. 12. 
184 HuBER-MUTZNER 433· 
In Germany, besides the certificate of ability, other documents are re-
quired, such as a certificate that the husband's nationality will not be lost by 
marriage under foreign law; another showing that the husband transfers 
his nationality to the bride is probably obsolete. Moreover, it is remarkable 
that where religious marriage is compulsory in the homeland of a party, Ger-
many and Switzerland require a priest to declare himself ready to marry the 
parties. Cf. supra p. 231, n. 55· 
185 KosTERS 366 states this principle and exceptions thereto granted by Royal 
favor in the Nether lands. 
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Effect of violation of personal law. Because of the broad 
scope of the personal law, it is necessary to determine what 
law governs the effects of a violation of its prescriptions. As 
we have seen in connection with formal prescriptions, the 
dominant opinion is that the same internal law that estab-
lishes a requirement determines the effect of failure to com-
ply with the requirement.186 Covered by this rule are the 
problems whether a prohibited marriage is valid in spite of 
the prohibition or whether, if not, it is absolutely null (non-
existent), conditionally valid until annulment, or voidable at 
the instance of certain persons; whether or not an annulment 
has retroactive effect; by what persons action may be 
brought; whether an annulment may be pronounced by per-
sons other than judges; by what events the right to annul is 
extinguished, etc.186a 
Where the parties have different personal laws, each of 
the two laws must be consulted with respect to the conse-
quences of a violation. The law of the husband may give him 
an exclusive right to avoid the marriage or may perhaps en-
title the wife alone to do so; sometimes both laws concur in 
the same or in more or less similar effects. In addition to the 
illustrations implied in the cases discussed above, the follow-
ing may be of interest: 
( i) Case decided by the Reichsgericht on January 20, 
I928 (I20 RGZ. 35): in I9IO two Swiss citizens, A (male) 
and B (female) married in Salt Lake City, Utah. Without 
having obtained a divorce from A, the wife B married C, a 
German citizen, in Indianapolis, Indiana, in I 9 I 6. Nat until 
I 9 I 8 was the marriage between A and B dissolved by di-
Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, II 581 no. II points out: a Swiss cannot 
marry his late wife's sister who is of Italian nationality, unless she receives 
dispensation under Italian C. C. (1865) arts. 59, 68, and hence produces an 
Italian certificate of nihil obstat. 
l86 See citations supra p. 247, n. 121. 
186a In the result Trib. civil Bruxelles (June 18, 1949) Pasicrisie 1950 
III 7 (Simulation of marriage). 
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vorce. In I92I C, who had meanwhile returned to Germany, 
received knowledge of B's previous marriage to A, and 
thereupon B and C separated. Upon inquiry, C was told by 
an American Military Commission in Germany that his mar-
riage with B was null and void. Thereupon, in I 924 C went 
through a German ceremony of marriage with D. When the 
validity of this last marriage came up for determination by 
a German court, this court, according to the German choice 
of law rule, had to test the validity of the marriage between 
B and C by the national laws of these parties, i.e., simultane-
ously by German and Swiss law. By article 7f of the Swiss 
Law on Conflicts, the court would have been referred to the 
law of Indiana. Under Indiana law, the marriage was abso-
lutely nonexistent, while German law merely regarded it as 
destructible ex tunc by decree of court. Following the general 
Continental approach of applying to such cases the law es-
tablishing the more severe sanction, the court should have 
found the second marriage void without any legal process 
and the third marriage valid. By inadvertence, the Reichs-
gericht overlooked the renvoi of the Swiss statute on con-
flicts and, instead of Indiana law, applied as B's personal 
law the law of Switzerland, which it held to be identical with 
that of Germany.181 Hence, the court held that C's marriage 
to B was valid when he married D, that the marriage with 
D, objectively considered, was adultery and that B would 
be entitled to a divorce. 
( ii) Let us assume that in I 9 I 6 B had married in Iowa 188 
instead of in Indiana; 189 then the infirmity of the marriage 
would have been cured by the divorce of 1918. The same 
would have resulted if they had married in Sweden.190 
(iii) The following situation is quite different. A German 
girl, fifteen years old and domiciled in Switzerland, marries 
somewhere, her age being concealed. Germany claims her as 
187 This finding was not entirely correct either. Under German law an 
annulment of a bigamous marriage destroys the marriage ex tunc; it is effec-
tive only ex nunc in Swiss law. The sanction of the German law is the more 
severe and should have been applied. 
188 Iowa Code ( 1939) § 10445 subsec. 4, § 10486 sub sec. 3· 
189 See Compton v. Benham (1909) 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365; Simms 
v. Kirk (1924) 81 Ind. App. 515, 144 N. E. 146. 
190 Swedish Marriage Law of June u, 1920, c. 10 § 1 par. 2. 
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a national, Switzerland as a domiciliary. The marriage would 
be considered void ( annullable) in Germany and voidable in 
Switzerland. 
Evasion of directive requirements. Since the effect of a vio-
lation of a requirement depends on the law establishing the 
requirement, it follows that the effect is the same whether the 
marriage takes place abroad or at home. Thus, the Dutch re-
quirement of parental consent, being merely a directive pre-
scription, does not invalidate a foreign marriage, although 
the wording of the Dutch conflicts rule could be understood 
to entail invalidity.191 In other words, evasion of directive re-
quirements by a foreign marriage is of no consequence. This 
result is certain. It is obscured only by the usual idea that, in 
a well-ordered system of civil status, even non-mandatory 
rules of domestic marriage laws are securely protected 
against violation. 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS 
The law of the place of celebration, which governs with-
out qualification the substantive requisites of marriage in the 
United States and Argentina, contrasts with the personal law 
observed as a matter of course everywhere else. The con-
trast is striking enough to offer a legislative problem, a prob-
lem aggravated by the limited knowledge we have of the 
exact reasons at present for the American system. The his-
toric background is obvious. Those of the statutists who 
advocated the law of the place where the marriage is cele-
brated, did no more than apply the rule they taught for 
contracts in general, and their main impulse in establishing 
the rule sprang from self-sufficient territorialism. We may 
191 Dutch Supreme Court, H. R. (May 23, 1919) W.10436, N. J. 1919, 689, 
in opposition to the questionable text of BW. art. 138. 
Likewise, for instance, to avoid nullity Belgian citizens are bound to ob· 
serve only mandatory requirements abroad, i.e., the requirements of age, 
consent, relationship and affinity. See PAGE, I Droit civil beige ( 1933) no. 692. 
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presume the same conception to have prevailed in America, 
while it remained a country dependent on immigration and 
pioneering. Requirements of the old countries were not to 
impede the marriages necessary to new settlers. It was fair 
to replace them by the demands of an honest Christian com-
monwealth. All this is understandable without much re-
search. 
However, for a considerable period, neither immigrants 
nor pioneers have typified the shifting population of this 
country. Nevertheless, while in each of the forty-eight juris-
dictions the legislature occupies itself with enactments elabo-
rately shaping the requirements for marriage, marriages out 
of the state are fairly numerous, and the conflicts rule per-
mits citizens to choose at pleasure any one of all these 
statutes, to which to submit both the celebration and validity 
of their marriages. This equation of intrinsic with formal re-
quirements is no longer appropriate. While the various 
forms of secular ceremonies solemnizing marriage are inter-
changeable, the very different kinds of marriage impediments 
in the statutes are not thought of as equivalent in any way 
in the mind of the legislators. Yet, under the conflicts rule, 
they are all treated in the same way. 
The harm done by indiscriminate application of local law, 
however, involves more than trespassing on the domain of 
foreign state legislation. First, social progress achieved in 
one jurisdiction in the field of eugenics-as respects insanity, 
medical certificates, etc.-is freely frustrated in others.192 
Granted that some reformers of marriage welcome the un-
bounded multitude of marriage statutes as an immense labo-
ratory for social experimentation-an attitude rather ques-
192 The marriage of a fourteen-year-old girl from Wisconsin marrying in 
Minnesota was declared in Iowa voidable only according to the Minnesota 
statute of the time (cf. at present Minn. Stats. 1953, sec. 517.02, 518.02) despite 
the prohibition and the evasion statute of Wisconsin. See, in contrast, supra 
p. 275, n. 37· 
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tionable-here freedom is converted into anarchy. Second, 
if the state of the domicil reacts against foreign violation of 
its policy, the great advantage of the principle that a mar-
riage is good if valid at the place of celebration, disappears. 
Nevertheless, the implications of the legislative power and 
of specific marriage policies are being more distinctly real-
ized, and the cases where a marriage is held void at the 
domicil of a party grow more frequent. 
Under these circumstances, the failure of the Uniform 
Marriage Evasion Act to rally the states to the principle that 
marriages concluded contrary to the domiciliary law should 
be avoided is most regrettable. Could it be that its reforms 
were not sufficiently clear and adequate to be considered 
worthwhile? Probably, they were regarded as inefficient in 
the absence of more effort than the Act dared to require. No 
machinery for enforcement was provided to prevent false 
allegations by the parties and to effectuate interstate ex-
change of legal requirements and personal records. Nor has 
the one state that adopted the section in the Uniform Act 
requiring the license issuer to ascertain whether the proposed 
marriage contravenes the home statutes of the parties, been 
interested to prescribe investigation of the alleged facts. It 
may have been premature to expect more. Today in many 
jurisdictions, as a hundred years ago, marriage licenses are 
granted with the greatest facility and promptness. While a 
growing number of statutes stress the necessity of proofs of 
age, parental consent, and freedom from dangerous diseases, 
as well as banns or notice of intention to marry, others have 
repealed the requirement, formerly obtained by social stu-
dents, of a few days' interval between the advance notice 
and the celebration.193 A new species of state supervision may 
be needed to insure to marriage legislation due respect by the 
state's own officers as well as by other states. The develop-
l93 See VERNIER, Suppl. 10 § 16. 
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ment in foreign countries seems to suggest, however, that a 
better interstate understanding would not require restrictions 
on the legislatures, whether they prefer ultraradical or ultra-
conservative policies. 
The chief rule of the civil law countries certainly is in ex-
treme opposition to the American. While codes and treaties 
are pathetically engaged in trying to conciliate clashing poli-
cies of two or more jurisdictions, the American method of 
simply ignoring the problem by exclusively depending on the 
law of the place of celebration is so far from the European 
view that Diena called it "absurd." But, if simplicity indi-
cates a sound law, the American rule is sound, and the Euro-
pean system hopelessly "absurd." Still worse than the compli-
cations themselves is the variety of the attempts to harmo-
nize contradictory principles of the national and local laws. 
The system of applying the personal laws of two parties and 
the law of the celebration at the same time, if carried 
through as initiated by the school of Mancini and embodied 
in innumerable codes, is impractical. A thoroughly informed 
representative of the Prussian Ministry of Justice told the 
legal committee of the Diet in 1929 that the difficulties of 
ascertaining the capacity of foreigners to marry had in-
creased to a disturbing extent after the first world war, 
strange results were occasioned by exotic religious laws, and 
that the principle of nationality was far from furnishing the 
certainty it was supposed to guarantee.194 
A remarkable remedy, however, may be noted. By inter-
national conventions, the scope of the requirements that 
should be observed abroad has been narrowed. Further aid in 
the same direction is supplied by modern enactments, such 
as the new Italian Code, which spontaneously reduces the 
causes of nullity of marriage when celebrated abroad. In-
deed, if a statute insists on prohibiting marriage between 
194 See supra p. 167, no. 210. 
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first cousins, which is allowed in most jurisdictions, why 
should another country yield to this problematic proposi-
tion? The state enacting such a statute would do better to 
limit the prohibition to domestic ceremonies. The Hague 
Convention, the Treaty of Montevideo, and the C6digo 
Bustamante agree in the division of domestic marriage im-
pediments into two categories, one of international and the 
other of merely national applicability. Only the gravest ob-
jections, shared by all participant states or raised by one 
state and understood by the others, are considered sufficient 
to prevent or nullify a marriage contracted outside of the 
home state. The lists of internationally relevant impediments 
so far established coincide in some obvious inclusions-as 
for instance consanguinity between ascendent and descendent 
or between brother and sister, or an existing marriage of a 
party-and in other respects vary in a characteristic man-
ner. The religious impediments that had so great significance 
for the Hague Convention on Marriage are excluded from 
consideration in the two Latin American treaties. Under 
that of Habana (art. 40), any minimum age, including that 
of eighteen years for male and sixteen years for female 
parties prescribed in Brazil (C.C. art. I8J, XII), must be 
observed in the other states. The Montevideo Treaty (art. 
I I) does not oblige a state to respect a lower limit than 
fourteen years for men and twelve for women. Although this 
is unsatisfactorily low, the idea of fixing an international 
age limit is excellent. 
Finally, the existing contrasts suggest a compromise on 
another basis. Suppose Italians visiting the United States. If 
they are well informed, they may walk right from the pier 
into a court house and be married at once. The permissibility 
of their union will be judged exclusively under the law of the 
state where they happen to stay during a couple of hours. 
An American may be domiciled for forty years in Italy, but 
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his capacity to marry at all, or to marry a certain person, will 
be determined by all Italian authorities concerned, by search-
ing the law of some forgotten home of his or of his father or 
grandfather. One system is as abusive as the other. A state 
should not want to join foreigners in marriage utterly dis-
regarding their home laws. Nor should a state, using the 
dubious test of nationality, exaggerate and perpetuate its 
significance for the determination of civil status. 
When is it reasonable to acknowledge the effect of a 
change of circumstances upon the substantive requisites of 
marriage? That the mere presence of parties ought not to 
suffice to change the applicable law, is recognized, at least 
in theory. But also the mere, though actual, change of domi-
cil should not be regarded as enough. Evasion will not in 
practice be eliminated if people who contemplate matrimony 
may choose their marriage law by simple transfer of their 
domicil. This is the danger also in making the first matri-
monial domicil govern the substantive requisites. 
All this leads to the proposition that the personal law of 
the parties should continue to govern for a certain period 
after the parties change their domicil. Marrying after this 
time, they would be subject to the law of the place of celebra-
tion alone, with effect also in their home countries. In such a 
simple system, no additional precaution is needed. If it must 
be complicated by concessions to the actual conflicts law, the 
method of shortened lists of international impediments is 
unavoidable. 
CHAPTER 9 
Personal Effects of Marriage 
I. EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE IN GENERAL 
I. The Internal Conceptions 
"EFFECTS of marriage" is a modern legal concept 
corresponding to the comprehensive matrimonial 
legislation which was developed in the course of 
the nineteenth century. Following the model of the German 
and Swiss codes, all recent European codifications of private 
law contain a chapter concerning the operation of marriage 
on the relations between the spouses themselves and between 
the spouses and third persons. The consequences of this 
arrangement are many and significant; the European doc-
trine attributes much importance to the fact of marriage and 
considers many, if not all, the pertinent provisions as a 
separate complex of rules within the system of law. 
At present, the term "effects of marriage" refers both to 
the personal relations and to the property of husband and 
wife. 1 The older codifications, compiled at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, acknowledged certain personal rights 
and duties of spouses but did not contain any extensive body 
of rules referring to the operation of marriage on property. 
They customarily treated the problem of property interests 
between spouses as it had been approached by the statutists, 
that is, by discussing the effects of marriage settlements, at 
that time customary among propertied classes. Character-
istically, today the settlement is still called in France contrat 
1 
"Personal" and "property" relations, of course, as used above, do not 
exactly correspond to their meanings in private law. 
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de mariage and in German, Ehevertrag, although it is not a 
contract of marriage but only a contract respecting property 
relations made upon the occasion of a marriage. 
Consequently, these codes and the literature of the period 
treated the entire question of the effects of marriage on prop-
erty as a question of contract. In the French Civil Code and 
codes of other countries influenced by it, the subject is still 
retained in the sections dealing with contracts. Not until very 
recent times have some of these countries, particularly Italy, 
Greece, and Peru, included in their new codes chapters on 
patrimonial relations between the spouses, chapters placed 
along with others dealing with the law of family relations. 
Numerous topics pertaining to the effects of marriage, how-
ever, are still dispersed throughout the codes. 
American law has not developed in this subject a body of 
doctrine similar to that of the German Civil Code. The near-
est approach to it is a collection of scattered topics con-
nected with marriage, brought together under the heading 
of "husband and wife" in the various treatises and casebooks 
on family relations. By analytical comparison, we find an 
important difference in that marriage in itself does not have 
so many peculiar consequences in the present private law 
of this country as it does in Europe. The emancipation of 
married women, particularly as brought about by the equal 
rights statutes of the common law states, has reduced the 
effects of marriage to a comparatively small residuum. 
Gradually, married women have been granted the power 
to own and manage property in their own names and the 
capacity to make valid contracts with and conveyances to 
third parties; transactions between husband and wife have 
been rendered possible; and the peculiar rules on liability for 
torts committed by a married woman and on the husband's 
liability for the wife's prenuptial debts abolished. Indeed, 
PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE 319 
in a few states, the old disabilities of married women have 
been swept away completely. 
On the other hand, legislatures and courts of numerous 
states have deemed it unwise to empower a married woman 
to bind her property as surety for the debts of her husband 
or to become his business partner. A considerable number of 
states have found it necessary to protect creditors by for-
bidding or restricting property transfers between husband 
and wife. In several states, the ancient institution of tenancy 
by the entireties has been preserved. In several states of the 
Middle West, a contract of a married woman does not bind 
her assets, unless she expressly states her intention to do so. 
vVith respect to torts, the recent family car doctrine has re-
sulted in a revival of the husband's liability for certain torts 
of his wife. In the field of property interests, statutory rights 
have been substituted for the ancient rights of dower and 
curtesy in the majority of states, in many cases with elabo-
rated and strengthened provisions. The effects of marriage 
upon the property relations of husband and wife, although 
no longer so vital as they were at common law, are still 
numerous and important. The changes from the old common 
law have been so recent, however, so unsystematic, and so 
different in the various states that no general doctrine has 
thus far been worked out. Considering the undoctrinal or 
even anti-doctrinal climate of American jurisprudence, we 
can hardly expect the elaboration of any such doctrine in 
the near future. 
2. Reaction on Conflicts Laws 
This is only one of the many differences of structure 
among the municipal laws, having distinct reactions on the 
conflicts law. Above all, in the Continental international 
private laws, the national law has come to govern the whole 
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complex of relations growing out of marriage. Under the 
German Introductory Law, which has been followed by many 
other codes, the non-patrimonial rights and duties of married 
persons are governed by the national law of the husband as 
of the time when a particular relation is in question; effects 
on property of the spouses are governed by the law of the 
country of which the husband was a national at the time of 
the marriage. 
The American law of conflicts, on the contrary, contains 
no separate body of rules on effects of marriage. The Re-
statement perfectly reflects the actual law, when it expresses 
the "effect" of foreign marriage in one single sentence 
( § r 33), saying that a state will give it the same effect as 
"a marriage created by its own law." Duty to pay for neces-
saries, for goods bought, and for alimony are treated to-
gether with all other alimentary obligations (§§ 459, 460, 
463). Effects on property of the spouses are considered 
exclusively under the head of interests of husband and wife 
created in each other's property, either immovable or mov-
able, and are treated along with property in general 
(§§ 237-38, 248, 289-293). Moreover, the capacity of 
married persons to enter into antenuptial contracts (§ 238 
comment b; §289 comment c), separation agreements, et 
cetera, is part of the law of contracts ( § 333) ; the capacity 
to commit torts, the right of one spouse to sue the other in 
tort, or the right of the husband to sue a wrongdoer for 
injury to his wife, are regulated by the law governing torts 
( §§ 377 ff.). Finally, there are the rules on constructive 
trusts, living trusts, and testamentary trusts, institutions 
affording the main safeguards for the family interests of the 
wealthy. 
As we must follow here the European division into two 
groups of effects, we encounter uncertainty about the border-
line between them. Again, no substantial argument supports 
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the theory that the lex fori, the distinctions of internal law, 
should decide directly the scope of a conflicts rule on personal 
or property effects. 2 The more important points will have to 
be discussed one by one. 
3· Person::tl Effects of Marriage 
The conflicts rules to be discussed here refer either to the 
law of the forum, the law of the temporary residence of the 
spouses, of their domicil, or of their nationality. In order to 
understand why these rules differ more than those on status 
in general, we must remember the nature of personal marital 
relations. Every legislator is conscious of the fact that such 
duties as those of mutual fidelity, cohabitation, and obedi-
ence of the wife, have their foundation in morality or re-
ligion. Nobody would think today of enforcing such duties 
through specific performance or compulsory execution. All 
modern laws agree that, so long as a marriage is normal, the 
law has no importance in these respects. Modern codifiers, 
however, have decided to lay down rules that give these 
duties a legal character; they wish to emphasize the social 
importance of sound marriages and to grant a spouse as 
much judicial help as possible, short of separation and di-
vorce. That it is insufficient to speak of "spiritual effects of 
marriage," as is done sometimes in Latin America, probably 
for the sake of Catholic doctrines, is demonstrated by the 
Codex Juris Canonici, which defines the conjugal duties in 
terms of definite jural rules (c.rrro-IIIJ). 
The more the legal nature of the mutual duties of a mar-
ried couple is stressed, the more it is felt possible to resort 
to a personal law determined either by nationality or marital 
domicil. Where the personal effects of marriage are gov-
erned simply by the law of the directing court, marriage is 
2 Still, this seems to be the prevailing opinion, also adopted in Latin 
America by authoritative writers, such as 2 Vrco, nos. 52, 6o. 
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thought to be ruled essentially by morals, which are naturally 
evaluated according to local written or unwritten rules. We 
shall see how both ideas are confused in some countries, for 
instance, in France. 
II. CONTACTS 
1. Law of the Residence 
The United States. In the United States, it is not quite 
clear whether purely personal marital relations are governed 
by the law of the forum or by the law of the place where the 
spouses "live," although the equation "place where they live, 
that is, the law of their domicil" 3 has probably been aban-
doned.4 As a matter of fact, in case both parties reside tem-
porarily at a place, the court of that place apparently will 
take jurisdiction and apply the local law.5 Probably, the 
Restatement ( § 133, Comment b) speaks of such a case, 
stating that "the incidents which result from the existence 
of the status are determined by the law of the place where 
they are sought to be exercised," and declares by way of 
illustration that the law of the place where they presently 
live determines the question whether a husband is guilty of 
battery when he uses force to control his wife. Other cases 
may be too rare to be taken into account. In British countries 
also, including Quebec, 6 the conception seems to be that the 
husband's authority over the person of his wife is of a disci-
plinary nature and to be decided entirely within the limits of 
the lex fori, jurisdiction being predicated upon residence, not 
3 MINOR § 79; DUDLEY FIELD art. 554· 
4 KuHN, Comp. Com. 144. This point is settled implicitly by the Restate-
ment §§54, I33· 
5 Cf. 4 PHILLIMORE 359 cited with approval by I WHARTON 365 and KUHN, 
Comp. Com. I44: "If the husband deserts his wife, refuses her maintenance, 
or ill-treats her by violence, she has a right jure gentium to redress in the 
tribunals of the place where they reside." Cf. also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 343 
no. 310. 
6 I JOHNSON 327. 
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domicil. This rule embraces the questions of what amount of 
forcible control the husband may use, as well as whether a 
resident foreigner may apply to the courts for restitution of 
conjugal rights.7 
Argentina. In Argentina, the test of domicil adopted by 
the Civil Code (art. I 6o) and by the Treaty of Montevideo 
of I889 (art. I2) was suddenly changed by the Marriage 
Law of November 12, I 8 8 8 (art. 3), which referred to resi-
dence; hence the courts have been stimulated to apply the 
law of the forum. 8 The literature criticizes this solution as 
an unjustifiable infringement upon the domiciliary principle.9 
2. Law of the Domicil 
Domicil, as the test chosen for questions of status in gen-
eral, is decisive also in the personal relations of the spouses 
in Denmark/0 Uruguay/1 if not in Argentina, more recently 
also Peru 12 and Brazil 13 and under the Treaty of Monte-
video.14 Domicil in this connection is the marital domicil. 
In Switzerland, likewise, in accordance with its general 
rules, married persons domiciled within the country are gov-
erned by the municipal law; 15 Swiss nationals domiciled 
7 Connelly v. Connelly (1851) 7 Moore P. C. 438; O'Leary v. O'Leary 
[Alberta, 1923] 1 D. L. R. 949· 
8 Even the former text, C. C. art. 160, was understood in the same sense 
by DAIREAUX, Clunet 1886, 293· ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 105 explains that 
in almost every case the law of the place where the conjugal rights and 
duties are exercised is deemed relevant. 
9 2 WEIS&-ZEBALLOS, Manual de derecho internacional privado ( ed. 5, 
1912) 159; 2 VIcO no. 6o; ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 281, 285. 
10 BORUM n6. 
11 C. C. art. 2396. No discussion or problem exists as declares VALLADAO 65. 
12 Peru: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. V, agreeing with precedents for which see 8 
APARICIO y SANCHEZ, C6digo Civil 70. 
13 Brazil: Lei de Introdu~iio ( 1942) art. 7· 
14 Text of 1889, art. 12, text of 1940, art. 14. 
15 NAG. arts. 2, 32, as interpreted by the Fed. Trib. (May 29, 1908) 34 
BGE. I 299, 316; cf. STAUFFER, NAG. 77 Vorbem. no. 7 to arts. 19 ff. The 
Swiss domiciliary law has been emphatically re-emphasized in BG. (April 
18, 1942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13, adding that the rules concerning the protection of 
the marital union belong to public policy. 
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abroad are subject to their national law, unless the domi-
ciliary law declares itself applicable.16 
French writers are increasingly inclined to propose legisla-
tion that marital domicil be taken as the test.11 
3· Law of Nationality 
The problem. In jurisdictions adopting nationality as the 
test of status in general, personal husband-wife relations 
have been controlled by the law of the state of which the 
husband was a citizen. The simple reason for this rule origi-
nally was that in the countries concerned the wife at mar-
riage regularly acquired the nationality of her husband. Yet, 
although this effect of marriage upon the nationality of the 
wife has been modified in an increasing number of countries, 
the conflicts rule has been preserved and is the prevailing 
rule. This attitude may be explained partly by the force of 
tradition and partly by the fact that both the wife's acquisi-
tion of the husband's nationality and the application of the 
husband's personal law are founded on the marital power of 
the husband, which in some rudimentary form still exists 
under most modern codes. 
As a matter of fact, however, the cases where spouses 
have different nationalities, either during the entire mar-
riage or as a result of later changes, have become frequent 
and this has had to be taken into account. 
In the United States, the law of nationality has been modi-
fied several times. Under the provisions in force since I 9 2 2, 
a foreign wife no longer acquires American citizenship by 
marriage, and an American woman no longer loses her citi-
zenship by marrying a foreigner. These rules also exist in 
the Soviet Union and in Brazil. French enactments after 
World War I provided that a French bride retained her 
16 NAG. art. 28 and supra p. 87 note 45· 
17 GouLJ!, "Mariage," 9 Repert. 89 no. 477· 
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nationality unless she filed a declaration to the contrary; an 
analogous provision is now in force with respect to foreign 
women marrying Frenchmen. Other countries have followed 
these models. Along the same line, repatriation of wives who 
have lost citizenship by marriage is frequently facilitated by 
reduction of the normal requirements. Another source of 
different nationalities of husband and wife is that, subse-
quent to the marriage, husband or wife may separately ac-
quire new nationalities. 
The cases of split nationality were considered by the 
Hague Convention on Marriage Effects of 1905. 
The rule that the national law of the husband governs the 
personal relations between husband and wife, is expressly 
upheld in the case of divergent nationalities in the codes of 
Germany,18 Austria,19 Greece, 20 Italy, 21 Spain,22 Egypt/2a 
Syria, 22b and Siam,Z2c by the C6digo Bustamante/3 and for-
merly the Treaty of Montreux concerning the jurisdictions 
in Egypt 24 and recently the Benelux-Draft.24a In other coun-
tries, the same view still obtains by interpretation. 25 Promi-
nent French authorities have also enunciated the rule.26 
18 EG. art. LJ- par. I, as now usually construed; LEWALD 88; RAAPE 275; 
\VIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 6I n. 352, but see infra n. 28; art. I4 
par. 2 adds that (;erman law applies also if the husband has lost his Ger-
man nationality but the wife has retained hers. 
l!i Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § 7· 
2o Greece: C. C. art. I4. 
~: Italr: C. C. (I 865) Disp. Pre!. art. 6; C. C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. IS. 
-- Spam: C. C. art. 9· 
zza Egypt: C. C. art. I3 par. I. 
22b Syria: C. C. art. I4 par. I. 
22c Siam: Law on Private International Law of I939, art. 2I. 
2 3 Codigo Bustamante art. 43· 
24 Convention of Montreux of May 8, I937 on Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, 
Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 29 par. 3, U. S. Treaty Series No. 
939· 
24a Benelux-Draft: art. 4· 
25 See for instance for the Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) 
W.Io 444, N.J. I032; for Guatemala: MATOS, no. 230; for Portugal: VAL-
LADAO 70. 
26 AUDINET, I I Recueil I926 I 2I2, considers this rule obvious; BARTIN, 2 
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The rule is unquestionably applied when both parties ac-
quire a new nationality by a common act. This mutability of 
the applicable law is recognized everywhere (in contrast to 
the immutability of the rules on marital property relations). 
Where the national laws of the spouses are different, the 
following efforts to modify the rule have been made: 
Last common nationality. If the husband alone changes his 
nationality, which until then has been common to both, it 
seems inequitable that the wife should suffer a corresponding 
change in her status. Therefore, the Hague Convention of 
I 90 5 (arts. I and 9 par. 2) provided that the law of the last 
nationality common to the spouses should govern. This solu-
tion has been followed by Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Italy, and Greece and has been approved by some writers. 27 
Illustration: In Germany (RG. [April IS, I93S] I47 
RGZ. 3 8 5) a Dutch husband acquired German nationality, 
his wife remaining a Dutch national. His action for restora-
tion of conjugal rights based on German law was denied 
because this cause of action is unknown to Dutch law, which 
continued to govern the duties of the parties according to the 
Hague Convention. 
The rule is understood as meaning that a change of nation-
ality, in order to affect both spouses, must be voluntary on 
the part of both, and not one which is voluntary on the part 
of the husband alone and extended to the wife merely by 
operation of law. 
Principes 2I4 § 293, sees no room for hesitation; BATIFFOL, Traite 508 with 
a qualification. 
27 Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I subsec. 9; Czechoslovakia: Law of 
1948 on private international law, § I4; Poland: Law of I926 on interna· 
tiona! private law, art. I4; Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. I8; Greece: 
C. C. ( I940) art. 14 and previously deci~ion of Epheteion Patron ( I922) 33 
Themis 92 (Italians, the husband later being naturalized in Greece). OLG. 
Kiel (Jan. 24, I93I) JW. I932, 599 (in relation to England, non-member 
state). Cf. CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I9I01 59; NIBOYET 736 no. 626; 3 ARMIN· 
JON 2o; PoULLET 432 no. 372. Resolution of the Sixth Hague Conference, 
1928; Rumanian Draft, art. 23. 
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But this solution is useful only in the case where there has 
been at least one common nationality. The Hague Conven-
tion is limited to this case; no uniform conflicts rule exists for 
any other case. 
Cumulative application of both national laws. To provide 
a solution for every case of different nationality, an influen-
tial doctnne advocates the application of both national laws 
cumulatively. Each party, it is argued, may have only those 
rights and duties that are established by his or her own na-
tional law. Hence, what right the husband or wife may exer-
cise depends on simultaneous approval by both marriage 
laws. 28 
It is rather generally felt, however, that such a cumulation 
is difficult to determine and very undesirable. In every coun-
try, the law regulating the effects of marriage is drafted 
to achieve a certain balance; to take out a single part because 
that part has not been acknowledged by another state's legis-
lation, destroys the consistency of the marital law and re-
duces its efficacy. 29 
Emergency solutions. On the basis of the nationality 
28 Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929 on family relations of international nature, 
§ I4 par. I. 
Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232; KG. (May 
27, 1927) JW. 1928, 73; KG. (Feb. 24, 1936) JW. 1936, 2470; cf. OLG. 
Stuttgart (March 31, 1905) II ROLG. 287. 2 ZITELMANN 670; WALKER 
742; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 408, but apparently no longer 
in his IPR. 197; contra: I BAR§ 172 and most writers, see RAAPE 275 (de-
minutia matrimonii). MASSFELLER, }W. 1936, 2472; ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. 7· The RG. {Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, has not yet taken 
sides. 
Italy: ANZILOTII, Corso (1913) 250; cf. his arguments as to the parallel 
problem of paternal relations, 2 Revista ( 1907) 116; CAVAGLIERI 219; UmNA, 
Elementi 181; FEDOZZI 432; Bosco 229; contra: CANSACCHI, 3 Guir. Comp. 
DIP. 275, with a good summary. 
29 J. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt im internationalen Privatrecht, Thesis 
( Gottingen, 1936) 42, tries, without success, to develop a more satisfactory 
"cumulation." WENGLER, Book Review, II Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 973, calls at-
tention to the rules in French Morocco, under which the status of each spouse 
is governed by his personal law. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 246 n. 85, suggests apply-
ing the law of the defendant. 
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principle, relatively the best solution seems that of resorting 
to the last common nationality which the parties may have 
had, as was done by the Hague Convention of r 90 5. Where 
the parties never had any common nationality, the best ap-
proach seems that of resorting to the law of the husband as 
of the time of the marriage. This solution was suggested in 
a draft issued by the Sixth Hague Conference of 1928. 
Every other solution founded on nationality imposes ex-
cessive risks on all third persons who deal with a married 
person.30 
Yet, would it not be preferable to abandon the principle 
itself, at least in this particular field? A tendency toward the 
domiciliary law seems strong; 31 it is of considerable weight 
in Latin America. 32 This development is closely connected 
with that of resorting to public policy with respect to for-
eigners domiciled in the forum, a trend which we shall con-
sider in the following section. 
4· Public Policy of the Forum 
Law of the wife. In a number of countries, the rule that 
the governing law is the national law of the parties or of the 
husband, is reversed, and under certain circumstances the 
30 POULLET (ed. 2) 479· 
81 CASSIN, 34 Recueil 1930 IV 757 j LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE 250 no. 239; 
NIBOYET, Traite 361; FEDOZZI 238; cf. AuDINET, Clunet 1930, 328. The 
problem was fully discussed with respect to the capacity of women to con-
tract by AUDINET and others in Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit inter-
national prive, Annee 4, 1936-37, 89 ff. The revised Czechoslovak draft 
(Revue 1931, 187) § 17 par. 2, refers, in absence of a last common nation-
ality, to the last common domicil of the parties; the law of 1948 (§ 16), 
however, declares in this case the lex fori applicable. 
The Institute of International Law deems applicable, in case of diversity 
of citizenship, the law of the common "habitual residence" or of the last 
residence or, as a last resort, the lex loci celebrationis, 46 Annuaire (1956) 
176. 
32 VALLAD.ii.o has devoted his book, Conflicto das leis nacionaes dos conjuges 
nas suas rela~6es de ordam pessoal e economica e no desquite, to the defense 
of this tendency. See particularly, 178 ff., on earlier views favorable to the 
law of the domicil and conclusions, 205 ff. The Brazilian Lei de Introdu~ao 
of 1942 has followed his doctrine. 
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law of the wife is applied, at least if it happens to be the law 
of the forum. 
In Germany (EG. art. 14 par. 2), German law is applied 
when the German husband acquires a foreign nationality and 
the wife remains a German national. 
In France, the case of a French bride marrying a foreign 
subject but retaining her French nationality has attracted a 
great deal of attention. While some authors have interpreted 
the amendment of the nationality laws, under which the 
French woman's French nationality is preserved,S3 as de-
signed to preserve her French private law rights in all cases, 34 
others limit the application of French law to couples living 
in France. 3 " A similar practice obtained in Brazil under the 
nationality principle; Brazilian law was applied when one 
of the parties to the marriage was a national of the country 
and both, or even the husband alone, were living in BraziP6 
The like seems to be true of other Latin American countries 
as well.37 An attempt to clarify the situation by an express 
statutory rule was made in France, in 1924, when the Cham-
ber of Deputies voted upon a bill providing for the applica-
tion of French law in all cases where either the husband is 
a Frenchman or where, the husband being a foreigner, the 
wife is a French national and the parties are domiciled in 
France.38 The requirement of French domicil was dropped 
in the draft of the Societe d' etudes tegislatives ( 1930) 39 : 
According to this, French law should govern the non-prop-
erty effects of marriage as to both spouses, if one is French I 
33 Law of Aug. ro, 1927, art. 8; Code de Ia Nationalite 1945, art. 94· 
34 LEREBOUR5-PIGEONN!ERE; ( ed. 3) 390 no. 3 33, whereas in his latest 
edition (ed. 6) 358 no. 332 the author advocates for this case the law of 
the matrimonial domicil; cf. NIBOYET, Revue 1929, 193, 194, 209. 
35 NIBOYET 734 no. 625. 
36 VALLADAO 136, zoo. 
37 E.g., Guatemala, MATOS nos. zu, zrz. 
38 Revue 1924, 315 n. r. 
39 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 164, art. 19; cf. ibid. 76. Cf. NIBOYET, 
Revue 1929, 193, zu and 4 Traite 366; BAR TIN, 2 Principes 201 § z88. 
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French courts. The courts in France go so far in applying 
domestic law that it has been alleged that they would do so 
every time a French party is concerned or any French in-
terest is at stake.40 However, this does not represent the 
dominant opinion. For some time, the French courts have 
been wavering between the two poles of national law and 
public policy, the former having been strongly advocated by 
Andre Weiss and his school, the latter appearing as a goal 
of nationalistic post-war trends. At present, it seems that 
certain effects of marriage are regarded as dependent on the 
national law and others on the domestic law. The catalogue 
of the latter group, as drawn up by Weiss himself 41 in 19 r 2, 
has presumably been extended since. In 1928, the following 
problems were enumerated by Niboyet 42 as governed by the 
personal law: capacity or incapacity of the wife; mutual ob-
ligations of fidelity and assistance of husband and wife; 
wife's duty to follow husband to his residence and the right 
to bear his name; special capacity of the wife to dispose of 
her salary; "putative marriage." 43 
The realm where public policy prescribes the exclusive ap-
plication of French law, was defined as follows: penal pro-
visions; implied authority of one spouse to contract for the 
other; alimentary obligation; desertion of family. 43a 
The same general pattern exists in the other countries fol-
lowing the nationality principle.44 So many variations in de-
40 Trib. civ Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461. AUBRY, L'incapacite 
de Ia femme mariee en droit international prive fran~ais (Paris, 1933) 57; 
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 356 no. 33 I, extending public policy to all moral 
conceptions. 
41 WExss, 3 Traite 584 ff. 
42 NIBOYET 736 nos. 627, 628. 
43 See infra p. 587. 
43a Twenty years later, NIBOYET, 4 Traite no. 1503, extended the second 
group by including the duty of the wife to obey her husband and to follow 
to his residence; the mutual obligations of fidelity; and the exercise of a 
profession by the wife. 
44 Cf. for Spain: TRIAs DE BEs, 31 Recueil 1930 I 677 and 6 Repert. 253 
nos. 103, 104; GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 299· 
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tail exist, however, that we shall have to discuss every one 
of the various effects of marriage separately. 
Procedural law. It is a traditional proposition that do-
mestic law is exclusively applicable in matters of procedure 
and penal law. Exclusive domination of the lex fori in mat-
ters of procedure is recognized by the Hague Convention on 
Marriage Relations of I 90 5. After stating as a general 
principle that the rights and duties of the spouses in their 
personal relations to each other are governed by their na-
tional law, article I adds the following proviso: 
However, these rights and duties cannot be enforced except 
by the means permitted under the law of the country where 
their enforcement is sought. 
According to this provision, the forms of action, judgment, 
and execution are controlled by the local rules of the court, 45 
but the court of the forum does not permit any cause of ac-
tion that is not also recognized by the national law.46 A 
German husband, for example, is allowed under the German 
civil and procedural codes to sue his wife for restoration of 
conjugal rights, but he cannot bring such an action in Bel-
gium. A Belgian husband, on the other hand, may not bring 
an action of this kind in a German court, since he has no such 
right of action under his nationallaw.47 
This rule, forbidding a country to grant a foreigner a 
right of action not recognized in his national law, is a strange 
limitation on local public policy, to which the signatories to 
the Convention voluntarily submitted. A national of a non-
signatory country may well be permitted to avail himself 
of a local remedy that is not recognized by his national law, 
45 See also I BAR 481 § I7Z par. 3; z FIORE 103 ff. no. 598. 
46 The methods of enforcement must be analogous but not identical: see 
Actes de Ia Quatrieme Conference de Ia Haye, 1904, 178; German Denk-
schrift in I8 Z.int.R. ( 1908) s8o. 
47 Cf. infra n. so. 
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when the forum considers the granting of such remedy re-
quired by its own public policy.48 
III. ScoPE OF THE RuLEs 
In this section, we shall note the matters that have been 
claimed either generally or in some legal system as within 
the scope of the conflicts rule on personal marital relations. 
I. Duties of Conjugal Life 
Where the personal law governs the relations between 
husband and wife, it has been applied to determine the 
spouses' mutual duties of fidelity and personal assistance, the 
wife's duties of obedience and rendering services in the 
household or in the husband's business, and similar matters. 
It depends on the personal law 49 whether the husband 
may forcibly control his wife's conduct, whether he may 
open her correspondence or rescind her contractual obliga-
tions of personal work, and whether one spouse may sue the 
other for restitution of conjugal rights.50 
As already mentioned, the local law is competent, how-
ever,S1 to bar an action that does not fit in with the local sys-
tem or to refuse a method of enforcement not permitted by 
48 See, for instance, for Italy: CAVAGLIERI 2I8; UDINA, Elementi I82 no. 
I32· It has been contended, however, particularly by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 255, 
that the public policy of the participant states was modified by the Hague 
Convention. See this contention in another connection, supra p. 30I. 
49 Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 350; NIBOYET 737 no. 627 (2). 
50 Applying the personal law of the parties, German courts have accorded 
this action (provided for in the German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I) 
to Czechoslovakian spouses (RG. (June I2, I922) Leipz. Z. I922, 5I8) and 
denied it to Belgians (LG. Giessen (Nov. I, I92o) 20 Jahrb. DR. 22I), 
Swedes (LG. Stuttgart (April 4, I924) 23 Jahrb. DR. 442), and Dutchmen 
(OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 23, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 49; RG. (April I5, I935) 
I47 RGZ. 385). A peculiar exception has been made by the RG. (Feb. I7, 
I936) I50 RGZ. 283 (an Italian wife domiciled in Germany was granted 
this action, unknown to Italian law, because she lacked the remedy she 
would have enjoyed in Italy). 
51 Supra p. 331· Thus, German courts would not assume the task of Swiss 
judges of admonishing the parties and suspending their life in common, 
Swiss C. C. arts. I69, I70. 
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its procedure; it seems safe to assert also that no forcible 
control by extrajudicial acts is granted unless permitted by 
the local law. 52 
Instead of resorting to the personal law, French courts 
have sometimes simply applied the domestic law, especially 
when the court was anxious to compel a husband to support 
his wife. · French courts have also enforced the duty of 
obedience to which a wife is bound under French law, irre-
spective of whether such duty was incumbent on her under 
the national law of the spouses.54 The C6digo Bustamante 
seems to abandon the personal law entirely, when it states 
that the obligation of the spouses to live together, to observe 
mutual fidelity, and to support each other, is subject to the 
local law (art. 4 5). 
Domicil by operation of law. A problem deserving special 
discussion is that of determining the law by which the domicil 
of a married woman is fixed. The conflicts rule on marital 
relations determines, as a matter of course, whether a wife 
is obliged to follow her husband to his place of abode; 55 but 
does it also determine whether her domicil necessarily coin-
cides with that of her husband? The municipal laws differ 
widely in answering this question.56 While England and 
52 Only occasionally, the action for restoration of conjugal rights has been 
classified as of imperative public policy; thus RG. (Oct. 6, 1927) IPRspr. 
1926-1927, no. 68 (Soviet Russians). 
53 Trib. civ. Seine (May 3, 1879) Clunet 1879, 489; Cour Paris (April 20, 
r88o) Clunet 188o, goo (action for goods received at the domicil of the hus-
band); Cour Paris (Jan. 7, 1903) Clunet 1905, 208. 
54 Trih. civ. d'Evreux (Feb. 15, 1861) D. 1862.3.39 and Trib. civ. Seine 
(April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461. Concerning the latter, see infra n. 83. 
55 Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232 (Ameri-
can wife held obliged to follow her husband from New Jersey to Germany, 
the law of New Jersey being in accord). 
France: Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1923) Clunet 1924, 462 (in the application 
of German BGB. § 1354 par. 2, it was held that a German wife in Alsace 
need not follow her husband to an inconvenient dwelling place). 
56 E.g., in America the older rule that a deserted wife is domiciled at the 
new domicil of her husband, has not yet been abolished by the present 
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 8, but 
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Latin America still insist upon the ancient rule that the hus-
band's domicil is necessarily that of his wife, other countries, 
for instance, Norway and the Soviet Union, do not recognize 
the wife's domicil as dependent on her husband's at all.57 
In Germany, prevailing opinion applies the personal law 
(i.e., the national law of the husband) also to the question 
whether the wife necessarily shares her husband's domicil.58 
The United States courts, as well as the Treaty of Monte-
video, resolve this question, like all other questions con-
cerning domicil, by resorting to the forum's own rules on 
domicil, unified throughout the country, instead of referring 
the problem to the law declared applicable by the forum's 
choice of law rules. Thus the Restatement says: 
"§ 27 . . a wife has the same domicil as that of her 
husband." 
"§ 28. If a wife lives apart from her husband without 
being guilty of desertion according to the law of the state 
which was their domicil at the time of separation, she can 
have a separate domicil." 
Except on the question of desertion, neither the municipal 
law of the domicil nor that of the forum is decisive. 
A case decided by the Tribunal civil de la Seine 59 involved 
a citizen of Czarist Russia who had married an American 
girl from Rhode Island before a civil official in Cyprus. 
is abolished by the new draft of 1940, art. 9· The Restatement § 28, moreover, 
permits the wife leaving her husband to establish a new domicil if she is not 
guilty of desertion; statutory law permits the same even if she is guilty. 
57 Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 570 no. 72. Russia; FREUND, 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 340. 
58 RAAPE, IPR. 3n; cf. the recent decision of the RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR. 
1939, no. 376, 159 RGZ. 167, on the child's domicil (infra p. 649, n. 261). 
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 23 I, 503. 
Similarly, Belgium: Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.179; Trib. 
Bruges (March 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. Cf. infra Divorce, Chapter II, 
n. 71. 
59 Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759, with note by 
NIBOYET. Similar c'ases: Cass. (req.) (June 21, 1865) S.r865.1.313; Cass. 
(civ.) (March 13, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 718, Clunet 1933, 639; Cass. 
(civ.) (Dec. 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1937, 189. 
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Some time after the marriage, the husband went to Paris, 
while the wife went to live in Capri, Italy, and never came to 
France at all. The Tribunal, considering the question one 
of "qualification" and following Bartin's theory on this sub-
ject, declared in conformance with the French law of the 
forum that the domicil of a wife was necessarily that of her 
husband. 60 
It may be observed, however, that this decision, like many 
others, 61 was concerned with domicil as a condition of the 
court's jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the wife at 
the domicil of the husband. In this connection, the local con-
cept of domicil clearly has a better claim than in the choice 
of law. 
In line with the general tendency toward the domiciliary 
principle, it has even been advocated that the law of the hus-
band's domicil should decide the legal domicil of the wife.62 
2. Capacity of Married Persons 
Classification. Under the system of personal law, the ques-
tion has been raised whether a married woman's disabilities 
are part of the status of the wife, and therefore governed by 
her own personal law, or rather whether they are part of the 
specific effects of marriage, and therefore subject to the law 
governing these effects, which may be the law of the husband, 
that of the common nationality, or some other law. All bias 
aside, this problem of classification depends on the specific 
nature of the wife's incapacity. The conflicts rule concerning 
status in general envisages legal incapacities presumed to in-
6° Cf. NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 1935, 762. 
61 Cf., e.g., OLG. Stuttgart (May 8, 1908) 17 ROLG. 81, 18 Z.int.R. (1908) 
453· 
Uruguay: App. Montevideo (about 1938) Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. 1938, 210, 
Clunet 1938, 841 (action for separation between American citizens, the hus-
band being domiciled in Uruguay, the wife living in the United States). 
62 NIBOYET, I Traite nos. 541, 551. 
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here in the female sex; the rule concerning personal effects of 
marriage regards such disabilities as may be imposed in con-
sequence of marriage. The principal illustration was the 
former article 2 r 7 of the French Civil Code: A wife, even 
when there is no community or in case of separation of prop-
erty, cannot give, convey, mortgage, or acquire property, 
either with or without consideration, without her husband's 
joining in the instrument or his written consent. This rule, 
imitated in many countries, was abolished in Italy in 1919, 
in France itself in 1938, and in other countries, 63 but is still in 
force in some other places. The probable motivation of the 
draftsmen of the Code,64 emphasized by modern commenta-
tors,65 was not a belief in the "frailty of the sex" but a de-
sire to strengthen the leadership of the husband, who was 
intended to enjoy his powers not only in his own interest but 
in the interest of the family as a whole. Hence, the provision 
affects not so much the status of the wife as the organization 
of the family, i.e., the effects of marriage. An incapacity, such 
as was imposed by the French Code, should be governed by 
the conflicts rules on personal effects of marriage rather 
than by those dealing with personal incapacities. 66 All these 
observations seem equally true in regard to the common law 
disabilities of married women. They were never designed 
for the protection of the wife but were based upon the idea 
of the merger of personalities and thus flowed from the mar-
63 Italy: Law no. II76 of July I7, I9I9. 
France: Law of Feb. I8, I938, J. Off. Feb. I91 I938, 2058 no. 42, also in 
39 Bull. Inst. Int. ( I938) I45· 
Belgium: C. C. arts. 2I2-226 bis, as amended by Law of July 20, 1932. 
Rumania: Law of April I9, I932. 
64 See HERCHENRODER, "The Capacity of Married Women in French Law," 
20 Journ. Comp. Leg. {1938) I97 n. I. 
65 CoLIN et CAPITA NT, I Cours elementaire de droit civil fran~ais ( ed. 3) 
6I8; NIBOYET 736 no. 627, and prevailing theory. 
66 Dominant doctrine, see RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. {I93I) 267; M. WoLFF, 4 
Rechtsvergl. Hand'wiirterb. 408; PILLET, I Traite 59 I no. 277; FEDOZZI 454· 
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 232, because of his theory, and some of the Swiss 
decisions because of the confused Swiss legislation. 
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riage relationship.67 A different characterization of similar 
incapacities by the municipal law of the forum is irrelevant. 
It is always possible, of course, that some statute, for in-
stance, that of Florida, although on its face similar to the 
provision of the French Code, requires a different con-
struction. 88 
Suppose a woman, a citizen of the United States, is mar-
ried to a Belgian, both being domiciled in England, and she 
procures a loan in Nice, France, without her husband's con-
sent. A court following the nationality principle (German, 
Cuban, etc.) will apply neither American law (as of her 
status) nor the English (as of her domicil) nor the French 
(as lex loci actus) but Belgian law (as governing marital 
relations). 
Where the wife has retained a personal law of her own, 
the only consistent solution is to disregard this law. 69 
Finally, personal effects of marriage must be distinguished 
from the effects of marriage on property interests. Numerous 
disabilities of a spouse as regards freedom of contract or 
conveyance result from some matrimonial regimes, for in-
stance, from the community property system or the systems 
according to which the wife's general assets are managed 
by her husband. Prevailing opinion does not link with per-
sonal effects of marriage the limitation of a married woman's 
capacity, unless it results from the marriage itself irrespec-
67 See the most recent writer, JosEPH GINSBURG, "Contractual Liability of 
Married Women in Nebraska," 20 Neb. L. Rev. (I94I) I9I, I92. 
68 In Florida and Texas, the common law disabilities of married women 
have only partially been removed; cf. 3 VERNIER 36 §I 52; in Florida the 
Circuit Court may grant the wife power "to take charge of and manage 
her own estate and propery," if the court is satisfied as to her capacity to do 
so, Fla. Statutes Ann. ( I94I) §§ 62.38-62.56; cf. also § 708.08. 
69 PILLET, I Traite 59 I; LEWALD 95; doubts have been expressed by M. 
WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. I) I24, and RAAPE 289, but have been dropped recently, 
M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I98, and RAAPE, IPR. 3I3. However, the Benelux-
Draft (art. 4) declares incapacities of the wife decreed by the husband's 
national law relevant only to the extent that her national law agrees. 
338 MARRIAGE 
tive of any matrimonial property regime. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal formulated this rule once by acknowledging such 
effects on the personal relations, if these effects take place 
even where the wife has no property at alP0 Thus, the ca-
pacity to contract and to acquire property 71 granted to mar-
ried women by the American equal rights statutes is a general 
capacity and ought to be respected everywhere as an incident 
of the marriage law involved insofar as that law is applied 
at all to the relations between a husband and his wife. 
Analogous observations apply with respect to limitations 
on married men. 
Married woman's capacity to contract. (a) As a general 
rule, the personal law is applied everywhere in Europe. This 
principle has been stated expressly by a recent Finnish stat-
ute and seems unchallenged throughout the civil law coun-
tries. 72 It was held in France, for instance, that, in accordance 
with the foreign law of the time, an English wife was capable 
70 BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. For an illustration of the 
double task of ex.amining first the personal capacity in general, then the pos-
sible restrictions by matrimonial property law, see the opinion by LYON-CAEN, 
advocate general, Cour Paris (July 7, 1928) Revue 1929, 81 (Norwegian 
spouses). 
71 Cf. KG. (Aug. 2, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 44· 
72 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929 on family relations of international nature, 
§ 14 par. 3, capacity of a married woman to act determined by the law of the 
state whose citizen she is, except for art. 16, relating to third persons, and the 
provisions concerning marital property. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 30, 1854) S.1854-1.27o; Cass. (civ.) (July 29, 
1901) Clunet 1901, 971; and a great many decisions of the lower courts; see 
WEISS, 3 Traite 588. 
Germany: OLG. Kiiln (Dec. 5, 1898) Clunet 1905, 396; RG. (Oct. 12, 
1905) DJZ. 1905, rr7o, Revue 1907, Sao (German wife contracting in Lux-
emburg, liable under German law); RG. (March 20, 1906) JW. 1907, 328, 
Clunet 1908, 187. 
Italy: Cass. Roma (May 2, 1908) Giur. Ita!. 1908, 1, 941, Clunet 1909, 563. 
Switzerland: The national law of the wife, not the domiciliary law, is de-
cisive; see BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 741, applying Handlungsfahig-
keitgesetz (1881) art. ro par. 2, instead of NAG. arts. 32, 34; BG. (May 23, 
1912) 38 BGE. II 3; capacity to contract is governed by the national law: 
BG. (April 6, 1894) 20 BGE. 648 ff., 31 ZBJV. (1895) 173. 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 
390 and 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 310; even if she is a former Swiss citizen: BG. 
(Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. 
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of contracting without her husband's consent/3 that an 
Italian wife could act upon the basis of a general power of 
attorney L·om her husband (contrary to French law), 74 and 
that a wife from Wallis, Switzerland, needed an authoriza-
tion of the court in case the husband was interested in the 
transaction. 75 
The capacity of married women under age to contract de-
pends on whether, under the marital law, any powers are 
reserved to her father or guardian.76 
(b) The law of the forum is seldom resorted to in this 
matter.77 
(c) The law of the place of contracting is applied no-
where but in the United States and, perhaps as to mercantile 
contracts, in England.78 
Capacity to sue and be sued. A woman's capacity to be a 
party to a lawsuit (persona standi in judicio, capacite d' ester 
en justice) is generally held to depend upon the personal 
law/9 except in the United States, where it is determined by 
the law of the forum (Restatement§ 588).79a 
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 10, 1893) Clunet 1893, 530, obviously protecting 
the French creditors, as the wife had made it clear that she contracted for 
herself alone, not on behalf of her husband. The same is true for other de-
cisions. 
74 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 5, x88I) Clunet I882, 6I7; conf'd Cour Paris (Dec. 
17, I883) Clunet I884, 289; Trib. civ. Tunis (Jan. 29, 1908) Clunet I909, 
745· 
75 Cour Chambery (Jan. 9, I884) Clunet I885, x8o; Trib. comm. Seine 
(May Io, I886) Clunet I887, I83; App. Chambery (Jan. 29, I934) Revue 
Crit. I935, I33 (Swiss wife needed authorization under Swiss C. C. art. I77). 
Correspondingly, Cour civ. Geneve (Nov. I7, I933) 56 Sem. Jud. (I934) 
572 (French wife in Switzerland under French law). 
76 RG. (Jan. IO, I9I8) 9I RGZ. 403. 
7 7 France: PILLET, I Traite 588 no. 276; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 357 
no. 33I; contra: Goudi, "Femme mariee," 8 Repert. 388 nos. I6, I7· 
78 CHESHIRE ( ed. I) 297, advocating the proper law; cf. supra pp. 206, 207. 
The cases are collected by CLARENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of 
Laws: A Comparative Study," I Int. Camp. Law Q. ( I952) 446-47I. 
79 France: WEISS, 3 Traite 589 n. I, cites six French decisions and three of 
Egyptian Mixed Tribunals. 
Germany: never doubted. 
The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (June 24, I9I9) W.xo566 (Italian law); 
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The public policy of the forum has hardly ever been ad-
vanced to eliminate the personallaw.80 
Right of the wife to carry on a business or engage in a 
profession. (a) Whether a wife needs the consent of her 
husband to accept employment or to carry on an independent 
business of her own, is decided according to the law that 
governs her personal relations. For instance, an Italian wife 
who had engaged in a profession in French Tunisia, was held 
to have done so with her husband's consent, which was pre-
sumed to exist under article 13 of the Italian Commercial 
Code, as worded at that time.81 The rule includes the condi-
tions for a wife's carrying on a business as a "sole trader." 82 
The Tribunal civil de la Seine} however, consistently fol-
lowing its tendency to apply French law whenever possible, 
awarded damages of so,ooo francs to an American husband, 
domiciled in Chicago, Illinois, against the managers of a 
theater in Paris who had employed his French wife, a former 
music hall diva, against his prohibition.83 It would be intoler-
able, the court said, if the wife could publicly challenge in 
France the authority of her husband, even when he is a for-
eign subject. The right of a French husband to forbid his 
Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.11163, N. J. 1924, 118 (Swiss law); 
Rb. Amsterdam (March 17, 1930) W.12151 and Rb. Arnhem (Jan. 23, 1933) 
W.12710, first point (German law) and others. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 13, 1885) 57 Sent. 45, Clunet 1888, 138, cf. 
Clunet 1889, 771 (wife, party to a lawsuit in Cuba, on the ground of her 
capacity under the law of the United States). 
Canada: Trottier v. Rajotte (Dec. 22, 1939) [1940] S.C.R. 203, II Giur. 
Comp. (1954) 318. 
79a However, the capacity of one spouse to sue the other for tort claims 
is determined by the law of the place of the wrong, irrespective of the law 
of the domicil, though occasionally the public policy of the forum inter-
venes. Cases collected in Annotation, 22 A.L.R. (2d) 1248. 
80 One case is known: App. Gand (Dec. 24, 1902) Clunet 1903, 980, criti-
cized by STOCQUART, ibid. 977· 
81 Trib. civ. Tunis (March 28, 1908) Revue 1909, 227. 
82 Cf. the American statutes collected by 3 VERNIER § 187 and for Europe, 
HARTENSTEIN, "Handelsfrau," in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterb. 156, on con-
flicts law ibid. 161. 
83 Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461. 
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wife to engage in separate professional activity has been 
preserved by the reform act of 1938, which, however, sub-
jects the exercise of this right to the approval of the courts. 84 
(b) The law of the forum simply is applied in the United 
States. 
Prohibition of certain transactions with third persons. In 
former times, a married woman was often forbidden to be-
come a surety or to pledge or mortgage her separate prop-
erty for her husband or other persons; her power to do so is 
still limited or denied in some states of the United States.85 
In the Swiss Civil Code (art. 17 7 par. 3), the authorization 
of the court of the domicil is required for any obligation to 
third persons undertaken by a wife for her husband. This 
restriction would be applied in a German court, 86 and it has 
been urged that a German court should grant such authoriza-
tion if the wife has her domicil in Germany.87 
Another prohibition established in Portugal and Brazil 88 
provides that a husband may not without the consent of his 
wife ( outorga ux6ria) alienate immovables, sue or be sued 
(sic) in regard to immovables, make gifts, or (by Brazilian 
law) become a surety. This prohibition is expressly stated to 
apply irrespective of the property regime and thus comes 
8
'
1 Law of Feb. 18, 1938. See supra p. 336, n. 63. 
85 Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania. 
The New Hampshire statute was construed as protecting only married women 
domiciled in New Hampshire; see Proctor v. Frost (1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197 
At!. 813, and Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1444. On Nebraska see 3 
VERNIER 315 n. 9· The Roman-Dutch law imposing restrictions on a married 
woman binding herself or her property, was considered a rule of capacity, 
governed with respect to immovables by the lex situs, in Bank of Africa Ltd. 
v. Cohen [1909] 2 Ch. 129, cf. CHESHIRE 562; also UNGER, "The Place of 
Classification in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3, 14. 
86 For France see WEISS, 3 Traite 590, 591, but he admits two decisions of 
1831 and 1833 applying the lex fori, ibid. n. 5· 
87 RAAPE 287 ff. 
88 Portugal: C. C. arts. 1II9, II91, 1471. Brazil: C. C. art. 235; cf. BEVIL-
AQUA, 2 Codigo Civil (ed. 5, 1937) II5. The husband's acting without the 
wife's consent is prevailingly held to be annuli able rather than void; see on 
the controversy in Brazil GUIMARAES, Accordaos, 3 supplemento (1939) 476. 
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under the heading of personal relations in all courts applying 
the personal law. The Brazilian courts, however, by their 
broad extension of public policy, have applied the prohibition 
also in the case of a foreigner married to a Brazilian wife 89 
and will probably continue to do so under their new law, in 
the case of Brazilian domicil of either party. 
Protection of third persons. Restrictions of the kind de-
scribed above are usually meant to apply also to relations 
between the spouses and third parties. If, however, foreign 
restrictions are to be upheld, the conflicts rule may well make 
an exception in the case of a third person dealing in good 
faith with one of the spouses. The German Code, although 
containing two clauses for the protection of domestic com-
merce ( EG. arts. 7, par. 3 and 16, par. 2), does not cover 
the prohibitions discussed here, but analogous application of 
these clauses has been advocated.90 In France, Brazil, and 
other countries, the vague and omnipresent force of public 
policy is invoked whenever domestic creditors are endan-
gered by the application of a foreign law. 
3· Implied Authority: Legal Transactions Between Hus-
band and Wife 
Power to obligate the other spouse. By virtue of her 
"power of the keys," so denominated in the German doctrine 
as a power granted ex lege, the wife is authorized to bind 
her husband by contracting within the sphere of household 
activities (BGB. § 1357). The French courts have gradually 
89 See Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 30, 1932), not published, see VALLADAO 124, 
reported by RODRIGO OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 986; Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 24, 
1929) 10 Rev, Jur. Bras. (1931) 353; for decisions of Sao Paulo, see VAL-
LADAO 132. 
In the parallel case of a Brazilian woman married in Brazil to a Portu-
guese, a Portuguese court did not apply the prohibition because the marriage 
had not been transcribed in a Portuguese register (supra p. 246 n. u6), 
Juizo de Direito de Villa Real (Dec. 18, 1933) 64 Revista For. (1935) 578. 
90 See RAAPE, IPR. 313· 
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been reaching similar results on the basis of an alleged im-
plied authorization ( mandat tacite) by the husband, the 
presumed contractual basis thereof becoming more and more 
fictitious. 91 Most countries have rules of either the German 
or the French type, which are sufficiently different from each 
other, ho1vever,. to cause problems in conflicts of laws. The 
prevailing view holds that all these regulations are concerned 
with the personal relations between husband and wife, rather 
than their property relations.92 
Of the same character are the various rules concerning 
liability for household expenses, such as the American family 
expense statutes, 03 the corresponding provisions in Switzer-
land,94 Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Scandinavia, Guatemala, 
and other countries,95 which declare both husband and wife 
liable for certain acts of the wife, and finally those occa-
sional rules which impose upon the wife liability for certain 
deeds of her husband. 
Not only in Germany is the personal law applied with 
respect to all these rules, 96 but also in America the courts are 
in agreement on this point. In Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt,0 7 
the family expense statute of Connecticut was applied by the 
Connecticut court to spouses domiciled in that state, while 
91 KARL TH. KIPP, Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Lehre von der Schhis-
selgewalt in den romanischen Rechten (Berlin, 1928). Nothing was changed 
by the reforms of 1938; cf. Note by VIALLETON in Sirey 1938.1.176, 179 and 
the new arts. 220, 221 C. C. 92 See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 144 and the authors cited by RABEL, 
5 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1931) 283; }. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt in internationalen 
Privatrecht, Thesis (Giittingen, 1936). To the same effect in Switzerland, 
STAUFFER, NAG. 79 no. 9· 
93 3 VERNIER 102 § 160. 94 Swiss C. C. arts. 207 par. 2, 220 par. z, 243 par. 3; cf. ibid. arts. 163, zo6. 
95 See KIPP, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 17; KADEN, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. 
205 2 b (a). 
06 Unanimous opinion. The application of the Hague Convention of 1905 
is controversial; cf. WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 63 n. 365 and 
contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 240. 
97 Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt (1919) 93 Conn. 513, 106 Atl. 766. 
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in Mandell Brothers v. Fogg,98 the Massachusetts court did 
not apply the statute of Illinois, making the property of both 
spouses jointly and severally liable for expenses of the 
family, as against a wife whose husband had bought goods 
in Chicago, both being citizens of Massachusetts. This latter 
case illustrates a disregard for the seller of the goods, typi-
cal of any consistent resort to the principle of personalla w. 
German law is less rigorous. The German code has estab-
lished an exception to the rule that the law of the husband 
governs the relations between husband and wife; German 
law applies if the spouses are domiciled in Germany and the 
German law is "more favorable" to the third party with 
whom a transaction has been made (EG., art. 16 par. 2). 
The awkward form of this sound exception has been prop-
erly criticized.99 
French courts, on the contrary, have been said simply to 
apply the law of the forum. 100 What they actually did in a 
series of cases was to allow fashionable Paris dressmakers 
to sue the husbands of lady customers on the theory that the 
debt was within the rather modest scope of those household 
expenses usually allowed on the ground of mandat tacite.101 
In no case would the national law of the husband have been 
more advantageous to the plaintiff; ordinarily the spouses 
were found to have been domiciled in France at the time of 
both the order and the delivery of the goods. Since the allo-
98 Mandell Brothers v. Fogg ( 1903) 182 Mass. 582, 66 N. E. 198. 
99 See comment by RAAPE 3 59· 
100 PILLET, 1 Traite 588 no. 276; BARTIN, 2 Principes 242 § 300, and others 
with regret, as they advocated the national law; NIBOYET 739 no. 628 (2). 
101 Worth c. Rimsky-Korsakoff, Trib. civ. Seine (March 30, 1893) Clunet 
1893, 868; Cour Paris (June 17, 1899) Clunet 1900, 138; Trib. civ. Seine 
(June 9, 1905) Clunet 1905, 1040; Beer c. Prince Kotschoubey, Trib. civ. 
Seine (April ro, 1907) conf'd Cour Paris (Nov. 5, 1907) Clunet 1908, 478; 
Beer c. Prince Y ourewsky, Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1908) Clunet 1909, 476 
(denying liability of husband) ; Redfern c. the same defendant, Trib. civ. 
Seine (July 13, 1911) Revue 1912, 385; Cour Paris (April 18, 1929) Revue 
Crit. 1935, 149 (English spouses living in France; the husband is not allowed 
to entrench himself behind the English system of property separation). 
PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE 345 
cation of the debt as between husband and wife was not in 
question, the result seems not very different from the Ger-
man rule. 
The failure of the American conflicts rule to accept the 
creditor's claim as defined under his own law, compels him, 
before contracting, either to investigate where the spouses 
are domiciled and what law is m effect there or to ask both 
spouses expressly to consent. The elimination of that neces-
sity is the precise purpose of the family expense laws. 
The best solution, so far not in force anywhere, would be 
to hold either spouse liable or free from liability, according 
to the personal law governing the non-patrimonial relations 
between the spouses and, further, to grant the plaintiff the 
possibility of availing himself of any more advantageous 
position that he may have under the "proper law of the 
contract." 
Prohibited transactions between husband and wife. A few 
vestiges of the ancient notion that marriage effects a merger 
of the wife's personality with that of her husband and that 
husband and wife represent a single unity of body and soul, 
have survived to the present day. In several states of the 
United States/02 husband and wife either cannot contract 
with each other at all or are unable to make certain transac-
tions with each other, for instance, to form a partnership, 
to transfer immovables, or to make a sale to each other.103 
The French courts, though they cannot carry the principle 
through, regard partnerships between spouses as nulU04 In 
102 3 VERNIER §§ I 56, I 73 . 
103 For sales, see also France: C. C. art. I595· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I503, and others. 
104 See LAGARDE, I Revue generale de droit commercial (I938) I75; since 
the alleged prohibition is based on the matrimonial law, Cass. (civ.) (July 3, 
I9I7) S.I92I.I.20I, it is applied to French spouses trading in Italy, App. Lyon 
(April 24, I929) S.I931.2.25 (refusing in consequence enforcement to an 
Italian decree treating the wife as a merchant and, hence, declaring her bank-
rupt). 
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European conflict of laws, the personal law clearly seems to 
govern the application of such provisions.105 
Widely discussed, however, are the choice of law problems 
arising from the prohibition of gifts between husband and 
wife. The controversy originated in the days of the postglos-
sators, when Baldus and Bartolus disagreed on whether the 
Roman prohibition of donationes inter virum et uxurem was 
a statutum reale or a statutum personale.106 Most codes have 
abandoned such prohibitions, but, under some legislations, 
gifts made during coverture are still invalid 107 or revo-
cable.108 According to prevailing opinion, these rules are 
within the scope of the personal effects of marriage.109 Hence 
the personal law applied is that of the lucrative transaction, 
irrespective of the time element considered determinative in 
marital property relations.110 To resolve the uncertainties in 
105 France: Cass. (req.) (Jan. 25, I938) D.H. I938. I64 ff. (sale between 
the spouses valid under Mohammedan law, despite French C. C. art. I595). 
In an exceptional case, a penalty for marital infidelity contracted between 
Bolivian spouses then domiciled in New York, void under Bolivian, but 
valid under New York law and there paid, was characterized as a delictual 
obligation; an action for repayment of the penalty, therefore, failed, Cour 
Paris (July 7, I954) Revue Crit. I954, 552, 556. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (May I7, I929) W.uoo6, N. ]. I929, 1279 (sale 
between German spouses of Dutch immovables, subject to German marital 
law rather than to Dutch BW. art I503). Similarly Louisiana: Rush et al. 
v. Landers (I902) 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95; Note, 57 L.R.A. 353 applies art. 
2446 La. C. C., to an immovable, the spouses being domiciled in Indiana. 
1oa Cf. WEISs, 3 Traite 592 n. I; AumNET, s Repert, 668 nos. 226 ff. 
1°7 Italy: C. C. ( 186 5) art. 1054, C. C. ( 1942) art. 78I; the Netherlands: 
BW. art. I7I5; Spain: C. C. art. I334· 
1°BFrance: C. C. art. 1096; Portugal: C. C. arts. n78, n81. 
109 Belgium: POULLET 549 no. 468 n. 2. 
France: WEISS, 3 Traite 592; BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I3 § 292; App. Caen 
(Jan. 15, 19I2) Revue 1914, 147; Cass. (req.) (March IS, 1933) S.I934·I.393· 
Germany: R.G. (March 2, I894) 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 351; RG. (Oct. II, 
I907) 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 222, and the general opinion of writers. 
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS 3 50 n. 36. 
Spain: See DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las calificaciones en el Derecho in-
ternacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( 1933) 265 at 278 n. I67, refuting 
the argumentation by RAAPE 341 II 3 as to Spanish law. 
Contra Italy: Cass. (Sept. 30, 1955) 79 Foro Ita!. (I956) I 552, 555, apply-
ing the law governing donations. 
11° KG. (March 20, I939) Dt. Recht 1939, 938 (supposing that the husband 
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the case where the spouses have different nationalities,111 the 
Polish statute expressly invokes the national law of the hus-
band at the time of the contract.112 
The French courts exclude immovables, at least immov-
ables situated in France, from the rule and apply French law 
as the law of the situs.118 
Other classifications have been occasionally preferred. 
The Dutch Supreme Court,114 for instance, once held that the 
Dutch prohibition, although affecting Dutch public policy, 
did not apply to German spouses because the prohibition was 
said to be inseparably connected with the prohibition of post-
nuptial marriage settlements, established in the Dutch legis-
lation and Latin Codes, but unknown to the German Code. 
As respects provisions excluding lawsuits between husband 
and wife, the American rule that the law of the forum 115 or, 
in the case of an action in tort, the law of the place of the 
wrong 116 should be applied, is not shared by other countries; 
such prohibitions are regarded merely as means of regulating 
the marriage relation and preserving domestic harmony. 
was of Greek nationality at the time of the marriage, a certain contract made 
by him, in view of the Greek matrimonial system of separate property, consti-
tuted a donation; since he certainly was a Greek at the time of the contract, 
a donation, if any, was void under Greek law, applicable as governing per-
sonal relations. The court did not, as a Note by REu believes, characterize 
donation under lex fori or lex causae, but simply applied the historic con-
ceptions common to all nations concerned). 
111 See, besides the general discussion, supra p. 324, AUDINET, 5 Repert. 669 
nos. 236, 242 ff. 
112 Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 15. 
Germany: Erster Gebhardscher Entwurf (1881) § 19 par. 3· 
113 Cass. (civ.) (April 2, 1884) Clunet 1885, 77; Trib. civ. Seine (March 
3. 1891) Clunet 1891, 508, modified by Cour Paris (May 27, 1892) Clunet 
1892, 940, 8.1896.2.73, conf'd Cass. (req.) (May 8, 1894) Clunet 1894. 562, 
D.1894-1.355; Cour Paris (March 5, 1901) Clunet 1901, 775; Cass. (req.) 
(May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 407. BARTIN, 2 Principes 215, 216, hopes this 
singular treatment of immovables is transitory. 
114 H. R. (May 17, 1929) W.12006; similarly Italian Cass. (Sept. 30, 1955), 
suPra note 109, stressing that art. 781 C. C. is not part of "ordre public 
international." 
115 Restatement § 133 implicitly. 
116 Critical STUMBERG 206. 
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Recent American writers have urged a corresponding appli-
cation of the personallaw.117 
Of the same character are laws that do not permit a hus-
band or wife to levy execution upon the property of the other 
spouse. The Swiss law contains peculiar provisions of this 
kind, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal has repeatedly de-
clared to be no part of public policy and therefore not ap-
plicable to the case of a husband domiciled abroad.118 
Finally, the personal law governing marital effects extends 
to the problem whether spouses during coverture may make 
agreements on such matters as alimony (without or until 
judicial separation), residence, or education of children. In 
modern times, more and more freedom of arrangement has 
been allowed, but the laws differ considerably. The French 
courts, vigorously insisting on their domestic restrictions of 
such agreements, are concerned almost exclusively with ex-
amining whether these restrictions have been observed.119 
Particular difficulties arise in the case of financial agree-
ments preceding separation or divorce.120 
117 STUMBERG 206; HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflicts of Laws 235; cf. as to 
vicarious liability of the husband, ibid. 255· 
118 BG. (March 31, 1927) 53 BGE. III 33, 37; BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 
BGE. III 173; contra: BG. (Sept. 5, 1916) 42 BGE. III 342, 348. 
119 Cour Paris (April 29, 1913) Revue 1913, 879; Trib. civ. Seine (June 
18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619, Revue Crit. 1935, 125, criticized by BATIFFOL, 
Revue Crit. 1937, 429, for not having inquired into the national (German) 
laws of the spouses; App. Lyon (March 26, 1934) Revue 1935, 461; Cass. 
(civ.) (June 26, 1938) D.H. 1938.197, and Cour Dijon (March 28, 1939) 
Clunet 1939, 634, neglect the analogous Italian marital law because the agree-
ment was valid under French law. 
12o E.g., a Swiss author, ADRIAN, (according to the review of his book in 38 
SJZ. (1942), 371) admonishes Swiss lawyers to be aware in the case of 
English parties, of the hostility of English law to agreements whereby a 
spouse promises financial advantages to the other for obtaining divorce, while 
Swiss C. C. art. 158 allows agreements as to the consequences of divorce or 
separation with allowance of the divorce court. See moreover, infra, pp. 
s66, 572. 
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4· Support 121 
Application of the matrimonial law. The husband's duty 
to support his wife or, more generally, one spouse's duty to 
support the other is considered in civil law countries as one 
of the principal incidents of marriage, 122 rather than a quasi-
contractual obligation as conceived under an earlier doc-
trine.123 
German courts and writers are in almost unanimous agree-
ment that the national law of the husband, being the law 
governing the marital relation, applies to all questions per-
taining to the conditions and kind of support to be rendered, 
either within the common household or during an extra-
judicial separation. The only exception to this principle, ac-
cording to German decisions, is that marital property rules 
govern the determination of what property is liable to fur-
nish the means of support.124 
French courts have often been said to follow the law of 
the forum, but they too start with the application of the na-
tionallaw.125 They think, however, that the French rules on 
alimony present a minimum standard which must be applied 
on the ground of public policy.126 This modification has been 
121 On comparative law and international enforcement see International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obli-
gations alimentaires (Rome, 1938); "L'abandon de famille et ses sanctions," 
in Travaux de Ia semaine internationale de droit (Paris, 1937); DE WINTER, 
"Developpements recents dans le droit international en matiere d'obligations 
alimentaires," 4 Ned. Tijd. Int. Recht (1957) 133-158. 
122 ROGUIN, Traite de droit civil compare, Le Mariage (1904) 198 ff. nos. 
147, 148; Swiss BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 313; Czechoslovakian 
statute on private international law of 1948, § 13. 
123 I BAR § 203. 124 RG. (Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, 16 Z.int.R. (1906) 298, 20 Z.int.R. 
(1910) 404, Clunet 19n, 946; Bay. ObLG. (March 3, 1913) 30 ROLG. 165; 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 260 n. 135; KG. (Feb. 9, 1929) IPRspr. 1929, no. 15; KG. 
1929, no. 15; KG. (March 9, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 66. 
125 Cour Paris (Oct. 30, 1926) Gaz.Pal.I927.1.284; NIBOYET 739 no. 628 
( 3). 
126 Cass. (req.) (July 22, 1903) Clunet 1904, 355; Cass. {req.) {March 
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rejected by most German authorities/27 although it might 
well be advocated in cases where a foreign married person is 
left stranded in the forum and has become a public charge, 
because his personal law fails to grant him a right to support 
by his spouse under the circumstances. The English and 
American rules on alimony and support in particular are 
usually construed so as to exclude their application by a 
foreign court; the lex fori is, then, the only possible resort 
to secure support for an indigent foreigner. 
Switzerland applies the general rules on marital effects ac-
cording to which foreigners domiciled in Switzerland are 
subject to Swiss law.128 
According to section 459 of the Restatement, the duty 
imposed by the state of the domicil to pay for necessaries 
furnished to a husband, wife, or minor child is enforced in 
every state. To this extent the personal law of the parties has 
extraterritorial effect. The Restatement also recognizes an 
obligation imposed by the state where the necessaries have 
been furnished, but only if this state has jurisdiction over 
the debtor. 
Lex fori. Simple application of the lex fori to the duty of 
support has been adopted in the United States 129 as well as 
by the C6digo Bustamante.130 
27, 1922) S.I923.1.27, Clunet 1922, n5, Revue 1924, 401. For many other 
decisions see WEISS, 3 Traite 597 n. 2. Spanish Trib. Supr. (July I, 1897) 82 
Sent. x8 declares that a foreign married woman is to be protected, if in 
Spain. 
1 27RG. (Feb. I5, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, cited supra n. I24; I BAR§ 203 n. 2: 
"arbitrary." LEWALD 9I no. 126; RAAPE 284; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 26I, em-
phasizing the force of the Hague Convention on effects of marriage. Contra: 
KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht I44 § 39B; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. I47, in the case 
where both spouses reside permanently in Germany, or one spouse with the 
consent of the other, in view of the administrative and criminal importance 
of the duty. 
128 BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 316 ff; BG. (Feb. 22, 1934) 6o 
BGE. II 77 (leaving undecided the case where only the defendant lives in 
Switzerland); BG. (April x8, I942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13. 
129 Restatement § 458. 
1 3° Codigo Bustamante art. 45· It is recognized in community property states 
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Law of the debtor. A theory presented by Pillet 131 and 
adopted by several Asian countries 132 subjects duties of sup-
port to the law of the debtor, but it is doubtful whether this 
rule is meant to apply to marital duties of support. 
Provisional decrees. If the personal law governs, it does 
so until the marriage is dissolved or some special rule applies. 
The personal law is not supplanted even on the commence-
ment of an action for annulment, for limited or full divorce, 
or for judicial separation; however, the procedural situation 
may give rise to particular needs.133 
A few German decisions have assumed that a court, taking 
cognizance of an action for divorce or some similar action, 
could by interlocutory decree grant the wife alimony pen-
dente lite, irrespective of the foreign personal law governing 
the marital status of the parties.134 More recent decisions, 
however, no longer resort to the German law of the forum 
even in an interlocutory decree unless the personal law can-
not be readily ascertained; 35 sometimes it is presumed that 
the foreign rule is identical with that of the forum. 136 
that the obligation to pay for necessaries arises out of the marriage and not 
out of the wife's partnership in the community fund. See DAGGE'IT, Legal 
E"ays on Family Law (1935) 116 for California, 123 for Louisiana, 134 for 
Texas, 144 for Washington. 
131 PILLET, 1 Traite 599 and Droit international prive, resume du cours 
(Paris 1904-1905). 
132 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 21. 
China: Decree of Aug. 5, 1918, art. 16. 
Siam: Law on private international law of 1939, § 36. 
133 See also infra pp. 566-570. 
184 OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 7, 1911) Hans. G. Z. 1912 Beibl. 56 no. 28 II; 
OLG. Hamburg (April 28, 1921) 76 Seuff. Arch. 242 no. 149; OLG. Miinchen 
(Nov. 4, 1921) JW. 1921, 1465; OLG. Koln (Dec. 14, 1928) JW. 1929, 449; 
OLG. Hamm (Sept. 22, 1932) JW. 1932, 3824, IPRspr. 1932, no. 87. This 
practice was approved by LEWALD 91 no. 126 (b) ; NussBAUM, D. IPR 147 n. 
3; JoNAS, JW. 1936, 3578. It does not refer to alimony between spouses in 
general, as an American writer understood. 
135 The constant practice of the 13th Senate of the Kammergericht (March 
9, 1931 and Oct. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, nos. 66, 67; (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr. 
1932, no. 88; (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 33; 
RAAPE 284; cf. also WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske--Loewenfeld I 62 n. 359· 
136 LG. Mainz (Sept. 2, 1925) JW. 1925, 2163; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 262. 
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5. Wife's Lien 137 
Article 2 I 2 I of the French Civil Code grants any married 
woman, irrespective of her property regime, a general lien 
on all her husband's land for the protection of claims which 
she may have against her husband, particularly claims aris-
ing from his management of her property. Prevailing opin-
ion in France categorizes provisions of this sort despite their 
pecuniary character among personal effects of marriage.138 
In recent years, however, French courts have refused to 
recognize a wife's lien on French immovables when the wife 
is neither a French national nor enjoys treaty rights, even 
though her national law imposes a lien on her husband's 
immovables.139 
The theory that the wife's lien is the counterpart of the 
disabilities of a married woman has been invoked to justify 
the first theory.140 This argument cannot be correct, as the 
wife's lien was not abolished in France 141 when full legal 
capacity was granted to married women by the law of Febru-
ary I 8, I 9 3 8. On the other hand, the courts transplant the 
problem into the field of the rights of aliens where it does 
not belong. The personal law should govern the problem 
simply as an incident of the marriage relationship.142 
137 CHARRON, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme etrangere," Nouv. Revue 
I937, 29; Note, ibid. 1938, I24. BATIFFOL, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme 
mariee en France et le droit international prive," I Festschrift Rabel S9I-
6oi. 
1 38 Trib. Havre (Dec. 29, 1928) Clunet I929, 1048. WEISS, 3 Traite 649; 
PILLET, I Traite 593 ff. no. 278; NIBOYET 74I no. 630; LEREBOUR5-PIGEON-
NIERE 390 no. 3s4; on an earlier practice see infra p. 362, n. 15. 
139 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 27, I903) S.1904.1.81; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 31, 
I9IO) Revue I9II, 369, Clunet I9II, 901; App. Aix. (Jan. 20, 1938) Clunet 
1938, 488, Nouv. Revue I938, I22. Critical NIBOYET, 2 Traite 26o; BATIFFOL, 
1 Festschrift Rabel (supra n. 137) 593· 
140 See PILLET and NIBOYET, /oc. cit. supra n. I38, CALEB, 4 Repert. 196 no. 
I76 and authors cited. 
141 C. C. art. 2135, modified by Decret of June I4, 1938, allowing the wife, 
however, to waive her hypotheque Ugale. 
142 French writers cumulate the personal law of the wife with the law of 
the situs, LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 390 no. 354, BATIFFOL, Traite no. 4S6, SIS; 
PoNSARD, in: Le droit international prive de Ia famille 47; cf. infra p. 362. 
In accord Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (Jan. 30, 1952) IS Pasicrisie Lux. 272. 
CHAPTER 10 
Eticcts of Marriage on Property 1 
I. BASIC CONCEPTIONS 
CORRESPONDING to far-reaching differences in the main conceptions of marital property systems, the conflicts rules on this subject are split into three 
groups, two of which are illustrated by the American con-
flicts rules on marital property rights in ( 1) immovables 
and ( 2) movables, and the third by the European rules on 
marital property rights. 
I. American Rules on Immovables 
The old rule on immovables, 2 which is preserved in this 
country, applies the lex situs. The underlying idea is that an 
immovable is considered an isolated object of rights. This 
1 On the American conflicts law see STUMBERG, "Marital Property and the 
Conflict of Laws," II Tex. L. Rev. (1932) 53; LEFLAR, "Community Property 
and Conflict of Laws," 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 221; HoROWITZ, "Conflict of 
Law Problems in Community Property," II Wash. L. Rev. (1936) 121, 212; 
:-iEUNER, "Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 La. L. Rev. ( 1943) 
r67; MARSH, Marital Property in the Conflict of Laws (1952). For compara-
tive conflicts law: JuLIA }OELSON, Giiterrechtliche Wirkungen der Ehe bei 
verschiedener Staatsangehorigkeit der Ehegatten im internationalen Privat-
recht (Heidelberg, 1933); DELAUME, "Marital Property and American-
French Conflict of Laws," 4 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1955) 35-59. 
2 1m mobilia reguntur lege loci. STORY §§ 158, 186, I88; 4 PHILLIMORE no. 
476; WHARTON 405 § I9I. D'ARGENTRE originated this doctrine in polemics 
(Commentarii in Patrias Britonum Leges, art. 2I8, gl. 6, § 34) opposing 
DuMOULIN's theory of domicil ( consilium 53) in case no matrimonial con-
vention was made. The doctrine was advocated in the Netherlands and in 
France by Paul Voet and Froland, from whom Story took inspiration. The 
problem was called the "most famous question" in a decision of the Court of 
Dutch Brabant of November 3, I693, "Decisio brabantina super famosissima 
questione." See FROLAND, I Memoires concernans Ia nature et Ia qualite des 
status ( I729) 272, 309, 3I6; I LAINE 234, 334· 
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idea can be traced back to ancient Germanic laws and was 
characteristic of the feudal system of landholding. If a 
woman owned land at the time of marriage, the interest 
acquired by her husband through the marriage was deter-
mined by the law of the place where the land was situated. 
Therefore, under the common law, if the spouses own real 
estate in ten different countries, ten different matrimonial 
laws must be consulted, each applying to its respective im-
movables only. The point of contact is the immovable itself; 
the place where the spouses are or where the assets are 
managed is irrelevant. This conception implies that no prob-
lem arises other than that of determining the interests of 
one spouse in the lands of the other. In fact, section 23 7 of 
the Restatement contents itself with declaring: 
"The effect of marriage upon interests in land owned by a 
spouse at the time of marriage is determined by the law of 
the state where the land is." 
2. American Rules on Movables 
Movables, according to the old rule, follow the person, 
mobilia ossibus inhaerent; rights in movables, created under 
the law of the domicil, have extraterritorial effect. With re-
spect to marital property, this rule is well settled in the 
United States despite occasional inroads made by the law 
of the situs.3 Accordingly, the mutual interests of husband 
and wife in each other's movables are localized at the place 
of the interested parties. 
So far the rule is unassailable. Doubt is cast on the rule, 
however, so soon as we ask whether all the movables belong-
ing to a married person are together thought to form a unit, 
an entity, or whether each asset is a separate unit. The con-
a It is remarkable, however, as a token of the strength of the territorial 
theory that the cases that actually or apparently preferred the lex situs are 
continually emphasized by the writers; and this theory was adopted in the 
proposed Final Draft of the Restatement § 3II. 
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ception of all the movables constituting one unit seems to 
obtain when the prevailing rule is justified by the "desirabil-
ity of applying a single uniform regime to the entire estate 
of the parties," 4 or when it is stated more precisely in the 
words of Beale 5 to be motivated by the consideration that 
"These (movables) are brought together into an aggregate 
unit, and from the time of acquisition become part of that 
unit, and ... the entire unit is treated by third parties as 
well as the spouses as a unit." 
\Ve should like to think that this idea means that the law of 
the marital domicil thus governs more problems than the 
single problem mentioned above concerning the existence and 
nature of the interests of husband and wife in each other's 
property. But we are warned against any such supposition by 
the language of the Restatement, which again speaks exclu-
sively of "rights or other interests in movables" ( §§ 289 ff.) 
and when we find similar expressions used by the writers. We 
shall see, indeed, that many, although certainly not all, other 
problems regarding the relationships between the spouses, as 
well as between them and third persons, are treated in Ameri-
can common law as belonging to the fields of contract, tort, 
or quasi-contract rather than to that of marital law. Appar-
ently, the formulation of conflicts rules in this country has 
been unduly influenced by the narrow scope of the matrimo-
nial law believed to remain after the passage of the Married 
Women's Acts. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been 
paid to the problems arising under the community property 
systems and to the regulations of the rest of the world. 
3· Continental Rules on Marital Property Relations 
Quite a different picture is presented by the traditional 
European marital laws, for which Central Europe has most 
4 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1287; STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (193z) 
63, supra n. I; LEFLAR, ZI Cal. L. Rev. (1933) Z33, supra n. 1. 
5 Z BEALE § Z90.1. 
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fully elaborated the general theories. The tangible and in-
tangible assets of the parties ( activa) are conceived as form-
ing one part of a major whole, viz., the estate, while the 
debts of the spouses form the other part. Therefore, inquiry 
is not limited to the determination of those interests which 
one spouse may have in the assets of the other, but it is 
also directed to the obligations that may arise between the 
spouses, the liability of either to creditors, the enforcement 
and execution of claims during coverture and after its ter-
mination, management of the wife's goods other than those 
pertaining to her separate estate, presumptions as to owner-
ship, and like questions. All these problems are regarded as 
forming one complex unit, similar to an inheritance treated 
as an aggregate, to which one conflicts rule applies. 
Generally, such a system extends to every asset, but in 
England and Argentina immovables are excepted and as-
signed to the lex situs, just as they are in this country. But 
even in these countries the system is not confined to the 
mutual interests of the spouses in each other's property. 
The Continental systems, of course, are recognized in any 
common law court in accordance with its conflicts rule; no-
body would think of refusing recognition because such a prop-
erty regime is "unknown in the lex fori." 6 
4· Scope of the Marital Property Law 
It is important to emphasize the comparatively broad 
scope of marital property law in civil law countries. 
In the American system also, the "effect of marriage upon 
the interests of one spouse," to use the expression of section 
237 of the Restatement, refers to all rules of the applicable 
municipal law under which, by virtue of the marriage, prop-
erty rights or interests are created, modified, or terminated. 
6 See BECKEIT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46 at 57· 
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In particular, both in the United States and in civil law 
countries, these rules determine what powers of management 
one spouse may exercise and what control the other may 
have; to what extent freedom of alienation is affected; who 
is the proper party to sue and be sued with respect to the 
property of either spouse; 7 and similar questions. 
In civil law countries, marital property law also includes 
the effects of such events as voluntary or judicial separation, 
divorce, postnuptial agreements, bankruptcy, and abuse by 
the husband of his rights of management. In principle, this 
is true in the United States too, but there are many variations 
and exceptions. 
Although article I 9 I of the C6digo Bustamante subjects 
the wife's right to recover her dowry to her personal law, a 
rational solution requires that either the matrimonial law of 
the spouses or the general contracts law governs.8 The for-
mer is the right solution where the applicable matrimonial 
law includes special rules on dowry, e.g., in Austria and 
Italy; in France the matrimonial law has been applied to a 
dowry constituted under the law of Maryland.9 
In community property states everywhere, marital prop-
erty law determines what constitutes the community fund and 
what the separate property of either spouse, and in addition 
the questions of management, possession, and control by the 
wife and the husband, respectively, the actions permissible 
during the community, the termination and partition of the 
common fund, etcetera. 
An integral part of these systems is also the regulation of 
7 See Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 
So. 851 {married woman, domiciled in Mississippi, allowed according to the 
(matrimonial) law of Mississippi to sue in tort in Louisiana, as the tort had 
been suffered there). See also Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Humble ( 1901) 
181 U.S. 57i Traglio v. Harris (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 439· 
8 Cf. RAAPE 342. 
9 App. Nimes {Dec. 10, 1912) D.1914.2.169. 
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liability of the different estates of the parties for debts either 
of the community or of the husband or wife. Liability of the 
community property for community debts only, as in Wash-
ington, or also for the debts of the husband as in Louisiana, 
or for all debts of the husband and the prenuptial debts of 
the wife, as in California, is naturally considered by the law-
yers of those states as growing out of the marriage. The 
same approach is used in Europe, not only with respect to a 
system of community but to any marital system, in classifying 
the problem of the husband's liability for prenuptial or post-
nuptial debts of his wife and vice versa. This does not seem 
to be the usual way of thinking in this country but should be 
recognized as the actually governing principle. 
As a matter of fact, if marriage property law is defined in 
the conflict of laws as dealing with problems of title to prop-
erty only, its scope is much narrower than in European coun-
tries. To visualize the difference and the attendant difficulties, 
let us assume that German spouses are domiciled in Germany 
and that the wife has been charged with a criminal offense but 
acquitted. Under the German Civil Code (§ 1387, No.2), 
the husband was obliged to pay or to reimburse his wife for 
the expense of her defense, and as a co-debtor he was person-
ally liable to his wife's creditors, e.g., to her attorney. If her 
husband can be sued in an American common law court, what 
attitude should that court take? Should it classify the prob-
lem according to the lex fori? It might find that no such claim 
is granted to the wife or her attorney by the matrimonial law 
of the forum although some claim under another theory may 
be prosecuted. Obviously, the desirable solution is that Ger-
man matrimonial law as the law of the domicil should be 
applied in its full bearing. 
If we change the facts of the case slightly, there would 
probably be no doubt at all about an American court's reach-
ing an analogous solution where the husband, under the Ger-
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man Civil Code ( § I 3 8 5), has to pay the taxes, interest on 
mortgages, and insurance premiums for those assets of his 
wife of which he is possessed ex iure mariti during coverture. 
These debts may be compared with the liabilities which are 
often indicated as incidents of community property. 
Conversely, a German court, applying the essentially 
narrower matrimonial law of a common law state, faces the 
question of what to do about matters considered part of the 
matrimonial law in Germany but not so considered by the 
governing foreign law. If, for instance, American parties are 
domiciled in a common law jurisdiction and the wife borrows 
money with the consent of her husband, the latter would be 
liable to the creditor only upon his assumption of a guaranty. 
Under the German Code (§ I386 par. I), however, the hus-
band was liable for the interest on the loan, both wife and 
creditor being able to enforce the liability ( § I3 8 8), which 
extends to the reserved property of the wife as well as to the 
husband's own property. If the German court follows the 
characterization appropriate to the civil law doctrine, it has 
to consider the problem as one of matrimonial law and there-
fore governed by the law of the American domicil. The most 
sensible consequence seems to be to adopt the conflicts rule 
applied in this country to surety contracts. Or, instead of the 
law of the place of contracting thereby indicated, should the 
German judges, as in other contracts cases, apply the law of 
the place of performance, as required by the German con-
flicts rule? The result would be that reached neither in Ger-
many nor in the United States. 
An analogous question concerning torts was raised before 
a French court. Article I477 of the French Civil Code pro-
vides as part of the matrimonial law that a spouse diverting 
or concealing any effects of the community property shall be 
deprived of his share of such effects. The judge considered 
this provision inapplicable to an Italian couple and granted 
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the ordinary remedies common to both French and Italian 
private laws/0 
In conclusion, it would seem that the broad concept of 
marital property law, as developed in Europe, can conven-
iently be employed in the United States whenever reference 
to the civil law in this field is to be made, and that, moreover, 
the scope usually allocated to marital property law needs en-
largement. 
5. Relation Between the Marital Property Law and the Lex 
Situs 
As is well known, the law of the domcil or the national law 
governing either movables or all property may clash with a 
divergent law established at the situs. On the one hand, Ger-
man writers have attempted to develop a theory of the rela-
tion between general conflicts rules (such as the rules on 
marital property or inheritance) and special rules (such as 
those of property referring to the lex situs or of obligations 
referring to the lex loci solutionis) .11 On the other hand, fear 
of friction has fostered the broad scope of the lex situs in the 
United States. 
Necessary role of the lex situs. What problems must be 
governed in all systems by the law of the situs? The lex situs 
determines quite naturally the kinds of property interests and 
the modes of their creation, transfer, modification, and termi-
nation, and it decides to what extent, if at all, bona fide pur-
chasers and attaching creditors are protected in their expecta-
tions.12 In its application to problems of marital property 
rights, the law of the situs may come into conflict with the 
personal law. The personal law may grant one spouse some 
10 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1897) Clunet 1899, 771, criticized by CLUNET 
in Clunet 1899, 740; see also BARTIN, 2 Principes 284. 
11 Cf. MELCHIOR 398; M. WoLFF, IPR. 81 if. 
12 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1286; cf. LEFLAR, 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 
221, 235, supra n. I. 
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property interest in an immovable of the other, for instance, 
a lien, which is unknown at the situs of the immovable, or the 
personal law may provide that, immediately upon the mar-
riage and without any conveyance, certain assets of the 
spouses are transformed into a community fund, while no 
such transformation by immediate operation of law is known 
under the law of the situs. In all such cases, the law of the 
situs prevails over the personal law insofar and only insofar 
as such immediate property questions are concerned. 
Thus, the Montevideo Treaty 13 limits the matrimonial 
law of the domicil insofar as its application is prohibited by 
the law of the place where the property is situated, with the 
significant restriction in the 1940 draft to matters de estricto 
cardcter real, i.e., which pertain strictly to real rights. 
Illustration: Before the unification of the German civil 
law, a couple domiciled in Westphalia lived under the system 
of community property, whereby the land owned by one 
spouse, immediately upon marriage, fell into joint tenancy by 
both parties. The wife owned land in Saxony, where, how-
ever, no transfer of land ownership could take place without 
a conveyance. The Court of Appeals of Saxony held that the 
wife continued to be the sole owner but that she was bound 
by reasonable application of the personal law to execute an 
appropriate conveyance.14 
In the same sense, it has been held in France that restraints 
upon the husband's alienation of his wife's dowry or liens to 
secure claims of the wife against her husband, provided by 
the personal law, are recognized as an interest in French im-
movables only to the extent and subject to the conditions 
13 Treaty on international civil law, text of 1889, arts. 40, 41; text of 1940, 
art. 16. 
14 OLG. Dresden {Dec. 1, 1896) 18 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 513; cf. LEWALD 
178, 179 no. 239; analogous decision of RG. (April 20, 1903) JW. 1903, 
250. An interest created under Maltese matrimonial law was dependent on 
publication in Tunis for absolute effect against third persons. Trib. Tunis 
(March 15, 1905) Clunet 1906, 444· 
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under which the analogous rights of French law are estab-
lished.15 An express provision of the former Italian Code 
was understood in the same way.16 The maxim underlying all 
these cases has been formulated by Zitelmann in the follow-
ing sentence: uDas Vermogensstatut lebt nur durch die Aner-
kennung der Einzelstatuten." 17 It has been decided in Can-
ada that marriage settlements concerning property situated 
in another country are enforceable "so far as the lex situs 
does not prevent their being carried into execution." 18 
American conception of the lex situs. In comparison with 
the American law of situs, the European property law has a 
very modest function. It does not determine the regime un-
der which the spouses shall live, with its innumerable ramifi-
cations, and of course not the requisites and construction of 
a marriage settlement. It merely decides the technical execu-
tion of the commands of the personal law. 
Under the American system as in feudal times, however, 
the law of the place where the immovable is located deter-
mines every question relating to the extent and content of the 
effects of marriage on property. Normally, foreign law is ap-
plied at the situs, neither to determine the property interests 
which one spouse may have in the assets of the other nor, if 
our assumption concerning the actual scope of American 
marital law is right, to determine what liabilities, if any, 
exist with respect to real property and whether the real prop-
erty of one spouse is liable to the creditors of the other 
spouse. In contrast to movables, the law of the situs, and not 
the domiciliary law, is considered competent to fix the eco-
15 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 20, x884) Clunet x885, 76; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 
12, 1889) Clunet 1899, 346; cf. NIBOYET 635 no. 507, but also 3 ARMINJON 
109 n. 2. On a different recent practice see above, p. 3 52. 
16 LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 532 n. I, approved by FEDOZZI 642, dis-
agreeing with other writers. 
17 ZITELMANN in Festschrift fiir Otto Gierke (19II) 255 at 261; LEWALD 
178 no. 239· 18 In re Jutras Estate (Saskatchewan) [1932] 2 W.W.R. 533, at 537· 
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nomic purposes of the marriage institution and to formulate 
public policy concerning administration by the husband, con-
trol by the wife, and protection of the creditors. This means, 
furthermore, that there are as many matrimonial laws as 
there are states where either of the spouses has immovable 
property. 
Even the capacity of married women with respect to all 
transactions connected with an immovable is governed by the 
law of the state where the immovable is located and not, in 
accordance with the ordinary rule of this country, by the law 
of the place of contracting. 
An explanation sometimes offered for the broad rule on 
immovables in the United States is that it is an essential func-
tion of a state to determine the title to interests in land. But 
does it not suffice that the property interest as such be gov-
erned by local law? Why should the local law also try to de-
termine the effects of marriage? Moreover, if this proposi-
tion were correct, the law of the situs would also have to be 
applied to movables. Some American writers have indeed 
claimed for the situs "a sort of primary control over prop-
erty within ... its border," 19 a claim quite unknown out-
side the United States. The law of the situs is said to have 
the power to decide what effect, if any, should be given to the 
law of the domicil, and the latter is said to be applicable not 
on the basis of an independent rule of conflict of laws but only 
indirectly by way of reference by the law of the situs. At-
tempts have been made to explain a few decisions 20 in this 
way, but these appear to be inspired rather by considerations 
of public policy.21 It would be absurd to assume that the 
19 LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I, 225, 230, supra n. I. The Restate-
ment § 8 (I) seems to share this view. 
20 Locke v. McPherson ( I90I) I63 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726; Smith v. McAtee 
(I867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 64I; cf. Graham v. First National Bank 
(I88I) 84 N.Y. 393,38 Am. Rep. 528. 
21 Cf. STUMBERG, 11 Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 6I, supra n. I. 
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courts of the domicil itself or the courts of a third state could 
not apply the law of the domicil without the permission of 
the law of the situs. True territorialism, furthermore, would 
require that the municipal law of the situs be applied, not 
merely its conflicts rule.22 
There exists, however, an important restriction upon the 
application of the lex situs. In almost all American jurisdic-
tions, 23 immovables acquired by assets pertaining to the sepa-
rate property of one spouse, are his separate property, and 
when acquired with community property are community 
property-the so-called replacement or source doctrine.24 As 
a result, the impact of the lex situs to a considerable extent 
is qualified by the operation of the lex domicilii influencing 
the ownership of assets used for acquiring immovables in 
another state.25 This may be the law of the actual or of the 
former domicil of the spouses. The lex situs, of course, re-
tains its power over acquisitions of immovables through 
earnings, gifts, and succession or distribution on death. 26 
The courts ordinarily also apply the lex situs without hesi-
tation in determining the validity and construction of such 
contracts by the husband or the wife as dispose of land, in 
adjudging the ownership of profits and fruits, and in ascer-
taining the internal relations between the spouses with re-
spect to their interest in immovables. 27 
Illustration. The husband bought land in Idaho with 
money earned in Michigan, and acquires separate property 
despite the community property system of the former state. 
But, if he deeds the land to his married daughter domiciled 
22 W!GNY and BROCKELBANK, Expose 33I n. I to art. 289. 
2 3 }Acos, "The Law of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. 
(I93I) I, 36. 
24 So named by JACOB (precedent note). See also In re Gulstine's Estate 
(I932) I66 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628. 
25 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) I67, 169, supra n. I. 
26 See for example the distinctions made in Newcomer v. Orem (I852) 2 
Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717. 
27 See cases collected by NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) 172, 173, supra n. I. 
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in New York, there is a presumption, under Idaho law, that 
the property is held in community by her and her husband. 
The converse case has been singularly treated. If land is 
sold in the state where it is situated and thus be converted 
into money or a chose in action, the movables so acquired 
should also, under the doctrine of replacement, to be con-
sistent, be substituted for the land and remain subject to the 
law of the situs. But in a series of early cases, it was thought 
in the court of the matrimonial domicil that, thanks to the 
conversion effected at the situs, the time had come to apply 
the lex fori of the domicil to the movables acquired. 28 In two 
other old cases, temporary differences of policy with respect 
to the emancipation of married women caused one court at 
the domicil 29 and the other at the situs 30 each to apply its 
own domestic law to the proceeds, in order to enforce in the 
interest of the wife the progressive view of the forum 
against the old common law principle. Inferences as to the 
present rules can scarcely be drawn from these decisions. 
The lex situs in other countries. The system founded by the 
postglossators, which places the effects of marriage on im-
movables under the law of the situs, has been adopted by 
Great Britain, the United States, and Argentina, and the 
Austrian courts.31 A similar situation exists with respect to 
Swiss immovables belonging to Swiss nationals. 32 
28 Courts applying their own common law on marital property rather than 
the community property rule of the lex situs: Kneeland v. Ensley {1838} 19 
Tenn. 620; Newcomer v. Orem ( 1852) 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717; Castle-
man v. Jeffries {1877) 6o Ala. 380. Court of community property system not 
applying the lex situs of Georgia: Henderson v. Trousdale {Sup. Ct. 1855) 10 
La. Ann. 548. 
29 Glenn v. Glenn {1872) 47 Ala. 204, refusing application of the old com-
mon law principle of South Carolina. 
30 Smith v. McAtee ( 1867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641, rejecting patheti-
cally the old common law principle of Illinois. 
31 Argentine Civil Marriage Law (1888} art. 6. Austria: OGH. (Oct. 22, 
1924) 6 SZ. 778 no. 337· Ontario: Landreau v. Lachapelle {March 22, 1937) 
[1937] O.R. 444, 11 Giur. Camp. (1954) 370. 
32 NAG. art, 28 no, J. This r~servation of the local law is uQdersto(ld t9 
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In France, Italy, and other Latin countries, this system 
has been applied in a few decisions, 33 though by prevailing 
opinion it has long been abandoned. 34 French public policy 
even goes so far as to make equal treatment of movables and 
immovables imperative, the nature of the conjugal associa-
tion being said to require that all its effects be regulated by 
one single, immutable law. Hence, it has been repeatedly de-
cided in France that the American regime of separation of 
assets applies to French immovables owned by Americans, 
the American rule to the contrary notwithstanding.35 
In Austria, there was a split of authority on this point.36 
In the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3, 
par. 2), only the right to dispose of immovables is reserved 
to the local law. 
Louisiana rule. In Louisiana, statutes have expressly pro-
vided since 18 52 that the community property system there 
cover capacity to contract and acquire by will, STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 14. 
SCHNITZER 532 observes that before the Swiss Civil Code the law of the 
canton of origin and not that of the situs was meant; thus the system was 
not exactly that of the lex situs. 
33 Cass. (civ.) (April 4, r88r) Clunet r88r, 426; see also OLG. Colmar 
(Dec. zr, 19rr), as a German court, DJZ. 1913, 174; CLUNET in Clunet 1907, 
676. Outside of France, it is often not understood that this opinion is ob-
solete. Likewise, in German interzonal law, LG. Gottingen (May 3, 1952) 
IZRspr. no. 39, superseded now by LG. Kassel (May 17, 1952) IZRspr. no. 
40, and LG. Braunschweig (Oct. 9, 1952) IZRspr. no. 41. 
84 France: Principle of indivisibility, NIBOYET 6o1 no. 478; WEISS, 3 
Traite 171, 4 ibid. 195; z ARMIN JON 465; AuDINET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 289 ff; 
BATIFFOL, Traite 682. 
Belgium: POULLET no. 443 ff. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Prine. 148; MONACO, L'efficacia 148. 
Portugal: CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, r Dire ito Civil 689 (exempting only special 
laws on immovables). 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 28, 1896) 79 Sent. 125 at 133; Cf. TRfAs DE BEs 
no. 138. 
35 Cass. (req.) (July 18, 1905) Clunet 1906, 446, Revue 1906, zoo; Trib. 
civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) Revue 1925, 240, 252; Trib. Meaux (May 4, 
1928) Clunet 1928, 1223, 1228. See, however, recently Trib. Orleans (Feb. 27, 
1951) Revue Crit. 1954, 358. Cf. also DELAUME, supra n. 1, 4 Am. J. Comp. 
Law ( 1955) 46 f. 
36 The courts were traditionally for the lex situs,· cf. r EHRENZWEIG-
KRAINZ 106. 
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY 367 
in force applies to all property, including movables, acquired 
in Louisiana "by non-resident married persons." 37 The 
courts have given effect to this provision in order to grant the 
outstanding benefits of the Louisiana community system to 
the wife with respect to real property acquired in the state,38 
but have declined to apply this provision to choses in action,39 
while their position as regards tangible personal property 
does not seem entirely settled.40 How this strange rule can be 
fitted into a well coordinated law of conflicts seems not to 
have been discussed so far. 
The Civil Code of Latvia also subjects to the lex fori all 
property of spouses not domiciled in the country.41 
Deference of Continental countries to the Anglo-American 
rule of lex situs. The application of the law of the situs to 
marital property interests in immovables in some countries, 
particularly those following the Anglo-American system, has 
been taken into consideration by several other countries, 
which in such cases allow their own personal law to yield to 
the lex situs to a greater extent than usual (see page 3 6o). 
The outstanding provision of this kind, article 28 of the In-
troductory Law to the German Civil Code, leaves the deter-
mination of interests in or respecting foreign immovables or 
movables to such particular local provisions as claim to gov-
ern at the situs. Thus, all rules applied in Maine or Cali-
fornia with respect to immovables of a married person-at 
least insofar as these rules are classified in America as rules 
37 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (1932) art. 2400. 
It is doubtful whether art. 164 of the Cal. Civ. C. of 1872, as amended in 
1917 and 1923, is to be understood in a similar sense. Cal. Civ. C. (Deering, 
1941) 6o ff., § 164; cf. 10 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) 154; STUMBERG, II Tex. L. 
Rev. ( 1932) s6, s8, supra n. I. 
In Texas no such case has been found, STUMBERG, ibid. 65. 
38 Succession of Dill (1923) 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752. 
39 Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. ( 1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 
851. 
40 DAGGETT, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 109-1II. 
41 C. C. (1937) art. 13 sentence 2. 
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of matrimonial character 42-are respected and applied in 
Germany as well. Article 28 of the German law has been fol-
lowed with respect to immovables by the Hague Convention 
of 190 5 on Effects of Marriage (art. 7) and other codifica-
tions.43 The reservation is applied, for instance, to home-
stead provisions.44 French courts, however, profess a radi-
cally contrary policy; in their eyes unity of the matrimonial 
regime has the dignity of an inevitable dogma.45 
Rationale. The American system of isolating interests in 
immovables, although it has hardly ever been justified on 
rational grounds,46 is based on firm traditions and is undis-
puted in its reign. Its principal advantage lies in the simplic-
ity with which it enables a court to determine the interests of 
the parties. This simplicity exists, however, only so long as 
the court has to deal with isolated legal relationships regard-
ing a specific piece of land. Complications similar to those 
arising in cases of succession or bankruptcy arise when assets 
are located in different states and are to be treated as belong-
ing to a single estate, either in the relation of the spouses to 
each other or in their relations with third parties. 
The European system of treating all problems of property 
relations as one single complex, subject to one single law, 
avoids the difficulties that arise when different assets belong-
ing to the same persons are subjected to different laws. It 
creates so many complications of its own, however, that it is 
42 One of the many questions not hitherto discussed, because the funda-
mental difference in scope between the matrimonial laws of this country and 
Europe has been neglected. 
43 Hague Convention on Marriage Effects, art. 7· 
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I6. 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of I948, s. I7. 
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 22 par. 3· 
Contra Denmark: see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44· 
44 CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 689 with reference to the Portuguese 
Decree no. 7033 of October I6, I92o. 
45 See supra p. 366 and infra p. 386. 
46 On the specious justifications by the ancient scholars, see I BAR § I8I. 
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problematical which of the two systems should be preferred. 
The greatest practical difficulties are caused by the coexist-
ence of two such fundamentally different approaches. Inter-
national cooperation of the type suggested by the Hague 
Convention and generous concessions such as those made to 
the Anglo-American system by the Introductory Law of the 
German Civil Code, might smooth over some of the friction 
between the two systems. 
II. THEORY OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Another basic difference in views concerns the relationship 
between the matrimonial law and the marriage settlement. 
I. French Practice 
The French courts still follow the theory of Dumoulin, 
who advocated in 1525 that the effects of marriage upon 
property should be determined primarily by the intention of 
the parties. This theory is well known in this country too; in 
the famous opinion in Saul v. His Creditors/1 Porter, J., al-
though rejecting certain elaborations of Dumoulin's theory 
as developed in later French and Spanish practice, adopted 
the principal ideas of the theory. In the opposite doctrine, 
marriage effects belonged to the domain of the various terri-
torial ("real") statutes, which were in fact multiple and in-
consistent customs. To free the relations between husband 
and wife from this entanglement, the parties were declared 
free to regulate their rights and duties by marriage settle-
ment once and for all, the extraterritorial effect pertaining 
to the personal "statute." Even in cases where the parties 
had made no settlement, they were said simply to have tacitly 
agreed to subject themselves to a certain local custom, pref-
47 (1827) 5 Mart. N. S. (La.) 569. A mistake by Judge Porter in interpret-
ing the Spanish law has been noted by DEFUNIAK, I Principles of Community 
Property (1943) 249· 
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erably to the custom in force at the marital domicil, identical 
for practical purposes with the domicil of the husband at the 
time of the marriage.48 
(a) Method and result of French cases. The full liberty 
of the parties to make any settlement they choose is still rec-
ognized by the French courts, which continue to imply a tacit 
contract in the absence of a settlement.49 
While once this method resulted in the general application 
of the matrimonial law of the first domicil, it is now em-
ployed more consistently with the original idea; in order to 
determine the presumed intention of the parties, all facts 
of the individual case are taken into consideration, including 
the conduct and statements of the parties after the mar-
riage.50 Criticism of this method of practical interpretation "1 
has been answered by the Tribunal de la Seine with the argu-
ment that manifestations of the parties during marriage, 
though they cannot modify the regime adopted at the time 
of the marriage, nevertheless give significant support to the 
assumptions of the court.52 By these methods, it has been 
presumed that the parties have tacitly agreed to adopt the 
law of the domicil of the husband or that of their common 
nationality or that of an intended future domicil.53 But as an 
after-effect of the old domiciliary tradition, the presumption 
of a tacit agreement to the law of the real or intended marital 
4B Cf. CALEB, Essai sur le principe de l'autonomie de Ia volonte en droit 
international prive (I927) I35; NIBOYET 792 no. 684; 3 ARMINJON nos. 88 ff. 
49 Cass (civ.) (July 11, I855) S.I855.I.699; Cass. {req.) (July I5, I885) 
Clunet I886, 93; Cass. {req.) (May IS, I886) Clunet I886, 456. See other 
decisions cited by WEiss, 3 Traite 639 ff. 
5o Constant practice, as the Repertoires attest; cf. particularly Cour Paris 
(Dec. 7, I887) D.I888.2.265; Cass. {req.) (June 4, 1935) Clunet I936, 898; 
Cass. (req.) (April 6, I938) S.I938.1.I5I, Clunet I938, 788; Cass (civ.) 
(May 5, I953) Revue Crit. I953, 799, Clunet I953, 658, excluding expressly 
a preponderance of a presumption for the matrimonial domicil. 
51 NIBOYET 833 no. 7I6; PILLET, 2 Traite 225. 
52 Trib. civ. Seine (May n, I933) Revue Crit. I934, I29. 
53 See the report of Brachet in Trib. civ. Versailles {May I5, I924) Revue 
I925, 24I, 245· See also }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at 9I. 
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY 371 
domicil seems to be preferred,54 the latter especially when it 
happens to result in the application of French law. Some de-
cisions have aroused amazement. Thus, a Swiss married a 
French woman in New York, went with her to Switzerland 
and many years after to France, but French law was pre-
sumed intended.55 The same result was reached in cases 
where sixty years after the marriage the bodies of the 
spouses were brought to France 56 and where Swiss spouses 
had stayed in France no longer than three weeks. 57 
(b) Influence of the French doctrine on other countries. 
The French system has been followed by some courts in other 
countries 58 and hinted at in the statutes of Spain, Portugal, 
and in the original text of the Treaty of Montevideo. 59 The 
54 CALEB, 4 Repert, I8o no. 69 ff.; cf. Cour Paris (Nov. I8, I937) Clunet 
1938, 3ro; Cour Paris {March 2, I938) Clunet 1938, 544· In Switzerland this 
was erroneously believed to be the French law; cf. ScHNITZER {ed. I.) I97· 
55 Trib. civ. Belfort (June I3, I911) and Cour Besan<;on {March 18, 1912) 
Clunet 1913, 171. 
5
'
1 Trib. civ. Versailles (July 19, 1927) Clunet 1928, 429; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 
296. 
57 Cour Paris (June 28, 1937) Schardon c. Chavon, Clunet I938, 537; the 
commentator, ibid. 540 is surprised, but the Court of Cassation affirmed (May 
5. 1938) Gaz.Pal.I938.2.232, cf. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 128. 
58 To this effect Belgium: Trib. civ. Anvers (Dec. 26, I925) Pasicrisie 
1926.3.24; Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Dec. 2, I925) Pasicrisie 1926.3.117; App. 
Bruxelles (June I3, I931) 18 Bull. lnst. Beige {1932-1933) 53; Trib. civ. 
Bruxelles {March 29, I933) Pasicrisie I934·3·I9. Cf. POULLET 513 ff. nos. 
442 ff. Other decisions, however, followed the national law. See infra p. 375, 
n. 82. 
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel {Feb. 4. 1948) 14 Pasicrisie Lux. 359· 
Brazil: with respect to marriages anterior to the Civil Code see VALLADAO 
153 and more recently Sup. Trib. Fed. (June I2, I940) In re Wolner, I40 
Revista dir. civ. (I942) 281 {submission to the Brazilian general community 
property system, assumed to have been effectuated by declaration in the 
marriage record, without marriage settlement; per abundantiam the Aus-
trian law, possibly national law of the parties is understood, with KRAS-
NOPOLSKI, Oesterreichisches Familienrecht (Wien, 1911) § 17, as permitting 
autonomy of the parties (at 287)); Trib. de Apela<;iio de Sao Paulo (Aug. 
21, I945) I05 Revista For. (I946) 315. 
The Netherlands: A few older decisions overruled by H. R. (May 17, I929) 
W. 12006; on a later decision of Hof den Haag (Feb. 6, I93 I) W. 12373 see 
VAN DER FLIER, Clunet 1933, 1110. For an implied choice of law by the parties 
again Rb. Roermond (Feb. 8, 1934) N. ]. I934, 824. 
59 Spain: C. C. art. 1325; Portugal: C. C. art. 1107; Belgian Congo: C. C. 
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Civil Code of Louisiana varies the French doctrine by declar-
ing that "every marriage contracted in this State, superin-
duces of right partnership or community of acquest or gains, 
if there be no stipulation to the contrary"; 60 of course, this 
is not an interpretation of the parties' intention but a state-
ment of the legal regime. 
In England, the contractual theory has exercised some in-
fluence. An express marriage settlement is construed accord-
ing to the law presumed to be intended by the parties; or-
dinarily, the effect is that, by a rebuttable presumption, it is 
governed by the law of the marital domicil. 61 Moreover, al-
though no longer popular, the doctrine of intended marital 
domicil has not been forgotten. 62 Finally, the inference from 
a tacit marriage covenant to an immutable law of the first 
domicil, which was rejected in Saul v. His Creditors, was pro-
claimed in De Nicols v. Curlier as late as 1898.63 The case, 
however, referred to a marriage celebrated in France by 
parties domiciled in France; a tacit marriage agreement was 
assumed, because the French courts administering the law of 
the domicil would have proceeded by this method. Neither in 
England, according to the better view, 64 nor in Canada, ac-
cording to the distinctly adopted opinion, is such construction 
imitated. In the absence of an express settlement and a will, 
marital property is governed by the law of the husband's 
domicil. Hence, the community system of Quebec was ap-
plied in Ontario to spouses who had their first domicil in Que-
art. I2; but all these are rather harmless reminiscences, M. WoLFF, 4 Rechts-
vergl. Handworterb. 410; Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, 
text of 1889, art. 4I (the marital domicil expressly agreed upon by the par-
ties before the marriage). 
60 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2399. 
61 In re Fitzgerald, Surman v. Fitzgerald [1904] I Ch. 573; In re Bankes, 
Reynolds v. Ellis [I902] 2 Ch. 333, etc. CHESHIRE 50I. 
6 2 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2u, 239; See WEsTLAKE 
72 § 36 ; DICEY 789, CHESHIRE 502. 
63 [1898] I Ch. 403; [1900] A. c. 2I. 
64 Doubtful: CHESHIRE 505 ff.; DICEY 788. 
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bee, because the law of Quebec like the French referred to 
the presumable intention of the parties to choose the local 
regime rather than because the Ontario court shared the 
theory of implied contract.65 
(c) Influence on America. In the United States, the old 
French doctrine had some influence on Story.66 
The "intended domicil" appeared in a few decisions 67 but 
has been rejected by prevailing opinion as well as by the Re-
statement.68 A contemplated domicil which, because of a 
change of mind, does not become a home in fact, may figure 
as an important element in ascertaining the law tacitly chosen 
by the parties in setting up a marriage contract, but it is no 
veritable domicil at all and is therefore neglected in this coun-
try; domicil is the test for the determination of marital prop-
erty rights in movables, independent of any intention of the 
parties.68a 
In Latin America, while the Montevideo Treaty of 1889 
testifies to the widespread adoption of the theory of intended 
marital domicil, the new text of 1940 evidences a disposition 
to abandon the theory.69 
(d) Opposition to French practice. The literature, includ-
ing the modern French writers, 70 unanimously rejects the old 
65 See Beaudoin v. Trudel (Ont. Ct. App. I936) [I937] I D.L.R. 216; In 
re Parsons (Ont.) [I926] I D.L.R. n6o. 66 STORY §§ I98, I99· 
67 Ford's Curator v. Ford (I824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574, 578, I4 Am. Dec. 
20I; I WHARTON 402 § I90. 68 Restatement § 289; 2 BEALE § 289.I n. 3; GooDRICH, "Matrimonial Dom-
icile," 27 Yale L. J. (I9I7) 49 at 50 (against STORY), STUMBERG, II Tex. 
L. Rev. (I932) 53, 55, supra n. I and in his Principles of Conflict of Laws 
3 I 2, but see 3 I7; cf. CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 492. 
as a See infra p. 3 97. 
69 Art. I6. Supra n. 59; see also I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ no. 224. 
70 BARTIN, D.r898.2-457, BARTIN, 2 Principes 247 no. 302; PILLET, 2 Me-
langes 95; VALERY n28 no. 794; 3 ARMIN JON IOI no. 95 bis; NIBOYET 833 
no. 7I6 and 5 Traite 398; AuDINET, 40 Recueil I932 II 257-259, 265. As is 
known, DuMOUI.IN's contemporary, D'ARGENTRE, fought against extraterri-
torial effect of a tacit agreement, see WEiss, 3 Traite 29. In Italy, ANZII.OTTI 
particularly attacked the doctrine of presumed intention. 
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French practice. The presumed intention is called an ex-
cessively fictitious assumption, and the unpredictability of a 
future court decision on this intention is considered intoler-
able.71 Of this system, it was recently said that the matrimo-
nial law, whose main reason to exist must be found in the 
security of the spouses and of third persons, fails completely 
to serve its purpose.72 
It is interesting that French writers advocating reform 
have expressed a preference in certain cases for the domicili-
ary test rather than the nationality principle. 73 The French 
private draft of 1930 favors the first marital domicil.74 
III. CONTACTS 
I. Domicil 
Domicil is the test of the effects of marriage on property 
in the Anglo-American countries, Denmark, Norway, Argen-
tina, Paraguay, and Peru,75 recently joined by Brazil 76 in 
accordance with the general principles of these countries in 
matters of status. Furthermore, domicil, rather than nation-
ality, has been recognized by the courts in Austria, 77 whose 
71 LEREBOUR~PIGEONN!llRE 417 no. 344, justifies the regard for manifesta-
tions of the parties subsequent to the marriage as a means of avoiding sur-
prises which the courts would otherwise inflict on the parties. 
72 SAVATIER, D.1936.I.7, 
73 3 ARMIN JON 104 no. 97; COSTE-FLORET, Note, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 224 
no. 126. 
74 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 82; cf. NIBOYET, ibid. 1928, 336. The offi-
cial draft of 1949 takes the personal law of both spouses into account, in 
case of difference the law of the place of the marriage ceremony (art. 37). 
75 Denmark: MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746; BORUM, Per-
sonalstatutet 455· 
Latvia: C. C. (1937) § 13, extending however lex fori to all property situ-
ated in the country. 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II6. 
Argentina: Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 5 par. I. 
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law of Dec. 2, 1898, art. 5 par. I. 
Peru: C. C. (1936) Tit. Pre!. art. V (for foreigners). 
76 Brazil: Introductory Law of Sept. 4, 1942, art. 7 § 4· 
77 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 5, 1864) 5 GIU. no. 2701; OGH. (Feb. 27, x89o) 
28 GIU. no. 13176; dictum in OGH. (Oct. 22, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 337; contra: 
most writers, see WALKER 748. 
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marital property law has not been changed since 1938. The 
particular system of the Swiss conflicts law extends to the 
property effects of marriage.78 
The domicil in question has been generally and still is the 
domicil of the husband at the time of the celebration of the 
marriage. This principle, derived from the old ideas of cover-
ture and merger, as in England, is preferred in the United 
States as a simple and unequivocal test to indicate the matri-
monial center, more reliable than the concept of first conju-
gal domicil. Yet another view has been taken in Switzerland 
and increasingly in Latin America, where the law of the first 
domicil actually established by the husband and wife in com-
mon is declared applicable. 79 But as this doctrine needs to be 
supplemented when the parties, because of premature death 
or separation or continued migration, never establish a 
common domicil, the husband's domicil at the marriage has 
to be utilized as an inevitable emergency test.80 The C6digo 
Bustamante (art. I 87) adopts this method also in case the 
parties have no common nationality.81 
These divergent concepts are obviously part of the marital 
property laws, so as to make characterization of the domicil 
dependent on the applicable law. 
2. Nationality 
In other countries,82 the nationality of the husband is the 
test adopted and is preferred to the possibly different na-
78 Switzerland: NAG. arts. 19, 20, 32; cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 472. 
79 Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 19, 1929) 55 BGE. II 231. Treaty of Montevideo 
on international civil law, text of 1940, art. 16. 
Brazil: Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7· 
80 Opinion adopted in Switzerland following TEICHMANN; see STAUFFER, 
NAG. 87 f no. 13; BG. (Sept. 19, 1929) 55 BGE. II 230. 
81 Similarly, e.g., Guatemala C. C. (1926) art. 174; Law on Foreigners 
( 1936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. 116, if both parties are foreigners. 
82 Germany: EG. art. 15, followed by Hague Convention on Marriage 
Effects, art. 2. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June r6, 1926) Pasicrisie 1927.2.77, Clunet 1928, 
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tionality of the wife. In this field, unity and clarity of the 
regime to govern the effects of marriage on property are con-
sidered more important than attempts to satisfy both na-
tionallaws.82a This contrasts markedly with the controversial 
literature respecting the effect of divided nationality on per-
sonal marital relations.83 
1102; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (]an. 15, 1934) Clunet 1935, 682; App. Bruxelles 
(July 7, 1943) J.d. Tr. 1944, 41, Clunet 1946-49, 106; App. Bruxelles (May 
24, 1954) Revue des Faillites 1953-54, 312, Revue Crit. 1955, 701. See also 
supra p. 371 n. 58. 
Bulgaria: GHi1NOV, 6 Repert. 192 no. 68; GANEFF, 4 Leske--Loewenfeld I 
818. 
China: Law of 1918, art. 10 par. 2. 
Finland: Law of 1929, art. 14 par. 2. 
Egypt: C. C. (1948) art. 13 par. 1 (for foreigners). 
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. u6 (in 
cases of common nationality of the parties). 
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. I5. 
Hungary: 6 Repert. 463 nos. 83, 83 his, 88. 
Iran: C. C. art. 963. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. I9; as to the former law: Cass. (April 
I6, I932) Foro Ita!., II Massimario I932, 282 no. I376. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I5. 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) W. I0444; VAN HASSELT 
6 Repert. 630 no. I7o. 
Philippines: C. C. ( I949) art. I24· 
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I4 par. 3· 
Portugal: C. C. art. 1107, cf. art. I6; CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 
689. 
Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 23, I937) affaire Grigoriou, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
no. I89. 
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 22. 
Spain: C. C. arts. 9 and I325 as currently interpreted: see MANRESA, 9 
Comentarios al C6digo Civil Espafiol ( I908) I 99; J. LASSALA SAM PER, El 
Regimen Matrimonial de Bienes. Derecho Internacional y Interregional 
(I954) I64; Trib. Supr. (July I, I955) Revista Priv. I956, I43 1 Rev. Esp. Der. 
Int. I955, 6o8. 
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I no. 2. 
Syria: C. C. (I 949) art. I4 par. I (for foreigners). 
82a A proposal of MAKAROV, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Frau und das 
Internationale Privatrecht," I7 Z.ausl.PR. (I952) 382-396, to adapt the Ger-
man statutory Conflict rules to the constitutional postulate of equality of the 
sexes has been generally rejected, cf. DOLLE, in: Le droit international prive 
de Ia famiile 564. 
83 In this field only isolated voices have protested the dominant doctrines 
such as 2 ZrTELMANN 749 who advocated a compulsory system of separate 
property in nationally mixed marriages, 
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Following the general trend from nationality to territori-
ality,84 however, the courts of some countries are inclined to 
apply their own municipal law, if the wife was a national of 
the forum before the marriage or at the time of suit or if the 
first marital domicil was established at the forum. 85 Recent 
statutes have confirmed this tendency.85a In France, this trend 
has inspired a draft proposal of the Societe d' etudes tegisla-
tives, basing the property regime on the law of the place 
where the parties "fix" their domicil immediately after mar-
riage, of which the last version significantly limits itself to 
provide for the application of French law in the case of a 
first French matrimonial domicil.86 
On the other hand, the far-reaching arm of the national 
law is exhibited by the declaration of the Italian Supreme 
Court that a regime of general community of property, under 
which the spouses in Argentina believed they were living, 
was inapplicable, because this regime was forbidden to them 
84 See Jupra pp. 163 ff., 374• 85 In Spain, Spanish law has been applied where the marriage is celebrated 
in Spain and the wife is a national; see TRIAs DE BEs, 31 Recueil I930 I 6s8, 
68o. 
Regarding the Brazilian law previous to 1942 (C. C. of 1916, Introduction 
art. 8), decisions of the Sup. Trib. Fed., Recurso Extraord. no. 919, Wein-
berger {Dec. 20, 1916) 12 Revista Jur. (1918) 479, (Dec. 30, I918) and 
(Dec. 20, 1919) 19 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 48 (cf. VALLADAO 128, I29) 
modified the principles essentially for the benefit of the Brazilian party. They 
deal with an American from New York who married a Brazilian woman and 
established domicil in Brazil. He went bankrupt under the law of New York, 
and the wife claimed her Brazilian immovables under the common law sys-
tem. The Supreme Court actually applied the law of New York and not the 
Brazilian general community system. But the New York regime could not 
govern immovables in Brazil. Moreover, under the principle of renvoi, 
Brazilian law was competent in every respect. In the cases of Sao Paulo 
(VALLADAO 133) the law of the forum was undisputed. 
85a The C. C. of Egypt, I948 {art. I4) and of Syria, I949 {art. IS) apply 
the lex fori if one of the spouses at the time of the celebration of the mar-
riage is a national of the lex fori. In Czechoslovakia, in case of diversity 
of the national laws of the spouses, the lex fori governs subsidiarily (Law 
on private international law of I948, §IS). 
86 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1928, 339 ff., art. 20; definitive text, ibid. I930, 
I7S ff., art. 20. Cf. NIBOYET, ibid. I928, 3I9 ff., 334, Revue I929, I93, 2I2. As 
to the official draft of I949, see supra n. 76. 
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as Italian nationals by article 1433 of the Civil Code (of 
I86s).87 The disharmony between the Italian nationality 
principle and the Argentine domiciliary principle has at-
tracted attention, in view of the millions of Italian immi-
grants living in Argentina, and has resulted, if not in con-
cessions to the domiciliary law, at least in the suggestion that 
the parties should be induced to declare a choice of law on 
their marriage. 88 
/llustration. 89 A German married woman domiciled in 
Zurich, Switzerland, contracted a loan with a Swiss bank. 
The contract was, without doubt, governed by Swiss law. The 
question, however, whether she could, without her husband's 
consent, make her nonreserved property liable, was answered 
in Germany under the German law of nationality, while a 
Swiss court would have applied the Swiss law of domicil. 
3· Law of the Place of Celebration 
The law of the place of celebration has been invoked but 
rarely.90 Except within the strict confines of title questions, 
the situs of movables is attributed no importance in any law. 
4· Renvoi 
Divergences between the law of the situs and the personal 
law (for instance, in the case of immovables in the United 
States), or between the proper law (French practice) and 
other principles, make place for renvoi. If two French na-
. tionals domiciled in the United States are married, under 
American law their movables are governed by the law of the 
87 Cass. Roma (April 16, 1932) Foro Ita!., II Massimario 1932, 282 no. 
1376 j cf. UDINA, Elementi 184 no. 135 j FEDOZZI 446. 
88 FEDOZZI 451; AuniNET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 241 at 265. Cf. WEISS, 3 
Traite 643, in view of the uncertain French practice. 
89 Bay. ObLG. (May u, 1929) IPRspr. 1929, no. 75· 
90 Argentine Civil Marriage Law ( 1888) art. 5 par. I, probably presuming 
that the marital domicil is at the place of celebration. Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. (Vernon, 1940) art. 4627 declares expressly that removal to Texas sub-
jects the marital rights of persons "married in other countries" to Texas law. 
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state of their domicil; French courts would probably arrive 
at the same result by construction of the parties' intention.91 
German courts would follow the presumed French decision 
under the statutory command of renvoi (EG. art. 27). 
It is likewise by renvoi that, in Germany, the lex situs 
governs the effects of marriage on immovables owned by 
Americans.92 German courts have interpreted this renvoi so 
broadly that all questions determined in the United States 
according to the lex situs of immovables are by them decided 
in conformance with the German law applicable to immova-
bles located in Germany. 
Illustration: An American wife in New York owned Ger-
man immovables. The law of the matrimonial domicil, New 
York, did not require the husband's joinder for conveying 
the land. Under German matrimonial law, however, the land 
was a part of those assets of the wife of which she could not 
dispose without her husband's consent. The German court 
held that the American renvoi to the lex situs resulted in the 
application of all the rules of German law on matrimonial 
property and that, therefore, the husband's consent was nec-
essary.na Thus, the ordinary German conflicts rule on capacity 
to contract was not applied. Similar arguments have been 
made in Switzerland.94 
The French courts are in a different position, as their doc-
trine of renvoi yields to their doctrine that the matrimonial 
property law must be supreme and unqualified.95 
01 See the decisions above, n. 54, and LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 567. When 
renvoi was followed by OLG. Colmar (Feb. 12, 1901) Clunet 1903, 666, II 
Z.int.R. (1902) 282, it was done under French law, but the court was German 
at the time. 
Spain: see MANRESA, op. cit. supra n. 82, at 205. 
92 OLG. Colmar (Aug. 24, 19II) 4 Rhein. Z.f.Zivil- und Prozessrecht 295; 
cf. OLG. Miinchen (March 15, 1913) 30 ROLG. 45 (renvoi by Hungarian 
law); OLG, Breslau (Oct. 31, 1929) JW, 1930, IOII. 
93 OLG. Colmar (Aug. 24, 19II) 4 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht 295; 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 401 n. 57 approving. 
94 HuBER-MuTZNER 476 n. 417. 
95 See supra n. 35 and infra n. 122. 
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The problem arising from the different scope of European 
and American marital property laws in the application of 
renvoi has not yet been properly explored. It seems obvious, 
however, that renvoi must be applied when the two foreign 
laws involved agree with each other in a certain result. Sup-
pose that Italian spouses are domiciled first in Italy and then 
in Switzerland; a Swiss court would apply the Italian system 
of separate property so far as the mutual relations of the 
spouses are concerned, and Swiss law of "property union" 
with respect to their relations to third persons. In like case, 
an English court would strictly follow the Swiss court, pro-
vided the parties retain their Swiss domicil. Would an Amer-
ican court, disregarding the Swiss partial recognition of Ital-
ian law, also apply the Swiss principles of "property union" 
between the parties? Another question is still more delicate: 
Would an American court introduce its own distinction be-
tween movables acquired before and after marriage? 
IV. TnE PROBLEM OF MuTABILITY: CHANGE OF 
PERSONAL LAw DuRING CovERTURE 
1. Change in Legislation 
If altered during the marriage, the governing municipal 
law, according to principles generally recognized in Europe, 
rules in its changed form. 96 The same law also determines 
what retroactive effect changes have on the matrimonial rela-
tionship. 97 
96 E.g., Cour d'Aix (April 28, 1910) Clunet 1911, 199 (change from Italian 
to French law by the annexation of Nizza in 186o). 
07 Cass. (req.) (June 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1936, 755; Trib. Colmar (June 
12, 1951) Revue Crit. 1952, 313. HABICHT 128 and the general opinion in 
Germany. 
After the introduction of new marital property regimes in Poland in 1946 
and 1950, effective also for existing marriages, the courts did not find that 
this retroactive change infringes public policy: Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. II, 
1950) N. ]. 1951 no. 391; Cour Paris, (July 2, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 810, 
Clunet 1955, 142. 
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In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment in some 
measure limits retroactive state legislation.98 
2. Change in Status 
It is an old question whether alteration of the initial domi-
cil alters marital relations. The question now comprehends 
any change in the personal law 99 and is of extraordinary im-
portance in view of the enormous differences of matrimonial 
property systems and the multiplied migrations of our time. 
The former conception in Germanic countries seems to 
have been that the legal incidents of property are only an 
outgrowth of the personal relations between the spouses. The 
personal regime being mutable, the property system was held 
mutable too. This concept was followed in Switzerland, Eng-
land, and, before the German Civil Code, in the northwestern 
parts of Germany and in Baden. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1265 A.D., the Spanish Partidas, 
which have been so influential in the Americas, declared the 
matrimonial regime immutable in the face of a change in per-
sonal status/00 
In France from the times of the postglossators, the prob-
lem was controversial; the victory of the theory construing 
marital property law as a tacit contractual system naturally 
brought with it the assumption of permanence. Moreover, in 
French municipal law itself, the immutability of marital regu-
lation of property was proclaimed so as to prohibit postnup-
tial settlements of any kind, and finally also in the Civil Code 
(arts. I 3 94, I 3 9 5) , even in the case of divorce and remar-
riage of the spouses (art. 29 5 par. 2) , in the belief that, to 
secure conjugal peace and to protect husband and wife 
98 See the interesting Note, 16 Cal. L. Rev. (1927) 399· 
99 TEICHMANN, Uber die Wandelbarkeit oder Unwandelbarkeit des gesetz-
lichen ehelichen Giiterrechts, bei Wohnsitzwechsel (Basel, 1879); 2 ZITEL-
MANN 725. 
100 Partida IV, ley 24, tit. XI, a very clear and neat statement. 
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against their respective maneuvers as well as those of their 
creditors, the system of marital property must be stable. 
Therefore, the principle of immutability was considered im-
perative. 101 
On the contrary, it is characteristic of modern codifications 
to permit marriage settlements during marriage.102 
3· The Principles 
(a) Full mutability. In England, the House of Lords 
decided in the Hog case ( 1804) 103 that parties, acquiring a 
domicil in Scotland after fifteen years of marriage, thereby 
became subject to the Scotch rule of community, and Lord 
Eldon held that the rule applied to all movables which Hog 
possessed. However, the communio bonorum of Scotch law 
was not a true marital regime but only a mode of distribution, 
and hence adequately governed by the law of the Scotch 
domicil of the deceased at the time of his death rather than 
at the time when he acquired such domiciU04 
Full mutability decrees also the new Brazilian law.104a In 
Switzerland, the principle of mutability, limited to the rela-
tions of the spouses to third persons, applies to a married 
couple transferring their domicil to Swi tzerland.105 
1o1 The entire Latin group followed this model. 
1o2 The United States: see 3 VERNIER §I 56. 
Denmark: Law on Effects of Marriage of I925, c. 4 § 28. 
Germany: BGB. § I408 (as amended by Law of June IS, I957)· 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I405 {for modification of settlements only). 
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. I03. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I62 par. 3· 
Sweden: Marriage Law of I920, c. 8 §I. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 179 par. I. 
103 Lashley v. Hog (I804) 4 Paton {Scotch Appeals Case) 58 I. DICEY 796 
Rule I82; CHESHIRE {ed. 2) 493, but doubtful in ed. 5, 509. 
104 WESTLAKE 73 ff.; FoOTE 354 {both concluding for the system of full 
immutability). 
104a C. C. Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 par. 4, as amended 1943; 
TENORIO, Lei de Introduc;ao ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro ( ed. 2, I955) 276. 
105 NAG. arts. I9, 20, 3I. However, the spouses can submit, by formal 
declaration, also their mutual property relations to Swiss law, art. 31 par. 
3, 20 NAG. 
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(b) Mutability of new acquisitions. In the United 
States 106 and Argentina/07 the principle of mutability is es-
tablished in the sense that only movables acquired after the 
change of domicil are governed by the law of the new domi-
cil. The same principle was adopted by the Scandinavian Con-
vention on Family Law (art. 3) and is sometimes assumed to 
be English law.108 In the United States, the continuing effect 
of law on property once acquired 109 is the more important 
principle, since the interests in movables acquired under the 
former domiciliary law continue in any objects that may re-
place these movables,110 so long as the proceeds of the origi-
nal goods can be traced.111 (In the language of the civil law, 
a subrogation; pretium succedit in locum rei, and res succedit 
in locum pretii.) Moreover, the authorities emphasize that 
transfer of movables from the state where they have been 
acquired or from one domicil to another does not· alter their 
condition, either as separate or community property.112 This 
doctrine is generally thought to be protected by the constitu-
106 Matter of Majot (1910) 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 rejected the doc-
trine of the De Nicols case. The great majority of American courts have 
adopted the law of the domicil at the time of acquisition. Cf. Succession of 
Packwood (1845) 9 Rob. (La.) 438,41 Am. Dec. 341; Pearl v. Hansborough 
(1848) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; Castro v. Illies {1858) 22 Tex. 479, 73 
Am. Dec. 277; Snyder v. Stringer (1921) n6 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733. To 
the same effect the statute of Louisiana Civ. Code { 1932) art. 2401; Ari-
zona Code Ann. (1939) §§ 63-306; and Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. {Vernon, 
1947) art. 4627. Restatement §290; 2 BEALE §290.1; DEFUNIAK, I Principles 
of Community Property (1943) 250; MARSH (supra n. I) 213. 
107 Argentine Civil Marriage Law {I888) art. 5 par. 2, followed by 
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law {I898) art. 5 par. 2. 
108 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," IS 
Can. B. Rev. {1927) 226, now Essays 105, arguments on De Nicols v. Cur-
lier [1900] A. C. 21. 
109 Brookman v. Durkee { I907) 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914; Restatement 
§§ 291, 292. 
110 ScHOULER, I Domestic Relations § 592; I WHARTON 415 ff. § 193a; 
MARSH (supra n. I) 206. 
111 McAnally v. O'Neal {1876) 56 Ala. 299, 302. 
112 Restatement §§ 291-293. Brookman v. Durkee (I907) 46 Wash. 578, 90 
Pac. 914 and many other decisions; see I2 L.R.A. (N. S.) 921; 57 L.R.A. 353· 
In Europe it goes without saying that these rules apply. 
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tiona! guarantees against deprivation of property without 
due process of law.113 Only the technical nature of community 
property may have to be construed, after a transfer, so as to 
agree with the new lex situs. The debts contracted by the hus-
band or wife likewise retain their nature as enforceable on 
separate or community property respectively.114 
Under section 291 of the Restatement, however, control 
by the former domiciliary law ends when "the interests are 
affected by some new dealings with the movables in the 
second state." The exact meaning of this proposition is in 
doubt. 115 Beale, in another place in his treatise,116 referring 
to Drake v. Glover, where it was said that "The lex loci con-
tractus governs, 'as to the nature, the obligation, and the in-
terpretation of a contract,' " 117 remarks only that dealings 
with movables must be carried out in accordance with the law 
of the new' domicil. 
How these rules work in practice has been illustrated dur-
ing a century in a few cases only, covering only a part of the 
situations imaginable and leaving incertitude in many re-
spects.118 
(c) Immutability. In the field of the law of conflicts, im-
mutability is proclaimed ordinarily by all systems following 
the nationality principle 119 and in addition by some others:~o 
113 In re Drishaus' Estate (I926) I99 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. SIS; In re Thorn-
ton's Estate (I934) I Cal. (2d) I, 33 P. (2d) I. 
114 As to moving domicil from a separate property state to a community 
property state: Hyman Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker ( I892) 44 La. Ann. 
ro8, IO So. 623; Clark v. Eltinge ( I902) 29 Wash. ZIS; 69 Pac. 736; Huy-
vaerts v. Roedtz (I9I9) IOS Wash. 6s7, I78 Pac. 8oi. For the inverse situ-
ation no case is illustrative; see also DE FUNIAK, I Principles of Community 
Property ( I943) S32, S33· 
115 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (I930) 1286, I289; MARSH (supra n. I) 203. 
116 2 BEALE § 292.I; cf. Restatement § 29I. 
117 (I8S7) 30 Ala. 382 at 389 quoting STORY 2I9 § 263. This distinction is 
universally recognized. 
118 NEUNER, s La. L. Rev. (1943) 176, I78-I82, supra n. I, makes an in-
teresting attempt to coordinate the cases. 
119 Germany: EG. art. IS. Following this model: Hague Convention on 
Marriage Effects, arts. 2 and 9· 
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Under this principle, the spouses continue under their former 
matrimonial law. 
Switzerland has adopted this conception, so far as the 
rights of the parties between themselves are concerned. The 
Federal Tribunal has observed that rights created under the 
China: Law of 1918, art. 10 par. 2. 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 15. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 15 par. 1. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14 par. 3· 
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I No.2. 
See moreover: 
Egypt: C. C. ( 1948) art. 13 par. I (for foreigners). 
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 15; formerly by interpretation of C. C. (I856) 
art. 4 § 3; 2 STREIT-VALL!NDAS 346 n. 22. 
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (I936) art. 40 last sentence. 
French Morocco: Dahir of Aug. I3, I913 sur Ia condition civile des Fran-
<;ais et des etrangers dans le protectorat Fran<;ais du Maroc, arts. 14, I5. 
Spanish Morocco: Dahir de Ia condicion civil de los espaiioles y extran-
jeros, art. 13. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. I9 par. 2. 
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 14 par. 1 (for foreigners). 
Decisions in the following countries: 
Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ( ed. I) I I05. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 16, 1926) Pasicrisie 1927.2.77, Clunet 1928, 
1102. 
France: App. Alger (Dec. 13, 1897) Clunet 1898, 723; Trib civ. Seine 
(Dec. z8, 1900) Clunet I9o1, 568; Trib. civ. Marseilles (July I2, I907) 
Clunet 1908, 831; Trib. civ. Marseilles (May 8, 1913) Clunet 1914, I27I; 
Trib. civil Colmar (June I2, I951) Revue Crit. I952, 3I3· 
Hungary: SCHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I929) 170, I74· 
The Netherlands: applied in the case of a Dutch husband by KG. (Feb. z6, 
I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins 1927, 58. 
Spain: TRIAS DE BES, 6 Repert. 253 nos. I03, I09; LASALA SAM PER (supra n. 
82) 209; Trib. Supr. (Oct. 29, I955) Revista Der. Priv. I956, 258, Rev. Esp. 
Der. Int. 1955, 624. 
Sweden: Sup. C. (July 31, 193I) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, I93I, 403, 7 
Z.ausl. PR. (1933) 934 (Swedish spouses domiciled in the United States); 
Sup. C. (Sept. 23, 1937) ibid. 1937, 438, I3 Z.ausi.PR. (1940/41) 841. 
120 Quebec: Astill v. Hallee (1877) 4 Q.L.R. 120. 
Denmark: Ostre Landsret (Sept. 24, I935) U.f. R. I935, 1143, 10 
Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 6zo; BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44; BORUM 
116, hut see for another view MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746 
no. 4· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. 116; SYNNESTVEDT, DIP. Scan-
dina vie 262. This rule was overlooked in Muus v. Muus ( I88z) 29 Minn. 
115, 12 N. W. 343, but probably would not have changed the decision. 
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 43· 
Rumania: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 3I8 no. 267 
(interprovincial law). 
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first law survive m such form as Is consonant with a new 
statute.121 
Under the rigid French notions, this approach leads to 
strange results. In the case of a married couple, first domi-
ciled in New York and then in France, the separate property 
system of New York was applied in every respect, even to 
French immovables of the husband acquired after the change 
of domicil. This was done, although the New York matri-
monial law does not extend to foreign immovables and, be-
sides, would not be applied by a New York court to objects 
acquired at a new domicil. This result was based on the 
principles of unity (assets regarded as an aggregate unit) 
and of immutability, both of which go together: "L'immuta-
bilite et !'unite vont de pair; l'une ne peut se concevoir sans 
l' autre." 122 
4· Exception: New Marriage Settlements 
Assuming immutability as a principle of conflicts law, the 
matrimonial law of the first domicil or first nationality de-
cides whether there is mutability in the field of private law, 
i.e., the first personal law decides whether or not the parties 
may make a settlement under a changed personal law. 
General Continental customary law has admitted an im-
portant exception, however,123 which is formulated by the 
121 See NAG. art. I9 par. I, as contrasted to par. 2 and art. 31 pars. 2 and 
3; BG. (Dec. Io, I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6I9; BG. {Dec. 5, I940) 66 BGE. II 234 
no. 48. (Swiss spouses having transferred their domicil to a foreign country 
retain their regime established in Switzerland, except when the foreign law 
opposes it.) But see also supra n. IOS. 
122 Trib. civ. Versailles (May IS, I924) with the conclusions of Counsellor 
Brachet, affirmed by Cour Paris {Oct. I7, I924) Revue I925, 240, 254· Easier 
to decide to the same effect was the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I7, I924) 
Revue I925, 226 (incommutability and indivisibility of the property separa-
tion of a naturalized American, former Frenchman, domiciled with his wife 
first in New York and then in France). However, a recent decision has ac-
cepted the renvoi of the law of New York to the French lex sitae, Trib. civil 
Orleans (Feb. 27, I95I) Revue Crit. I954, 358. 
123 RG. {March 9, I9oo) IO Z.int.R. (I900) 28I; RG. (Sept. 25, I903) 
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German Civil Code (Introductory Law art. 15, par. 2), 
namely that if a foreign husband acquires German nation-
ality after the marriage or if foreign spouses establish their 
domicil in Germany, they are allowed to contract a marriage 
settlement, even if no such agreement would be permitted by 
their former personallaw.124 
The Hague Convention on Marriage Effects accepts this 
result in the case where both spouses acquire a new common 
nationality,125 but not where there is only a change of domi-
cil126 nor where the husband alone changes his nationality. 
The more sweeping German statute has aroused much criti-
cism/27 which is justified in the case where the husband alone 
becomes a German national after marriage. 
In the case where both parties change their status, it has 
been argued that a former personal law that allows them to 
modify their regime during coverture, invests them with a 
right effective after the parties leave its orbit, whereas, if it 
prohibits such modification, the prior law ceases to have a 
I 3 Z.int.R. ( I903) 587. ANZILOTII, Sui mutamenti dei rapporti patrimoniali 
fra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato (Firenze, I899) I2I. 124 Followed by Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14 
par. 2. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 19 par. 2. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. I05· 
Swiss writers have inferred from NAG. art. 20 a similar right of French 
parties to conclude a postnuptial settlement in Switzerland against the na-
tional law. See STAUFFER, NAG. I02 n. 49· 
1 25 Art. 9 par. I with art. 4 par. r. 
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, § I no. 9· 126 KG. {Feb. 26, I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins 1927, 58 {settlement 
concluded by Dutchmen after having established themselves in Germany 
void). This restriction by the Convention of the rule of EG. art. I5 par. 2 is 
approved by LEWALD, 103 no. I44, and others. Contra: under EG. art. 15 
par. 2, the KG. (June 23, I932) HRR. I933, no. 205, recognized a settle-
ment by Swiss nationals who had established their second domicil in Ger-
many, whereby they agreed to a system of separate property in accordance 
with the German Code but not in accordance with Swiss C. C. art. I79 par. 2. 127 2 ZITELMANN 741 n. 40I; NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. I) 20; KOSTERS 468; 
LEWALD I03 no. 144; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 3 IO ff. who overrates the nationality 
principle. 
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legitimate role.128 This last argument suffices to prove that 
the solution of the question should be reserved to the new 
personal law. Various writers have suggested that, in the 
event of a change of personal law, the parties should be 
allowed to adapt their property relations to their new legal 
surroundings, irrespective of the municipal law of the first 
state and the general conflicts rule of the second state.129 
Louisiana has instituted such an exception to its otherwise 
rigid rule of immutability.130 
The draft proposed by the French Societe d' etudes tegis-
latives provides that if the marital property was not gov-
erned by French law and if both parties are of French na-
tionality, either by naturalization or reintegration-viz., of 
both, or of the party not a French national-they may adopt 
a settlement accepting a regime within a year.131 Under the 
recent Brazilian law, a party who is naturalized may require. 
with the consent of the other, that the judicial decree of his 
naturalization should state the acceptance of the Brazilian 
regime of general community property saving (acquired?) 
rights of third persons.132 
5. Classification 
The classification of the problem of mutability is theoreti-
cally easy; there can be no doubt that it belongs to the field 
128 KosTERS 454· 
129 Switzerland: NAG. arts. 20, 32, 36b. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI, op. cit. supra n. 123, at 65; DrENA, 2 Prine. 153 ff.; 
FEDOZZI 453· 
130 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. ( 1932) art. 2329, as amended by Act No. 236 of 
1910. 
131 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 175 ff., art. 21; cf. ibid. 1928, 319 ff. at 
339 ff. According to art. 26 as proposed the French regime replacing a foreign 
system, has an effect retroactive to the day of marriage, this, however, with-
out prejudice to the rights acquired by third persons and the validity of 
regularly performed acts of the spouses. Similarly the official Draft of 
1949 (art. 40), adding that a previous legal property regime will be sub-
stituted by the French legal regime of marital property if the parties omit 
an express settlement. 
132 Brazil: Introductory Law ( 1942) art. 7 § 5· 
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of effects of marriage on property.183 Most French writers, 
however, thought that immutability in French law implies a 
certain incapacity, characteristic of the French regime, which 
therefore concerns status and as such is dependent on the na-
tional law.134 Nevertheless, the French courts 135 place the 
problem in the category of the regime matrimonial in a pe-
culiar way. The Court of Cassation, in adopting the classifi-
cation, emphasized as decisive the unity of the marital prop-
erty law (regime Ugal) ,136 meaning thereby that parties who 
have once come to live under the French system of com-
munaute Ugale are bound by it irrevocably, regardless of 
whether they are of French nationality. Parties, however, 
who have chosen or who are subjected to a foreign regime, 
may change to the French community system whenever such 
change is permitted by their first personallaw.137 
Fortunately, no such queer controversy exists in any other 
country. 
6. Renvoi 
The renvoi problem is resolved by including in the govern-
ing law the conflicts rule respecting variability. For instance, 
two Americans, who have not made a marriage settlement, 
establish their domicil first in the United States and then in 
Germany. According to the American rule (Restatement 
§ 290), on the one hand, newly acquired movables would be 
133 To this effect in France, BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1934, 641 and Traite 
700; LEREBOURs-PrGEONNIERE 368 no. 341. 
134 2 ARM!NJON {ed. 2) 585; HARTIN, 2 Principes 143 § 271; NIBOYET, 
no. 710, but contra 5 Traite no. 1507; VALERY 1096 no. 768; AUDINET 474 
no. 589; CALEB in Repert. 199 no. 192 If., SAVATIER, D. 1936.1.7, 10. 
135 Cour Montpellier {April 25, 1884) D.r845.2.36; Cass. {req.) (June 4, 
1935) D.r936.1.7, Clunet 1936, 898, Revue Crit. 1936, 755, annotated by 
BASDEVANT, ibid. 761; Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939, 
105; Trib. civil Colmar (June 12, 1951) Revue Crit. 1952, 313. Contra: 
Trib. civ. Strassburg (July 24, 1935) Clunet 1937, 320. 
136 Report of Counsellor Pilon, Cass. {req.) (June 4, 1935) D.1936.1.7, 
cited supra, n. 135. 
137 This was hailed by LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE {ed. 2) 402 no. 340. 
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considered subject to the German system of separate prop-
erty, subject to participation in gains upon its termination. 
Under the German conflicts rule, on the other hand, the 
common law system of the first domicil would continue to 
apply to all property. The German matrimonial law will 
be applied, however, because its application is induced by the 
American rule of conflict of laws. 
7. Rationale 
Apart from the antiquated historical reasons that have in-
fluenced French developments, the invariability of the gov-
erning law has been explained as being required by the theory 
of vested rights/38 by the alleged function of the law first 
applying to give a definitive solution,139 by the need of the 
wife to be protected against arbitrary changes,140 and by 
other arguments equally weak. From a rational standpoint, 
there is only one reason for a voiding a radical change in the 
regime, the danger of confusion and unworkability in main-
taining two heterogeneous systems at the same time, a dan-
ger illustrated under the American rules pursuant to which a 
former regime partially survives with respect to movables 
acquired before the change of domicil or replaced at any 
time, and makes itself felt in other ways. 
These difficulties, it is true, seem not to have attracted 
much attention in this country. For some unknown reason, 
cases dealing with the topic are relatively few. 
On the other hand, the permanence of property relations, 
188 In connection with an assumed implied contract, a vested right (jus 
adquisitum) was at the base of the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht; see 
Prussian Obertribunal (March u, I873) 69 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. IOI. Among 
the modern writers see PILLET, Principes 52 I no. 289; DIENA "La conception 
du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique en Italie," I7 
Recueil I927 II 343, at 4I6; RAAPE 304; WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I 64 n. 373· 
139 I BAR § I84; KosTERS 453· 
14o I BAR, loc. cit.; WEISS, 3 Traite 647. 
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more completely adopted in Europe than in this country, 
raises problems in connection with other conflicts rules. While 
the law governing marital property is fixed on the day of the 
marriage or of acquisition, the law controlling succession to 
the estate of a predeceasing spouse depends on his nationality 
or domicil as of the day of his death, and the law governing 
the personal relations between the spouses admittedly 
changes with every change of domicil or nationality. In every 
municipal legislation, these three matters are to a certain de-
gree coordinated. Their harmony may be greatly disturbed 
by combining in the applicable laws two or more divergent 
principles, one for marital property, a second for personal 
relations, and a third for succession upon death. Difficult 
problems of characterization, much discussed in recent litera-
ture, result. 141 Those regarding the relation between marital 
property and inheritance law will be illustrated hereafter. 
The position of third states is particularly delicate. In this 
country, an acquisition by an Italian married couple, after 
emigration to the United States, will be treated according to 
the law of the state where the parties establish themselves. 
Italian courts, however, hold that Italian matrimonial law 
continues to govern in every respect. What should be done 
by a court in Cuba or France? Under the nationality princi-
ple there in force, these two countries generally agree with 
the I tali an conception, although such a decision seems ill-
advised.142 
The circumstance, finally, that the German doctrine has 
adopted the principle of mutability in the related field of 
paternal rights in the property of a minor child,143 further 
suggests that all existing rules are unsatisfactory and that 
entirely new methods should be devised. 
141 Doubt of the advisability of the principle on this ground has been con· 
sidered by NEUNER, Der Sinn 67, 68. 
142 Cj. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 307. 
143 See infra, pp. 6oo, 6scr-6sr. 
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V. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 
I. Characterization 
What agreements are covered by the rules dealing with 
marriage settlements, is in practice only to be ascertained by 
comparative law.144 
2. Permissibility 
In the United States, the ordinary rule respecting contracts 
is applied to antenuptial agreements. Hence, the Restatement 
declares applicable the law of the place of contracting.145 The 
Argentine Civil Code states the same rule.146 This place, how-
ever, may easily coincide with that of the first marital domi-
cil.147 
Generally, the conditions under which a marriage settle-
ment is permitted are determined, in the absence of an ante-
nuptial agreement, by the law governing the marital prop-
erty.147a This law decides questions such as are incident to the 
English doctrine of freedom of contract, to the Italian 
provisions that the parties may choose only between narrowly 
144 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 261 and 283; JoELSON, op. cit. supra n. 1. 
145 Restatement § 238 comment b, § 289 comment c, should be read with a 
view to the criticism by STUMBERG 317, 318 referring to Hutchison v. Ross 
(1933) 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65. 
146 Argentine C. C. arts. 1220 (new 1254), 1205 (new 1239); cf. 2 VICO 
48 no. 69, ibid. 50 no. 72; Cam. civ. 1 Cap. (June 27, 1941) J. A. 1942. I 
926, 937 (explains in a learned comment that the restrictions on community 
property settlements do not apply to foreign-concluded contracts). 
The Brazilian C. C. of 1916, Introduction art. 8 provided that the spouses 
may choose the Brazilian law. On this unfortunate addition proposed by the 
Senate and approved by the House of Representatives, which has been called 
mysterious, see BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 168 ff. no. 50. 
147 See, for instance, LeBreton v. Miles (N.Y. 1840) 8 Paige 261 (intended 
domicil in France); Spears v. Shropshire (1856) II La. Ann. 559, 66 Am. 
Dec. 206; Davenport v. Karnes (1873) 70 Ill. 465; Mueller v. Mueller ( 1899) 
127 Ala. 356, 28 So. 465. 
147a Expressly the Czechoslovakian Statute on private international law of 
1948, § 16; Benelux-Draft art. 5 par. 3; King v. Bruce ( 1947) 145 Tex. 647, 
201 S. W. (2d) 803. 
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defined regimes 148 (viz., the dowry system or the community 
of gains), or to the German provision that the parties, unless 
one of them is domiciled abroad, may not, merely by refer-
ring to the foreign law and without expressly stating its rules, 
incorporate a foreign regime in their contract.149 The same 
law also controls the question whether the parties may insert 
clauses in favor of third persons or provisions looking to 
the death of one of them. 
The law meant here is, of course, the law of the husband's 
or of the matrimonial domicil in certain countries and the na-
tional law of the parties in the great majority of civil law 
countries. 
In both systems, the validity of the settlement is suspended 
until the celebration of the marriage. In England, the appli-
cable law is considered to be that intended by the parties, 
which, only by rebuttable presumption, is identified as that of 
the matrimonial domicil. 
The French courts again have developed a contrary view. 
Where two Italians marrying in France stipulate universal 
community of assets, the contract is prohibited and void in 
Italy but has been held valid in France, either by application 
148 Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I381; C. C. (I942) art. 161. 
Spain: C. C. art. I3I7, contrary to French law, see PLANIOL, RIPERT, et NAsT, 
1 Reg. Matr. 47 no. 36. 
149 BGB. § I433, now§ 1409 (as amended by Law of June IS, I957), fol-
lowed by Italian C. C. (I942) art. I6I. Germans in Belgium may by virtue of 
§ 1433 choose the Belgian community of gains, RG. (March I6, I938) 92 Seuff. 
Arch. no. 96, ]W. I938, I7IS. The Reichsgericht even extended this benefit to 
Germans simultaneously citizens of another state, beyond the limits of § I433 
par. 2, RG. (March I3, I924) Leipz. Z. 1924, 74I. 
Contra: the Hooge Raad (June 24, I898} W. 7I41; H. R. (Jan. I4, I926} 
W. II459, and KoSTERS 447, have seen in a similar Dutch provision, BW. art. 
198, a rule on formalities not binding Dutch subjects abroad; but see the crit-
icism by HI] MANS 108; OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 707. 
An old decision of Louisiana, Bourcier v. Lanusse (ISIS) 3 Mart. 0. S. 58I 
held that the submission of the parties to the coutume of Paris was invalid, 
the C. C. of Louisiana not permitting parties to choose a law other than of 
a state of the union. 
394 MARRIAGE 
of the law of the situs or nowadays generally under the doc-
trine of implied contract.150 
On principle, an antenuptial agreement made by foreign 
immigrants before coming to this country will be recognized 
in the United States.151 But they cannot be sure that a settle-
ment validly made here will be recognized in their homeland. 
3· Formalities 
The rule locus regit actum governs the formalities of mar-
riage settlements. For this particular subject matter, it is rec-
ognized also in England that this rule as generally under-
stood is optional, that is, it applies in case of noncompliance 
with the formalities of the proper law.152 
The Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage, article 
6, has adopted some peculiar provisions; either the lex loci 
actus or both national laws of the parties must be ob-
served.152a 
4· Capacity 
It is generally held outside the United States that capacity 
to contract an antenuptial agreement is entirely distinguish-
able from capacity as envisaged under the personal or the 
property law relations of husband and wife. In the common 
assumption, it is not affected by the marriage but flows from 
the general status rights of the party. Therefore, capacity 
150 See Cass. (req.) (May 7, I924) Revue I924, 406 and 2 ARMINJON, ed. I, 
463, ed. 2, n. 2. 
Cf. Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I433· 
151 See, however, infra n. I 56. 
152 Sir John Romilly in Van Grutten v. Digby (I862) 3I Beav. 56I; In re 
Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis [I9o2] 2 Ch. 333 per Buckley, J.; In re Barnard, 
Barnard v. White ( I887) 56 L.T.R. 9 per Kay, J.; In re Fitzgerald, Surman 
v. Fitzgerald [1904] I Ch. 573; cf. WRIGHT, "A Problem of Conflicting Mar-
riage Settlements," 44 Law Q. Rev. (1928) 85, 93; CHESHIRE SI4· 
152a Followed by Finland: Law on international family law of Dec. 5, I929, 
§ 15 par. 2; French-Morocco, Dahir of Aug. 12, I913, art. I2; Portugal: 
C. C. art. no6; Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, § I no. 6. 
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to enter into a marriage settlement before marriage is gov-
erned by the law of the domicil or nationality of the party 
at the time when the agreement is made,152b the same as the 
capacity of an unmarried person to make any other kind of 
contract. 
However, in disagreement with this view, the Hague Con-
vention on the Effects of Marriage (art. 3) has referred to 
the national law at the time of the marriage rather than that 
of the contract.152c By a remarkable coincidence, the English 
writer Cheshire suggests that on principle the law of the 
matrimonial domicil should prevail.153 Although his main im-
pulse derives from his peculiar proposal to extend the marital 
law to capacity to marry, it may be argued on another ground 
that the marital law governing the objective permissibility 
of settlements should likewise cover their subjective re-
quirements. 
Nevertheless, in recent times, the dominant opinion has 
been well supported by the emphasis laid on the independence 
of married women. If the wife retains her own personal law 
during the marriage, her status deserves to be respected in 
the case of postnuptial settlements-in accordance with their 
basic significance-and the more so in the case of contracts 
preceding the marriage. 
5. Mutability 
The right to alter the property regime during coverture is 
determined in the same way as in the absence of a settlement. 
152b Denmark: Law on Marriage Effects of March I8, I9251 § 53 par. I; 
Finland: Law on international family law of Dec. 51 I929, § I5 par. I; Siam: 
Law on private international law of I939, § 24. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July I 1 I955) Revista Der. Priv. I956, I43 1 Rev. Esp. 
Der. Int. 1955, 6o8. 
152c Also the Swedish law of June r, I9I21 §I no. 3· 
153 CHESHIRE sxo. Other suggestions are made by MoRRIS, "Capacity to Make 
a Marriage Settlement Contract in English Private International Law," 54 
Law Q. Rev. (I938) 78, 86. 
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The very origins of the doctrine of immutability in France 
were connected with antenuptial agreements. Because the 
property of spouses was supposed to be governed by such an 
agreement for the whole duration of their union in all juris-
dictions, tacit agreements were implied. The doctrine was ap-
plied in England in the case of a French marriage 154 and is 
used in Canada in the analogous case of a contract made or a 
marriage celebrated without express settlement in Quebec.155 
Also, the American courts basically consider express mar-
riage settlements to be valid and unaffected by any change of 
status. But they have construed some agreements as intended 
solely to cover property owned at the time of the marriage or 
acquired while the parties resided at their first conjugal 
domicil.156 This was done particularly in the case of immi-
grants who had settled their matrimonial property in the old 
country without contemplating emigration. A certain tend-
ency in favor of such a presumption may still be observed,107 
sometimes subject to question. According to the English and 
Continental point of view, a settlement applies to all assets 
of the parties wherever and whenever acquired. This inter-
pretation is certainly convincing, where change by postnuptial 
agreement after change of status is permitted and there is 
actually no new settlement. 
This contrast and the conflict of policy behind it are 
154 De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A. C. 21 regarding movables; In re De 
Nicols, De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] 2 Ch. 410 with regard to immovables 
(implied French contract was held enforceable against property in England). 
155 See supra n. 65. 
156 Long v. Hess (1895) 154 Ill. 482, 40 N. E. 335 (the parties having im-
migrated many years ago; their settlement made in the grand duchy of Hesse 
was declared not binding); Castro v. Illies (1858) 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 
277; Fuss v. Fuss (1869) 24 Wis. 256. More recently: Hoefer v. Probasco 
(1921) 8o Okla. 261, 196 Pac. 138 (avoiding by mere construction of the 
intention of the parties for clear equitable reasons the interference of the 
agreement to a homestead acquired in a new domicil). 
157 See the statement of the writers: 2 BEALE 1015; LEFLAR, "Community 
Property and Conflict of Laws," 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 221, 224; GooDRICH 
391 n. 52. Cf. NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, 185, supra n. I. 
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sharply illustrated by the well-known case of Hutchison v. 
Ross/58 where the higher New York courts applied the lex 
situs to give effect to transactions between spouses who were 
continuously domiciled in Quebec and lived under a marriage 
covenant of property separation, immutable under the law of 
Quebec. This leading case in conflict of laws on trusts has 
been considered a violation of the marital law of the domicil, 
and the lawyers of Quebec resented the Appellate Divi-
sion's 159 interpreting the covenant as not intended to bind 
the spouses during their whole marriage or to subject them 
definitely to the law of Quebec, a construction which has 
been called fantastic/60 
6. Settlements Concerning Immovables 
The Restatement declares that settlements concerning im-
movables are to be construed in accordance with the law of 
the situs, excepting the validity of the contract.161 This state-
ment has been criticized as too broad/62 but it is misleading 
as a whole unless it is remembered that the Restatement rec-
ognizes renvoi from the lex situs ( § 8, ( 1)). The ulex situs" 
in this case simply consists of a conflicts rule common to all 
jurisdictions of this country. First, the validity of the con-
tract is ascertained according to the law of the place of con-
tracting or whatever law is deemed to be applicable thereto. 
Second, under another conflicts rule which is not more ulex 
situs" than the first, the agreement is recognized as having 
full effect in the state of the immovable, unless a particular 
public policy is offended, and likewise is to be recognized in 
158 Hutchison v. Ross (I933) 262 N. Y. 38I, I87 N. E. 65, Annotation, 89 
A.L.R. I023. 
159 Ross v. Ross ( I93I) 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N. Y. Supp. 87I. The argu-
ment was not adopted by the Court of Appeals (see note I58, supra). 
160 I ]OHNSON 449, Appendix (devoted to the case). 
161 Restatement §§ 237, 238 comment b; 2 BEALE § 238.2. 
162 NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I84, supra n. I, explains that the first part 
of the rule is too broad. 
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all third states. An antenuptial contract concluded between 
residents of Nebraska in that state is applicable, beyond any 
doubt, "to real property situated in Kansas owned by the 
husband at the time of his death," in accordance with "the 
general rule that antenuptial agreements, equably and fairly 
made are valid and enforceable." 163 
In the great majority of countries, this result is unchal-
lenged, on the premise that immovables and movables are 
parts of a unit. 
7· Obligatory Settlements 
An interesting experiment has been made in Guatemala, 
where a marriage settlement in the form of a public instru-
ment must be executed when an alien or naturalized bride-
groom intends to marry a Guatemalan woman.1"' European 
authors have suggested similar measures for aliens marrying 
in the country or foreign married couples acquiring citizen-
ship.165 Many uncertainties would be avoided by some cau-
tious pressure in this direction. 
VI. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES 
Opinion is strongly divided concerning the advisability and 
means of protecting third parties. While, according to the 
older conception, the personal law could be invoked against 
everyone, in recent times protection of third parties within 
the jurisdiction results from the system of territoriality or 
from exceptions to the rule of the personal law. 
163 Sanger v. Sanger (1931) 132 Kan. 596, 296 Pac. 355, 356. 
164 Guatemala: Law of Foreigners (1936) art. 41; C. C. (1933) art. 100 no. 
4; cf. MATOS 356 no. 241. 
165 See authors cited supra n. 88. See, in particular, the detailed requests 
that marriage officers should address to the parties, as proposed by ROGUIN 
at the Hague Conference of 1900, Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia 
Haye (1900) 231. 
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1. No Exception to the Personal Law 
No exception to the application of the personal law is 
granted to third parties in France, Poland, and a few other 
countries. French courts, when they actually recognize that 
foreign law governs the property regime, consider it the 
duty of anyone dealing with the husband or wife to inform 
himself about the legal background.166 
2. Exception with Respect to Third Persons 
Conversely, in a system historically rooted,167 Swiss law 
distinguishes sharply between the relations of husband and 
wife to each other and their relations with third persons. Ir-
respective of the law applying to the former, the latter are 
governed by the matrimonial law of the conjugal domicil, 
which determines especially the legal position of the wife in 
relation to the husband's creditors in the case of his bank-
ruptcy or of an execution levied upon his property.168 This 
proposition sounds attractive, but its application is compli-
cated 169 and, as the Swiss Federal Tribunal itself was com-
pelled to admit, results in certain curious consequences.170 It 
was criticized by Meili as early as 1902.171 
166 Trib. civ. Seine (May 29, I90I) Clunet I902, 36I; see, however, DE-
LAUME (supra n. I) 4 Am. J. Comp. Law (I955) 38. For Greece see 
MARIDAKIS, II Z.ausJ.PR. ( I937) I22. 
167 See in particular Prussian AJlg. Landrecht, II Tit. I §§ 35I, 352 declar-
ing the law of the first domicil immutable except in relation to third persons. 
The code referred only to the case where married persons, without a mar-
riage settlement, move from a country of separate property to another of 
community property, but the courts extended the rule to the converse case; 
see Obertribunal (March 28, I846) I3 Entsch. kg!. Ob. Trib. 297 no. 24 where 
it is stated that the continuance of the original regime should not harm third 
parties acting in good faith. 
168 NAG. art. 19 par. 2. 
169 SCHNITZER 3 92 ff.; H UBER-MUTZNER 469 ff.; BG. (July IO, I 907) 33 
BGE. I 6I7, 622; BG. (July 14, I909) 35 BGE. II 463, 470; BG. {Dec. IO, 
I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6I6, 6I8; BG. (Oct. I7, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 333· 
170 BG. (July II, I929) 55 BGE. III 732; cf. also BG. {Dec. I7, I908) 34 
BGE. I 734, 737· 
171 I MElLI § 75; see }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at Io8-II6. 
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The C6digo Bustamante declares in article 189 that the 
forum's provisions on the effects of marriage as respects 
third persons belong to the sphere of public policy of the 
forum, i.e., that they apply even where a foreign personal 
matrimonial law otherwise governs. 
3· Exception in Favor of Third Persons in Good Faith 
Under the German provisions, a person may rely on the 
results of German matrimonial law when he contracts with a 
married foreigner domiciled in Germany, if he is ignorant of 
the fact that the spouses are governed by some foreign re-
gime and this fact is not recorded in Germany in the proper 
public register; likewise a married woman who carries on an 
independent business enterprise in Germany with the consent 
of her husband is purported to have capacity as under Ger-
man law,172 although she may otherwise be governed by a 
foreign regime. 
Illustration: Suppose an American married couple domi-
ciled in Germany. Nothing has been entered in the public 
record respecting matrimonial property rights. The husband 
sold a crop of grain owned by his wife to a buyer who was 
ignorant of the fact that the husband and wife were living 
under the American system of separation of assets, under 
which, contrary to the German law, the husband had no 
power to sell and transfer his wife's crop. The German rule 
granting the husband such power is to be applied. 
Other countries also prescribe that a foreign regime must 
be publicly recorded 173 and establish consequences for the 
parties' failure to do so. 
1 72 EG. art. 16, art. 36 par. I. Also the German presumptions of ownership 
of the husband (praesumptio Muciana) and of the wife (§ 1362 BGB.) are 
declared applicable if they are more favorable to the third party, EG. art. 16 
par. 2. 
173 Switzerland: Justice Dept. Oct. 25, 1933; see II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 658. 
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, § 2. 
Denmark: Law on Marriage Effects of March 18, 1925, §53 par. 2. 
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In effect, the German system is not much different from 
the Swiss, because parties living under a foreign system of 
matrimonial property law very rarely take the trouble to 
have this fact recorded. 
The international relation between these two systems has 
been described by the Swiss Department of Justice,174 to the 
effect that a Swiss married couple living in Germany have to 
observe the German prescriptions of registration to make 
their marriage settlement effective, even in cases where other-
wise Swiss law would be applicable under the conflicts rule of 
the court. Thus, a Swiss national domiciled in Switzerland, 
who contracts with a Swiss husband or wife domiciled in Ger-
many, must inform himself concerning the property system 
valid in Germany. In addition, Swiss legislation has given 
such spouses opportunity to publish their property regime 
with the registrar of their home canton, effective for trans-
actions in Switzerland. 
In the United States, no particular provisions exist for 
such protection. Sometimes it has been assumed that the ap-
plication of the lex situs to the marital property in immova-
bles has the purpose of giving third parties the legal position 
they are likely to suppose,175 or that, for the benefit of a 
bona fide purchaser or a creditor, movables are occasionally 
treated as if they were not brought from a former domicil.176 
But the cases do not seem to give such assumptions any con-
siderable support. 
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § I6. 
Japan: C. C. art. 757· 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 75 par. 2, and Nicaragua: C. C. art. I 54, which pre-
scribe that charges of regime must be recorded in the appropriate registers 
to be effective against third parties, may be applicable by analogy. 
174 See 29 SJZ. (I932-33) 25 no. IS. 
175 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 172, suPra n. I. 
176 HARDING, "Matrimonial Domicil and Marital Rights in Movables," 30 
Mich. L. Rev. (I932) S59; LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 235, supra n. I; 
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) I So and n. 49, supra n. I. 
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VII. QUESTIONS OF CLASSIFICATION 
r. Composition of Community Property 
Two cases of the German Reichsgericht undertake to de-
termine whether the community fund includes certain rights 
which taken by themselves are governed by a law other than 
that of the community property. In the first case, German 
parties were married under a German contract of community 
of acquests. The wife having acquired a tort claim under Bel-
gian law, the court properly applied German matrimonial 
law to the problem whether the claim belonged to the com-
munity. But the preliminary problem whether the claim was 
alienable, so that it could fall into the community fund, 
should have been decided under Belgian law.177 
In the second case, German spouses, living abroad, had 
validly settled their community regime under Belgian law. In 
the proceedings for partition of the community fund, the 
question arose whether the rights of the husband in a Ger-
man partnership were a part of the community fund. The 
court correctly inquired into the alienability of the right, ap-
plying the German law governing the partnership and de-
ciding that the right was not alienable iH the precise sense in 
which alienability is required in the Belgian and French law 
of community property.178 
A comparable case in this country is where the husband 
buys a chattel outside the domiciliary state. Thus, in Snyder 
v. Stringer,179 the husband, domiciled in Washington, ac-
quired an automobile in Iowa with earnings made in Mon-
tana and Iowa. Under the laws of these two states, the earn-
177 RG. (May 30, 1919) 96 RGZ. 96. Comments in various sense by MEL-
CHIOR I 87; RAAPE 309; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 400 n. 52. 
1 78 RG. (March 16, 1938) JW. 1938, 1718. For another interpretation 
RoBERTSON, Characterization 152 n. 6o. 
179 (1921) n6 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733; cf. LEFLAR, 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 
232, supra n. I. 
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ings and the automobile purchased therewith would have 
been acquired as the husband's separate property, but they 
were deemed to be community property by the law of the 
domiciliary state, Washington. 
2. Marital Property and Inheritance 
(a) Importance of defining limits of each field. To draw 
the proper line of demarcation between marital property law 
and the law of succession upon death is important in defining 
the scope of conflicts rules.180 In the United States, Great 
Britain, and Argentina, the law governing movable marital 
property is determined differently from that governing in-
heritance of movables; in most countries, the difference also 
includes the rules on immovables. 
It has been asked, for instance, in England whether the 
English rule that a will is revoked by marriage is to be classi-
fied as a rule of matrimonial or testamentary law. As the rule 
has been held to be essentially connected with the marriage 
relationship, 181 its effect is measured by the law of the matri-
monial domicil, "i.e. in most cases by the lex domicilii of the 
husband at the time of marriage," 182 rather than by the lex 
domicilii of the testator aUhe time of his death. This reason-
ing is unsound, and the decision ought to be overruled.183 
Many international treaties contain special clauses provid-
ing rules for the distribution of estates upon death. For in-
stance, one of the oldest bilateral treaties on jurisdiction, 
18° C/. particularly, BARTIN, Etudes 5, 68; SILBERSCHMIDT, 3 Z.int.R. (1893} 
132 at 143, 8 Z.int.R. (1898} 97 at 109, 48 Z.int.R. (1933) 313; RABEL, 5 
Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) 6off. and in 5 La. L. Rev. 
( 1943) 167 at x86, supra n. x; M. WoLFF, IPR. s6; BECKETT, "The Question 
of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," zs Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law ( 1934) 46; cf. also ROBERTSON, Characterization I58-x68. 
181 Vaughan Williams, L. J., in the case of In re Martin, Loustalan v. 
Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, 240. Cf. CHESHIRE 550. 
1 8 2 CHESHIRE SSO. 
188 FALCONBRIDGE, IS Can. B. Rev. (1937) 227-230, supra n. zo8, now Es-
says II2-II7; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 595· 
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that between France and Switzerland of I 869/84 provides 
that the assets of a Frenchman or a Swiss dying within the 
territory of the other country should be distributed by the 
court and under the law of his last domicil in his home coun-
try. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held in a recent case that 
the question whether certain assets belonged to the wife's 
separate property or to the acquisitions of marriage is a mat-
ter of marital law and does not come within the treaty.185 
The two fields of marital property and inheritance are not 
separated in the systems of municipal law by a uniform or in-
variably clear line. This fact has given rise to various useless 
theories that have greatly overburdened the so-called prob-
lem of characterization. The only acceptable method of 
treatment has proved to be that based on general principles. 
Repeated comparative research has revealed a basic criterion 
that more or less obviously underlies all legislations, namely, 
that matrimonial law determines the interests of husband 
and wife during the marriage, including the specification of 
the assets of either spouse on the dissolution of their conjugal 
life. In the event of one spouse's predeceasing the other, the 
law of inheritance regulates the distribution of those assets 
which belonged to the deceased in accordance with the matri-
monial law. This distribution is particularly significant where 
the matrimonial regime is a community property system. On 
the death of one spouse, two partitions take place, either 
actually or at least for the purposes of an accounting or a 
fictitious liquidation. First, all property of husband and wife 
is examined to ascertain what constitutes the community fund 
and which part of it continues to be owned by the surviving 
spouse, while the other part, together with the predeceased 
spouse's separate estate, forms the inheritance. Second, ad-
184 Treaty on the jurisdiction and execution of judgments in matters of pri-
vate law of June IS, I869, art. 5 par. I. 
185 BG. (Dec. 4, I936) 62 BGE. I 235, Praxis 1937, 6I. 
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ministration and distribution of the assets designated by the 
matrimonial law as the separate property and the part of the 
community fund belonging to the deceased, are governed by 
the law of inheritance according to the will or the rules of 
intestacy, as the case may be.186 
This distinction is adequate to satisfy the theoretical needs 
of all legislations and therefore to serve the needs of inter-
national application as required by the law of conflicts. Of 
course, the distinction is so general that it leaves occasional 
doubts as to classification. In fact, in determining which rule 
of conflicts is applicable, uncertainty may arise from two 
sources. On the one hand, some municipal systems have in-
stitutions of mixed or obscure character. On the other hand, 
marital and inheritance regulations, forming integral parts 
of municipal legal systems, should logically be applied con-
currently, and not separately as necessitated by the dictates 
of two different conflicts rules. We must explain these two 
difficulties. 
(b) Rights and expectancies distinguished. Ordinarily, in-
terests in assets of one spouse, which by marital law or mar-
riage settlement have been conferred upon the other, come 
into being or, in the usual language, acquire the quality of 
vested rights before the dissolution of the marriage. At com-
mon law, for instance, a wife by virtue of the marriage has a 
dower interest in every parcel of real estate of which her hus-
band has been seised at any time during coverture. This in-
terest can be defeated neither by a conveyance of the husband 
nor by his will. On the other hand, where testamentary or in-
terstate succession entitles a surviving spouse to participate 
in the distribution of the predeceased spouse's estate, the sur-
viving spouse receives no more than a mere expectation, 
186 See ROGUIN, Droit civil compare, Regime matrimonial ( 1905) 9; KADEN, 
"Eheliches Giiterrecht," 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 705. Cf. also FALCON-
BRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. {1937) 
537, 540, now Essays 105, uo. 
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strengthened at the most by provisions for forced shares; 
viventis hereditas non datur. 
It follows that where a legal system grants to a spouse a 
genuine right to be acquired upon and during the marriage, 
this right is always to be classified as matrimonial. Such a 
right will therefore be acquired under the applicable matri-
monial law, irrespective of the inheritance law of the last 
domicil or the last nationality. By a marriage settlement, in 
England, "the law of the testator's domicil may be ousted 
from its regulation of a will." 187 In this country, much dis-
cussion has centered around the question whether, in all ten 
of the community property states, the wife has a present in-
terest in the community fund during the marriage, sufficient 
for a separate income tax return.188 There seems to be a 
growing tendency to affirm the existence of an actual right 
for all purposes.189 In France, Germany, Switzerland, as well 
as in the Latin American countries, all regimes, except that 
of complete property separation, undoubtedly give actual 
rights during marriage. Antenuptial or valid postnuptial set-
tlements have a clear precedence over intestate distribution 
also in this country.190 
Where, conversely, a right of a spouse is recognized as ex-
istent only at the time of the dissolution of marriage, the 
right by no means necessarily originates in the law of in-
heritance. Death of one spouse is ordinarily only one of sev-
eral possible causes of dissolution and the regimes that are 
usually called systems of community upon death are in reality 
187 BENTWICH, The Law of Domicil in its Relation to Succession (London, 
191I) 133 ff. 
188 See DAGGETT, "Wife's Interest in Community Property," Legal Essays 
(1935) 101 ff. For the construction of the law of Idaho see JACOB, "The Law 
of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I93I) I, 25. 
189 See STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 65 n. 50, supra n. I; DAG-
GETT, "Division of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage," 6 Law and Cont. 
Probl. ( I939) 225, 233. 
190 Ford's Curator v. Ford (I824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574; Estate of J. B. 
Aubichon (I874) 49 Cal. I8. 
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meant to confer some interest also in cases other than 
death.191 For this reason alone, such systems cannot be char-
acterized as constituting successions on death. Moreover, al-
though the nature of the benefits granted to a surviving wife 
is uncertain in such systems, analyses undertaken in recent 
years for the purpose of applying conflicts rules has shown 
that in almost all such institutions the widow is entitled to 
an interest upon marriage rather than upon inheritance.192 
Still, some legislations contain veritable mixtures of ele-
ments which resist satisfactory classification. Thus, certain 
American institutions of mixed character, such as the wid-
ow's right of election between dower rights and testamentary 
bequests under the law of Pennsylvania,193 or between dower 
and intestate share in Florida.194 or between statutory por-
tion and legacy under New York law, 195 have been objects of 
discussion in the European conflict of laws. 
191 KADEN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. I. 
192 The Austrian community on death is to be classified with matrimonial 
law; see RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 261; likewise the Danish community of 
goods, see PAPPENHEIM, 6 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1932) 120; and the Hungarian com-
munity of gains, see ALMAS!, I Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, I922) I97 ff., 
RAAPE 344· 
An interesting example of a matrimonial institution clearly preserved from 
ancient ideas is the continued community property of the German Code 
(§§ 1483-1518), by which the community which existed between the spouses 
is continued after the death of one spouse between the survivor and the chil-
dren of the marriage. The children step into the place of the predeceasing 
parent through the operation of marital law rather than the rules of in-
heritance. See RG. (Oct. 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 331, 334· Hence, German courts 
and other courts having a similar set of conflicts rules apply the said provi-
sions whenever the husband was a German national at the time of the mar-
riage. 2 ZITELMANN 694; RAAPE 343; KADEN, 3 RechtsvergJ. Handworterb. 
500; contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 391. 
In Switzerland, an exactly analogous characterization of the existing con-
tinued community property system of the canton of Bern was made on the 
basis of federal law, viz., general notions and the nature of things, by the 
BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287, 294; cf. ScHOCH, "Conflict of Laws in a 
Federal State: the Experience of Switzerland," 55 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) 738, 
767 ff. 
193 Classified as part of the matrimonial law by Cour Paris (Jan. 6, 1862) 
S.1862.2.337, discussed by BARTIN, Etudes 70; NEUNER, Der Sinn 6o. 
1 94 Cf. NEUNER, Der Sinn 64-66. 
195 Classified as part of succession law by French Cass. (civ.) (Aug. 16, 
x869) S.1869.I-417. 
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The name that an institution bears in its legislative home 
country cannot be decisive. Nor should the law of the forum 
influence the analysis of foreign institutions.196 
(c) Coordination of the two fields in municipal legisla-
tion. In some municipal laws, the connection between the 
matrimonial property law and the law of inheritance is par-
ticularly strong. Recent authors have drawn attention to the 
purposeful balancing of provisions in the two fields, disre-
gard of which has caused unfortunate results. 
Thus, for instance, under the Massachusetts statute, a 
widow has a dower interest in the property of her late hus-
band, while no community property is recognized. A hus-
band, who shortly before his death had transferred his domi-
cil to California, would not leave any community property. 
nor would the widow have any dower right. "That result 
would defeat the spirit of both of the dower laws of Massa-
chusetts and of the community property laws of the distribu-
tary estate; yet it would be reached none the less." 197 If the 
husband had gone to Louisiana, the widow would receive 
nothing if there are "heirs." 198 Conversely, where the hus-
band removes his domicil from California to Massachusetts, 
the widow enjoys simultaneously her community share ac-
quired under California law and the dower interest under 
Massachusetts law. 
Similarly, in Sweden the wife is granted a share in the com-
On the question whether or to what extent provisions of a marriage settle-
ment are offset by the provisions of distributing statutes establishing forced 
shares, see BRESLAUER, "Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Testa-
tion," 27 Iowa L. Rev. (I942) 425, 44I; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I87, 
supra n. I. 
1 &6 This method has in fact been observed by the Reichsgericht since early 
times; see its decision RG. {Dec. I9, I887) 43 Senff. Arch. 288 and {Nov. 25, 
I895) 36 RGZ. 33I, 334· The French courts have also followed it, as NEUNER, 
Der Sinn 6o has demonstrated in opposition to BARTIN's thesis of classification 
according to the lex fori. 
197 LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L, Rev. ( I933) 22I at 226, 227, supra n. I. 
198 La. C. C. {Dart, I932) art. 924; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) at I76, 
supra n. I. 
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munity fund and for this reason is excluded from participa-
tion in the inheritance, if there are descendants of the hus-
band. Where a German married couple, not having con-
cluded a marriage settlement, acquire Swedish nationality 
and the husband dies, the widow has no claim under German 
matrimonial law, which provides no benefits for the wife, nor 
under Swedish inheritance law. 
Where, conversely, a wife is not given any matrimonial 
right (except, of course, through an express marriage settle-
ment), she may be granted under modern legislation a gen-
erous and indefeasible portion in her deceased husband's 
estate. If, for instance, the spouses were of Swedish nation-
ality at the time of their marriage and later became German 
nationals, in the courts of both countries the widow would 
receive, under the Swedish matrimonial law, half the hus-
band's property as community part and, in addition, under 
the German law of succession on death, half or a quarter of 
the rest as heir. 
Thus, coordinations carefully worked out within a domes-
tic statute are badly disturbed when different systems of law 
are called into play by the choice of law rules on matrimonial 
property and inheritance. Ingenious remedies have been sug-
gested,199 but so far with little success. The problem is aggra-
vated by the double fact that in most systems of private law 
the relation between the two groups of provisions is hidden, 
and that the factual situations are far from suggesting that 
radical change of the conflicts rules, or enlargement of the 
scope of the law at the last domicil, is in equity required. We 
may take for illustration the American cases in which the 
husband transfers his domicil from a separate property state 
to a state where community property obtains. Apart from 
the hardship imposed by the former common law doctrine 
1 99 See RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn 66 and 5 La. 
L. Rev. ( 1943) 190, supra n. I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 326; RAAPE, IPR. 320. 
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upon the wife, which it was not the task of conflicts rules to 
remedy, it seems not inequitable to apply the law of the first 
domicil. Bruggemeyer,200 a lawyer, earned almost all his 
money in Illinois as his separate property and then stayed for 
years with his wife in California where she died. There was 
no reason why this change of domicil should have shifted 
half of his earnings to the heirs of his wife. The spouses La t-
terner 201 lived three years in Boston, Massachusetts, and 
fifteen in Los Angeles, until they separated. No equitable 
argument challenged the character as separate property of 
the husband's earnings as a physician in Boston. O'Connor 202 
married in 1925 in Indiana, but the spouses separated within 
"a few days"; there was no ground why the husband's later 
moving to California should give the widow half of the hus-
band's premarital land in Indiana. 
The easiest practical way to assure that matrimonial and 
inheritance statutes in the same legal system preserve their 
natural balance, is simply more circumspect drafting of these 
statutes. In this country, a federal Union where a part of the 
population is inclined to change domicil, statutes of descent 
and distribution should not blindly envisage only cases where 
both the first and the last domicil happen to be in the state 
and, moreover, no marriage settlement was established. In a 
community property state, the possibility that the surviving 
spouse may fail, for any cause without his fault, to enjoy the 
regular matrimonial share, should be considered. Vice versa, 
in a separate property state, there should be an appropriate 
provision to adjust the ordinary distribution in the case 
where the surviving spouse is amply provided with a matri-
monial property interest. True, theoretically the matter be-
longs to conflicts law, but conflicts rules suitable to all situa-
tions are scarcely available at this time. 
200 In re Bruggemeyer's Estate (1931) II5 Cal. App. 525, 2 P. (2d) 534· 
2°1 Latterner v. Latterner (1932) 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. (2d) 870. 
2°2 In re O'Connor's Estate (1933) 218 Cal. 518, 23 P. (2d) 1031. 
PART FOUR 
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
CHAPTER 11 
Divorce 
I. THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN DIVORCE 
T HE conflicts rules concerning divorce are generally applicable not only to absolute divorce, i.e., dissolu-tion of the bonds of marriage, but also to limited di-
vorce, such as separation from bed and board and similar 
types of judicial separation, not merely temporary. Never-
theless, we shall confine our discussion in general to absolute 
divorce. Judicial separation has some particular features; for 
example, there are special rules in the United States respect-
ing the recognition of foreign separation decrees.1 
I. Aspects of the Problem 
Divorce is to be studied here in three aspects. We have to 
consider first the connection that the parties to a divorce suit 
(or corresponding proceedings of a non-contentious nature) 
are required to have with the forum and, in the case where 
persons, not subjects of the forum, are permitted to be par-
ties, the law applicable to the suit. In the second place, it 
will be presupposed that a divorce decreed in one jurisdiction 
is being examined for the purpose of recognition in another. 
Third, the extraterritorial effects of non-recognized and of 
recognized divorce decrees will be analyzed more precisely. 
The subject to be discussed in this chapter has been some-
what neglecte,d in comparative surveys and international dis-
cussions. Particularly in this country, endeavor to improve 
1 Restatement § 114 and comment. 
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the actual situation in case a marriage may be regarded as 
existent in one state and dissolved in another, with all its tre-
mendous consequences for the parties and their issue and 
third persons, has chiefly centered around the recognition of 
foreign decrees. In the highly spirited debate under the head-
line of Haddock v. Haddock/ or now of Williams and Hen-
drix v. North Carolina/ it has been asked what position 
should be taken by a state whose court is requested to recog-
nize another state's divorce decree, rather than what attitude 
might be suitable to that state whose court is to take cogni-
zance of the original application for divorce. 
Every state of the Union has the unquestionable power to 
determine by itself all of its divorce policy; on the other 
hand, by the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as 
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States, recog-
nition of divorce decrees is compulsory under certain condi-
tions. Hence, not unnaturally, scrutiny of the more or less 
anomalous decrees rendered by the courts of about fifty juris-
dictions and selection of those decrees that deserve recogni-
tion, has appeared the chief problem. The complement of the 
problem is, what limits every state ought to observe in open-
ing its courts to divorce, so as to facilitate reciprocal recog-
nition. Perfect mutuality has been reached by this method in 
such treaties as those of Montevideo and the Scandinavian 
states. The drafters of the successive uniform acts in this 
country 4 also distinctly perceived the problem and found, in 
2 (1906) 201 u. s. 562. 
8 (1942) 317 U. S. 287, and Williams et al. v. North Carolina (no. 2, 1945) 
325 u. s. 226. 
4 Draft of a Uniform Divorce Law, 14 Harv. L. Rev. (1901) 525; Resolu-
tions, adopted by the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws in Wash-
ington, D. C., Feb. 19-22, 1906; Proposed Uniform Statute relating to Annul-
ment of Marriage and Divorce submitted by the Subcommittee on Resolutions 
to the Divorce Congress of Philadelphia, Nov. 13, 1906. This statute was 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in 1907 and adopted in Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, but was 
replaced by the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1930, 9 Uniform Laws 
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the writer's opmton, an adequate solution; yet these acts 
have encountered an amazingly unfriendly reception.5 The 
restaters of the law of conflicts, too, saw the goal when they 
started to define "jurisdiction for divorce," 6 apparently as 
an absolute notion, good for the use of all courts concerned. 
But what they have stated can hardly be meant to bind the 
courts granting divorce; it has useful reference only to the 
problem of deciding in which cases the jurisdiction exercised 
by a divorce court should be recognized by a court of another 
state, i.e., the problem of jurisdiction in the international 
sense. 
2. Diversity of Divorce Legislation 
Comparative research in divorce legislation has revealed 
staggering diversity. However, for writers to claim for this 
reason alone that in cases of conflict of laws every state must 
stick to its own policy without regarding the outside world, 
is an overstatement. Certain contrasts are fundamental in-
deed; others are not. 
The doctrine of the Catholic Church that marriage can-
not be dissolved except by death, although having lost its 
force in many countries, actually prevails in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and Spain, and with re-
spect to Catholics in some parts of Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East. 7 Absolute divorce was until recently excluded 
also in South Carolina. 8 Next to this group, we must place 
Annotated (1932) 133. Uniform Divorce Recognition Act (1948}, approved 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
adopted in California, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 3akota, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
6 See especially VREELAND so. His own propositions were called politically 
impossible by STUMBERG, Book Review, 2 La. L. Rev. (1939) 207. 
6 Restatement §§ uo-113; cf. ibid. at §§ 43, 77· 
7 See infra p. 462. 
8 S. C. Constitution, Art. 17 § 3, amended 1949, Stats. 1949 no. 137, Code of 
Laws of S. Car. ( 1952) §§ 2D-101-2o-148. 
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the laws of New York and formerly of the District of Co-
lumbia, admitting divorce only on the ground of adultery.9 
Looking to the opposite end of the line, we notice several 
institutions of a very diverse nature. There are remainders 
of the old patriarchial repudiation by which, for instance, an 
Egyptian Moslem may divorce his wife without any alleged 
cause. There was up to 1944 the ultramodern view of the 
Russian Soviet Republics allowing each spouse to termi-
nate the marriage by unilateral declaration. Neither state 
nor church influenced this act.9a Again, we may add a few 
American and Mexican jurisdictions where the dissolution of 
marriages is offered, as the current expression goes, 10 on a 
commercial basis; also, in addition to these open divorce 
markets, some states are disgraced by abusive practices. The 
Old Testament right of a sovereign head of a household, the 
Soviet emphasis on freedom of marriage, and the readiness 
of American courts to provide divorce, are certainly hetero-
geneous phenomena, but in common they result in permitting 
indiscriminately what the legislations of the first group re-
fuse indiscriminately. 
We may well call both groups of legislations radical and 
set them apart for the major purposes of conflicts law. In the 
rest of the world, divorce regulations form a block of kin-
dred systems. To be sure, they are very far from being homo-
geneous. The old conception that divorce is a remedy given 
9 D. C. Code (1929) tit. 14 § 64, was repealed by the Act of August 7, 1935, 
49 Stat. 539, c. 453, §I. 
Laws of New York (Cahill, 1937), C.P.A.§ II47· 
9R On July 8, 1944, an Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR decreed a judicial divorce proceeding, without setting forth grounds 
for dissolution of marriage (arts. 23-27; German translation in BERGMANN, 
s. verbo U dSSR p. 5). The several Soviet Republics changed their Family 
Codes accordingly, e.g., RSFSR Code on Marriage, Family and Guardianship, 
arts. 18-22, GsovsKI, 2 Soviet Civil Law (1949) 246. 
10 Hatton, J., of Tonopah, sitting during the vacation of a judge in Carson 
City, Nevada, "asserted that the State Legislature, with commercial intent and 
under pressure, had legislated the present divorce law," in the cause of Mrs. 
de Forest Payne, N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1942, p. 12. 
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to an innocent against a guilty party vanishes more or less 
slowly; modern social aims are gaining acknowledgment here 
and there; private interest and public welfare are differently 
evaluated; many historical remainders and arbitrary predi-
lections of local lawmakers increase the number of varieties. 
Vernier lists eight major and thirty-one minor causes for di-
vorce in this country alone, irregularly distributed over fifty 
jurisdictions.11 Defenses, principles of procedure, authorities 
empowered with granting divorce, are diverse. Nevertheless, 
the basis is a common one: marriage can be dissolved, if dis-
solution appears to be the minor evil, and whether it is must 
be controlled by an agency of the state in appropriate pro-
ceedings. A really basic difference occurs respecting the ques-
tion whether a mutual agreement of the parties should be ac-
cepted as a self-sufficient ground for divorce decrees, but, 
strangely enough, this point has not been much emphasized 
as a consideration of public policy in conflicts law. On the 
whole, soberly examined, a modern statute on divorce is usu-
ally on the middle road, a product of compromise with an in-
creasing admittance of social-hygienic ideas. There is little 
need for conjuring up the vision of bridgeless gulfs between 
conceptual antitheses. 
There is something more to tone down the contrasts. A 
statute such as that of Nevada or of a Mexican state em-
bodies the normal terms and provisions, at the most indulg-
ing in some clauses that promise secrecy or allow unnamed 
grounds for divorce at the discretion of the judge, whil~ the 
experiences of other countries, we may discover, again and 
again reveal an average practice laxer than the official lan-
guage indicates. Lawyers know this well, each with respect to 
his own state; probably it is a universal tendency. A few illus-
trations: When before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 
11 Z VERNIER § 62. 
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adultery was the only divorce ground in England, scandalous 
maneuvers were in semi-official use to simulate evidence of 
adultery. The same revolting practice is said to be frequent 
in New York. Courts where desertion is not recognized as a 
cause, find a cause in cruelty and vice versa; in the numerous 
countries following the Code N apoUon, ({injures graves" is 
an elastic notion. German courts were never seriously embar-
rassed by the provision that the defendant spouse must have 
caused the breaking up of the marriage by his reprehensible 
conduct. A reform of the law was demanded and finally ac-
complished, with the effect of legalizing the liberal practice 
and obviating the conventional lies of the parties, rather than 
of introducing a new rule. 
Why are these practices admitted? In large centers of 
population, courts are unable to examine the individual cir-
cumstances as they might wish to do. As has well been ob-
served in this country/2 collusion between the parties or 
abandonment of the cause by the weaker party characterize 
the overwhelming majority of cases. A divorce judge in any 
such country has the feeling of gliding down an inclined 
plane; no stop anywhere is firmly assured, once divorce has 
been permitted. Of course, there will always be judges more 
conscientious, or conservative, or formalistic than the aver-
age. But it is the general trend that counts. And even the gen-
eral prohibition of divorce does not work without exceptions. 
Courts without absolute divorce at their disposal are inclined 
to grant annulment of marriage where in other systems di-
vorce would be expected. 
In addition, there are geographical limitations on legisla-
tive control. Italian couples went to Fiume for divorce, Ar-
12 HARPER, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. 
(1935) 335; JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 
749, 959; SAYRE, "Divorce by Judicial Process," 18 Iowa L. Rev. (1933) 493, 
508; Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1936) 1121; cf. JACOBS, "The Enforcement of 
Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250, 251. 
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gentines used to go to Montevideo, citizens of South Caro-
lina to Georgia and North Carolina, and the answer to New 
York is given in Reno. That only wealthy people are able to 
escape their home laws aggravates the moral aspects of the 
situation. 
Paradoxes reach a climax in the field of recognition. For-
eign decrees are irregularly recognized in this country and en-
counter prohibitive defenses in Continental Europe, espe-
cially in the country to which a party belongs as a national. 
However, if "invalid" divorces are not a simple "myth" 
within the United States/3 the contention that they are to a 
large extent in fact recognized is true with respect to all 
countries. 
3· Divergence in Method 
In approaching the problem of the interstate and interna-
tional treatment of divorce, we must be aware of a funda-
mental difference between the American method and that fol-
lowed in the principal civil law countries. 
In this country, it is a matter of course that every state 
grants jurisdiction for divorce without asking what extra-
territorial effect the forthcoming decree will enjoy in other 
states. Moreover, so soon as jurisdiction is assumed by a 
court, there is no doubt that the case will be decided in exclu-
sive accordance with the municipal statute of the forum (lex 
fori), irrespective of any qualifications of the parties; no 
choice of law therefore is involved. 
The most representative legislations of the civil law, bow-
ever, take into consideration the position of the law of the 
state whose nationals the parties are, with regard to one or 
both of the following points: 
( i) Jurisdiction in the case of foreign nationals is not as-
13 GOODRICH § 128 n. 46. 
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sumed unless the national law of the parties is willing to 
recognize this jurisdiction. 
( ii) Divorce is not granted, unless it is agreeable to the 
internal law of the national state of the parties. 
In the heyday of the principle underlying these ideas (the 
so-called principle of nationality), many writers went fur-
ther, applying the pure national law of the parties.14 But with 
the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (I 896) and 
the Hague Convention on Divorce and Separation (I 902) as 
models, it is now generally required that both the foreign and 
the domestic laws must concur in permitting divorce in the 
particular case. Hence, the law of the forum, although not 
exclusively governing, as in the common law countries and 
others, has more to say than in almost any other field of con-
flicts law. Its importance is further increased where one party 
is a subject of the forum and the other a foreign national. 
4· Predominance of Lex Fori 
Why in divorce involving foreign aspects, the law that a 
court must apply in purely domestic matters should have such 
an abnormal influence is usually explained by a general ref-
erence to the nature of the institution. It is said that divorce 
is permitted or refused in every state according to its tradi-
tion, religion, ethics, logic (or what is believed to be logic) , 
and in conformity with hygienic and other considerations of 
population policy. This general reasoning is not adequate to 
the subject. Consideration of the three groups of divorce leg-
islations set out under ( ii) above, taken as a basis to measure 
affinity of divorce policies, suggests the following. 
The standards of each of the three groups are basic. We 
may be astonished indeed by the grouping of states in which 
the Hague Convention of I902 undertook to unify the rules 
14 GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht, 236; REGELSBERGER, I Pandekten 178; 
5 LAURENT 244, 276, 285, and others. 
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for granting divorce and for recognizing foreign divorce. 
There were, on the one hand, the states which had normal 
modern legislations and, on the other hand, Austria, Italy, 
Portugal, and the Czarist Russian Empire, where at that 
time divorce was either left to the ecclesiastical authorities 
of the various denominations, or forbidden at least to Catho-
lics. Italy has remained a member and retained its ban on di-
vorce; the Convention has prevented Italian nationals from 
being divorced in any participating state. This has been 
praised as a great progress in international cooperation/5 
but it has resulted in the final withdrawal from the Conven-
tion of France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden 
successively. It is quite as prejudicial to combine legislations 
of contradictory character for the purpose of reciprocal re-
spect, as it is to exaggerate minor varieties of policy. In fed-
erations that guarantee mutual recognition of state acts be-
tween the single states, it should be presupposed that the 
aims of the several legislations, varied as they may be, are 
not fundamentally hostile to each other. In a Union including 
legislations of New York and Nevada, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause cannot work smoothly. It is the writer's con-
viction that it is not so much the multitude of regulations in 
the United States as the extremes to which a few of them go 
that creates difficulties in the mutual recognition of divorce 
decrees. 
On the side of the majority group, no such prominent dif-
ferences obstruct mutual understanding. All these systems 
strive, through an institution controlled by the state, to as-
sure sound domestic relations within the limits to which the 
assistance that law and legal machinery provide is subject. 
To apply the law of the forum among states of this group to 
foreigners as well as to citizens presumes a claim to a strin-
15 LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum Internationalen Privatrecht," in 
STRUPP, 1 Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der Diplomatie 466. 
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gent public policy that cannot be objectively justified by the 
accustomed standards of comparative law. Whether con-
siderations pertaining to the field of conflicts rules better 
support that claim will be asked later. 
5· "Migratory" Divorce 
Our subject includes divorces described in the United 
States as "migratory" and probably best defined as divorces 
obtained in a state by persons who have just completed the 
minimum time of residence required by the local statute for 
granting jurisdiction over divorce. Technically, it is required 
that a bona fide domicil be established and, in the prevailing 
opinion, that the person must have had actual residence dur-
ing this time. Hence, it is presumed by the law "of the books" 
that the newcomer has intended to transfer the center of his 
entire life to the state for an indefinite time. In contrast, it is 
not sufficient to take residence within the jurisdiction merely 
for the purpose of obtaining divorce, although the circum-
stance that the domicil is changed with the motive of secur-
ing a divorce is not prejudicial. The minimum requirement of 
"residence" is generally understood to evince the required 
mental purpose, which, to put it simply, is that of establish-
ing a real and permanent domicil. 
The actual picture looks so different from this legal struc-
ture that migratory divorces are currently identified with 
those obtained in evasion of the domiciliary statute, i.e., by 
a falsely pretended domicil. The rate of migratory divorces 
in the first sense, i.e., upon completion of minimum residence 
requirements, has been appraised for the year 1929 as con-
stituting only 3 per cent of the total number of divorces in 
this country, a much smaller percentage rate than had been 
feared.16 The absolute numbers, however, are high.17 The 
16 CAHEN, Statistical Analysis of American Divorce (1932) 78. The ap-
parently optimistic views of this writer have influenced most sociological ob-
servers. 
17 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, U. S. Dept. 
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total of divorces was over 20o,ooo in I929 and, after the 
drop caused by the depression, reached 250,000 in I937 
and about 264,000 in I940. In the two counties in Nevada, 
Clark and Washoe, where Las Vegas and Reno are situated, 
divorces totaled 1756 in I929, 4769 in I93I, and 3629 in 
I935/8 The rate of divorce for IOo,ooo population has been 
estimated with respect to the year I 940 as 200 in the United 
States, 90 in the Middle Atlantic states, and 4 7 IO inN evada. 
More serviceable than many arguments used to moderate 
the apprehensions that must be aroused by the rapid increase 
in these rates is comparison. Although in Europe, excluding 
Soviet Russia, no country reaches even half of the American 
percentage, the highest percentage of divorces occurs in 
Switzerland,10 despite the repugnance to divorce in the 
Catholic inner cantons and the conservative character of the 
population in the entire country. In I 93 I the rate of divorce 
for wo,ooo population was 70 in Switzerland as against I47 
in the United States. We may conjecture that the spirit of ad-
vanced democracy and industrial enterprise has some influ-
ence on the frequency of divorce. Yet, obviously, every di-
vorce marks a regrettable failure even for a childless couple, 
and lawyers cannot fail to be moved by the inadequacy of 
of Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 18, p. 193 (March 20, 1942). Estimated number 
of divorces by states, United States 1937-1940. 
18 According to a newspaper correspondence in 1943, there were 5910 di-
vorces in Washoe County and 2720 cases in Clark County, an "all time high" 
rendering $2oo,ooo in fees in these counties. The total of seventeen ccnnty 
courts in Nevada is given with u,399 divorces again 8,616 in 1942, the fees 
amounting to more than $soo,ooo. 
19 This fact has been observed by Swiss authors. GMUR, 2 Familienrecht 
r so, with respect to the decade of 1900 to 1909. It is confirmed by the follow-
ing figures regarding the year 1927: divorce rate per 1oo,ooo population: 
England and Wales, 7.3; Belgium, 31; France, 45; Germany, 57.6; Den-
mark, 55; Switzerland, 62; Japan, 79; United States 16o; Leningrad, 983; 
Moscow, 959· REUTER and RUNNER, The Family (1931) 210; HANKINS, "Di-
vorce," 5 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences ( 1935) 177. Higher figures in 
similar proportion have been indicated for 1935, omitting Switzerland, see 
JACOBS, Cases on Domestic Relations ( ed. 2, 1939) 352. The relation to "mar-
ried persons" or "existing marriages" would be more instructive, but this is 
not available. 
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their machinery. The divorce mills complete the evils of fa-
milial maladjustments; not only do they work against the in-
tentions of sister state legislatures, in itself a sign of unsound 
relations, but they also enable legislatures, courts and attor-
neys to destroy homes for the sake of local profits. 
6. Ex Parte Proceedings 
The many cases in which, under modern statutes, a spouse 
can sue for divorce while the other party is resident in an-
other state, need particular care by legislatures and courts. 
Not only do almost all legislations of the world allow in 
such cases subsidiary use of service by publication and the 
grant of divorce despite the absence of the defendant, but 
often the procedural guarantees are handled unsatisfacto-
rily.20 Facts alleged by the plaintiff are not sufficiently veri-
fied. Even fraudulent maneuvers-for instance false indica-
tion of the defendant's address designed to prevent due no-
tice of the trial-are not efficiently counteracted, whatever 
the law of procedure may be. 21 No wonder that the interna-
tional attitude is simple mistrust. Easily gained divorces may 
be attacked in the courts of other states, if enforcement is 
sought or, alternatively, annulment is asked. And this, de-
spite the fact that everywhere, by customary law or statute 
or express clause of international treaty, proper service and 
a decent opportunity for defense are made primary condi-
tions to the recognition of foreign divorces. Any observer 
will note that all those states whose courts indulge in routine 
20 Very conveniently, SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for 
Judicial Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 321, 
339 suggests "more effective substituted service than is required now" as part 
of the process. 
21 Among the endeavors to help the victims of divorce, the activities of the 
International Migration Service are particularly deserving. See WAINHOUSE, 
"Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. 
Probl. (1935) 360. 
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service by publication, are among the severe censurers of the 
same act by foreign courts. 
We have, however, to limit our survey to the two mam 
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. 
II. JURISDICTION 
A divorce suit is considered to belong to a court either by 
virtue of some domiciliary connection or the nationality of 
both, or possibly one, of the parties. 
Other grounds for assuming divorce jurisdiction have 
sometimes been deemed to include the place where the mar-
riage has been celebrated or the place where an offense 
against the marriage has been committed. The first concep-
tion is derived from regarding marriage as a contract and 
dissolution of marriage as a rescission thereof; the second 
reflects the idea that divorce is of a penal nature and there-
fore governed by the law of the place of the wrong. These 
conceptions no longer retain roots in the present legisla-
tions; 21a their after-effects may be discerned in certain rules 
of choice of law and, in this country, in some additional pro-
visions relative to jurisdiction over divorce, rather than in 
the main principles. 
The existence of a third ground for jurisdiction is quite un-
certain. Generally, it is emphatically denied that in matrimo-
nial causes the parties may agree on a court. 22 Nevertheless, 
sometimes openly, courts are induced to take jurisdiction 
21a The recently enacted Ecuadorian law of October u(25, 1956, art. 3 
provides that a marriage concluded in Ecuador by an Ecuadorian national 
can only be annulled or divorced by an Ecuadorian court, see Karger, 22 
Z.ausl.Pr. (1957) 525, 527; cf. also infra n. 151, 152. 
22 There are exceptions such as the permission by Mexican state laws to 
grant jurisdiction in divorce when both parties submit to the court. The 
Federal Supreme Court holds recognition due in the Federal District and 
Territories in the case of express submission as contrasted with tacit agree-
ment, on the basis of art. 602 of the Cod. Fed. de Proc. Civ. See decisions 
(April 2, 1935) 44 Seman. Jud. 72 as to the state of Chihuahua, and (Dec. 
7, 1934) 42 Seman. Jud. 3596 as to the state of Morelos. 
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without close scrutiny, when the defendant consents to the 
suit.28 In any event, jurisdiction is quite frequently assumed 
everywhere on undisputed false allegations of domicil, with-
out any inquiry by the court, which is equivalent to making 
the parties domini litis as to jurisdiction, and-more legit-
imately-a separate domicil of the wife is recognized when 
the husband consents. 
I. Nationality as Basis 
The faculty offered by most civil law countries to their na-
tionals to bring suit for divorce even when the plaintiff is 
domiciled in another country may be briefly mentioned. 24 
A few countries go so far as to reserve all matrimonial 
suits involving a national to their own courts exclusively, 
even if the parties are domiciled abroad and in the most dis-
tant regions. Once the Czarist Russian and the Austrian Em-
pires were in this group. Today the list includes-after 
many doubts are discounted 25 and leaving Austria aside 26 
28 Submission to divorce jurisdiction is treated as actually effective in 
Greece by 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 379· 
It has been considered but rejected in Argentina, see LAZCANO, 57 ].A. 
( I937) 463 ff. n. 128. 
The Brazilian Supreme Court, however, seems to have construed arts. 3 I 8-
323 of the C6digo Bustamante, allowing submission to a court, so as to include 
jurisdiction in divorce; Fed. Sup. Ct. (July I7, I940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83. 
In the English case of Hussein v. Hussein [I938] 54 T.L.R. 632, marriage 
was celebrated in England but the husband was not even a resident. The 
court took jurisdiction on the undefended suit by the wife, a decision pre-
sented as model to Scotch courts in so Jurid. Rev. I95· 
24 For details see French Cass. (req.) (April 29, I931) S.I93I.I.247· 
German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2, 6o6b. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 g. 
25 In Greece exclusive jurisdiction is no longer claimed by the courts except 
for Greeks domiciled in Greece. See STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 V ISI; FRAGISTAS, 
7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 297; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 382; cf. Trib. Athens I933, 
no. I676, Clunet I934, I04I; Trib. Athens I (st inst.) I935 no. 8250, 47 Themis 
582, Clunet I937, 597, TENEKIDES, Clunet I937, 598. 
Portugal: I BERGMANN (Portugal p. 5). 
Czechoslovakia: A Czech writer claimed that the Code of Civil Procedure 
( I950) § 6I2 par. I conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Czech courts, STAJGR, 
"Rapports juridiques avec l'etranger dans Ia loi sur Ia procedure en matiere 
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-Hungary,27 Poland,28 the Soviet Union,29 and Turkey.30 
On the other hand, such exclusive jurisdiction is not claimed 
by the vast majority of states, and, although at one time na-
tionality of the husband was considered the only generally 
sufficient condition for divorce jurisdiction,81 in some coun-
tries national: ty alone, without domicil or at least residence, 
of one party in the state is considered insufficient for suing or 
civile," 9 Bulletin de Droit Tchecoslovaque (1951) 64, 68. Contra: I BERG-
MANN (Tschechoslowakei p. 8); RAAPE, lPR. 290 n. 86. 
26 Austria: § 8I no. 3 of the "Jurisdiction Law" (Exekutionsordnung) was 
understood as reserving divorce jurisdiction over nationals to the Austrian 
courts, see \VALKER 724. This interpretation has been superseded by the 
Decree of Oct. 15, 1941 (§ 24), which is still in force. Today, Austria no 
longer claims an exclusive jurisdiction. 
27 Even, if only one party is Hungarian: Code of Civil Procedure, Execu-
tive Decree no. 22/1952, § 15(a); I BERGMANN (Ungarn p. 10). This rigid 
rule has been mitigated by bilateral treaties on judicial assistance with the 
neighboring countries, e.g., Treaties with Yugoslavia of Nov. u, 1930, art. 
28, with Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1951, art. 21, with Bulgaria of Aug. 8, 
1953, art. 23. 
28 A contrary liberal doctrine was clearly adopted by the Polish Law of 
1926 on international private law, art. 17 par. 3, on which a great many 
German decisions were based, see RAAPE 397· It was the declared intention of 
the judicial commission of the Polish Sejm, as the Polish Ministry of Justice 
recognized, to facilitate the divorce of Polish emigrants before foreign courts. 
See documentation of the decision of App. Danzig (Oct. 21, 1937) 4 Z.osteu-
rop.R. (1937) 304. Yet, the tendencies were reversed, and by a rather sur-
prising interpretation of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 1932, § 528, 
recognition of any foreign divorce decree was refused except for the reci-
procity provided by treaty. See Zou., 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 716; Polish Supreme 
Court (Feb. 5, 1931) Z.f.Ostrecht 1932, 383; Polish Supreme Court (April 
23, 1936) Clunet 1937, 617; and Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Civil 
Chambers (May 29, 1937) published in Dt. Justiz 1938, 251; cf. RABEL, 8 
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 718; 9 ibid. (1935) 290. MASSFELLER, "Einzelfragen aus 
dem deutschen internationalen Ehescheidungsrecht," JW. 1935, 2465. Corre-
spondingly, jurisdiction was denied by RG. (Feb. 24, 1936) 150 RGZ. 293; 
RG. (July 3, 1939) 160 RGZ. 396, 399; OLG. Stettin (Sept. 23, 1938) JW. 
1939, 249; OLG. Hamm (July 18, 1949) IPRspr. 1945-49 no. 66. 
29 Since 1944, the Soviet Union has claimed exclusive jurisdiction in matri-
monial suits in which both parties are Soviet nationals, not however, in suits 
concerning mixed marriages, LUNZ 306; HoYER, Anerkennung von Ent-
scheidungen in Ehesachen im Ausland auf Grund inneren Staatenrechts 
(1951) 34i 4 Schwz. Jahrb. (1947) 263. 
30 Turkey: Art. 13 no. 6 of the Law of April 22, 1924, amending § 18 of 
the Code of Civ. Proc., see I BERGMANN (ed. 2) 768. 
s1 See Gebhardsche Materia!ien 184. 
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being sued.32 Even so, many conditions attach to recognition 
of foreign divorce decrees by the national states, including 
such powers of re-examination as approximate exclusive ju-
risdiction. 33 
The conflicts between the claims of the national and the 
domiciliary jurisdictions have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion. Generally, the only remedy envisaged has been in con-
cessions by the states of domicil to those states to which the 
parties involved belong. Not only has the Hague Convention 
sanctioned this trend, but more moderately, even an English 
authority has suggested that divorces rendered at the compe-
tent court of the national state should be recognized in Eng-
land the same as decrees of the matrimonial domicil.34 
2. Domicil as Basis 35 
By common law, coverture effects a merger of the person-
alities of husband and wife. The wife necessarily shares the 
domicil of the husband. This "matrimonial domicil" is, if 
any, the most suitable place for the dissolution of the mar-
riage or, in the terminology of the common law, to locate the 
{(res" that constitutes the object of the action in rem, as the 
action for divorce is commonly regarded. It happens that un-
der common law the private relations of individuals are gen-
erally governed by the law of their domicil, and this, of 
course, is interrelated with the domiciliary principle of juris-
diction. But the idea that the domicil of the parties, even of 
az E.G., the German Law on Divorce of January 24, I935, §I; Swiss NAG. 
art. 7g par. I also involves restrictions; see BG. (Oct. IO, I930) 56 BGE. II 
335, at 341. 
83 See infra pp. 510, 5I6-5I8. 
34 GuTTERIDGE, "Les conflits de competence jurisdictionnelle en matiere de 
divorce et de separation de corps," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938) I, 7. 
I6, 28. 
35 Recent Anglo-American developments are noted by GRISWOLD, "Divorce 
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study," 
65 Harv. L. Rev. (I95I/52) 193-233. 
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one party, in a state suffices to give that state jurisdiction for 
divorce, because divorce is a matter of "status"-this "gen-
erally accepted doctrine," in the words of Beale 36- may be 
questioned after a glance at the rules of the civil law coun-
tries. In most of these, status and capacity of an individual 
are governed not by the law of his domicil but by that of the 
country whose national he is (principle of nationality). N ev-
ertheless, also in these countries, jurisdiction for granting di-
vorce is ordinarily assumed at the matrimonial domicil or at 
the domicil of one party. Certainly, divorce alters the family 
status of a person, and, therefore, the states following the 
nationality principle have partly opened their courts to non-
domiciled nationals also. But the reasons why jurisdiction is 
given at the "domicil" and the more precise determination of 
domicil for this purpose are not to be found in any doctrine. 
They are policy considerations that we shall subsequently 
try to analyze. 
(a) Cammon domicil. Where, under the conception of 
the court applied to for a divorce, both spouses are domi-
ciled, in the full sense of this word, within the forum, juris-
diction is granted in all states acknowledging the dissolution 
of marriage inter vivos. There are two groups. 
The matrimonial domicil is sufficient everywhere for as-
suming jurisdiction. However, in Great Britain since the sub-
ject was clarified in 189 5 31 until recently, in the British do-
minions except Australia and South Africa, 38 and under the 
36 I BEALE § I 10.1. 
31 Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A. C. 517. 
38 South Africa: Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, 1939, as amended 
I953, s. I ( 1) (b,c), but limited to cases in which residence and domicil 
are in different jurisdictions of South Africa. 
General exceptions in favor of wives living separately are made in New 
Zealand: Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 1930, s. 3; and 
in Australia: Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act, 1945-1955, ss. IO {I), 
12 A, in consequence of the English cases in misericordia, see below n. 128. 
For particulars, see GRISWOLD (supra n. 35) 202 ff. 
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present Treaty of Montevideo, 39 the matrimonial domicil 
has remained the sole test of jurisdiction for the purpose of 
divorce. The wife has her domicil with that of the husband 
by operation of law. It is the most certainly recognized case 
of divorce jurisdiction also in this country.40 
This simple system of conferring jurisdiction also provides 
an appropriate test to determine the applicable law, since the 
statutes of the state where the marriage is located work in 
the double function of lex fori and lex domicilii, and more-
over, among the states adopting this system, mutual recog-
nition of divorce decrees is easy. 
In countries acknowledging a separate domicil of the wife 
or ignoring the institution of legal domicil, the principle has 
to be modified. Jurisdiction is exercised when both spouses 
have their domicil within the state, either together or sepa-
rately.41 Naturally, this rule obtains in the United States.42 
The reasons supporting these rules and underlying the 
"res" theory are obvious. A community in which the spouses 
have centered their lives may feel competent to adjudicate 
the continuation of their marriage. Insofar as the conduct of 
private persons may deserve consideration in determining 
jurisdiction, an element of submission to the state activity 
may be implied. On the other hand, it appears a superfluous 
hardship to send the parties away to their distant home-
lands; this would sometimes mean their ruin. 
(b) Presumption of common domicil. If in the eyes of the 
forum the parties have their domicils in different states, an 
39 Treaty of Montevideo, text of I889, art. 62; text of I940, art. 59· 
40 Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6} 20I U.S. 562; Atherton v. Atherton (I900) 
I8I U. S. I 55; Restatement §§no, 114. 
41 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 § I: " ... before the 
competent authority of the place where the parties have their domicil." 
Under the Scandinavian Convention, art. 7 par. I, this is the main ground 
for jurisdiction. 
42 Restatement § uo. 
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attempt has been made to maintain the original system in 
one of two ways. 
One way is this: The last matrimonial domicil of the par-
ties is held competent for the purpose of divorce, even 
though it has been deserted by the husband. Thus, the ancient 
construction is superseded, whereby the husband would trans-
fer the matrimonial domicil to his new place. This progress 
was made in the United States as the earliest step to improve 
the situation of married women as against offending hus-
bands.43 The same step has been made in British countries 44 
and, as late as 1937, in England.45 The draftsmen of there-
cent revision ( 1940) of the Montevideo Treaty added a 
similar clause to their text,46 after the Argentine practices 
had taken a kindred view.47 Analogous clauses in the Hague 
Convention and the Swedish law permit divorce at the for-
mer common domicil in case the defendant has deserted his 
spouse or has left the country after a cause for divorce 
arose, 48 and, more generally, the Scandinavian Convention 
gives jurisdiction to the state where both spouses "had their 
last common domicil and one of them is still domiciled." 40 
Traces of this stage of the development are frequent in this 
country.50 
43 See I BEALE § 28.2. 
4 4 Canada: Divorce Jurisdiction Act (I930) 2o-2I Geo. V, c. I5 § 2. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand: see the detailed statements by READ, Recognition and 
Enforcement 224. 
South Africa: Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, I939 as amended 
I953, s. I (I) (a). 
45 Matrimonial Causes Act, I937, Edw. VIII & I Geo. VI, c. 57, § 13, now 
Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, I4 Geo. VI, c. 25, § I8. 
46 Treaty of Montevideo, text of I940, art. 59 par. 2. 
47 Cam. civ. 2 Buenos Aires (March 24, I933) 4I J. A. 420; the law of the 
matrimonial domicil determines also the question whether the husband has 
deserted his wife, Cam. civ. 2 (Oct. 7, I935) 52 J. A. I44· 
4 8 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. I sentence 3; 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of I904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § I par. 1 
sentence 2. 
49 Scandinavian Convention art. 7 par. I. 
50 In particular, venue exists in the county where the parties lived as hus-
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The other way has been demonstrated by the German pro-
cedural code. Where both parties are of foreign nationality, 
the actual domicil of the husband within the state was suffi-
cient and necessary for suits of either party, without regard 
to the domicil of the wife, 51 whether or not it be recognized 
elsewhere or for other purposes. 
(c) Admission of separate domicil for married women. 
During the second third of the nineteenth century, the courts 
in the United States successively began to acknowledge the 
capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil in 
a steadily increasing number of situations. Ultimately, even 
the most conservative courts acceded to this for the purpose 
of bringing a suit or being sued, for divorce.52 Consequently, 
American courts and statutes no longer distinguish, for this 
purpose, between husband and wife but treat them equally 
as parties. Despite the diversity of the clauses-there are 
seventeen different kinds 53-in all jurisdictions, suit for di-
vorce can be brought by the plaintiff at his own domicil.54 
Optionally, it can be instituted in most states also at the 
domicil of the defendant by a non-resident plaintiff. 
The theoretical basis of all this is traditionally attributed 
to the conception that every state has an eminent interest in 
band and wife, if the defendant still lives there, cf. Mass. Gen. Laws ( I932) 
c. 208 § 6, or if the plaintiff lives there, cf. Miss. Code Ann. (I942) § 2738, 
or without such conditions, cf. Ala. Code Ann. ( I940) tit. 34 § 28; Va. Code 
Ann. (Michie & Sublett, I950) § 20.98; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 
1955) §4709· 
5l Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. the Netherlands: B\V. 
art. 262 par. I. However, under the principle of equality of the sexes, the 
situation has been remedied in both countries; jurisdiction is now based on 
the residence of either party within the country. Western Germany: Code of 
Civ. Proc. {as amended by Law of June I8, I957) § 6o6 par. 2; the Nether-
lands: BW. art. 262 par. I {as amended by Law of June 14, I956). 
52 I BEALE § 28.2. 
53 2 VERNIER § 8I. 
54 Haddock v. Haddock ( I9o6) zoi U. S. 562; Williams v. North Carolina 
(no. I, I942) 3I7 U. S. 287, 298; Stevens v. Allen (I9I6) I39 La. 658, 71 So. 
936; Perkins v. Perkins { I9I6) 225 Mass. 82, I I3 N.E. 84I; Re Ellis ( I893) 
55 Minn. 40I, 56 N. W. 1056; Jones v. Jones ( I889) 67 Miss. I95, 6 So. 7I2; 
Blakeslee v. Blakeslee (19I7) 4I Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950; Hubbell v. Hubbell 
( I854) 3 Wis. 662. 
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the status of its domiciliaries and is thereby entitled to alter 
the married status of a person domiciled in the state, even 
though the other party may be domiciled in another. 55 Thus, 
the marriage status of one spouse is treated in the same man-
ner as the marriage of a married couple was under the older 
doctrine. In the words of a New Jersey decision of 1934, the 
husband's or the wife's domicil "carries with it the complete 
(marital) res or a part of it," so as to give the state court 
jurisdiction. 56 How can this be? Vreeland may well ask: 
"Since the status is that of two persons, and not one, does the 
wife upon acquiring a new domicil take half of the res with 
her and leave half with the husband, or does it all stay where 
it last was, or do they both have a sort of tenancy by entirety 
in the res . . . ?" 57 
On the practical side, we are made aware by Goodrich that, 
merely as a matter of logic, the out-of-state spouse would not 
be affected, but consistency compels the courts to assume fur-
ther that the divorce destroys also the married status of the 
non-domiciled party. 5 8 In counterpoise to this convincing rea-
soning, we may remark that the Michigan statute allows its 
courts to divorce, in their discretion, any party who is a resi-
dent of the state and whose husband or wife has obtained a 
divorce in another state, whether the foreign divorce is valid 
or not. 59 The explanation given by the Michigan Supreme 
Court is that the courts of both domicils possess jurisdiction 
to grant divorces only "so far as the party resident within its 
own limits is concerned; if <>ne proceeds first, there is no legal 
impediment to the other's taking like steps afterwards." 60 
55 See I BEALE at § 10.8, 110.1. 
56 Webb v. Webb (1934) 13 N. ]. Misc. 439, 178 At!. 282. 
5 7 VREELAND 28. 
5 8 GOODRICH 412. 
~ 9 Mich. Camp. Laws (1948) § 552.6(6) [Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 25.86]. Related 
but perhaps not identical statutes are in force in Florida, cf. Fla. Statutes 
( 1941) § 65.04 and Ohio, cf. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. ( 1953) § 3105.01 (I). 
60 Wright v. Wright (1871) 24 Mich. 179; cf. Van Inwagen v. Van In-
wagen (1891) 86 Mich. 333, 49 N. W. 154· 
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The fact is that the American divorce law has outgrown 
the doctrine of jurisdiction in rem. From the time that the 
wife acquired the power to assume a domicil of her own, 
duality of domicil as a basis for divorce jurisdiction has been 
possible, and all conceptions born of the ancient idea of mari-
tal unity have lost their sense. Domicil has remained an 
essential prerequisite of jurisdiction only insofar that, ac-
cording to the best settled rule of this unstable field, no juris-
diction is granted when neither of the spouses is domiciled 
within the state. The entire question depends upon the extent 
to which a state chooses to shoulder the responsibility of en-
tertaining divorce suits, or to leave them to other states. In-
dividual legislatures have tried to solve the problem in such 
a variety of ways as to indicate that there is no logical ne-
cessity to follow any of them. 
Indeed, no exact analogy to the American doctrine exists 
elsewhere, and very few foreign regulations approach it. 
Even these cannot be compared with it without understand-
ing that they deal with parties of foreign nationality, while 
in this country the law has been developed with American 
citizens in view and is applied to aliens with very few quali-
fications. The nearest parallel is afforded by the Swiss law. 
In Switzerland, jurisdiction is assumed at the instance of a 
plaintiff of foreign nationality if he is domiciled within the 
country, irrespective of whether husband or wife is suing and 
whether the defendant is a Swiss national or domiciliary.6 ' 
In France and other countries, the defendant spouse must be 
a domiciliary, but the husband's domicil determines that of 
the wife, except where she has been judicially separated.62 
61 See BECK 404 no. 37, comment to NAG. art. 7h par. I. 
Uruguay since 1946: ALFONSIN, Regimen Internacional del Divorcio ( 1953) 
133 ff. 
62 France: GLASSON et TISSIER, 5 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, 1936) 
no. 1609. 
Belgium: Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 144 no. 471. 
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The Hague Convention allows an option for the domicil of 
the defendant where the parties have not the same domicil.63 
The general rule of reference to the defendant's domiciliary 
law is also resorted to by the Federal Supreme Court of 
Mexico in interstate divorces, in case the laws of the Mexi-
can states determine jurisdiction for divorce differently 
(domicil of the husband, marital domicil, domicil of the de-
serted wife). 64 
Hence, we find.the American law rather isolated. But the 
French practice sheds some light on one motive that is of 
universal validity. The French courts have proclaimed the 
doctrine that they must refuse to entertain jurisdiction over 
parties who are both of foreign nationality, at least if they 
have not their common domicil in France.65 However, in 
practice jurisdiction is exercised when the defendant does not 
prove that he has maintained a foreign domicil at which he 
can be actually sued 66 or, in another version, when there is no 
foreign jurisdiction in which the suit can be prosecuted with-
out hardship. 67 The desire to avoid what would look like a 
denial of justice, is a legitimate one among the many im-
pulses for entertaining causes presented. 
The reverse side of this obliging attitude was well known 
in this country from the wave of divorces of Americans m 
Paris until the decline of the 1920's.68 
63 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. I sentence 2. The 
provision has prevailingly been understood so as to characterize the domicil 
of a party generally under his national law. See German RG. (April 5, I92I) 
102 RGZ. 82, 84; LEWALD in I Strupp's Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der 
Diplomatic 469. 
64 Mexico: S. Ct. (Oct. I4, I940) Seman. Jud. I94I.1.403. 
65 French Cass. (req.) (June 25, I9I8) S.I918-I9.1.206; Cas. (civ.) (Nov. 
Io, I920) S.I923.I.I29; Cass (civ.) (April 30, I927) S.I927.I.2o8. 
66 GLASSON ET TISS!ER, supra n. 62. 
67 See French Cass. (civ.) (July 29, I9I2) S.I9I3.I-425; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 
10, I920) and Trib. civ. Nice (Dec. 6, I920) Clunet I923, 72 ff.; Cass. (Dec. 
30, I930) Revue I932, III; cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. I70. 
68 See BATES, "The Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. 
Probl. (I935) 324; see also }Aeon, "Problems of Divorce in France Incident 
to the Statutes of 194I," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) at 309. 
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The wider such "hospitality," the more conflicts are likely 
to appear. Conflicts are not even confined to that diversity of 
national and domiciliary divorce laws that has been receiving 
paramount attention in Europe. The different views, for in-
stance, regarding the wife's domicil have the result that a 
court of Uruguay, predicating jurisdiction upon the matri-
monial domicil, will divorce an American citizen domiciled in 
Montevideo from his wife who lives in the United States,69 
while a New Y ark court, if the wife lived there, would 
probably consider her domiciled in the state and protected 
by certain special rules against the Uruguayan decree. A 
series of Canadian decisions has invalidated decrees rendered 
in this country because the finding of domicil was in contra-
diction to the Canadian doctrines. 70 Where a Swiss court, as-
suming jurisdiction because of her separate Swiss domicil, 
had divorced a woman of Belgian nationality, a Belgian 
court denied recognition to the decree; not even for the pur-
pose of jurisdiction could a Belgian wife have a domicil 
separate from her husband. 71 Well known is the number of 
divorces unrecognized within the United States despite the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, and in the 
second Williams case, 71a the U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
pressly confirmed that a divorce decree obtained at the dom-
icil (for purposes of divorce court) of one spouse need not 
be recognized in another jurisdiction denying that domicil 
under its own qualification. 
Residence is sometimes taken as a substitute for domicil, 
particularly for the purpose of jurisdiction for limited di-
vorce; 72 as such it may suffice. 
69 Trib. Ap. Montevideo (Sept. 13, 1935) 36 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (1938) 
:no, Clunet 1938, 841. 
70 See infra p. 532, n. 143. 
71 Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925-1.179; Trib. civ. Bruges (March 
4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. 
na Williams v. North Carolina (no. 2, 1945) 325 U. S. 226; Rice v. Rice 
( 1949) 336 u. s. 674· 
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We have now to investigate the additional rules that re-
strict the assumption of jurisdiction. 
3. Restrictions on the Assumption of Jurisdiction 
It is a comforting experience that modern legislatures have 
felt the need to limit their own domiciliary jurisdiction over 
divorce, partly for the express purpose of avoiding at least 
certain conflicts with other jurisdictions, partly with less dis-
tinct intentions to the same effect. However, these additional 
requirements are of a very different nature in this country 
from those on the European Continent. 
(a) Additional requirements. In the United States, the 
prerequisite that one party or the plaintiff be domiciled in 
the state at the time of the commencement of the action, is 
usually accompanied by further qualifications. The statutes 
have varied and mixed the requirements so "as to defy clas-
sification," Vernier attests. 73 The author must confess that he 
has not succeeded so far in completely understanding the 
meaning of several such combined versions and would most 
welcome a thorough discussion of all these clauses by a more 
competent writer. It seems that there are three main statu-
tory clauses: 
Sometimes it is required that the parties have, at some 
time before suit, both lived in the state. This is obviously de-
rived from the idea of the matrimonial domicil, upon return 
to which either spouse is entitled to sue the other. 
A considerable number of various clauses emphasize the 
importance of the place and the time where the cause of ac-
tion accrued. Of this group, certain are important as direct 
measures to reject petitions evasive of foreign divorce law 
and will be considered separately. 
72 With respect to the United States see 1 BEALE § xo.8, § uo.s. 
73 2 VERNIER § 81 and p. 107. 
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In their vast majority, the statutory clauses require a defi-
nite period of "residence" of that party whose domicil is 
decisive, previous to the filing of the action; almost always it 
is provided or understood that this period should immedi-
ately precede the suit. The period is from six weeks to two 
years in particular states and varies also in different cases. 
It may make a difference what the cause for divorce is. In 
linking the ideas just mentioned with the minimum residence 
requirement, the length of time is declared unnecessary or 
reduced, if the party, or both parties, lived in the state be-
fore, or lived there at the time when the cause of action 
arose, or if the cause occurred in the state, etc. A typical for-
mula is presented in the Uniform Annulment of Marriage 
and Divorce Act of 1907, whose first provision gave jurisdic-
tion: 
"When, at the time the cause of action arose, either party 
was a bona fide resident of the state, and has continued so to 
be down to the time of the commencement of the action; ex-
cept that no action for absolute divorce shall be commenced 
for any cause other than adultery or bigamy, unless one 
of the parties has been for the two years next preceding 
the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this 
state." 74 
As this wording shows, no exception is made in the case of 
both parties being domiciled in the state at the time of suit.'5 
Similarly, in the great majority of the statutes no particular 
exception seems to be intended to that effect, although the re-
quirement of residence may be released in related situations, 
such as where the defendant is personally served. 76 There 
74 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, Draft of an Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating 
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce (1907) § 8(a). 
75 Statutes formed after this model speak expressly of both parties. 
7 6 See, for instance, Iowa Code (1954) § 598.3 (defendant resident and per-
sonally served). 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 7334· 
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are, however, a few statutes which state that actual domicil is 
sufficient, if both parties are domiciled in the state.77 
Disregarding the labyrinth of the statutory details, we 
may take it that the restrictions of the last type counter-bal-
ance the ruthlessness of divorce jurisdiction at the domicil of 
one party by qualifying this domicil in a possibly very effec-
tive manner. The requirement of residence previous to the 
suit is generally understood as meaning domicil and, in most 
jurisdictions, actual presence in the state as well, although a 
temporary absence is innocuous. 78 The lapse of time guaran-
tees that the individual has become a participant in the life 
of the state and serves as evidence that the change of abode 
includes a serious change of domicil. If applied to the case 
where both parties have come to the state, the requirement 
is intended to foil evasive demands as well as to protect one 
spouse against the othe;'s arbitrary choice of the forum. In 
both applications, the requirement is usually held to be man-
datory/9 
Unfortunately, the great purpose of this restriction has 
often been forgotten. It is buried under the maze of confus-
ing details accumulated in the various statutory experiments. 
Moreover, two defects are rightly much criticized. While 
some states formerly demanded a residence of five years, 
an unjustifiably long period, others are content with three 
months, or, since the famous competition of Nevada with 
Idaho and Florida, with six weeks. It has become the only 
purpose of such a requirement to benefit the local hotels and 
shops. The other evil is lax enforcement of the normal resi-
77 See especially Ala. Code Ann. (I940) tit. 34 § 29, as amended by Law 
of July 6, I945· 
N. H. Rev. Stats. ( I955) § 458-5-
In this sense, see also the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of I930, §I (a) 
(ed. I932). 
78 I BEALE § 10.8. 
79 Hetherington v. Hetherington ( I928} 200 Ind. 56, I6o N. E. 345· 
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dence period; strange stories have been told in the literature 
in this respect. 80 
Could these faults be corrected, this dependence of juris-
diction on a residence period would be calculated greatly to 
inspire legislation in other countries where thus far a mini-
mum period of residence has only occasionally been pro-
vided.81 
(b) Conformity toN ational Law. In Europe, while as a 
rule jurisdiction over foreigners is taken at the matrimonial 
domicil or in some countries at the domicil of one party, 
measures are taken to avoid collision with the national law. 
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention,82 fol-
lowed by the statutes of Sweden and Poland,83 has recog-
nized, in special clauses, the claim for exclusive jurisdiction 
of divorce, which today is asserted by such countries as So-
viet Russia, Hungary, and Poland.84 If the jurisdiction of a 
state over petitions for divorce or judicial separation is ex-
clusive for its nationals, such jurisdiction is recognized by 
the other states as the only one competent. The Belgian 
courts observe the same restraint in the absence of an en-
acted rule and without being bound any longer by the Hague 
Convention. 85 
80 BREARLEY, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinans," 2 
Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 329, 332. 81 Poland: Law of I926 on interlocal private law, art. 2 (one year for 
change of personal law). 
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904, as amended, c. 7 § 2 par. 2 (one year in case 
of Swedish spouse) ; c. 7 § 4a (two years for certain foreign fiances). 
France: the now superseded decree of Nov. 12, I938, requiring a police 
permit for at least a year's residence for recognizing the domicil of a for-
eigner (supra p. 152) evidently was applicable to divorce. 
8 2 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. 2. 
83 Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of I904 with amendments, c. 3 § I par. 2. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, § I7 par. 4· 
84 See supra p. 426. 
85 Cour Bruxelles (March IS, I922) Belg. Jud. I923, col. I03; Rb. Antwerp 
(Nov. I9, I937) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. (I938-1939) col. 547 no. 112 and (March 
29, I939) 9 ibid. (I939-I940) col. I373 no. 28I; App. Bruxelles (May 20, 
1939) 9 ibid. (I939-I940) col. 42 no. 7 (Hungarians). 
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Germany. The German law goes even further. German 
courts may not exercise jurisdiction in divorce cases where 
the national country of the husband would not recognize the 
resulting judgment because of lack of jurisdiction of the Ger-
man forum. The German provision prescribes that, if both 
spouses are foreigners, action for divorce may be brought at 
the forum, provided that the domestic court has jurisdiction 
also according to the laws of the state of which the husband 
is a national. 85a According to one opinion, this text requires 
that the national country should recognize also the specific 
court where the suit is brought as having jurisdiction.86 Bet-
ter authorities, however, declare it sufficient that any Ger-
man court, this or another, be considered endowed with ju-
risdiction in the eyes of the national law, that is, that 
German courts have jurisdiction in the international sense.87 
The prohibition does not extend to the case where there-
sulting decree of divorce would not be recognized on another 
ground, for instance, because of lack of reciprocity or be-
cause of service of the defendant by publication.88 
This prohibition, however, covers many more cases than 
just those of exclusive jurisdiction mentioned above. It ex-
tends to all situations where one or both of the foreign 
spouses are domiciled in a country that does not recognize 
the effectiveness of the German decree within its borders. 
'
5a Germany: Code of Civil Procedure, § 6o6 b no. 1; similarly Bulgaria: 
Family Law of 1949, art. 59 par. 2. 
86 RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, ]W. 1930, 1309; KG. (Oct. 25, 1937) 
]W. 1937, 3249, but cf. MASSFELLER, JW. 1936, 3579· 
87 SCHONDORF, 75 }herings Jahrb. 66; RUHL, }W. 1930, 1310; 3 FRANKEN-
STEIN 505; PAGENSTECHER, II Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 480. 
A via media is followed by STEIN-}ONA5-SCHONKE, 2 ZPO. (ed. 17, 
1951) § 6o6 III suggesting to ask the foreign law whether it requires the 
jurisdiction of a specific court or that of any German court. 
88 RG. (Nov. 21, 1935) 149 RGZ. 232; cf. KG. (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr. 
1932, no. 76. On the application of the provisions to religious divorce forms, 
see below, p. 413. On the case of subjects of a country where divorce cannot 
take place except by bill of parliament, see NIBOYET 506 no. 417; ibid. 744 
no. 636; 2 BERGMANN 79; RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 262. 
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Similarly, exclusive jurisdiction has been claimed by many 
American cases for the courts of the domicil, and likewise by 
Switzerland, which does not recognize a foreign divorce of 
two Swiss citizens, one of whom is domiciled in Switzer-
land. 89 Before assuming jurisdiction to divorce an American 
husband, a German court must therefore ascertain, among 
other points: 90 ( I ) where the husband is domiciled, under 
the American definition of domicil, requiring in particular the 
animus manendi in the American sense; ( 2) if he thus is 
found to be domiciled in Germany, whether the American 
conflicts rule recognizes the jurisdiction of the domicil, and 
as of what time. 
This subject needs more discussion m connection with 
renvoi. 
Switzerland. Still broader is the scope of the former 
Swiss 91 and Hungarian 92 and the Czechoslovakian 92" pro-
visions that require not only the jurisdiction but also the de-
cree to be recognized by the national law, insofar as the act-
ing court is able to predict.93 Also, the Court of Appeals in 
Zurich was denied jurisdiction, because personal service on 
8 9 BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335; BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 7·h 
78; cf. for more difficult situations, BEcK, NAG. 363 nos. nz-115. 
9° Cf. in particular RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, IPRspr. 1930, no. 
136. 
91 Law on Civil Status of Dec. 24, 1874, art. 56, now superseded by NAG. 
art. 7h par. I. 
92 Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 116: ... if the judgment has force 
in the state whose citizens the spouses are; though the new Marriage Law of 
1952 lacks a comparable provision, the requirement of enforceability has 
been maintained as a principle of public policy, TORZSAY-BIBER, "Problems 
of Private International Law in Matrimonial Actions in Hungarian Courts," 
3 Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe (1955) 15. 
92a Czechoslovakian Code of Civil Procedure § 612 par. z sentence 2, re-
quiring recognition by the national law of both spouses. 
93 App. Zurich (Jan. n, 1936) Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1936) 359; the treaty 
is that of Nov. 2, 1929. App. Zurich (1937) 38 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1939) 78 
no. 36 denies jurisdiction to the wife, because, under the applicable Polish 
law, she shared the domicil of her husband who lived in Antwerp, Belgium. 
Similarly, in the case of a wife suing her British husband domiciled in Can-
ada, 37 SJZ. (194o--I941) 31 no. S· 
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the defendant was impossible and German courts, under the 
German-Swiss treaty on mutual recognition and execution of 
judgments,94 therefore, would not have recognized the 
decree. 
There is some uncertainty in applying either of these self-
imposed restrictions, due to the difficulties of knowing ex-
actly the position of the foreign law. The possibility that the 
national court in reviewing the decree will even re-examine 
the jurisdictional facts further aggravates the problem. The 
Swiss law was therefore significantly changed in the wording 
of its provision. Former article 56 of the Swiss Law on Civil 
Status required proof that the future judgment would be rec-
ognized in the homeland. As this was found to be an impos-
sible task, the actual text (NAG. art. 7h par. I) demands 
proof only that the Swiss jurisdiction would be recognized. 
But it is not clear whether by this change the evidence has 
been made easier to produce. Once, a Swiss court tried to 
consult the Supreme Court of the United States on the 
"American" divorce law but was informed that neither 
courts nor administrative agencies in this country are pre-
pared to give advice.95 At any rate, the court can only guess 
at the chances of recognition, if it does not want to refuse to 
assume jurisdiction in virtually every case, and experience 
shows that no court wants that. 
In some cases, it may be suspected that Continental courts 
94 Examples regarding American citizens: Bez. Ger. Ziirich (June 18, 1930) 
27 SJZ. (x93o--1931) 87, no. 14 (wife under medical treatment in Ziirich, in-
tending to stay "permanently" in order to study there. Jurisdiction was 
granted in view of the husband's submission to the court and the certainty 
that the decree would be recognized in Minnesota). Same court (Nov. 3, 
1931) z8 SJZ. (1931-1932) 250 no. 217 (the wife paid taxes and attended 
classes at the University. The husband in Boston consented to the separate 
domicil. The divorce ground would also be recognized in Massachusetts). 
In both cases the assumption of domicil was questionable, but the husband's 
consent to its establishment would be termed decisive. The same observations 
are true for a case of British subjects, Bez. Ger. Ziirich (Oct. 25, 1935) 32 
S]Z. ( 1936) 202, no. 41. 
95 BuRCKHARDT, 4 Schweizerisches Bundesrecht 142 no. 1674 II. 
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have too lightly presumed American and especially English 
willingness to recognize a domicil at and, therefore, jurisdic-
tion of, the forum. 
4· Religious Divorce 
When a court applying the rule of nationality finds that 
under the national law of a party divorce can be pronounced 
only by an ecclesiastical authority (as in the countries influ-
enced by the Greek Orthodox Church and by Islam), the 
court faces the problem whether it may exercise jurisdiction 
or must refrain from it. The German courts feel prohibited 
from assuming jurisdiction by the provision that jurisdiction 
must be in accordance with the national law of the husband, 
for a national law giving exclusive powers to the churches is 
deemed to exclude any judicial activity of temporal tribu-
nals, 96 even abroad. 
In France, jurisdiction was likewise denied, especially by 
the Supreme Court in the famous case of Levinfon/7 a Rus-
sian Jew. Since the Russian law at the time left divorce pro-
ceedings to the religious authorities, a French court was held 
unable to apply the national law of the party in its true form 
without injury to the religious feelings of the parties. This 
example was followed by many other French decisions, most 
of which had to deal with subjects of the former Russian 
parts of Poland and Lithuania.98 
96 KG. (Dec. 19, 1905) 14 ROLG. 241, aff'd RG. (Oct. 4, 1906) 19 Z.int.R. 
(1909) 263; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925) Clunet 1925, 1055. This is also the meaning 
of the Hague Convention on Divorce, Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference 
de Ia Haye (1900) 211. An analogous position was taken in Switzerland by 
the Trib. Zurich (Sept. 22, 1936) 34 SJZ. (1937-1938) 313 no. 591, although 
in the instant case jurisdiction was assumed because the marriage was void 
under the national (Palestine) law. 
97 Cass. (civ.) (May 29, 1905) D.1905.1·353, S.1906.1.161, Clunet 1905, 1006, 
Revue 1905, 518. 
98 Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) S.1911.1.581; Cass. (req.) (July 20, 1911) 
S.1912.1.132; about ten decisions from 1920 to 1927 cited by J. DONNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 485; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 15, 1936) Nouv. Revue 1936, 541. Similarly 
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In France, however, some courts and writers have ex-
pressed contrary opinions, mainly because of the hardship 
imposed on the parties but also because of two legal argu-
ments. First, public policy is invoked on the ground of the 
declared neutrality of the French state toward the churches 
and the impropriety of granting more prerogatives to for-
eign churches than to its own.99 Second, religious divorce 
rules are analyzed as composed of substantive rules, con-
cerned with the permissibility and the causes of divorce, and 
procedural rules giving way in a French tribunal to the 
French rules of procedure.100 A recent Belgian critic of the 
dominant doctrine remarks that neither the consistories of 
the Orthodox Church nor the rabbinate tribunals use any for-
mule sacrec, prayers or deprecations; they exercise purely 
judicial functions. 101 Courts of other countries, too, are di-
,-ided on the question.102 
in Belgium: Trih. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 1931·3·36; see 
also PoULLET 443 no. 378; Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 
col. 120 (Spanish Catholics). 
9
" Trib. civ. Seine (June 11, 1921) Clunet 1921, 525 (Greek Orthodox Rus-
,ians); Trib. civ. Seine {Dec. 24, 1921) Clunet 1922, 117 (Russian Jews). 
100 See in this sense HARTIN's note to the decision of Cour Paris {March 
17, 1902) D.1903.2-49 and (implicitly) Trib. civ. Seine {Feb. 25, 1937) 
Clunet 1937, 523 (Lithuanian Jews); PILLET, 2 Melanges 359.,373, NIBOYET 
S67 no. 752 and 5 Traite 630. App. Alger (March 7, 1898) Clunet 1898, 1102 
1 separation of Spanish Catholics); Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue 
Crit. 1939, 105 (Russian-Polish Jews); Cour Paris (Jan. 9, 1943) S.1943.2.29 
with affirmative note of NIBOYET (separation of Spanish Catholics). 
101 ]oFf, 22 Revue Inst. Beige (1936) 140. 
H•" Belgium: for exercising jurisdiction under application of substantive 
Belgian law: Trib. civ. d'Anvers (May 30, 1936); cf. 65 Revue Dr. Int. 
(Bruxelles) (1938) 295, and Cour Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) J.d. Tr. 1938, 
no. 3550 col. 646 (Polish Jews); ]OFE, "Divorce de Polonais en Belgique," 
4-5 Pand. Fer. (Jan. 1938) 5· 
For denying jurisdiction: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 
1931·3·36 (Spanish Canon marriage-no divorce possible); App. Bruxelles 
(July 9, 1932) Revue 1933, 511; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Clunet 
1932, 487, 489; Trib. civ. d'Anvers {March 1, 1939) Pasicrisie 1939·3·76; 
also PouLLET 443 no. 378; VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 
295; DE Vos, 1 Probleme 165. 
Italy: for exercising jurisdiction: Trib. Roma (June 22, 1898) Giur. Ita). 
1898, I, 2, 647 (separation of Spanish Catholics married according to canonic 
formalities); for denying jurisdiction: App. Roma (June 6, 1899) La Legge 
1899·2·45· 
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The role of the religious element under the national law, 
however, may be less important. The Austrian Civil Code 
prescribed that Jews are to be divorced in court but that in 
the case of a mutual divorce agreement a preliminary at-
tempt at conciliation must be made by the priest or teacher .103 
The Marriage Law of I 836 of the Warsaw District required 
as a preliminary to court proceedings a certificate of a rabbi 
on the ecclesiastical aspect of the case.104 French and German 
courts have considered such regulations no obstacle to litiga-
tion at the forum. 105 They find it more difficult to adjust their 
own procedure to the singular presuppositions of the foreign 
laws. But some courts have even agreed to recognize the ac-
tivities of local religious authorities corresponding to the for-
eign customs.106 
103 AUg. BGB. §§ 133, 134. 
104 Marriage Law, Kingdom of Poland, art. 189, as generally interpreted. 
Although art. 196 of the Code required ecclesiastical jurisdiction also for 
Catholics and Protestants, the German LG. Bremen (May 8, 193-1-) JW. 1934, 
2353, IPRspr. 1934, no. 55, concluded from the Polish international private 
law of 1926 that jurisdiction should be assumed, and tried to apply the rules 
of both these churches to a mixed Catholic-Protestant marriage. 
105 France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg (Oct. 22, 1930) Clunet 1931, 166, Revue 
Crit. 1935, 753; Trib. civ. Metz (May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue 
Crit. 1935, 754 (Russian-Polish Jews). 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3 RGZ. 38; RG. (May 20, 1935) I.J-7 
RGZ. 399; KG. (Dec. u, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so 
(Russian-Polish Jews}, overruled see infra n. 106. 
Of Greek Jews, the Greek laws do not speak; cf. CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 430 
nos. 95, 96; but in view of the entirely judicial and temporal procedure in 
Greek legislation following Law no. 3222 of August 28-30, 1924, the Cour 
Paris (Dec. 29, 1925) Revue 1929, 258 has granted jurisdiction. 
106 France: Cour Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Trib. civ. Metz 
(May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue Crit. 1935, 754· Contra: Cass. 
(req.) (July 20, 19II) S.1912.I.132; App. Rabat (May 9, 1933) Revue Crit. 
1934, 125 (whether a French Algerian Jew has to give a religious bill of 
divorce); AuDINET, Revue Crit. 1935, 756. 
Belgium: App. Liege (June 26, 1934) Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce 
371 no. 1715 (certificate of the Grand Rabbi of Belgium accepted}. 
Germany: OLG. Kiiln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304, IPRspr. 1932, no. 
78; KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so. Contra, over-
ruling this practice, RG. (May 20, 1935) 147 RGZ. 399· 
England: Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] 2 All E.R. 373; also Victoria: 
Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51. 
DIVORCE 447 
The sacrifices involved in such concessions to foreign 
claims are admirable instances in the development of inter-
national cooperation. But they originated from such a super-
stitious belief in the legitimacy of the nationality principle, 
that the most unreasonable of all its claims, that for exclu-
sive jurisdiction over emigrated married couples, was not 
questioned. Foreign law must not be recognized, unless it is 
fit for international use. 
III. COMMON ScoPE OF THE Lex Fori 
To evaluate the domain of choice of law in the countries 
observing the personal law, it is necessary to go beyond the 
question of jurisdiction and to realize that important ques-
tions are everywhere governed exclusively by the law of the 
forum. 
I . Procedure 
Procedure, of course, is the concern exclusively of local 
rules. The law of the forum determines the necessity of con-
tested and the permissibility of uncontested proceedings, as 
well as the acts constituting procedure.107 Provisional decrees 
for separate residence or maintenance rendered during a di-
vorce suit also follow the procedural rules.108 
107 Deviating from this principle, the Appeal Court of Paris in Affaire 
Chiger, Cour Paris (April 30, 1926) Clunet 1926, 943, Revue 1927, 243 de-
clared that a French court could appropriate the power to determine causes 
for divorce in its discretion, a power provided for by the Soviet Russian law 
of the time, with respect to a controversial divorce between Soviet Rus-
sian nationals. This decision was much criticized; cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 
302, 303. 
In Greece, the requirement of a previous conciliation is recognized as a 
procedural question, 20 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1955) 151. 
108 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 6; Poland: Law of 1926 on inter-
national private law, art. 17 par. 4 sentence 2; for comment, see KAHN, 2 
Abhandl. 360 ff. 
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2. Decrees 
The law of the forum controls the form in which a divorce 
is granted, if at all, including the choice of the persons or 
authorities entrusted with granting divorces. 
In certain countries, divorce is granted by the king or an 
administrative authority/09 in others by the parliament,110 
often by ecclesiastical tribunals,111 or it is a private agree-
ment between the parties either with or without some re-
ligious 112 or public control.113 Whatever form divorce has in 
a country for its own subjects, is also permitted between 
foreigners. Divorce, conversely, if allowed at all, must not be 
granted to foreigners according to formalities nor by per-
sons, other than those prescribed for subjects of the forum. 
Hence, religious and private divorces are out of the question 
in the United States,114 as well as in Western and Central 
Europe. French and German courts annulled scores of di-
vorce decrees rendered in their territories by religious au-
thorities, especially in cases of Czarist Russians of various 
denominations, Polish Jews, members of the Orthodox 
109 Denmark, Norway. 
110 Domiciliaries of Newfoundland and Quebec may obtain relief only 
by special acts of the Dominion Parliament of Canada. Judicial decrees re-
placed Parliament bills in Ontario by the Divorce Act (Ontario) 1930, 2o-21 
Geo. V, c. 14 of the Statutes of Canada, 1930; Northern Ireland by Matri-
monial Causes Act (Northern Ireland), 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, Pub!. Gen. Acts 
of 1939, c. 13; and in the Isle of Man by Act of 1938. 
111 Greece (since Law no. 3222 of 1924 for Mohammedans only and per-
haps Jews). With respect to limited divorce: Italy, Spain, and Colombia. 
112 Jewish law as chiefly in use in Israel and formerly in some eastern 
European countries. The rabbis assist in varying degrees, but constitutive is 
the offer and acceptance of the "Gueth"; see the observations of HAIM H. 
COHN, Advocate General of Israel, Revue Crit. 1950, 559· The old Austrian 
and Polish law had modified this principle, see supra p. 446. 
113 Mussulman countries excluding Turkey. 
114 Chertok v. Chertok (1924) 208 App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (divorce 
decree by the rabbi of Brooklyn granted to a husband in New York against 
his wife living in Russia, held invalid despite recognition by the Russian 
Government); In re Spiegel (S.D.N.Y. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 6os. 
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Church, and others.115 For instance, a divorce of a Yugoslav 
and a Russian of Greek Orthodox faith by the Orthodox 
diocesan council in Paris was annulled by the Tribunal de la 
Seine in 1930.116 
This, of course, is a purely negative proposition, leaving 
unsolved the dilemma whether such persons should be 
granted divorce according to the formalities of the forum or 
denied divorce on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction because 
their personal law requires religious proceedings.117 
Exceptions to the principle of exclusive municipal formali-
ties are very rare.118 Even a consulate of a foreign power is 
115 Belgium: Trib. Liege (March 21, 1929) Belg. Jud. 1929, col. 428 (decree 
by rabbi in Louvain). 
France: Circular of the Garde des Sceaux of April, 1909, prohibiting the 
recording of divorces granted in France by any judge without civil powers, 
an abuse then often committed; Cour Paris (June 21, 1910) Revue 1910, 837; 
Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 1910) Revue 19II, 82; Cour Paris (Dec. 26, 1912) 
Revue 1913, 424; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1920) Revue 1921, 226 at 236; 
Cour Paris (March 23, 1922) and (May 10, 1922) Revue 1923, 425; Cour 
Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Cour App. Nancy (June 17, 1922) 
Revue 1922-23, 435; Cour Colmar (May 23, 1931) Clunet 1933, 97· 
Germany: Law of Jurisdiction of 1877 (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) RGBI. 
1877, 41, § rs par. 3 declares that the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 
temporal matters is without civil effect. Though this provision has been 
abrogated by the Law of the Federal Republic of Oct. r, 1950, the principle 
persists (RAAPE, IPR. 293). The rule applies especially to marriage and 
divorce: RG. (April 21, 1921) ro2 RGZ. u8; RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3 RGZ. 
41; KG. (Dec. r6, 1920) Warn. Rspr. 1921, no. 35; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925) 
Warn. Rspr. 1925, no. 133; KG. (Dec. 21, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 143; KG. 
(March 21, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 77 (privilegium Paulinum recognized by 
the Marriage Law of Warsaw (Kongresspolen) of 1836, art. 207); OLG. 
Kiel (Nov. 30, 1926) 91 Schlesw. Holst. Anz., N.F. ( 1927) 145 (repudiation 
under the law of Russian Jews); LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402 
(sending of divorce bill by a Russian Jew from Germany to Russia ineffec-
tual under German law); OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 21, 1949) StAZ. 1950, 130; 
LG. Mannheim (March 17, 1953) JR. 1955, 6r. 
Switzerland: Justice Dept., BBl. 1937, III 141 no. 9 (divorce by the Council 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in France, invalid in France and Switzer-
land). 
Greece: App. Athens (1950) Z.ausi.PR. 1955, 150. 
For decisions to the contrary see supra n. 106. 
116 Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1078. 
117 See supra pp. 444-447. 
118 For Russian subjects of Armenian origin and faith, the Rumanian Cas-
sation Court recognized a divorce rendered by the Bishop of the Gregorian 
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not usually allowed to grant divorces; apparently, the only 
exception was contained in the German-Russian Treaty of 
October I 2, 1925, which permitted Russians married before 
a Russian consulate in Germany to divorce by mutual agree-
ment in accordance with Soviet lack of formalities but with 
recordation thereof at the same or another Russian consulate 
in Germany.119 
Domestic law also defines the wording of a divorce decree. 
German courts have often considered, however, whether they 
should insert in a decree divorcing foreign parties the state-
ment required by the German Civil Code declaring which 
party is in fault. The Reichsgericht finally decided that the 
judgment should omit this statement only when it is either 
prohibited by or would be of no significance under the per-
sonallaw.120 
3· Validity of the Marriage Prerequisite 
Apart from some confusion between divorce and annul-
ment,121 a universal prerequisite for divorce is that the mar-
riage be considered valid at the forum or, if voidable, at least 
provisionally valid. When, in the eyes of the court, the mar-
riage never existed or has already been dissolved, there is no 
Church in Bucharest, Cass. (May 13, 1935) Pand. Romane 1936.!.57; contra: 
PossA, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359 no. 134, in view of the secularization of di-
vorce by the Rumanian constitutional laws. 
119 See Final Protocol of the German Russian Treaty of Oct. 12, 1925, Ger-
man RGBI. 1926, II 6o at 82. 
120 RG. (April 18, 1918) Warn. Rspr. 1918, no. 189; RG. (Feb. 24, 1928) 
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64. KG. (March 13, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 81; KG. 
(June 27, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 86, etc., confirmed as steady practice, KG. 
(May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750; and after the Matrimonial Law of 1938 
went into effect, see KG. (Aug. n, 1938) referred to in JW. 1938, 2750 n. I. 
Cf. for Dutchmen, KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47, but also OLG. 
Dusseldorf (Nov. 21, 1933) JW. 1934, 437, IPRspr. 1934, no. 48. Correspond-
ingly, Switzerland: BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43 advised Swiss courts 
to state culpability in the case of German spouses, and OG. Solothurn 
(June 27, 1949) Schw. Jahrb. 1950, 278, omitted the time limited prohibition 
of remarriage against the spouse guilty of adultery. 
121 See infra p. 576. 
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subject matter for the proceeding to dissolve the marriage 
tie. On the other hand, if the marriage is recognized in the 
forum, it is immaterial whether it is recognized in the coun-
try to which the parties belong. 
A significant application of the principle is the case of a 
so-called matrimonium claudicans (limping marriage) cele-
brated either at the forum or abroad under circumstances 
warranting its recognition as valid at the forum, which is 
considered invalid under the personal law because of formal 
or intrinsic defects. If, for instance, without a religious cere-
mony a Greek married a French woman in Paris before a 
civil official, the marriage, valid and dissoluble in France, 
would be null and therefore indissoluble in Greece.122 In such 
cases, the countries that ordinarily take the personal law into 
consideration disregard it. When the parties marry within 
the forum, consistency and dignity of the jurisdiction require 
that the forum stand upon the validity of the marriage.123 
Thus, a marriage annullable in the home country of the 
party involved may be dissolved in the country of its cele-
bration, each court taking the only way available for the 
termination of the marriage ties. 
The German courts have made it clear that in these cases 
122 Cf. }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 450. 
123 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 2, 1923) Pasicrisie 1923·3·133, 
Clunet 1924, 1098 (Russian-Polish Catholic). , 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 19, 1920) Clunet 1921, 184, Revue 1922-
1923, 306; cf. also 6 Repert. 431 no. 97 (civil marriage of an Orthodox 
Greek); Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 15, 1922) Clunet 1922, 396 (Polish Jew mar-
ried to Catholic French woman before registrar in Brussels). 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139, 143; RG. (Nov. r6, 1922) 
105 RGZ. 363 (Czarist Russians married in conformance with temporal for-
malities in Germany); RG. (Oct. r, 1925) JW. 1926, 375, Warn. Rspr. 1926, 
no. 15 (Orthodox Greek married to a Norwegian girl in Norway, the mar-
riage being recognized in Germany under the law of the place of celebration, 
EG. art. II par. r sentence z); OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) JW. 1934, 
1740, IPRspr. 1934, no. 46; RG. (Nov. 7, 1935) Warn. Rspr. 1935, no. 192; 
KG. (Jan. 14, 1937) JW. 1937, 96r; LG. Berlin (Nov. 2, 1937) JW. 1938, 
395, Clunet 1938, 824; and other decisions, see infra n. 124. 
Switzerland: App. Bern (May 30, 1923) 6o ZBJV. (1924) 40. 
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the law of the forum alone is to be applied and the personal 
law entirely ignored.124 It is not feasible, for instance, to 
apply to the divorce by analogy foreign rules of separation. 
The cases also have required adjustment of the ordinary ju-
risdictional rules 125 to meet the needs of the party interested 
in dissolution rather than annulment of the marriage. 
In this latter respect, an analogous doctrine developed in 
England in cases ex misericordia. In Stathatos v. Stathatos, 126 
a Greek, having married an Englishwoman at a registry of-
fice in London and taken her to Athens, sent her back to 
England; at his instance, the marriage was declared null in 
Athens, while it was undoubtedly valid in England. In this 
and another case,127 English courts affirmed their divorce 
jurisdiction despite the lack of an English marital domicil. 
124 RG. (Dec. I7, I908) 70 RGZ. I44, cited supra n. 123; RG. (May 4, 
I933) JW. I933, 2582 (the decisive passage was published by LEWALD, Revue 
Crit. I934, 663); KG. (Dec. II, I933) JW. I934, 6I9, IPRspr. 1934, no. so; 
KG. (April 2o, I936) JW. I936, 2464; LG. Berlin (Nov. I, I937) JW. I938, 
395; LG. Berlin (Feb. 3, I938) JW. 1938, 1273; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. r, 
1937) Recht I938, 22 no. I94; LG. Frankfurt/Main (Dec. 6, I950) IPRspr. 
1945-1950 no. 66; LG. Berlin (March IS, 1954) JR. 1955, 6o. This theory 
was advocated by LEWALD III no. 158, and Revue Crit. 1934, 661; ScHDNDORF, 
75 ]he rings Jahrb. 53, 74; I FRANKENSTEIN 233 n. 189, 3 ibid. 425. Contra: 
RAAPE 401 and IPR. 285; also Hans. OLG. (Oct. 25, 1933) JW. 1934, 242, 
16 Hans. RGZ. ( I933) B. col. 683, Revue Crit. I934, 66r. See on the broader 
problem of "limping marriages," supra pp. 251-252. 
France: An older doctrine refused to divorce Austrian Jews who had 
married only in civil form in France (Cass. civ., Oct. 30, I905, Revue I906, 
730) and annulled the marriage under Austrian law (Trib. civil Seine, April 
28, I9o6, Revue I906, 751). Recent practice has admitted divorce according 
to French law: Cour Toulouse (Dec. 14, 1943) Revue Crit. 1947, 110 affirmed 
thus far by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, 1947) ibid. 1947, 444 (note NmoYET); 
BATIFFOL, Traite 520 n. 70. 
The Netherlands: Rb. s'Gravenhage (Dec. I9, 1950) N.J. 1952 no. 444· 
125 According to the Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5 no. 2 in fine, the 
foreign jurisdiction exists (even in the case of an exclusive jurisdiction 
claimed by the national courts) over a marriage with respect to which action 
for divorce or separation cannot be brought before the competent court of 
the national state. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § r par. 2 
final words. German OLG. Karlsruhe (June 13, 1933) JW. 1933, 1669. 
126 [1913] P. 46. 
127 Montaigu v. Montaigu [1913] P. I54· 
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This doctrine was later overruled in England.128 The main 
remedy to free the parties from a marriage void in the home-
land was then usually found in the recognition extended by 
English courts to any annulment decree that might be 
granted by the competent authority of the husband's domi-
cil.129 The same attitude has been recommended to the courts 
of Canada, 130 and a similar position was taken in a Scotch 
case, in which a marriage with a Hindu was held valid in 
Scotland, though invalid in India. The Scotch court denied 
the application of. the wife, who was living in Scotland, on 
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, although the court knew 
that she would be unable to prosecute litigation in India.131 
This unsatisfactory proposition, where at the instance of the 
foreign party a foreign annulment is recognized to the dis-
advantage of the wife while she is denied on a purely for-
mal ground the right to divorce,132 has been remedied re-
cently by legislation. An exceptional domicil of the wife for 
the purpose of divorce is now recognized in England, Scot-
land, Australia, and New Zealand.133 
IV. CHOICE OF LAW 
r. Lex Fori 
United States. The principle in the United State~ is that a 
divorce court applies the law of the forum to determine 
128 H. v. H. [I928] P. 2o6; Herd v. Herd [1936] P. zos, 105 L. J. P. 
D. & A. 108 (the husband abandoned his English domicil of origin and lived 
in the United States; divorce denied the wife on ground of lack of jurisdic-
tion of English court); cf. CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 357; for Canada: HOGG, "Domi-
cile of a Married Woman in Relation to Divorce," 6 Can. Bar Rev. (1928) 
655, 666; FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation (I932] 4 D. L. R. 37· 
129 Unanimous opinion following the Salvesen case, infra p. 585. 
130 2 jOHNSON 36-40. 
131 Watson-Mangrulkar v. Mangrulkar [I939] S. C. 239 (Session Case). 
Cf. Thomson v. Thomson (1935) Sc. L. T. 24 (Outer House of Ct. of Sess.). 
132 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard 
( I93 5) IS and supra p. 252, n. 142. 
133 England: Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, s. IS {r) {b); Scotland: Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, s. 2. Australia and New 
Zealand, supra, n. 38. 
454 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
whether divorce is admissible, as well as whether the party's 
conduct or other event complained of constitutes a ground 
for divorce.134 
This system was shared, a century ago, by general Euro-
pean theory and practice. Savigny 135 supported the system 
by the belief that divorce law is imperative in nature, because 
it expresses moral conceptions purporting to be of absolute 
value. Many writers and courts advocated the same idea.136 
This doctrine slowly disappeared, however, until at the 
Hague Conference, it was found to have almost no pro-
ponents.137 
In this country, application of the lex fori seems to have 
been justified by the merely statutory nature of divorce, the 
effect of statutes being believed to be necessarily territorial-
a theory going clearly back to such fathers of territorialism 
as D'Argentre and Ulricus Huber. It has also been advanced 
that divorce remedies are special or equitable and therefore 
cannot be exercised except by the courts of the state establish-
ing the remedy. Sometimes there is invoked the general moti-
vation for territorialism that, theures" being located within 
the state, the state's interest prevails. It may be hoped that 
nowadays nobody cares seriously for all these artificial and 
worn-out assertions. 
134 Stewart v. Stewart (I9I9) 32 Idaho I8o, I8o Pac. I65; Restatement 
§ I35· 
135 SAVIGNY § 379 no. 6. 
136 BURGE (ed. 2), 3 Colonial and Foreign Law 923; LAURENT, 5 Principes 
no. I85; I BROCHER 297; OLIVI, Revue I88s, 55," AssER-COHN 67, French tr. 
by RIVIER (I884) n6; UNGER, I System I93 § 23 n. 126. This was the pre-
vailing opinion in Germany before the Civil Code, see RG. (June I9, I883) 
9 RGZ. I9I; NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. Privatrecht §§ 99, IOO, and in I 
Z.int.R. ( I89I) 36I, 2 Z.int.R. ( I892) 473, 5 Z.int.R. ( I895) I67, I68 n. 3 ; 
in Austria, see OGH. (March 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hochst. Entsch. nos. I564-, 
I565; OGH. (May 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hochst. Entsch. no. I04I; WALKER 
722, 728, and I KLANG's Kommentar 324; in Czarist Russia, see MANDELSTAM, 
Clunet I902, 490; in former Turkey, see Clunet I903, 86, 96. 
137 The learned Norwegian delegate Beichmann, Actes de Ia Deuxieme Con-
ference de Ia Haye (I894) 73, was the main advocate of the lex fori, but 
presented it as identical with the law of the domicil. Likewise, I BAR § I73· 
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Neither are we any better served, when it is argued, es-
pecially in the Restatement, that "the law of the forum gov-
erns the right to divorce not because it is the place where 
the action is brought but because it is the domicil of one or 
both of the parties." 138 Story 139 and his contemporaries 
could properly propose such a theory with respect to the mat-
rimonial domicil, whereby they had simply the husband's 
domicil in mind. To identify the law of the forum with that 
of the domicil is correct when divorce is rendered exclusively 
at the matrimonial domicil. The predication is manifestly 
wrong so soon as there are two domicils of the parties. 
The reasonableness of the rule appears never to have been 
questioned. This alone, the unvarying application of the local 
statute in every American court, makes it clear that the prin-
ciple of territorialism with its strong roots in the past com-
mon law has in fact here found one more expression. The 
spirit of independence and the need to sever an immigrant 
or settler from his former associations may have contributed 
to perpetuate this indifference to the outside world. As the 
story goes,140 it was almost half a century before the poten-
tialities of the Nevada statute of 1861, with six months' 
residence, for affording easy divorces on a large scale was 
grasped by a former New York attorney. These early legis-
lations were simple documents of pioneers. If so, we may 
wonder why under changed circumstances the application of 
foreign divorce law never has been taken into consideration, 
while the choice of law problem is so prominent in Europe 
and while also in this country the main purpose of conflicts 
law is perfectly acknowledged as being the achievement of 
uniformity in establishing the solution of a legal question 
138 Restatement § 135 comment a. 
139 STORY § 229 a. 
140 INGRAM and BALLARD, "The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada," 
2 Law and Cont. Probl. (1935) 302, 305. 
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irrespective of the forum.141 There may be, indeed, no posi-
tive reason at all but only a negative explanation for this 
result. At any rate, we cannot overlook the fact that the 
actual doctrine has no clear conceptual basis and that this 
lack of foundation has greatly contributed to the much de-
plored confusion and anarchy in this field. 
Other countries. The law of the forum is openly applied 
to any person in Soviet Russia 142 and in some Latin Ameri-
can countries,143 upon the basis of the territorial principle. 
Also in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, traditionally the 
law of the forum is applied, although the writers doubt 
whether it is not rather the law of the domicil that is applied, 
because usually divorce is not granted unless both parties are 
domiciled within the forum or both parties had their last 
domicil and one continues to live, within the country.l44 It 
might be advisable to construe soberly all these rules on the 
basis of territorialism and lex fori rather than in terms of 
the principle of domiciU45 The manner in which specific 
141 See supra p. 94· 
142 MAKAROV, Precis 396 attests a uniform doctrine; LuNz 304. 
143 E.g., see the declaration of the Colombian delegation in signing the 
C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 374; Vene-
zuela: Cass. (June 15, 1914) Memoria 1915, 171, 172; Cass. (Feb. 21, 1921) 
Memoria 1922, 162, 163. Uruguay: By virtue of art 2401 C. C. a court has 
jurisdiction only if Uruguayan law is applicable; this is the case if one of 
the spouses is domiciled within the country, ALFONSIN, Regimen Inter-
nacional del Divorcio (1953) 133 ff. The recent law of Brazil (1942) does 
not mention separation in Brazil, but includes it in the "domiciliary" law 
applicable according to Lei de Introduc;ao art. 7· ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado ro66 
asserts that in the case of different domicils, both laws must be attended 
concerning permissibility and causes of separation. 
144 Denmark: BoRUM, 122; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 214 no. 8; ibid. 
at 220 nos. 48 ff.; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II8. 
Iceland: EYJ6LFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762; LONING in 9 Z.ausi.PR. 
(1935) 407; see also German RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103. 
The Scandinavian Convention arts. 7, 9 starts from a primary rule that 
divorce is rendered at the matrimonial domicil, but states exceptions, and 
finally declares the law of the forum applicable. 
145 But for intrastate conflicts Australia has designated the law of the dom-
icil rather than the lex fori of the residence, cf. (Commonwealth) Matri-
monial Causes Act, 1945-1955, s. II. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 
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problems are solved by prevailing practice is more in ac-
cordance with the lex fori principle. Also, the application of 
the American rule by Continental courts, resulting from the 
nationality principle and renvoi, is much simplified, if we 
understand it as based on the law of the forum.146 
Latin American treaties. On the other hand, the Treaty of 
Montevideo has unequivocaiiy declared domiciliary law to 
determine not only jurisdiction for divorce 147 but also, in a 
provision correctly separated,148 the right to divorce. The 
problem, it is true, appeared in its simplest form, since juris-
diction is exclusive for the court of the present or last matri-
monial domicil. 
In the same way, the C6digo Bustamante clearly isolates 
the choice of law question and with one exception subjects 
the right to divorce to the law of the marital domiciJ.l49 This 
is a remarkable victory for the domiciliary principle, as 
usually the Havana Code does not decide which is the per-
sonal law. 
2. Diverse Contacts 
As an aftereffect of former conceptions/50 divorce some-
times has been assimilated to the dissolution of ordinary con-
tracts; as a matter of fact, all requisites of marr.iage in this 
country are considered governed by the law of the place of 
celebration, indicated by the historic rule for contracts. This 
idea has also played a role in determining the dissolution of 
marriage 151 and continues to do so in a few countries. In 
D. L R 36 prefers the domiciliary angle but concedes doubts on this point; in 
Essays 727, 728, he adheres to the lex fori conception. 
146 Infra pp. 480 ff. 
147 Treaty on international civil law, text of r889, art. 62; text of 1940, art. 
59· On restrictions of the principle, see supra n. 46. 
148 Treaty of Montevideo, text of r889, art. 13b; text of 1940, art. rsb. 
149 C6digo Bustamante art. 52 (for the exception of art. 54, see infra p. 
462). 
150 See supra p. 425. 
151 PUTTER, 3 Rechtsfiille, part r, So, 85, quoted by 1 BAR 486 § 173 n. 6, tr. 
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particular, the Marriage Law of Argentina provides, in a 
section known for the incessant complications and doubts it 
has provoked in the world, that a foreign divorce of a mar-
riage celebrated in the Argentine Republic does not entitle 
either of the spouses to remarry, if the divorce is inconsistent 
with the Code/52 This means, in the prevailing though con-
tested opinion, that a foreign, e.g., Uruguayan, divorce of a 
marriage celebrated in Argentina is invalid in Argentina.152a 
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 implying this interpre-
tation 153 invalidates such a divorce in all member states/54 
although Uruguay departs from this rule on the ground of 
public policy.155 It is a fortunate concession to international 
needs that, in the new 1940 draft of Montevideo, Argentina 
acquiesced in the elimination of this extraterritorial effect 
by GILLESPIE 384 § 173 n. 10; Austrian Imperial Decree of Oct. 23, r8or, 
Justizgesetzsammlung no. 542; cf. WALKER 727 n. 14; D'OLIVECRONA in Clunet 
1883, 343 at 359· For criticism of this theory, see STORY § 23oa, and \VEISS, 
3 Traite 682. But it is the basis on which BARTIN, 2 Principes 323 § 318 advo-
cates application of the national law of the husband at the time of the mar-
riage. 
Peru: The Supreme Court of Peru, in a series of decisions declared that a 
foreign marriage could not be dissolved for causes not recognized in the coun-
try of celebration. See Ej. {July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 (Japanese 
marriage) and cases cited by APARICIO y SANCHEZ, 8 C6digo Civil, Con-
cordancias 70. Contra Ej. {June 20, 1936) 32 Anales Jud. (1936) 100 (consent 
divorce). The C. C. of Aug. 30, 1936, art. V par. 2, seems to eliminate this 
practice. 
Bolivia: The dissolubility of a marriage depends on the law of the place 
of celebration (art. 24 of the Divorce Law of April 15, 1932). 
152 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 7, cf. art. 82. Divorces of 
Argentine marriages and foreign marriages must be distinguished, apart 
from the ordinary distinction of domestic and foreign divorces. Cf. the clear 
survey by ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 313-320. A related provision of 
the Chilean C. C. art. 120 was adopted also by Ecuador: C. C. art. 105; El 
Salvador: C. C. art. 170; Uruguay: C. C. art. 103, and refers to all divorces 
granted abroad which the municipal law would not permit. 
See infra n. 178. 
152a According to GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 392-402 the effects of this pro-
vision are limited to denying the capacity of remarriage, within or outside 
Argentina; a further relaxation may be expected after the introduction of 
divorce into Argentine law by the statute of Dec. 14, 1954. 
153 2 VIco nos. 107, 108. 
154 Treaty on international civil law, art. 13b. 
155 See infra p. 518. 
DIVORCE 459 
of the law of the place of celebration; the proviso was 
changed into a mere reservation allowing the state of cele-
bration to deny recognition to foreign divorces/56 
The Polish Supreme Court resorted to the law of the place 
of celebration to solve the problem arising from interprovin-
cial conflicts,157 while the Rumanian Supreme Court re-
jected this test.158 The Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia 
seemed to have returned to the idea.159 
Any reference to the place where the offense to marital 
duties was committed has long been abandoned in all coun-
tries.160 But reference to the law of the place where the 
cause for divorce accrued is found in America in sporadic at-
tempts to limit jurisdiction for divorce.161 
3· National Law Cumulatively Applied with the Lex Fori 
In most civil law countries, the two questions of jurisdic-
tion and applicable law are distinguished as a matter of 
course, and, with respect to the latter, consideration is given 
to the le.'C fori in conjunction with the lex patriae. However, 
the approach varies. 
France and others. In France and the majority of other 
countries following the French Code, 162 grant of divorce 
must accord with the national law of the parties and not 
contravene the forum's public policy understood in its broad-
156 Art. I5b. 
157 Polish S. Ct., Plenary decision {Oct. 9-I6, I937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (I938-
I939) 459• 
15
' Rumania: S. Ct. {March 3, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 1937-I938) 320. 159 See Sup. Ct. {Feb. 28, 1929) no. 8745 and (March I, 1934) no. I3328, 
10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) I7I; I BERGMANN {ed. 2) 746. 160 STORY § 230a; I BAR 487 § 173 n. 9a, tr. by GILLESPIE 385 § 173 n. 16. 
161 See infra p. 488. 162 France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Rumania, Portugal, also Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Bulgaria; and with respect to separation from bed and board, 
Brazil (until 1942), Italy and Spain and the more recent enactments of 
French and Spanish Morocco. See subsequent footnotes for cases. This sys-
tem has been adopted by numerous Latin American writers, e.g., MATOS no. 
258, cf. also no. 264. 
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est sense. The observance of the national law is the rule, 
and public policy intervenes as a basis for exceptions, the 
determination of which is left to the discretion of the courts 
and which therefore remain ~easurably uncertain.163 In fact, 
they cover many, if not most, cases.164 
The Dutch courts, which started with this basis, seem 
now to apply exclusively Dutch divorce law, disregarding 
the personal law where they are not bound by the Hague 
Convention to consider it.165 For the Netherlands, this is 
extraordinary. 
In the German legislation, and those following its lead, 
viz., those of Austria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Sweden, China, 
and Japan, and by the unwritten law of Greece, divorce de-
pends directly and concurrently upon conformity with the 
national law and the law of the forum.166 This system of 
1 63 See NIBOYET 746 and 5 Traite 422, 428; BATIFFOL, Traite no. 459, 462; 
POULLET 446 ff. no. 379; KOLLEWI]N, Het beginsel der openbare orde ( 1917) 
90. 
1 64 N!BOYET, Notions Sommaires (1937) 187 no. 310 bis, even formulates a 
simple principle of cumulative application of the personal and the French 
laws, parallel to the German system. 
165 The decision of the Hooge Raad (Dec. 13, 1907) W. 8636, Clunet 191 I, 
1334 had attracted attention, as it applied Dutch law to American citizens 
domiciled in the Netherlands, not by renvoi but as the lex fori. Cf., for in-
stance, the criticism by KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 87. See 
the later decisions Rb. Amsterdam (Jan. II, 1924) Clunet 1925, u2o; Rb. den 
Haag (April 7, 1932) W. 12661; Hof den Haag (June 22, 1933) W. 12715; 
Hof Amsterdam (June 27, 1935) W. 12956; Rb. Almelo (Jan. 22, 1936) 
W. 1937, no. 54 (Lithuanians}; Hof den Haag (June 5, 1936) W. 1936, no. 
1052 (Germans, after Germany had left the Hague Convention); Hof den 
Haag (June 16, 1949) N.J. 1950 no. 578; Hof den Haag (Oct. 24, 1956) N.J. 
1957 no. 467. 
1 6 6 Germany: EG. art. 17 par. 4· Divorce cannot be pronounced in this 
country upon the ground of a foreign law, unless it is permissible according 
to both the foreign law and the German laws. 
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 8. 
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 84. 
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 86. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3, § 2. 
China: Law of 1918, art. II. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16. 
Greece: App. Patras ( 1936) no. 171, Clunet 1937, 369; App. A then ( 1950) 
no. 1365, Revue Hellen. 1951, 150. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 372; FRAGISTAS, 
Z.ausi.PR. 1955, 150. 
Also the Benelux-Draft, art 6. 
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cumulation was adopted by the Hague Convention.167 Al-
though in this group the domestic divorce law does not 
operate merely by way of exception, the rule refers, here 
too, to the national law in the first place, with the internal 
law controlling permissibility and causes for divorce. Hence, 
also under these statutes, the divorce decree is founded on 
the foreign law. 
Under the Swiss statute, however, the roles are reversed; 
if both laws consent, divorce is "pronounced according to 
Swiss law." 168 The courts have concluded from this provi-
sion that Swiss law must be applied to all legal effects of 
divorce, such as alimentary obligations and guardianship 
over children.169 
V. APPLICATION OF THE NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE 
I. Permissibility of Divorce and Grounds for Divorce Dis-
tinguished. 
The disposition of the Hague Convention relating to Di-
vorce and Separation, that the granting of divorce or separa-
tion must conform with the national law of the parties as 
well as with the law of the forum, is in two parts: 
"Art. I. Married persons may apply for a divorce pro-
vided the law of the state to which they belong (national 
law) and the law of the place where the application is made 
both permit divorce. 
"The same applies to separation from bed arid board. 
"Art. 2. Divorce may be granted only if obtainable in the 
particular case under both the national law of the spouses 
167 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. I: " .•• provided their 
national law and the law of the place where the application is made both 
admit divorce." 
168 Swiss NAG. art. 7h last paragraph. Similarly, Belgian Congo: C. C. 
book I art. I3 par. 2. 
169 BG. (June I3, I9I2) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; BG. (May 28, I9I4) 40 BGE. 
II 305, 308; BG. (Nov. 27, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 453, 454; BG. (Feb. 2, I92I) 
47 BGE. II 6; BG. (Dec. Io, I936) 62 BGE. II 265. 
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and the law of the place where the application 1s made, 
though on different grounds. 
"The same applies to separation from bed and board." 
There is nothing in the Convention to justify such a di-
vision of the rules, but this division had been established by 
the discussions of the Institute of International Law 170 and 
during the Hague Conference 171 for the purpose of a differ-
entiated regulation. The distinction has regained signifi-
cance in the C6digo Bustamante; under article sz, the right 
to separation or divorce is governed by the law of the matri-
monial domicil, while under article 54 the causes for divorce 
or separation are subject to the law of the place of suit, pro-
vided that the parties are domiciled in the forum. 171a It is 
difficult to understand this provision. 
Generally, such distinctions are made for the purpose of 
analytical discussion but without any intended contrast.172 
2. Permissibility of Divorce 
(a) Under the law of the forum. Complete dissolution of 
the marriage bond is at present prohibited in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and since 1938 again in 
Spain; also for Catholics under the Austrian Civil Code in 
Liechtenstein and for marriages celebrated before a Catholic 
priest in Portugal. 
Although legislators generally do not envisage persons 
170 Annuaire 1887-1888, 125, the national law should govern the question 
whether or not divorce is allowed at all, and the law of the forum decides 
the grounds for divorce. 
171 See Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye, 1900, 193; KAHN, 2 
Abhandl. 321. 
171a Similarly, the Siamese Law on private international law of 1939, § 27, 
makes the permissibility of divorce depend on the national law of the 
spouses, whereas the grounds for divorce are governed by the lex fori. 
172 In the Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, 
art. 13b, it is required that "the alleged cause" be agreeable to the law of 
the place of celebration. This is too narrow an expression, as it must have 
been intended to include permissibility of divorce in the first place. This 
mistake was not corrected in the 1940 draft. 
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other than subjects of the forum, a divorce not granted to 
domiciliaries or nationals is not granted to foreigners. Re-
ligious and ethical reasons, as well as respect for the judicial 
institutions of the forum, motivate this rule. The rule, which 
was observed in France until divorce was reintroduced in 
1884,113 is in force in Spain,114 Italy (with short interruption, 
however, much noticed during the preparation for the Hague 
Convention) ,175 Brazil,176 Argentina (though with consider-
able opposition) ,177 and probably everywhere in the countries 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
By an analogous rule, foreigners cannot obtain any form 
of limited divorce unknown to the forum. Whatever type of 
judicial separation short of complete dissolution of the mar-
riage ties may be prescribed by the national law, no form of 
17 a WEISS, 3 Traite 689 If. 
174 TRIAS DE BEs, 6 Repert. 255 no. III; GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 313· 
175 Following the contemporary trend toward permitting divorce of for-
eigners whose national law did not oppose it, divorces were granted to 
foreigners by App. Ancona (March 22, 1884) Monitore r884, 365, Giur. Ita!. 
r884, II, 247; App. Genova (June 7, 1894) Monitore 1894, 784, Giur. Ita!. 
1894, I, 2, 554, Clunet 1898, 412; Trib. Milano (June 2, 1897) Monitore 1897, 
514 and (June 30, r898) Giur. Ita!. 1898, I, 2, 765, aff'd App. Milano (Nov. 
24, 1898) Monitore 1899, 64. But the last-mentioned decision was reversed 
by Cass. Torino (Nov. 21, 1900) Monitore 1900, 981; similarly, Cass. Firenze 
(Dec. 6, 1902) Clunet 1903, 910, and all later decisions, applauded by the 
writers; see Bosco, 22 Rivista (1930) 461, 500; FEDOZZI 466 n: 3· On the sen-
sation caused at the Hague meetings by this temporary liberalism, see KAHN, 
2 Abhandl. 313 ff. Among the other literature see 2 FIORE no. 68g, generally 
followed in Latin America; see, eg., MATOS, no. 564. 
In order to correct the more liberal attitude of some Northern Italian Ap-
pellate Courts (e.g. Turin, April 13, 1951, Foro padano 1951 I 471) the law 
of July 30, 1950 amended art. 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to 
give the state procurators a wider power to contest sentences in matrimonial 
matters; the Supreme Court firmly declines to divorce foreigners: Cass. (May 
17, 1952) Foro Ita!. 1952 I rr88, reversing the above-mentioned decision of 
Turin. 
176 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. r8, 1920) App. civ. no. 2, 755, 23 Revista 
Jur. (1921) 496; Distr. Fed. (Sept. 1, 1932) per EDMUNDO DE OLIVEIRA FI-
GUEIREDO in 23 Arch. ]ud. 478, cf. OCTAVIO, Dicionario, Divorcio absoluto 88 
no. 408 If.; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 8o and 6 Repert. 166 no. 44· 
177 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of r888, arts. 81, 82. There is opposi-
tion now to the rigidity of excluding divorce for foreigners; cf. RoMERO DEL 
PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 314. 
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separation not provided by the law of the forum is granted. 
Where, for instance, no divorce other than absolute divorce 
is allowed, it is not possible to obtain any limited kind of 
separation. These principles, not so natural as they sound, as 
we shall see, may create real hardship. Nevertheless, the 
maxim is universal and fully adopted by the Hague Con-
vention on Divorce (art. 1). 
(b) Under the national law. By virtue of the nationality 
principle, divorce a vinculo is denied if the national law does 
not permit dissolution of a marriage during the lifetime 
of both spouses. If, for instance, formerly an Italian subject 
were married to an Argentine bride in Argentina,178 divorce 
cannot be obtained in Germany, because the husband's na-
tional law forbids it, 179 nor in France because neither na-
tional law allowed it.180 
The question has been raised, however, whether, in a 
country having the institution of divorce, the public policy 
that regards the institution as based on morality and social 
sanity is so strong that it must oppose foreign prohibitions. 
178 Case of Trib. civ. Seine (May II, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129. It is 
disputed in Argentine literature whether under the Argentine Civil Marriap:e 
Law of 1888, art. 82, a marriage celebrated in Argentina can be dissolved in 
a foreign country that has not signed the Montevideo Treaty, so that remar-
riage abroad is legal. The negative answer, presented by the decision in 
100 Gac. del Foro (1932) 78 col. 2, and ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der Int. Priv. 
319 (with CALANDRELLI, WEIS5--ZEBALLOS, LLERENA, GOLDSCHMIDT) has been 
approved also by the Camara civil de Apelaciones de Ia Capital (March 14, 
1935) 49 }.A. 505, Clunet 1937, 124; see also SCHLEGELRERGER, 4 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1930) 756. The opposite view (GONZALEZ, MACHADO, LAFAILLE, ALCORTA, 
VIco, REBORA) has been said to be the prevailing opinion by a mistaken Ger-
man author GoTTSCHICK in JW. 1930, 1827, who has been followed by numer-
ous German decisions, such as those enumerated by 2 BERGMANN 8 n. I and 
KG. Berlin (Feb. 9, 1931) IPRspr. 193 r, no. 68. 
179 EG. art. 17 par. 4· It makes no difference whether the marriage was 
celebrated in Germany, OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) Hans.RGZ. 1936, B 
486 no. 171. 
1 80 Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, 1918) Clunet 1918, II82; Cour Paris (April 
30, 1926) S.1926.2.89, D.1927.2.1. Correspondingly, in Trib. civ. Seine (May 
II, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129 (see supra n. 178) a divorce granted to the 
parties in Uruguay was not recognized in France. Czechoslovakia; S. Ct. civ., 
nos. 6787, 9079; but cf. S. Ct. (March 1, 1934) no. 13328. 
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When the temporary Spanish Republic had solemnly intro-
duced dissolution of marriage, it seemed unbearable to re-
fuse its benefits to any category of persons, even for-
eigners.181 Analogous decisions have occasionally occurred 
elsewhere.182 But prevailing opinions have preferred strict 
application of divorce prohibitions imposed on the parties by 
their nationallaw.183 It must be admitted that by this strict 
application the policy of permitting the dissolution of mar-
riage appears weaker than its counterpart, the policy of in-
separability of spouses. 
(c) Separation. A further consequence of the nationality 
principle is that separation from bed and board, or judicial 
or administrative separation of any other kind, except pro-
visional measures, depends upon the approval of such an 
institution by the national law of the parties.184 Since, accord-
ing to present general opinion,185 the kind of separation 
granted must also conform with the law of the forum, doubts 
arise when each law has a form of limited divorce, but the 
forms are not identical. The varieties are numer.ous indeed.186 
But, apart from the very complicated problems caused in 
181 Republican Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 27, 1933) 207 Sent. 56; cf. Revue 
1933, 533, 24 Rivista (1932) 567. 
B 2 Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 192 notes decisions both ways. 
Belgium: Divorce to two Catholic Austrians was granted by App. Liege 
(:'\ov. 2, 1937) J.d. Tr. 1937, col. 672 no. 3512, 23 Bull. Inst. Beige (1937) 
76; 24 ibid. (1938) 52; this decision joins several other Belgian manifesta-
tions of a liberal policy stronger than the usual; cf. infra ns. 217-219, 222. 
183 See, for instance, German RG. (Jan. 13, 1936) 150 RGZ. 61, Nouv. 
Revue 1937, 109; Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pasicrisie 1882.1.62; 
Cass. (May 16, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. (Ch. reunis) (Feb. 16, 
1955) Pasicrisie 1955 I 647, Revue Crit. 1955, 143. Cf. POULLET 441 no. 377 
and the foregoing notes 179 and 180. 
184 See for the late law of Brazil: Josii F. MANSUR GuERIOs, "Desquite por 
mutuo consentimento," 53 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1941) 113, 114. 
1 85 Under the former pure theory of national law, the Trib. civ. Bruxelles 
(May 8, 1908) Pand. Per. 1908.604 granted a separation on the mutual agree-
ment of the parties according to the foreign law unsupported by the Belgian 
law. 
1 8 6 See for comparative legislation, RocurN, 1 Traite de droit civil com-
pare, le Mariage ( 1904) 237; BERGMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb 723. 
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Germany by the creation of a particular type of "dissolution 
of the marital union" in the Civil Code of 1896,187 problems 
which disappeared in 1938 with the abolition of this un-
fortunate institution, few difficulties seem to have been en-
coun tered.188 
A much deplored result 189 of the double legal require-
ments concerning separation occurs in the numerous inter-
national situations where one of the legislations involved 
provides only for absolute divorce and the other only for 
separation, or where the spouses loyal to their faith or to 
their national legislation do not want the absolute divorce 
available at the forum. In these cases, neither form of relief 
can be conferred under the system of nationality.190 The 
consequences are apt to include special inconveniences, espe-
187 Cf. RAAPE 381; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 474 j cf. also 3 FRANKENSTEIN 468. 
See LEWALD, 57 Recueil 1936 III 313 on the decisions of the highest Dutch 
and Swiss courts. 
188 Italians are separated in Switzerland; see decisions in 6 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1932) 836; 7 ibid. (1933) 644; II ibid. (1937) 656. The effects of such a 
separation are governed by Swiss law (SCHNITZER 379); but alimony is 
generally not given under art. x6o C. C. as in case of a Swiss separation but 
according to art. 152 C. C. as in case of a divorce, BG. (Feb. x6, 1926) 52 
BGE. liz, contra: OG. Zurich (March 23, 1950) 8 Schwz. Jahrb. (1951) 292. 
In France, it was decided that the effect of a French separation of Italians 
should be determined by Italian law rather than French; see Cour Dijon 
(March z8, 1939) Clunet 1939, 634. Portuguese nationals before 1931 could 
be separated but not divorced in France; see Trib. civ. Seine (June xz, I 888) 
Gaz. Pal. 1888.1.902. Nationals of countries recognizing judicial separation 
may likewise obtain separation in Portugal; see CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, Direito 
Civil 696 (where also conversion of separation into divorce is treated). 
A judicial separation under South African law was not recognized as 
basis for a conversion into divorce under Danish law, ¢stre Landsret (Feb. 
19, 1952) zo Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514; but see BoRUM 123 n. 4· 
189 Cf. especially KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 330, 339, 342 (more violently than is 
justified by his strong position against the law of the forum) and WALKER 
702. 
190 OLG. Kiel (May 16, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349, IPRspr. 1934, no. 59 
(Danish law); RG. (Nov. 4, 1937) 156 RGZ. 106. Austrian separations from 
bed and board have been transformed, according to the Law of July 6, 1938, 
§ II5 by a simple procedure and without instituting a new suit, into full Ger-
man divorces between persons who have become German subjects, RG. (Dec. 
15, 1938) 159 RGZ. 76. 
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cially when the parties, faced with barred doors at their 
domicil, are refused jurisdiction even in their homeland.191 
A court having only absolute divorce, besides merely pro-
visional orders, at its disposal, such as the Rumanian or the 
German tribunals,192 is unable to give any relief to parties for 
whom Italian,198 Brazilian,194 etc., law is considered applica-
ble, although these legislations allow separation from bed 
and board. Inversely, Italian courts deny such separation to 
Rumanian or German nationals, because the parties' national 
law does not provide separation.194a For the latter case, it 
was suggested that this hardship should be alleviated on the 
ground that the larger remedy is agreeable to the personal 
law,l(J4b anJ some Brazilian courts have proceeded in conse-
quence,m while others have been opposed.196 Yet at the 
Hague Conference, it was answered that limited divorce is 
101 Compare, for instance, Rumanian C. C. art. 216, and KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 
339· But see WALKER 703. 
192 Since 1938, no limited divorce has existed in Germany, but the situation 
was materially the same before, according to the opinion prevailing in the 
court decisions. See OLG. Breslau (Sept. 8, 1933) JW. 1933, 2400, IPRspr. 
1933, no. 33· 
1
"' Compare PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 195, and FEDOZZI 461. 
194 Just. Fed. Nictheroy (Oct. 31, 1922) 66 Revista Dir. Civ. (1922) 314; 
cf. OCTAVIO, Dicionario no. 319 If. 
194a However, the Trib. Rome (Feb. 18, 1950) Foro Ita!. 1950, 488, has 
admitted the separation of Greeks; MoRELLI, Elementi II7· 
194b The Benelux-Draft, art. 7 sentence 2, has apparently proceeded on a 
related theory admitting separation according to the lex fori though the na-
tional law only admits divorce. 
195 The cases of this note and notes 196 and 198 have been kindly pointed 
out by Miss Magdalene Schoch, Harvard Law School. Rumanian spouses or 
husband: Ap. Pernambuco (1938) II5 Rev. dos Trib. 745; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo 
(1938) II6 ibid. 157; 126 ibid. 171; German spouses: Ap. civ. Sao Paulo 
(1941) 131 ibid. 243; Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro no. 8260 (Jan. 13, 1942) 61 
Arch. Jud. (1942) 314; Japanese husband: Trib. Sao Paulo (Dec. 4. 1931) 
cited by 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 83. 
196 The Appellate Court of Parana in Plenary Meeting of its chambers 
(June 6, 1941) 34 Parana Jud. (1941) 59 adopting the nationality principle 
denied separation by consent to German parties. Sao Paulo (1941) 133 Rev. 
dos Trib. 152 (German husband, Russian wife; no desquite in Brazil, as 
both German and Russian law, in case she should have retained Russian na-
tionality, do not provide separation). 
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not a "minus" which may be subtracted from absolute di-
vorce, but a different thing.197 
The Brazilian practice, previous to the law of 1942, was 
interesting. The courts in principle required agreement of 
the national laws of both parties for granting separation by 
mutual consent (desquite amigavel) but granted it also in 
three exceptional cases, viz., the case just mentioned of the 
national law allowing absolute divorce, the case of renvoi, 198 
and the case where one party is of Brazilian nationality.199 
These decisions seem to retain authority in cases where for-
eigners are not domiciled in Brazil. 
3· Grounds for Divorce 
Under the principle of lex fori or lex domicilii as well as 
under that of nationality, applied exclusively, the right to 
divorce is governed by one law. The English courts demon-
strate how seriously they accept this doctrine by applying, on 
the one hand, only English law in any divorce suit in Eng-
land and, on the other hand, by recognizing foreign divorce 
decrees of the matrimonial domicil without inquiring into 
what law was applied in the case. Similarly, when French 
courts adhered to the pure nationality rule, they granted 
divorce for reasons found in the national law but not in 
French law.200 This point of view still exists in some coun-
tries.201 Of course, causes repugnant to the public policy of 
the forum are always excepted. 
197 See documentation in OLG. Kiel (May 16, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349, 
IPRspr. 1934, no. 59· 198 Sup. Fed. Ct. (1937) 112 Rev. dos Trib. 334 (obiter dictum); Ap. civ. 
Sao Paulo (1938) 118 ibid. 715; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1939) 123 Rev. dos 
Trib. 597 (Czechoslovakian law of husband applied as the German law of 
the wife refers also to that Ia w). 199 See infra n. 236. 
2oo See SuRVILLE 440. 
2°1 The Polish Law of 1926 on private international law, art. 17 par. 1 
declares the national law applicable without any qualifications; likewise the 
Czechoslovakian law on private international law of 1948, § 18, the Bul-
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At present, however, courts in France and many other 
countries are disinclined to apply a foreign ground for di-
vorce, unless it corresponds with a ground acknowledged in 
the forum. 202 Absolute identity, it is true, is not demanded. 
For instance, in the relations among the countries following 
the Code N apolion, divorce for injures graves is granted 
without regard to the varying meanings of this term, which 
term is also held to correspond to gross insults, cruelty, or 
desertion, constituting grounds for divorce under American 
statutes,203 and even covers adultery as a foreign requisite. 204 
The result of this system is, of course, that divorce is de-
nied, if the personal law includes no ground to support the 
action. Englishmen (except where renvoi was applied) were 
refused divorce in most cases because of the narrow limits 
of the right to divorce in the English matrimonial law before 
the reforms. 205 The same is still true of citizens of New 
garian Family Law of 1949, art. 58, and in case of foreigners, the Egyptian 
C. C. ( 1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14 as well as the Syrian C. C. ( 1949) arts. 14 
par. 2, 15. 
Greece: Court of Athens (1937) no. 1952, 49 Themis 473, Clunet 1939, 463 
granting separation from bed and board to Italian nationals according to 
Italian Jaw on a ground unknown in Greek law. 
In Portugal: CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, r Direito Civil 692 thinks that outside ot 
the Hague Convention a cause of the national law unknown to the Portu-
guese law suffices in principle. 
202 Belgium: Trib. civ. Verviers (March 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige 
( 1933) 74 (Swiss parties; grave injury required by Belgian law must be 
proved, as well as disruption of the marriage by a lesser injury, ground for 
divorce under Swiss law). 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, goo, Revue Crit. 
1935, 759 requires identity of grounds in both laws, while LEREBOURs-PIGEON-
)>:IERE 394 ff. no. 336 suggests that equivalence should suffice. ' 
The Netherlands: Cf. VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1937, 155· 
203 E.g., Trib. civ. Seine (April 6, 1922) Clunet 1922, 674 (equation with 
gross insults under California law); Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 19, 1926) Clunet 
I 926, 66 3 (equation with desertion under the Indiana statute). 
204 POULLET, no. 379; NIBOYET 746. Adultery may be defined very differently 
(cf. SAITER, 5 Giur. Camp. DIP. rr), but the differences are not considered 
material. 
205 Cour Paris (March r, 1933) Gaz.Pal. 1933·1.884; App. d'Aix (March 
23, 1936) Rec. Somm. 1936, no. 1736; Cass. (req.) (April 20, 1937) Gaz. 
Trib. 1937.1.87: "injures graves" no cause for divorce under English law. 
Switzerland: BG. (Feb. 21, 1935) 58 Sem. Jud. (1936) 209, II Z.ausl.PR. 
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York, domiciled in New York.206 But the internal conceptions 
of what are sufficient grounds for divorce also play a large 
role, although a certain elasticity in their application rests in 
the discretion of the court. 207 
A more definite position is taken by the German Code, 
the Hague Convention, and the codifications following 
them.208 Divorce must be supported in this system by the 
lex fori as well as by the national law. 
This group, however, divides on the following point. In 
some of the texts involved, it has been made clear that, al-
though divorce must be justified by some ground under each 
of the two laws, the ground need not be the same in both.209 
Hence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal declared it sufficient if 
the facts of a case supported, at the same time, disruption of 
the marriage according to Swiss law and injures gra·ves 
within the French meaning 210 or disruption in the Swiss sense 
(1937) 656 no. 2 (facts insufficient to constitute "injures graves" under 
French law, C. C. art. 23 r). 
206 Trib. civ. Havre (Nov. 17, 1923) Clunet 1924, 1000. 
207 A Dutch observer, KOLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 90, thinks 
Belgian courts are more inclined than French judges to recognize foreign 
divorce grounds unknown to the lex fori; the most authoritative writer on 
Belgian conflicts law, PouLLET, no. 379 makes no such distinction, but he 
seems to favor a liberal interpretation of the similar ground theory. 
2os Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 2. 
Germany: EG. art. 17 par. 4· 
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 8 par. 4· 
Sweden: Law of July 8, 1904, with subsequent amendments, c. 3, § 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. r. 
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 84. 
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 86. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. r6. 
China: Law of 1918, art. II. 
209 Hague Convention on Divorce, German, Austrian and Swedish stat-
utes (see supra n. 208). The Swiss statute is interpreted the same way. Cf. 
German RG. (April 5, 1921) 102 RGZ. 82; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 21, 19q) 
Hans. GZ. 1915, BBl. no. 45; OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 5, 1915) ibid. no. 46; 
OLG. Restock (Dec. 16, 1921) 77 Seuff. Arch. 174; OLG. Frankfurt (July 
II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507; OLG. Kiiln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304. The 
Netherlands: Rb. Haarlem (Oct. 29, 1935) W. 1936, no. 756 (under the 
Hague Convention). 
210 Swiss BG. (May 26, 1932) 58 BGE. II 183, 188. 
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and violation of the marital duties under the then unmodi-
fied German Code. 211 Conversely, the disruption of the Swiss, 
German, and Austrian law being excluded by French and 
Belgian courts as contrary to public policy, 2lla a Belgian 
court found in the facts a violation of the marital duties.211b 
And if the national law of Polish Jews allowed divorce by 
mutual agreement, German courts granted it, provided that 
in addition, to satisfy the lex fori, a valid reason, such as 
adultery or fault in disrupting the marriage existed. 212 The 
case of mutual agreement of Soviet Russian nationals has 
been treated in the same way. 213 The statutes of Japan and 
China 214 by their wording seem to exclude such interpreta-
tion and hence to require in fact that the same or a similar 
ground exist in both laws. 
Cumulative application of two laws of any sort results in 
dismissal of a divorce suit when, according to only one of the 
two legislations, such events as condonation, recrimination 
(compensation of causes), 215 or lapse of time 215a negates 
the right to divorce. 
Moreover, the double requirement opens a strange gap 
when divorce cannot be granted according to the national 
211 Swiss BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, Erw. 3, 4· 
211 a Trib. civil Sarreguemines (Feb. 3, 1954) Clunet 1954, 958; Cour Bru-
xelles (June 26, 1951) J.d. Tr. 1951, 679. 
211b Cour Bruxelles (March 1, 1952) Pasicrisie 1952 II 58. 
212 OLG. Frankfurt (July II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507 (supra n. 209) and 
constant practice, despite some controversy in the literature whet:!er divorce 
by agreement is opposed to German public policy and, if so, whether it may 
be taken as a basis for a German divorce decree; the dominant opinion in-
terprets EG. art. 17 par. 4, which is less well drafted than art. 2 of the 
Hague Convention on Divorce, as satisfying all the exigencies of German 
pub! ic policy, irrespective of logical relation to par. 1 of art. 17. Cf. PRETZEL 
in JW. 1928, 3030; LUTTERLOH, JW. 1929, 419; HOLLANDER, }W. 1929, 1863. 
213 KG. (Sept. 14, 1936) JW. 1936, 3579; cf. RG. (April 4, 1928) 121 
RGZ. 24. 
214 China and Japan, suPra n. 208. 
215 Cour Paris (July 7, 1920) Clunet 1921, 518 states that evidence is lack-
ing for compensation of grounds according to the American law; cf. BARTIN, 
2 Principes 305 § 314. 
21 5a OG. Ziirich (June 25, 1941) 2 Schwz. Jahrb. (1945) 187. 
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law, because the forum would grant another type of relief. 
Laws that leave the right to divorce without any limitation, 
like formerly the Soviet Russian law, or which broaden the 
right, like the Belgian law, may eliminate or closely limit, 
respectively, the right to sue for annulment of the marriage. 
For instance, a marriage may be annulled under German 
law, because the husband was ignorant of an incurable seri-
ous illness of the wife at the time of the marriage, but it 
would not be voidable under Russian or Belgian law, as 
divorce takes the place of annulment there. Couples of these 
nationalities married in their respective countries and coming 
to live in Germany would not obtain either relief at their 
new domicil. 216 
Permissive policy. Divorce laws are sometimes quaint. 
even if they do not equal the Chinese rules before I 9 3 I , 
under which the husband could divorce his wife because of 
her garrulity and the wife had no right of divorce. The 
tribunal of Brussels, in fact, reacted against the latter 
provision 217 and recently also reacted against barring di-
vorce to Catholics of the former Polish kingdom, 218 as well 
as against the religious distinctions of the law of Iran. ~ 19 
The basis for its opposition is that it is contrary to the Bel-
gian public order to investigate the religious denomination 
of the parties. In all these cases, Belgian divorce law was 
substituted. 
But German courts have not considered the wife's defi-
nitely inferior position in suing for divorce under the legisla-
216 Annulment was denied where the national law of the party who was in 
error does not regard the mistake as an impediment by RG. (Oct. 6, 1927) 
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 13, IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 68, Revue 1930, 129; the 
prevailing opinion is in accord. See however, RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. (ed. 1) 179 
and infra p. 584. 
217 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3, 1923) 9 Bull. Inst. Beige (1923) 146. See 
also App. Liege (Nov. 2, 1937) J.d. Tr. 1937, col. 672 no. 3512, supra n. 182. 
218 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) }.d.Tr. 1938, col. 646 no. 3550. 
219 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 30, 1938) 53 J.d.Tr. 1938, col. 329 no. 353+· 
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tion of Austria and Italy as contrary to public policy. 220 Nor 
has the former English law, allowing only the husband to 
sue on the ground of adultery, ever been repudiated on the 
Continent. More doubt has been expressed about the Jewish 
laws prohibiting the wife from suing even on the ground of 
adultery or attempt on her life, but they have been applied; 
the wife of a Mohammedan Persian was similarly treated. 221 
Again, the court of Brussels once granted divorce in such a 
case. 222 According to the prevailing opinion, it is considered 
undesirable to increase the number of unfortunate cases 
where marriage exists with geographically limited force. 223 
So even bizarre foreign institutions are admitted. 
4- Different National Laws 
N a tiona! law of the husband. Upon the same historical 
basis of coverture as in England, the national law of the 
husband alone is applicable, without regard to that of the 
wife, in Germany, Portugal, China, and Japan; 224 according 
to part of the French doctrine, the national law of the hus-
band is said to govern the causes for divorce.225 Independ-
ently of the historical background, this system has been 
appraised as the simplest and most convenient in practice.226 
220 OLG. Dusseldorf (July 6, I91I) IIO Rhein. Archiv I 58; OLG. Kiel 
(Feb. 28, 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 267, Clunet 1925, I053· 
221 Germany: RG. (May 26, 1930) 43 Z.int.R. (r93o-3r) 391; RG. (Sept. 
29, 1930) JW. 193 r, 148; LG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 
81; KG. (May n, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 142. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) Clunet 1906, 410. 
222 App. Bruxelles (June 8, 1899) Clunet 1899, 859. 
223 RAAPE 435· 
224 German EG. art. 17 par. r; followed by Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16 
and China: Law of 1918, art. r r. This is also the rule adopted in the Treaty 
of Montreux, Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, Regulations of Judicial Organisa-
tion, art. 29 par. 3, pub!. in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 939, now superseded by 
Egyptian C. C. (1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14, followed by the Syrian C. C. (1949) 
arts. 14 par. 2, 15 (in both codes only for foreigners). 
225 BARTIN, 2 Principes 323 § 318 states that this rule in the French system 
is not doubtful, but the decisions are not homogeneous; cf. infra pp. 474 ff. 
226 ROLIN, 2 Principes no. 591. 
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In the last decades, however, such preference for the hus-
band has found less and less favor, in conformity with the 
increasing tendency to allow a married woman to retain or 
resume her original citizenship.227 
Last common nationality. In the Hague Convention on 
Divorce, the law of the last common nationality of both 
parties was adopted.228 The Sixth Conference added in its 
non-ratified drafts that where the parties never had a com-
mon nationality or where they changed from one common to 
two different new nationalities, divorce and separation de-
pend on both laws cumulatively. The recent Greek Code 
more conveniently calls in such cases for the application of 
the national law of the husband as of the time of the mar-
riage celebration 229 whereas Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria 
in this case resort to the lex fori. 229a 
Both laws cumulatively. According to another theory, the 
granting of divorce must be permitted by the laws of both 
spouses. 230 
227 There is no advocate in France any longer, ]. DDNNEDIEU DE VABRES 
474 n. 2 asserts, in ignoring Bartin's recent book supra n. 225. 
The West German Supreme Court (]an. r8, 1954) NJW. 1954, 837, Revue 
Crit. 1954, 8os, has held, that the predominance of the husband's law is not 
incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality of the sexes. 
2 28 Hague Convention on Divorce, arts. r, 2, 8; followed by Poland: Law 
on international private law, art. 17 par. 1; Rumanian Preliminary Draft 
of C. C. art. XXIV; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international Ia w of 
1948, § r8; Bulgaria: Family Law of 1949, art. 58. 
229 Greek C. C. (1940) art. 16. 
229a See the provisions cited supra n. 228. 
2so Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929, art. ro. 
Siam: Law on private international law of 1939, § 27 par. z. 
Belgium: App. Liege (July 7, 1938) Pasicrisie 1938.2.129 (particularly ex-
acting, as the wife had resumed Belgian citizenship); Rb. Antwerp (May n, 
1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, 1552 no. 312; Cass. (May 16, 1952) Revue 
Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. {Ch. reunis) (Feb. I6, 1955) Pasicrisie 1955 I 647. 
Revue Crit. 1955, 143· 
Italy: UoiNA, Elementi no. 136; SALVIOLI, 19 Rivista (1927) 354 (admits 
difficulties); and some decisions in France. Only Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 
1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759 states that the grounds for divorce must agree 
with the foreign laws of both parties as well as with the French law. 
NrBOYET, Note ibid. 762 declares regard for the defendant's Jaw unnecessary. 
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The law of the plaintiff. In contrast, the French courts 
usually pronounce divorce at the instance of a party whose 
national law as such permits it. Although occasionally under 
this system foreign law has been applied/31 the usual result 
is a resort to French law. 
This conforms to a general trend. Suppose that the ap-
plicable conflicts rule calls for the municipal law of the hus-
band, he a foreigner and the wife a national; or suppose that 
the last common nationality law should be applied, the wife 
alone having acquired the nationality of the forum during 
marriage,-courts are tempted to abandon the conflicts rule 
for the sake of the wife. The same development that has 
fostered favor for the wife's separate nationality induces the 
courts to permit the wife such rights of divorce as the law of 
the forum, which is also her national law, permits. Hence, 
early examples of exceptions made for nationals in some 
European and particularly in Latin American jurisdictions, 
have been multiplied in recent times. 
From about 1906, French courts have granted divorce 
according to French law to the French wife of a mixed mar-
riage.232 If the husband were of Italian nationality, however, 
they were bound by article 8 of the Hague Convention on 
Divorce to observe the last common national law of the 
parties. But precisely for this reason, France renounced her 
participation in the Convention in 1913, and in 1927 a 
French woman marrying a foreigner was allowed to retain 
her French nationality. These two events reinf.orced the 
Portugal: Sup. Trib. de Just. (Jan. 5, I9I8) so Direito 250, cited by CUNHA 
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 693. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 23, I933) 59 BGE. II II3; App. Zurich (June 23, 
I934) 34 BI. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I935) 72 no. 27; and App. Zurich (June I2, 
I937) 37 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I938) 304 no. I5I. 
281 Cour Paris (March I, I933) Gaz. Pal. I933· I. 884, Revue I933, 629 
(English law applied against English husband in favor of his French wife). 
232 Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 26, I9o6) Revue I907, 590; Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 
I9Io) Revue I911, 82; etc. 
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trend of the French tribunals. In the outstanding case of the 
Marquis de Ferrari, a French woman who, by marrying an 
Italian, had become an Italian national and had been judi-
cially separated from her husband in Italy, recovered French 
citizenship. She was granted a divorce a vinculo in spite of 
the prohibition of Italian law which had controlled her 
marriage and was still the law of the Marquis. The basis 
was surprisingly simple: the Court of Cassation declared 
that French law is an indispensable attribute of French na-
tionality.233 This decision attracted world-wide attention; its 
exact scope remains obscure, except where the application 
of the French law is in issue. 234 Much criticism has been 
aroused by the inconsistency with which the foreign prohibi-
tion has been discarded in cases analogous to those in which, 
before dissolution of marriage was allowed in 18 84, the 
French courts refused to recognize foreign divorces of a 
French national married to an alien, and the further incon-
sistency with the theory of fraud, which the French courts 
were fostering at the very time of the Ferrari suit.235 Never-
theless, the precedent of the Ferrari case has been followed 
for 2 5 years. 
In 1953, however, in recognizing a divorce decreed at the 
matrimonial domicil in Ecuador the Court of Cassation was 
satisfied that also under French rules the Equatorian law 
233 Affaire Ferrari no. 1, Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.I922.1.137, 8.1923.1.5, 
Clunet 1922, 714, Revue 1922-1923, 444; no. 2, Cass. (civ.) (March q, 
1928) S.1929.1.92, Clunet 1928, 383. 
2 34 BARTIN, 2 Principes 308 concludes that these are purely French solutions, 
of mere French interest, which we have no reason whatsoever to apply to 
foreign couples; he does not even want to suggest recognition of an analo-
gous decree of a foreign-say, a Brazilian-tribunal. 
235 See PILLET, Revue 1922-1923, 464 frankly regretting the decisions as a 
break with international private law; AUDINET, rr Recueil 1926 I 230; DE-
GAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83; SALVIOLI, "Conflitto di leggi personali in materia 
di divorzio," Rivista 1927, 354. NIBOYET, Note S.1929.1.9. As to the theory 
of fraud, J. DONNilDIEU DE VABRES 480 has answered that fraud is relevant 
only if committed against the law of the forum. 
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was applicable, even though the wjfe was a French citizen. 235a 
The recent Lewandowski case has confirmed, for a family 
living in France, the new rule, that the divorce of mixed 
marriages is governed by the law of the matrimonial domi-
cil.235b The new doctrine will certainly not exclude any special 
protection accorded to French wives, especially in cases 
where the law of the matrimonial domicil does not admit 
divorce. If divorce is demanded by a foreign plaintiff against 
his French wife and contrary to his national law, the lower 
courts make the plaintiff's law prevail.235c 
In addition to France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, 
and Sweden successively left the Hague Convention to avoid 
the divorce prohibition of the member state, Italy; in all 
these countries, migratory Italian workers had married and 
deserted native women. Except for the little influence the 
Convention has preserved, it has become a habit in most of 
the European countries to allow divorce to a national party 
of a mixed marriage according to the lex fori. 236 In Germany, 
the enacted law was adjusted to this end.231 
235a Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953, Riviere v. Roumiantzeff) Clunet 1953, 
86o, Revue Crit. 1953, 412 (note BATIFFOL) ; note BATIFFOL in 4 Am. ]. Comp. 
Law (1955) 574-581. 235b Cass. (civ.) (March 15, 1955) Revue Crit. 1955, 320 (note BATIFFor.). 235cTrib. civ. Seine (Jan. 27, 1956) Revue Crit. 1956, 497; Trib. civ. Nice 
(Oct. 24, 1956) Gaz. Pal. 1956.2.371. 236Brazil: (Before the law of 1942) Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 6, 1918) Re-
curso Extraordinario no. 587, 20 Revista Sup. Trib. ( 1919) 246; Ap. civ. 
Rio de Janeiro (Jan. 16, 1942) no. 8oo, 62 Arch. J ud. 58. Cf. Ap. civ. Rio 
de Janeiro (Oct. 25, 1934) no. 4·332, 121 Revista Dir. Civ. (1936) 322 (the 
constitutional provision that Brazilian law is to be applied to the dissolution 
of a marriage even if only one of the spouses is of Brazilian nationality ap-
plies also in cases of judicial separation if nationality is acquired by natu-
ralization). 
Egypt: C. C. (1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14. 
Syria: C. C. (1949) arts. 14 par. 2, 15. 
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 83. 
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 85. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S.1929.1.9, Revue 1928, 653 (conver-
sion of separation into divorce after naturalization) ; Cass. ( civ.) (Feb. s, 
1929) Clunet 1929, 1258; Cass. (req.) (Feb. 4, 1931) Clunet 1932, 451; Cour 
Colmar (Feb. 13, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1937, 240; Cour Paris (Dec. 21, 1937) 
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In Belgium, however, the courts have been thus far in dis-
agreement. Their decisions are significant. In a series of 
cases, divorce was denied to a woman who had married an 
Italian and later recovered Belgian nationality, and to wives 
of Austrian origin and Catholic faith who had acquired 
Belgian nationality, on the unmodified rule that divorce must 
agree with the national laws of both spouses and on the con-
sideration that at the time of the marriage both parties 
knew that their bond would be indissoluble. 238 It has been 
argued, furthermore, that, logically, to free the party who 
belongs to the forum by application of his or her national 
Revue Crit. 1938, 251, and decisions of lower courts; cf. PERROUD, Clunet 
1926, 24 n, 19; J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 475; Note, Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 
19, 1926) Clunet 1926, 663 (through renvoi, applying French law as the 
personal law of an American woman domiciled in France); Trib. civ. Seine 
(Dec. 20, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1938, 324 (granted divorce to the wife who had 
resumed French nationality, while under the husband's Dutch law adultery 
would have been required); Cour Colmar (Jan. 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 797• 
Nouv. Revue 1938, 326 (French wife granted divorce without regard to the 
German law of the husband). 
Luxembourg: Cass. (April 28, 1949) 14 Pasicrisie Lux. 541, 548 (plaintiff's 
national law). 
Rumania: Cass. (Sept. 13, 1876); Trib. Ilfov (April 8, 1935) Clunet 1937, 
625. The contrary rule obtains because of the Hague Convention in the case 
of an Italian wife naturalized in Rumania: Cass. Bucarest (Oct. 25, 1928) 
Revue 1930, 517. 
Spain: (during republican times) Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1934) 214 Sent. 642, 
Clunet 1936, 210 (Spanish wife, Italian husband). 
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, 1901) 27 BGE. I 180 proclaimed that a Swiss 
spouse could apply for divorce notwithstanding the prohibition of divorce by 
the national law of the other spouse; BG. (June 13, 1907) 33 BGE. I 355 (one 
spouse a naturalized Swiss former Austrian Catholic); BG. (July 9, 1914) 40 
BGE. I 418, 428; BG. (March 2, 1922) Clunet 1922, 752 (one party a natu-
ralized Swiss, former Orthodox Russian); BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93, 
Clunet 1932, II51, Revue 1932, 710 (Swiss nationality resumed by wife of an 
Italian after Switzerland had left the Hague Convention). 
237 German EG. art. 17 par. 3· 
238 App. Bruxelles (July 9, 1932) Revue Crit. 1933, 5II (sees the ideas of 
the Hague Convention transferred to the Belgian common law); App. Gand 
(July II, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 302 no. 136; App. Liege (July 7, 1938) 
Pasicrisie 1938.2.129, Belg. J ud. 1939, 303 (the more severe of the two na-
tional laws must be applied); App. Liege (Jan. 12, 1939) Belg. Jud. 1939, 
401 (the wife "submitted' to the indissolubility of the union); Cass. (May 16, 
1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. (Ch. reunis) (Feb. 16, 1955) Pasicrisie 
1955 I 647, Revue Crit. 1955, 143· 
DIVORCE 479 
law, would leave the other party married. 239 As a matter of 
fact, this is the Swiss practice and the prevailing opinion in 
Germany, 240 so far as remarriage is concerned. The Belgian 
authorities 241 to the contrary, who admit divorce, have re-
plied that if the non-Belgian spouse remains married under 
his or her national law (not by Belgian law), it should be 
realized that this undesirable result is due to the fact that the 
unity of the law governing the marriage has been broken by 
allowing the wife a separate nationality.242 This consequence 
is not strong enough "to prevail over the absolute and un-
conditional right that the wife derives from her national 
status and entitles her to break up a union the continuation 
of which might dainage her." A Belgian writer has added 
that attitudes of high indifference to the misery of others are 
repugnant to the basic tendency of public life in Belgium.243 
The analogy of the granting of divorce by the courts of 
the domicil of one party in the United States is the more 
striking, as in these Continental cases the plaintiff is gen-
erally domiciled at the forum. Niboyet suggests, however, 
that a wife should not be allowed to sue for divorce under 
her separate national law, unless the matrimonial domicil 
was established in France by both parties at the marriage or 
later. 244 This means a step toward the exclusive dominance 
of the domiciliary jurisdiction, desirable in all respects. 
239 Thus, LABBE, Note in 8.1878.1.195. Cj. also DEGAND, 5 ~epert. 553 
no. 76, with earlier French decisions rejecting divorce; Trib. civ. Mons 
(April 8, 1927) Belg. Jud. 1927, 508 (applying exclusively the foreign hus-
band's law "to avoid inextricable complications and eminently wrong sit-
uations"). 
240 See infra p. 558. 
241 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 27, 1928) Belg. Jud. 1928, 635 (despite the 
'"bizarre and absurd" consequence that one party is not allowed to remarry); 
Trib. civ. Mons (May 8, 1930) and Trib. Bruxelles (May 20, 1931) J.d.Tr. 
1931, cols. 462, 673 cited by ]OFE, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. (1936) 132; App. 
Liege (Feb. 2, 1931) Clunet 1932, 489. These cases are overruled by the latest 
decisions of the Court of Cassation, see n. 238. 
242 Trib. Arion (April 23, 1937) Pand. Per. 1938, 31 no. 8. 
243 JOFE, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. ( 1936) 133. 
244 NIBOYET 749 no. 641. 
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VI. RENVOI 
The problem of renvoi is presented when, according to the 
principle of nationality, the divorce law of the state to which 
a party belongs should be applied, while, according to the 
conflicts rule of the foreign state, this law is not to be ap-
plied. The Hague Convention on Divorce 245 denied renvoi 
between member states, all of which followed the nationality 
principle, but renvoi is observed, as usual, in most countries 
following the principle, particularly by the French, 246 Ger-
man,247 Swiss,248 and Belgian 249 courts.249a The situation in 
245 See RG. (Nov. 8, 1922) 105 RGZ. 340; KG. (Nov. 27, 1933) IPRspr. 
1934, no. u6 and KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47· 
246 France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 19, 1926) Clunet 1926, 663 (American 
wife); Trib. civ. Fountainebleau (June 24, 1932) Clunet 1933, 666; Cour 
Paris (Dec. 24, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1936, 108; Cour Paris (July 24, 1937) 
Nouv. Revue 1937, 772 {two English parties; the English law even declares 
itself incompetent); and finally Cass. (req.) {May 10, 1939) Gaz.Pal. 
1939·1·962, Nouv. Revue 1939, 153, Revue Crit. 1939, 472 with a note by 
NIBOYET declaring that now he renounces his opposition to renvoi, although 
he construes it merely as a theory of national interest in cases not regulated 
by the national law. Trib. civil Seine (June 28, 1950) Revue Crit. 1951. 6+8, 
Clunet 1952, 174 {transmission over). Among the four decisions against ren-
voi listed by J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 472 n. g, and now overruled, the 
fourth, Cour Paris {March x, 1933) Gaz.Pal.I933-I.884, Revue 1933, 629, 
Clunet 1935, 99, decided against the English husband, plaintiff, in favor of 
the French wife, defendant; the third, mentioned by KuHN, Comp. Com. 172 
n. 66, Trib. Basses-Pyrenees (May 28, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1092, was a curious 
mistake. 
247 Germany: as to American citizens: RG. (March 21, 1904) 48 Gruchot's 
Beitriige {1904) Sox; OLG. Frankfurt (June 20, 1910) cited by LEWALD 110 
no. 156; LG. Miinchen (July x, 1921) JW. 1921, 1471; LG. Berlin (April 2+, 
1928) JW. 1928, 3128; OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6ox; RG. 
{Nov. 21, 1929) JW. 1930, 1309. As to British subjects: KG. (Sept. 20, 1901) 
3 ROLG. 365; OLG. Darmstadt (May x8, 1906) DJZ. 1907, 1327; RG. (Jan. 
7, 1907) JW. 1907, 127; OLG. Hamburg {Nov. 6, 1912) Hans. GZ. 1913, 
Beibl. 84 no. 52; OLG. Hamburg (March 31, 1927) Hans. GZ. 1927, Beibl. 
139 no. 99; KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3572; OLG. Hamburg (April 
22, 1937) Hans. RGZ. 1937, B 222 no. xox; LG. Berlin (May 21, 1938) J\V. 
1938, 1916. Argentine nationals: (where marriage is celebrated outside of 
Argentina) OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 2, 1929) and {May x6, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, 
nos. 75, 76; KG. {Feb. 28, 1938) JW. 1938, 2748. Danish nationals: dictum 
in RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 106, correcting RG. (Feb. 24, 1928) 
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64. 
Iceland: RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103. 
Norway: OLG. Celie {Oct. 15, 1925) JW. 1926, 388. 
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German and Swiss divorce courts, however, is further com-
plicated by the provisions forbidding them, as we have seen 
above, 250 to assume jurisdiction unless recognition of their 
jurisdiction appears fairly certain in the national country of 
the parties. Generally, it seems, these courts have not been 
aware of all the intrinsic difficulties in this matter; however, 
most of their decisions can probably be justified. We must 
here distinguish the questions of choice of law and of juris-
diction. 
The problem of the law of conflicts is rather simpler in 
this case than in status questions generally.251 It is quite 
easily settled, if we understand the position of English, 
American, Danish, and Norwegian lawyers in the sense that 
they recognize the jurisdiction of the domicil under certain 
conditions and that, as they themselves apply the law of the 
forum at home, they are not interested in what substantive 
private law would be applied by a foreign divorce court.252 
Hence, a French or German divorce court is permitted 
(though not directed, as was so often believed in Europe) 
by the national law of a British subject to apply the law of 
the forum. It does not matter that by another mistake 253 
Nicaragua: KG. (March 30, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 70. 
248 Switzerland: BG. (June 15, 1928) 54 BGE. II 225, 231; cf. SCHNIT-
ZER 174• 
249 Belgium: Trib. Bruxelles (April 13, 1951) Pasicrisie 1952 III 42, Clunet 
1953, 384; Trib. Bruxelles (March I, 1952) J.d.Tr. 1952, 250. Contra: Rb. 
Antwerp (May n, 1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, col. 1552 no. 312. 
249a The absurdities brought about by a legislative exclusion of renvoi are 
well illustrated by Trib. Cairo (March 31, 1953) Revue Egypt. 1954, 157: 
the divorce of British subjects, born in Cyprus, but domiciled (in the English 
sense) in Egypt, was submitted to English law. 
250 Supra pp. 441-443. 
2 51 Cf. supra n. 146. 
252 This seems to agree with KuHN, Comp. Com. 171; it is true that KUHN 
concludes just contrary to the text that renvoi is particularly unsound with 
respect to common law countries. 
253 For instance, OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6o1, and BERG· 
MANN in the note ibid. assume a renvoi from the California law because the 
party had formerly been domiciled in California. See supra p. 144. 
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European courts have often referred to the common law 
country where a British or American national was last domi-
ciled instead of to the general principles of British or Ameri-
can law. Recently, German courts have realized that they are 
applying German law as the lex fori 254 (and not qua lex 
domicilii) with the blessing of that national law. This was a 
new realization, as observers in Germany had thought that 
there never is a renvoi referring to the law of the forum. 255 
With national laws such as that of Argentina, the situation 
is theoretically different; the law governing at the domicil of 
the husband is applicable. 256 
The entire problem, otherwise almost desperate, is re-
duced in this manner to the question of determining in which 
cases a Continental court may assume jurisdiction for divorce 
with the expectation that the decree will be recognized in 
the national country. As a matter of fact, the answer must 
be different with respect to the individual jurisdictions where 
recognition is sought. 
It is easy to answer the question when the husband is a 
national of a country such as England or Argentina, where 
the domicil of the husband is the matrimonial domicil anJ 
the law of this domicil governs the right to divorce (possibly 
also after one party has deserted the rna trimonial domicil) . 
German courts have scrupulously investigated whether a 
British husband was domiciled within their territory, making 
certain that domicil at the forum exists not only in the Ger-
man sense but also in the British sense.257 
If one or both of the parties are of American nationality, 
254 See, e.g., KG. {March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570 in fine. 
255 MELCHIOR 215 § 143· 
256 This was overlooked by LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 565, who uses the 
Argentine law as an argument against renvoi. 
257 See the detailed instructions about what a German court ought to ascer-
tain concerning the American requirements for recognition of divorce decrees 
in RG. {Nov. 21, 1929) ]W. 1930, 1309, and the careful statements as to the 
domicil under English law in KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570. 
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the solution is simple where both have their effective domicil, 
common or separate, in the country of divorce. But if not, 
which of the approximately fifty individual American terri-
torial laws should be considered? It is incorrect to assume 
that the last domicil within the United States, now aban-
doned, should control, and the Continental court would 
scarcely be justified in speculating before which court in the 
United States the matter could probably be brought on 
the grounds of the situs of property, the residence of chil-
dren, etc. 
The requirements of full faith and credit to divorce de-
crees under the Constitution as developed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States would not be directly decisive, 
since they do not include foreign nations. Recognition seems 
to be granted in virtually all American jurisdictions to alien 
decrees of divorce, however, if no party is domiciled within 
the forum to which such a decree is presented for recognition 
and one party was domiciled at the divorce forum, while the 
other was personally served with process or appeared and 
litigated on the merits. Hence, it would be safe to assume 
jurisdiction in such a case in Germany, 257a Switzerland, 
Sweden, Hungary, etcetera. Although not certain, it is prob-
able that these conditions have been fulfilled in most, if not 
all, cases of admitted renvoi. And there is no necessity of 
allowing more divorces to foreigners. 
VII. CHANGE oF DoMICIL OR NATIONALITY 
Conditions on which the granting of divorce depends may 
change in different respects, viz., (I) domicil or nationality 
as the foundation of the court's jurisdiction may be' altered 
while the lawsuit is pending; ( 2) domicil or nationality as 
determining the applicable law may be modified during the 
2 5 1a LG. Kassel (Dec. 10, 1952) NJW. 1953, 307, IPRspr. 1952-1953 no. 
157 (stateless wife of American husband domiciled in Germany). 
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proceedings; and (3) the status may have been changed 
after the occurrence of the circumstances on which the di-
vorce action is based. 
1. Change of Factor Determining Jurisdiction 
As the three questions just mentioned have sometimes 
been confused, it has not always been clear that the first is 
dependent simply on the definition and the effects which the 
rules of civil procedure give to the commencement of an ac-
tion for divorce. Generally, so soon as the action is con-
sidered instituted according to the conception of the forum, 
the jurisdiction established at this moment remains fixed for 
the duration of the suit-forum perpetuatur-jurisdiction 
continues. 258 That, conversely, the ground for jurisdiction 
can be supplemented later, is not universally affirmed. 
2. Change of Factor Determining the Choice of Law After 
Beginning of Litigation 
The second question may be illustrated hy three German 
cases, which result in the following paradigm. An American 
citizen, at the time domiciled in Germany but formerly of 
California, instituted a divorce suit in the German court of 
his domicil but afterwards during the proceedings moved to 
Copenhagen, Denmark. There was no doubt that by Ameri-
can principles (or, as it was construed, by the law of Cali-
fornia) German family law was to be applied by way of 
renvoi, so long as the domicil of the husband was in Ger-
many. But did American law, after the change of domicil, 
refer to German or to Danish law, and was this reference 
still decisive for the German court? The Court of Appeals 
of Stuttgart thought the question solved by the principle of 
258 See, for instance, Restatement § 76; German C. of Civ. Proc. § 263 
par. 2. 
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perpetuation of the forum mentioned above. 259 But, although 
this reasoning may seem consonant with the conception, 
prevalent in this country, that the lex fori governs divorce, 
in Germany the matter is undoubtedly part of the choice of 
law problem and cannot be answered by procedural rules. 
The Reichsgericht, in another case also, in inquiring whether 
reference should be made to the new domicil, refused to 
consult the national law but based its solution on the deliber-
ate wording of the German conflicts rule,260 invoking the law 
of the state to which the husband belonged at the time of 
the commencement of the action. The same rule seems to 
prevail in France 261 and Belgium 262 as a matter of course. 
As the question is not identical with the procedural problem, 
the German courts permit the choice of law to be that of the 
time when the defendant is served in the action 263 or when 
the ground for divorce is pleaded in court; 264 a subsequent 
unilateral change of status by the husband is disregarded. 265 
The Polish statute (art. I 7 par. 1) also declares applica-
ble the law of the state to which the spouses belong at the 
time of the action; 26sa the Polish Supreme Court has under-
2
''
9 OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 601. Contra: RG. (April 6, 
I9J6) rsr RGZ. 103. 
~cu EG. art. 17 par. r; RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374; RG. (April 
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108 (husband of Icelandic nationality served with 
process in Germany returned to Iceland; in this case the Icelandic law, in-
vestigated as to its position on the question, revealed that it did not contain 
any rule concerning the effect of a change of domicil upon the law applica· 
ble). 
261 LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 304 ff. no. 280 and 361 no. 335· 
262 However, Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 120 rejects 
the action for divorce of Spaniards, divorce having been prohibited by the 
government of Franco during the pendency of the trial. 
263 RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108; cf. HABICHT 135; WALKER 685. 
Expressly the Czechoslovakian statute on private international law of 1948, 
§ 18 sentence r. 
264 RG. (April :n, 1902) 46 Gruchot's Beitrage (1902) 959; •RG. (April 
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; cf. KG. (Dec. 17, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 58. 
265 RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, ro8; against RAAPE 378 and IPR. 
277 and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 438. 
265a Also Bulgaria: Family Law of 1949, art. 58. 
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stood this to mean, however, the country to which the parties 
belong when judgment is rendered. 266 In fact, the danger of 
arbitrary changes made by one party is eliminated by this 
statute, since it refers to the law of the common domicil. 
3· Changes of Factor Determining Choice of Law Before 
the Divorce Suit Is Brought 
To understand the problem in question, suppose that the 
domicil of the husband is the test in two states, X andY, and 
that adultery is the only ground for divorce in X (e.g., New 
York), while desertion is a sufficient ground in Y (e.g., New 
Jersey), and suppose that: 
{i) The husband changes his domicil from X toY, suing 
his wife in Y on the ground that she deserted him when he 
resided in X; or 
(ii) The husband leaves his domicil in Y, suing his wife 
in X, alleging that she deserted him in Y. 
Three solutions have been advanced: 
(a) The court should consider the ground for divorce 
exclusively under the law ordinarily applic:tble, irrespective 
of whether the facts occurred before or a { ter the acquisition 
of the new personal law. 
Hence, desertion in X in case (i) is sufficient for divorce 
in Y; desertion in Y in case ( ii) is insufficient in X. 
(b) Conversely, the facts which happened when the per-
sonal law was not yet changed should be evaluated by the 
personal law of the party at that time. 
Hence, desertion in X is no ground; desertion in Y is a 
sufficient ground for both courts in both cases ( i) and ( ii). 
(c) Divorce should be granted only if the facts warrant 
divorce under both laws, the former personal law of the 
time when the facts occurred and the present personal law. 
266 Polish Sup. Ct. (Dec. 9, 1935) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 742· 
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Hence, action is dismissed in both cases ( i) and ( ii) . 
The first view- (a) -is naturally taken by courts apply-
ing the lex fori. Under this theory, decisions were formerly 
rendered by the German courts, as by the great majority of 
American cases. 267 It is also applied by the French courts in 
determining grounds for divorce according to the lex fori 
when the applicant is a French national; in the leading case, 
the Ferrari case, the Court of Cassation justified the grant-
ing of divorce under French law by events preceding the re-
naturalization of the plaintiff wife by declaring that the ac-
tion was to be based not so much on the material events as 
upon the harm done by them to the conjugal life. 268 It is 
remarkable that this view was accepted by the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in a case analogous to the Ferrari case, so that the 
court applied only Swiss law, although for this purpose a 
strictly contrary statutory provision had to be daringly inter-
preted as referring to foreign plaintiffs only.269 French 
courts, however, seem to extend the retroactive force of the 
lex fori to divorce actions of foreigners. 210 
The second view-(b )-agrees with a literal construction 
of the J apancse statute providing that divorce is governed 
by the national law of the husband at the time when the 
facts causing divorce occurred. 211 This method avoids in a 
radical way any attempt at evasion by the husband but ts 
highly impractical. 
267 Germany: RG. (June 19, 1883) 9 RGZ. 191, I93· 
England, see WESTLAKE § 5Z. 
United States: MINOR § 84; I BEALE § II0.5. 
268 Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1928) Clunet 1928, 383; see particularly App. 
Limoges (Feb. z6, 1929) and App. Nimes {April 15, 1929) Clunet 1930, 368. 
C antra: AUDINET, Note to Cass. ( civ.) (Feb. 5, 1929) 8.1930.1.81 ff., criticiz-
ing the retroactive effect given to a naturalization; but see LEREBOURs-PIGEON-
NIERE 367 no. 339· 
26
" BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93· 
270 LAURENT, 3 Principes 537 ff. no. 306, and many decisions, particularly, 
Cass. {civ.) (May 7, 1928)) 8.1929.1·9· 
211 Japan, Law of 1898, art. 16. 
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The third opinion- (c) -goes far back and was strongly 
advocated by an editor of Story's work, Judge Redfield, 
claiming that: 
"It would be an intolerable perversion that an act which by 
the law of the State where committed was no cause of di-
vorce should, by the removal of the parties to another State 
where the law was different, become sufficient to produce a 
dissolution of the married relation." 272 
In this assertion, the words "State where committed" are 
evidently a mistake. That the state where the act was com-
mitted should be of any importance was sharply denied by 
Story.273 Redfield plainly meant the state where the party 
was formerly domiciled; an act or conduct should not war-
rant divorce, if insufficient in the state where the party was 
domiciled at the time when it occurred.274 The rule as formu-
lated, however, was adopted by many statutes and even by 
the American Uniform Draft of 1900 and 1907, that of 
I 900 running as follows : 
"No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to 
the residence of the complainant or the defendant in this 
state which was not a ground for divorce in the state where 
the cause arose." 275 
This confusion of the time when, and the place where, the 
offence occurred, makes the interpretation of the various 
American statutes difficult. 
The sanction that Story himself would have had in mind 
was certainly the refusal of jurisdiction.276 Correspondingly, 
272 REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 230C. 
273 STORY § 230a. 
274 REDFIELD in STORY ( ed. 6) § 23oc speaks of the transfer of the domicil. 
§ 23od, however, sounds again perplexing. 
275 Draft printed in 14 Harv. L. Rev. (1901) 525, sec. r. The explanation 
at 526 is rather confused. 
2 76 See STORY's own quotation § 230a of Gibson, C. J., in Dorsey v. Dorsey 
(1838) 7 Watts (Pa.) 349; and see WHARTON § 231 on the later events in 
Pennsylvania. 
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the actual statutes possess two kinds of clauses. On the one 
hand, jurisdiction for divorce is often denied, with or with-
out statutory provision, when the cause of action occurred 
outside of the state and the spouses were domiciled at the 
time out of the state. On the other hand, in many statutes 
the required time of residence preliminary to the action is 
prolonged, if the cause took place outside of the state. What-
ever the exact sense of these clauses may be, their tendency 
is to prevent or to render it difficult for a fact to be appre-
ciated by a court under a law other than would be relevant 
if the party in question had stayed at his domicil. Apparently 
the draftsmen of the statutes have felt bound to the law of 
the forum, if once jurisdiction is assumed, and therefore have 
thought that the only remedy is to deny jurisdiction. A con-
nected provision of the Uniform Act of 1906 211 seems to 
follow this conception. The wording of the draft that had 
preceded in 1900,218 however, reproduced in the preceding 
paragraph, may possibly be understood as involving a choice 
of law, meaning that the divorce ground is governed by the 
law of the domicil as of the time when the facts complained 
of happened. A consequence would be, that where the alleged 
cause fails to agree with such foreign law, the suit ought to 
be dismissed as to the merits, and not only quoad instantiam. 
The same idea was to be found in Europe in the early 
nineteenth century and is now frequent. 279 The German 
statute, after providing that (EG. art. !71 par. I) divorce 
is governed by the law of the husband as of the time of the 
commencement of the action, prescribes that (ibid., par. 2) 
a fact that has occurred while the husband belonged to an-
211 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra 
n. 4, at §§ 8(b), w(b) adopted in Del. Rev. Code (1953) 13 §§ 1525(2), 
1527(2); N. ]. Stat. Ann. (1952) § 2A: 34-10(2). 
278 Draft of Uniform Divorce Law loc. cit., supra n. 4, cf. Ky. Rev. Code 
(1953) §403.035(2). 
279 App. Liege (April 24, 1826) Pasicrisie 1826, 125, 127; for the practice 
of the Prussian courts, compare Gebhardsche Materialien r88. 
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other state cannot be claimed as a ground for divorce, unless 
the fact is ground for divorce or separation also according to 
the laws of that other state. 
Correspondingly, the law of a former common nationality 
of the parties is to be consulted according to the Hague Con-
vention and the Polish, Swedish, Swiss, Czechoslovakian, 
and Hungarian statutes/80 and the law of the former domicil 
is influential in the Scandinavian countries 281 and under the 
Codigo Bustamante.282 
A special problem arises, if permanent conditions, such as 
mental deficiency, venereal disease, or habits of drunkenness, 
are recognized reasons for divorce under the new but not 
under the old statute; can desertion be said to begin only 
after the acquisition of the new status? The American cases 
are divided.283 Suppose a married couple was domiciled in 
New York, where insanity is not a cause for divorce, and 
280 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 4· 
Poland: Law of L926 on international private law, art. r7 par. 2. 
Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 2 par. 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 2; cf. BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93; 
SCHNITZER 175. 
Hungary: Formerly Marriage Law of 189+, § rrs par. r. 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, s. 19, as pre-
viously the treaties of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia (March 17, 1923, art. 
34 par. 2), Poland (March 6, 1925, art. 7, abrogated by that of Jan. 2 I, 
I949), and Rumania (May 7, 1925, art. 19 par. 2); cf. SvoBODA, 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 313 n. 186. 
In Republican Spain LASALA LLANAS 140 advocates the same principle. 
281 Denmark: prevailing opinion, see MuNcH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewen-
feld I 747; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. so; HoEcK, Personalstatut 
33; BORUM 123. 
Norway: see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II9. 
Iceland: see EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762. 
282 Art. 52; cf. art. 54 and BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes 
de Rio 121, no. 124. 
Cf. Guatemala: former C. C. art. 209. 
283 I BEALE 473 § rro.5. The courts of New Jersey are consistent in requir-
ing that the two year period for desertion must have run after the deserting 
party became a resident of the state; see Berger v. Berger ( I918) 89 N. ]. Eq. 
430, 105 Atl. 496, and citations at 497· The other view was taken by two old 
decisions of New Hampshire, see I BEALE 474 n. 2; Batchelder v. Batchelder 
(1843) 14 N.H. 38o; Hopkins v. Hopkins (1857) 35 N. H. 474· 
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later transferred their domicil to Norway, where it is, if 
continued through three years. Should a time of lunacy 
spent in New York be counted? This question ought to be 
affirmed, to avoid an unreasonable rule.284 
The choice of law rule just contemplated, although sys-
tematically better justified than the refusal of jurisdiction, 
makes the task of the judge delicate. Under the European 
formulas, several legislations must be simultaneously ap-
plied; if the parties have changed from a foreign nationality 
to two other foreign ones, this makes three, and with the 
law of the forum, four. No judge will like so much complica-
tion. All these rules may be questioned. Some of them seem 
practically superfluous. The German provision was designed 
to prevent the husband, whose national law alone is de-
cisive, from changing his nationality so as to force his new 
law on his wife, if the new law were more favorable for 
obtaining divorce.285 Similar are the purposes of enactments 
preserving the divorce law of a former domicil. But there is 
no sufficient reason to complicate things where the last com-
mon nationality or domicil of the parties is chosen to govern, 
just for the reason that it renders a change of status of one 
party harmless. 
As a whole, the contrast of opinions concerns the basic 
theory. Where the law of the domicil dominates' ideas, it is 
likely that this law will be regarded as determining the ju-
dicial value of the facts occurring during its reign. The 
European rules described above are derived in an analogous 
way from the personal national law. On the contrary, the 
majority view in this country is manifestly conceived within 
the sphere of territorialism. 
While American courts, at least, are consistent in follow-
284 Contra, RAAPE 388 and IPR. 277. 
285 Conversely, it seems that the husband is able to avoid a threatened di-
vorce by changing to a more rigid law; LETZGUS, 145 Arch. Civ. Prax. 299· 
492 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
ing the idea of a territorial law of the forum, some impor-
tant European courts inaugurating a similar theory have 
rebelled against the current respect for the national law. We 
have mentioned above the leading case of Ferrari; the 
French Court of Cassation granted divorce to the wife who 
was Italian by marriage but had recovered French nation-
ality. No new facts had arisen since the separation of the 
parties from bed and board, rendered before the wife's 
re-naturalization. If the French Court of Cassation granted 
the divorce upon the anterior facts because the action was 
based, not so much upon the material facts as upon the harm 
done by them to the conjugal life/86 the reasoning certainly 
is untenable; the different legislations determine precisely 
what kind of facts should be regarded as essentially disturb-
ing the marital community. 287 However, in view of the fact 
that one of the most reliable courts in the world, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, followed the French example all the way, 
in the face of the express contrary legal provision, 288 we must 
conceive that the application of the foreign law appears 
unbearable to judges. 
Hence, the European courts are coming back to where the 
English and the American courts have remained; the case 
where the plaintiff has changed to the domicil or nationality 
of the forum is the really important one. Of course, there is 
the evident danger of encouraging evasion of foreign laws, 
and the French courts have been reproached on this ground, 
the more so since they had been extremely sensitive to foreign 
divorce "in fraud" of French law. English criticism of this 
system emphasizes that a husband can, by transferring his 
domicil to England, escape the indissolubility of marriage 
286 See suPra n. 268. 
287 AUDINET, Note to Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 5, 1929) S.1930.I.8I.83; but cf. 
LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 368. 
288 See supra n. 269. 
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inherent in the law of his former domicil, and thus cause 
hardship to the wife and provoke legal difficulties, since the 
resulting decree, in all probability, will not be recognized in 
other countries involved. 289 This case has not been covered 
by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937. That Act only 
helps the wife to maintain the English home, but even for 
this it is not clear whether the English jurisdiction is exclu-
sive. The majority of the American statutes have tried to 
define the jurisdiction of the courts by those various addi-
tional requirements which we have mentioned before; these 
clauses are complicated and not really effective, except where 
the minimum residence is seriously upheld. 
The case where both parties change their personal law 
in favor of that of the forum, has always been felt as less 
shocking than the circumvention of a divorce law by one of 
the spouses to the detriment of the other. Also the means 
of repression need not be necessarily the same. The German 
provision was intended to prevent the husband from arbi-
trarily changing his law, which was the governing law; but 
the Hague Convention avoided this peril by constituting the 
law of the last common national law as governing. Both 
cases, however, ought to be clearly envisaged in future 
discussions. 
VIII. CoNcLusioNs 
Three systems are outstanding. The first, the American 
method of applying the lex fori to divorce suits w)th foreign 
elements, has revealed itself as being unique. In the wide 
domains of the British commonwealth of nations, and under 
the Montevideo and the Scandinavian Treaties, the litiga-
tion takes place at the actual or, in certain cases, the last 
matrimonial domicil, so that the law of the forum is in 
harmony with the genuine domiciliary principle. The third 
28° CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 479· 
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main solution presented by the Continental European and the 
Chinese and Japanese legislations has been derived from the 
doctrine that the national law of the parties must be re-
spected, although the domestic law has to be consulted at the 
same time. The courts, in these latter countries, are open to 
foreigners domiciled in the state and in many cases as well 
to nationals domiciled abroad. Now here, however, in these 
two systems do courts accept divorce suits at the domicil 
of the plaintiff alone and at the same time apply exclusively 
the local divorce statutes, even though the plaintiff is of 
foreign nationality. This is literally the rule in this country 
in the case of an alien petitioner. But the characteristic point 
of comparison is that where the plaintiff, an American citi-
zen, has by his domicil therein become a citizen of the state, 
this state will assume jurisdiction and apply its own statute 
exclusively, irrespective of the past and present legal situa-
tion of the other spouse. We have seen that no learned doc-
trine is able to justify this principle. We have also alluded 
to some of the evils to which it leads. But we have begun our 
comparative study for the purpose of finding out whether 
the methods used abroad are preferable. 
The answer is, flatly, no. 
The system centered around the matrimonial domicil is 
of tempting simplicity and offers a splendid basis for inter-
national cooperation. However, the United States and the 
states of the nationality principle cannot be expected to re-
store the idyllic conditions permitting such unity of rules. 290 
Again, it has never been discussed whether it would not be 
feasible and advisable to have a court, sitting at the domicil 
of one party, apply the law of the last common domicil in-
stead of its own law, irrespective of the time when the cause 
occurred. 
290 However, the latest development in France clearly tends into this di-
rection. 
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The system of cumulative application of laws is so com-
plicated that the difficulties connected with it seem out of 
proportion to its usefulness. More fateful still, the pre-
carious balance between the foreign and the domestic law 
achieved in the German Code and the Hague Convention has 
been finally destroyed by the judicial and legislative move-
ment characterized by the Ferrari case. Such a fervent advo-
cate of the nationality principle as Pillet immediately per-
ceived how incompatible with this principle it is to apply the 
domestic law to a foreign husband. This system is in ruins. 
A radical clearing up will be inevitable sooner or later. 
Thus, really, it cannot be contended that the methods used 
outside of this country are superior to the framework of the 
American law of this ~ubject. 
Reforms can consist of a very simple development. The 
requirement of a minimum residence time is today the chief 
vehicle for correcting the scope of divorce jurisdiction. Uni-
form drafts have acknowledged its importance and insisted 
that the minimum should be of one or two years. This re-
quirement ought to be freed from the wild-grown tendrils 
with which it is surrounded, and it should be enforced with 
the utmost rigidity. This method demonstrated by a century's 
history as being suitable to exigencies of life in America, 
brings us nearer to the much spoken of "interest of the state" 
in the married status of its domiciliaries. In the twilight 
under which it is hard to distinguish a freshly acquired actual 
domicil from a fictitious one, that is, a non-domicil, a court 
that must predicate its jurisdiction upon the "interest of the 
state" so defined is in an unenviable position. In order to 
compete with another state in the task of adjudging any 
status of a person, the state should ascertain that the person 
belongs to the life of the state, regularly and definitively. 
Such competition cannot be helped. But at least evasion 
among the states, and evasion by one spouse at the cost of 
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the other, would be eliminated. With a two years' residence, 
or even a period of one year, strictly observed, any intention 
of obtaining divorce under the conditions is immaterial. Be-
sides, very few individuals are able to change their local 
connections completely and to maintain their new center of 
private and business life during such a time merely to gain 
a divorce. Not every necessary improvement, of course, can 
be accomplished by such a measure alone; perhaps this is the 
reason why the uniform drafts have not appeared to attract 
sufficiently active support to accomplish a general reform. 
Where the parties are actually domiciled in two different 
states, the adequate method of dealing with the case is not 
to apply the statute of either state, but rather to apply that 
of the last common domicil. This suggestion should be ap-
preciated by future European legislators. Whether it could 
be brought into the structure of the American statutory 
systems might be a matter of discussion. 
More important, however, are reforms in the field of 
domestic divorce practice. They are prerequisites also of a 
better and sounder system of reciprocal recognition of for-
eign decrees. 
CHAPTER 12 
Recognition of Foreign Divorce 1 
D IVERGENCES concerning recognition of foreign divorces are too great to allow any systematic com-parison. 2 A few texts, representing the three sys-
tems described in the preceding chapter, illustrate the 
situation: 
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, § I I3. A 
state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve 
the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the 
state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if 
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state ( i) has 
consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or 
( ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to 
object to the acquisition of such separate home; or (iii) is 
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which 
grants the divorce; or 
(b) the state is the last state in which the spouses were 
domiciled together as man and wife. 
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law 
(I 940), Article I 5. The law of the matrimonial domicil 
governs: (a) conjugal separation; (b) dissolubility of mar-
riage; but recognition of the dissolubility shall not be obliga-
tory upon the state where the marriage was solemnized, if 
1 Comparative literature: LORENZEN, "The Enforcement of Rmerican Judg-
ments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. ( 1919) 188, 268; VREELAND, Validity of Foreign 
Divorces ( 1938) ; GurrERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial 
Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1938) 19; READ, Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of the British 
Commonwealth ( 1938) ; GRISWOLD, "Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of 
Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study," 65 Harv. L. Rev. (1951/52) 193-
233, 217 If.; HOYER, Anerkennung von Entscheidungen in Ehesachen im A us-
land auf Grund inneren Staatenrechts ( 1951); W. JELLINEK, Die zweiseitigen 
Staatsvertriige iiber die Anerkennung ausliindischer Zivilurteile (with texts) 
(Beitriige zum ausliindischen und internationalen Privatrerht, Heft 24, 1953). 
2 See VREELAND, Validity of Foreign Divorces 319 If. 
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the ground invoked for dissolution was divorce and if the 
local laws do not admit of that ground as such. In no case 
shall the celebration of a subsequent marriage, in accordance 
with the laws of another state, constitute the crime of 
bigamy. 
Article 59· Actions for annulment of marriage, divorce, 
or dissolution, and, in general, actions regarding all ques-
tions which affect the relations of spouses, shall be instituted 
before the judges of the matrimonial domicil. . . . 
German Code of Civil Procedure, § 328. Recognition of 
the judgment of a foreign court is excluded: 
I. If the courts of the state to which the foreign court 
belongs are not competent, according to the German laws; 
2. If the unsuccessful defendant is a German and has not 
defended the proceeding, provided that summons initiating 
the proceeding has been served on him neither personally 
within the state of the court of suit nor by means of German 
judicial assistance; 
3· If the judgment, to the detriment of a German party, 
disagrees with the provisions of article 13, par. I, 3 or 
articles 17, IS, 22 of the Introductory Law to the Civil 
Code, ... 
4· If recognition of the judgment would violate morals or 
the purpose of a German law; 
5. If reciprocity is not guaranteed. . . . 
l. INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS 3 
r. England 4 
A foreign final decree of divorce is recognized by English 
courts, if (I) it is rendered by the court of any other coun-
8 With respect to countries not considered here, see: 
For Switzerland, GAuTSCHI, "Die Anerkennung von ausHindischen Ehe-
scheidungsurteilen," SJZ. 1926, I. 
For Italy: SERENI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev. 
( 1943) 286, 291; CANSACCHI, "L'Evolution depuis 1945 du droit italien en 
matii~re de reconnaissance et d'execution des decisions etrangeres d'annulation 
du mariage et de divorce," Revue Crit. 1952, 241-252. 
For Brazil: H. VALLADAO, Estudios de Dire ito Internacional Privado 
(1947) 151-157· 
For Ecuador: ScHWIND, "New Conflict of Law Rules in Divorce Cases," 
4 Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 603-606. 
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try, which is competent according to its own lex fori,S and 
( 2) if (a) the husband was domiciled in the English sense 
in that country 6 at the time of the commencement of the suit 
for divorce 7 or (b) if the de.cree would be recognized by 
the court of the husband's domicil.8 
Illustrations: (a) An English married couple went to live 
in Detroit, Michigan; the wife returned to England; by 
agreement with her, the husband brought action for divorce 
and obtained a decree by default in the Wayne County Court. 
The High Court of England presumed that both spouses 
were domiciled in Detroit, as the husband certainly was.9 
Therefore, recognizing the Michigan divorce, the High 
Court dismissed an action of the wife for divorce.10 
(b) A husband, resident in Michigan according to Ameri-
can conceptions but domiciled in Canada according to British 
law, obtained a divorce decree in Michigan. The decree was 
For Venezuela: ]. SANCHEZ-COVISA, La Eficacia de las Sentencias Ex-
tranjeras de Divorcio { 1956). 
4 FALCONBRIDGE, "Recognition of Foreign Divorces" [1932] 4 D.L.R. 39, 
now Essays 736; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of 
Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 89; ELKIN, Clunet 1938, 98; 
CHESHIRE 374· 
5 Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209. 
6 Harvey v. Farnie [188o] 5 P. D. 153, [1882-1883] 8 App. Cass. 43; Le 
Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] 20 App. Cas. 517; Lankester v. Lankester 
[1925] P. 114; Simons v. Simons [1939] I K. B. 490 {Massachusetts decree). 
Gatty v. Att. Gen. [1951] P. 444, Clunet 1954, 152 {North Dakota decree; 
dictum: domicil cannot be acquired in the USA. as such but only in one of 
the states). 
7 Wilson v. Wilson {1872) [1869-1872] L. R. 2 P. & D. 435· 
8 Armitage v. Att. Gen. [1906] P. 135 {divorce decree in South Dakota 
would be recognized in New York, where the husband was domiciled; hence 
recognized in England). Cass v. Cass (1910) 102 L. T. R. 397, Clunet 1910, 
1259 (South Dakota decree not recognized in Massachusetts, where husband 
was domiciled; hence recognition denied in England); Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi 
(no. 2) [1953] P. 220 (Jewish divorce in England valid at the husband's 
domicil in Israel recognized in England); Walker v. Walker [1950] 4 
D. L. R. 253 (Reno divorce valid in California recognized in British Co-
lumbia). 
9 Crowe v. Crowe {1937) 157 L. T. R. 557, [1937] 2 All E. R. 723, Clunet 
1938, 97; similarly, Leigh v. Leigh [1937] I D. L. R. 773 (if nothing is 
proved, the court will presume that the foreign tribunal (again a Detroit 
court) had jurisdiction over the parties by reason of domicil and that the 
domicil was properly and validly established). 
1° Cf. the reasoning of FALCONBRIDGE in [1932] 4 D. L. R. 41, supra n. 4. 
before the Amendment Act of 1937. 
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not recognized in Canada 11 and therefore not m England 
either. 
English courts are known, however, by courtesy to recog-
nize the finding of domicil by trustworthy foreign courts.12 
The recent change of legislation (Matrimonial Causes 
Act of 1937) by which a deserted wife may institute suit at 
the last marital domicil would seem to bring about recogni-
tion of foreign jurisdiction under analogous circumstances; 13 
no authorities are yet known. 
The English rule is so exclusively influenced by jurisdic-
tional considerations that the reasons upon which a foreign 
court bases its decree are immaterial. The grounds of the 
foreign decree need not be in accord with the grounds for 
divorce established in English matrimoniallaw,14 provided, 
of course, the decree does not violate good morals. 
2. The United States 15 
While recognition of decrees of foreign countries attracts 
scant attention, recognition of divorces rendered in sister 
11 Rex v. Woods {1903) 6 Ont. L. R. 41; similarly, Green v. Green [1893] 
P. 89 {Pennsylvania decree). 
12 Information obtained in a Swiss divorce case; see WYLER, SJZ. {1933-34) 
199· 
13 The Court of Appeal expressed itself favorably in this sense, Travers 
v. Holley [1953] P. 246, [1953] 2 All E. R. 794; the dictum was followed by 
Carr v. Carr [1955] 2 All E. R. 6r, Arnold v. Arnold [1957] P. 237, and 
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott [1957] 3 All E. R. 473· But the foreign "ex-
traordinary" jurisdiction must be similar to the English, Dunne v. Saban 
(1954) [1955] P. 178 (Florida decree based on 90 days residence of wife not 
recognized) . 
Before the Act of 1937, recognition in England and throughout the British 
Dominions of a divorce rendered in New Zealand under the provision ena-
bling a deserted wife to sue at the last matrimonial domicil was anticipated 
by Mr. Justice Denniston in Poingdestre v. Poingdestre (1909) 28 N. Z. L. R. 
604, II G. L. R. 585, but doubted in the case of a Victoria decree by Chief 
Justice Irvine in Chia v. Chia [1921] V. L. R. 566. See READ, Recognition and 
Enforcement 229, who shared the doubts. The Victoria Supreme Court has 
now expressly disapproved of the doctrine of Travers v. Holley, see Fenton v. 
Fenton [1957] V.L.R. 17. 
14 Harvey v. Farnie [r88o] 5 P. D. 153, cited supra n. 6; Pemberton v. 
Hughes [1899] I Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209, cited supra n. 5; 
Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19, [1936] 3 All E. R. 130. 
1 5 Selected older literature is listed by I BEALE 467 n. 3 ; GOODRICH 408 
n. 42. For recent literature see supra p. 418, n. 12. 
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states is one of the most discussed subjects of American law. 
The formidable complications ensuing from conflicting social 
policies and constitutional controversies have not been met 
with consistent and purposive judicial methods, in part due 
to the limited federal control exercised over the subject 
matter by the Supreme Court under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. One school of thought, indeed, has seemed to 
prefer cautious case construction to any rules. However, in 
recent decades before Williams v. North Carolina 16 revived 
the conflict of opinions, it was prevailingly assumed that the 
recognition due under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Federal Constitution depended upon the following re-
quirements : 
(a) Under that Clause as construed by the Supreme 
Court, it was assumed that a state had the duty to recognize 
a divorce pronounced in a sister state X: 
( i) When both parties were domiciled in X; 17 
( ii) (Probably) when the defendant was domiciled in X; 
(iii) When the plaintiff was domiciled in the state and, 
in addition, one of the following three conditions 
was fulfilled, viz., that: 
X is the state where the parties lived together for the last 
time before they separated 18 or 
The defendant has been personally served with process or 
voluntarily appeared in X 19 or 
(In a disputed opinion) the defendant has caused the 
parties to be separated by his or her marital mts-
conduct.20 
16 Williams et al. v. North Carolina (1942) 317 U. S. 297, 143 A. L. R. 
1273; (no. 2) (1945) 325 U.S. 226. 
1 7 Restatement § uo; Haddock v. Haddock ( 1906) 201 U. S. 562 at 570. 
1 8 Atherton v. Atherton ( 1901) r8r U. S. 155; Thompson v. Thompson 
( 1913) 226 U. S. 551; Crimm v. Crimm ( 1924) 211 Ala. 13, 99 So. 301. 
1 9 Cheever v. Wilson (1870) 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. Ed. 6o4; for state cases, see 
t BEALE 506 n. 7· 
2o Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87; "generally accepted as law in the 
United States," ]ACOBS, Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (ed. 
2, 1939) 354 n. 2. 
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Inversely, no state, in the prevailing opinion, was obli-
gated to recognize a divorce pronounced by a sister state, if 
the plaintiff alone was domiciled in the divorce state and 
none of the three additional facts also appeared, particularly 
when the court had assumed jurisdiction only on the ground 
of constructive service of process on the defendant.21 Accord-
ing to the Restatement, 22 such a divorce would be void even 
in the state where it was rendered; this view, however, has 
been generally disapproved. 23 
Without the obligation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the majority of the states also recognize a divorce 
granted a resident plaintiff as valid when the defendant has 
been served by publication only. 24 A small minority, however, 
have refused recognition either generally or when, at the 
time of the decree, the defendant was domiciled within the 
forum of recognition or in a third state which did not recog-
nize the divorce. 25 
In principle, a divorce rendered in a state in which neither 
of the parties was domiciled is not recognized, irrespective 
of whether the defendant was personally served or put in 
an appearance. 26 This is fundamental. 
(b) This set of rules has been modified by the Williams 
case to an extent still discussed. To an unbiased mind, how-
2 1 Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562. 
22 Restatement § II3 comment g. 
23 BINGHAM, "The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court," 21 Cor-
nell L. Q. ( 1936) 393· At present, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his 
concurring vote in the Williams case postulates equal treatment of divorce 
decrees in all jurisdictions. 
24 Miller v. Miller ( 1925) 200 Iowa II93, 206 N. W. 262. 
25 New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and others 
which are variously listed by the writers; cf., for instance JACOBS, "Attack 
on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749, 756 n. 38; VREELAND 
327, 328; GOODRICH 348, n. 40. 
26 Bell v. Bell ( 1901) I8I U. S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews ( 1903) 188 U. S. 
14; Jardine v. Jardine (1937) 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N. E. (2d) 645; Voorhis 
v. Voorhis (1936) 184 La. 406, 166 So. I2I; Restatement §III. 
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ever, the impression made upon most practical lawyers 27 
appears right; the decision eliminates the alternative require-
ments described under (iii) above altogether, so as to hold 
it unqualifiedly sufficient that the decree be rendered at the 
domicil of the plaintiff. This construction of the case is sup-
ported by the facts of the twin cases decided, as the Nevada 
court had taken jurisdiction in the one case on service by 
publication and in the other by personal service beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court. The express declaration of the 
Supreme Court that Had dock v. Haddock is overruled, 
therefore, should not be taken as an obiter dictum or a non-
committal announcement of a future policy. Not even wrong-
ful desertion of the wife by the husband, according to the 
majority of the Justices, is relevant to the jurisdictional 
question whether the new domicil of the husband suffices for 
the purpose of divorce. A divorce pronounced in the state of 
the plaintiff's domicil ought to be recognized in any state in-
cluding that of the defendant's domicil or that of the former 
matrimonial domicil. Whatever criticism may be aroused, it 
may be justifiably claimed that the decision frees courts and 
lawyers from "hopeless refinements," 28 as well as from 
many extremely difficult fact findings, 29 and narrows con-
siderably the number of cases where the validity of the 
divorce and of a remarriage is subject to contrary holding in 
different states. The rule of the Williams case has been in-
corporated into the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act 
( 1948) adopted, so far, in nine states.29a An unfortunate 
feature of the case is due to the fact that the majority of 
the Supreme Court, for certain technical reasons which are 
27 See in particular the Annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294 ff., as against the 
subtle polemics by BINGHAM, "Song of Sixpence," 29 Cornell L. Q. {1943) I. 
28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Williams case, supra 
n. 16, at 307. 
29 Note, 143 A. L. R. 1296 ff. 
2 9a Viz., California, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin. 
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approved by learned critics,30 failed to enter into a discussion 
of the question whether the two plaintiffs, Mr. Williams and 
Mrs. Hendrix, actually were domiciled in Reno. The court 
in Reno established its jurisdiction on their residence, during 
the six weeks prescribed, in the "Alamo Auto Court" of 
Reno. The very fact that awakened the indignation of the 
courts in North Carolina, to which the victorious parties 
brazenly returned immediately as newly married husband 
and wife, became the issue of the second fVi!liams case. 30" 
Here the finding of the North Carolina courts that the par-
ties had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada was 
admitted by the Supreme Court; therefore, the Nevada de-
cree was not entitled to full faith and credit. An interested 
party has the right to challenge the jurisdictional facts of a 
foreign divorce. 
(c) Either under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or 
under the doctrine regarding the invoking of jurisdiction, 
several courts, particularly those of New York, 31 have de-
veloped a bar to the impeachment of an invalid divorce. A 
person who has been an active party to a divorce suit or a 
person who has in some way profited from a divorce, for 
instance by remarrying, is not allowed to allege the invalidity 
of the divorce. This doctrine results in consequences which 
approach recognition of decrees that would otherwise have 
been held void or voidable. But the application of the doc-
trine is confused and uncertain.32 
30 BINGHAM, 29 Cornell L. Q. ( 1943), supra n. 23, at 3: "few lawyers will 
disagree." But see the dissenting vote in the Williams case, supra n. 16, by 
Mr. Justice Jackson, at p. 320 under "III, Lack of domicile." 
soawilliams v. North Carolina (no. 2) (1945) 325 U. S. 226; Rice v. 
Rice ( 1949) 336 U. S. 674. 
31 In re Ellis' Estate ( 1893) 55 Minn. 401, 412, 413, 56 N. W. 1056, 1059, 
106o; Kelsey v. Kelsey (1922) 197 N.Y. Supp. 371, aff'd 237 N.Y. 520, 1+3 
N. E. 726; Krause v. Krause (1940) 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290; Ma-
loney v. Maloney (1940) 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 334· Restatement§ 112. 
32 Cf. JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 
749, 771; Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1255 and literature cited therein; 
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(d) Another limitation on the right to impeach a foreign 
divorce decree involves the review of jurisdictional facts. 
On general principles, the court where recognition is sought 
would be free to reopen the question whether the plaintiff 
was domiciled within the state of judgment or whether the 
defendant unjustifiedly deserted the plaintiff, as facts upon 
which the jurisdiction for granting divorce was based. 82a 
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, seem to indicate that the forum is bound to give full 
faith and credit to the finding of the divorce court when the 
defendant put in a special appearance and litigated the ques-
tion of domicil or desertion 33 or had at least full oppor-
tunity to contest the jurisdictional issue.33a 
Most influential is the tendency of courts, disturbed by the 
inconsistent treatment of divorces in the different states, to 
cover up defects in the jurisdictional justification of divorce 
decrees or, in the apt description by Lorenzen, "to close their 
eyes to the actualities of the situation and to allow juries to 
find the existence of a bona fide domicile in the state of di-
vorce on technical grounds." 84 What palpably constitutes a 
temporary stay of a plaintiff ready to return to his real home 
immediately upon rendition of the decree, is dissembled as a 
Note, 122 A. L. R. (1939) 1321. Cf. the caveat in Restatement § II2 mean-
while eliminated ( 1948 Supp.). 
32a Williams v. North Carolina (no. 2) (1945) 325 U. S. 226; Esenwein 
v. Commonwealth (1945) 325 U. S. 279· 
33 Davis v. Davis ( 1938) 305 U. S. 32; Case note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
(1939) 290; Note, 3 U. of Detroit L. J. (1939) 32; Note, II8 A. L. R. (1931) 
1524; Coe v. Coe (1948) 334 U. S. 378; cf. other applications of the theory: 
Stoll v. Gottlieb (1938) 305 U. S. 165; Chicot County Drainage District v. 
Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U. S. 371, rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 
695. See also FARRIER, "Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdic-
tional Facts," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. ( 1935) 552; and Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1940) 652. 
a sa Sherrer v. Sherrer ( 1948} 334 U. S. 343, distinguishing Williams v. 
North Carolina (no. 2) (supra n. 32a); Nappe v. Nappe (1956) 20 N.J. 337, 
120 A. (zd) 31. 
34 LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 341, 
348, 352, 353· 
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domicil replacing it for good, first by the divorce forum and 
subsequently by that of recognition. 
(e) On the other hand, the courts tend to limit the effects 
of such liberally recognized divorce decrees obtained at the 
domicil of only one spouse to the marital status of the par-
ties as distinguished from other personal or proprietary 
consequences. Thus, a decree for alimony granted in a sepa-
ration proceeding in New York was held unaffected by a 
subsequent Nevada divorce because the second spouse had 
not been subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court and 
support decrees survive a divorce under New York law.34a 
Even an unadjudicated claim for alimony survives a foreign 
ex parte divorce.34b Likewise, lack of jurisdiction over the 
wife justified refusal to give full faith and credit to a custody 
order included in an otherwise valid divorce decree granted 
at the husband's domicil.34c 
(f) A divorce rendered in a foreign country is, of course, 
not covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Neverthe-
less, a state will ordinarily recognize such a divorce under 
the same circumstances that it gives credit to a sister state's 
decree.35 Also the method followed in ascertaining the domi-
cil of the divorced party ordinarily is that customary in 
34R Estin v. Estin {1948) 334 U. S. 541; Kreiger v. Kreiger (1948) 3H 
U. S. 555; Mr. Justice Douglas in Esenwein v. Commonwealth {1945) 325 
U. S. 279, 281; Worthley v. Worthley {1955) 44 Cal. {2d) 465, 4ti8, 283 
P. (2d) 19, 21. Conversely, in the case of a Massachusetts alimony decree 
followed by a Nevada divorce in which both parties had appeared, Coe v. 
Coe (1948) 334 U.S. 378, 383; Nappe v. Nappe (1956) 20 N.J. 337, 120 A. 
(2d) 31, 37· 
34b Armstrong v. Armstrong ( 1956) 350 U. S. 568; a conforming New York 
statute {s. 117o-b Civil Practice Act) enacted in 1953 was held constitutional, 
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt (1956) 1 N.Y. (2d) 342, 135 N. E. {2d) 553, aff'd 
354 u. s. (1957) 416. 
34c May v. Anderson ( 1953) 345 U. S. 528 (the children were at the 
mother's domicil). 
35 For recent cases see Note, 143 A. L. R. at 1313; cf. HACKWORTH, 2 Digest 
of International Law ( 1941) 382 s. 168. 
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American courts rather than determination according to the 
view of the foreign divorce court.36 Yet it has been decided 
in agreement with the foreign law whether a married woman 
shares the domicil of her husband.37 Differences from the 
treatment of American decrees are most likely to occur in 
the respect that the place of domicil is more easily to be 
found situated in an American state than in a foreign coun-
try.38 But in Gould v. Gould, the Court of Appeals of New 
York, although stating that the domicil of the parties had 
remained in New York, held their bona fide residence in 
France sufficient for recognition of the French decree, in 
deviation from the doctrine of Andrews v. Andrews; 39 it 
was, however, a special case. Since both parties had appeared 
in the French suit and the decision was based on New York 
law, the court held that "under the circumstances of this case, 
the policy of this state is not offended by the recognition." 40 
(g) Judicial separation, granted at the matrimonial 
domicil, has been held by the United States Supreme Court 
to be entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.41 
More generally, it has been concluded from the cases that 
whenever a decree for judicial separation is granted under 
circumstances such as would have supported jurisdiction for 
36 RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, JW. 1930, 1309 no. 14 (the Ger-
man court, in an Iowa case, respects whatever method is followed in the 
United States). 
37 Torlonia v. Torlonia (1928) 108 Conn. 292, 142 At!. 8431 38 See supra p. 151, n. 157. 
39 (1903) 188 U.S. 14. 
40 ( 1923) 235 N.Y. 14, 29, 138 N. E. 490, 494· STUMBERG 308 thinks estop-
pel was the ground of the decision. In the discussion of the American Law 
Institute, 4 Proceedings, Appendix {1926) 348, 354 Judge Page observed 
that the matrimonial domicil was in Paris; Professor Beale declared himself 
extremely well satisfied by this statement. The court seems to have affirmed 
the domicil in New York for reasons lying outside of the case. 
41 Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 551; cf. GOODRICH 415. Note 
33 Yale L. J. ( 1924) 426. 
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absolute divorce in the sense of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, recognition cannot be withheld.42 
Traditionally, however, where statutes have requirements 
for judicial separation different from those for dissolution 
of marriage, separation may be granted on the basis of 
personal jurisdiction, residence of both parties being suffi-
cient. This, it is understood, only "protects the spouse 
against certain acts of the other spouse while they are within 
the state," 43 without extraterritorial effect.44 
3· France 45 
France has no written law on the recognition of foreign 
divorce decrees, but the practice has developed, in addition 
to the rules concerning foreign judgments in general, certain 
peculiarities as regards foreign judgments affecting status 
and capacity of individuals.46 
(a) Foreign divorce decrees, like other foreign judg-
ments creating or modifying status and capacity, are held 
effective without exequatur by the French courts for purposes 
not requiring physical execution on property or coercion of 
persons.47 
42 Restatement § II4 comment b; STUMBERG 320; GOODRICH 416. In the 
cases concerning extraterritorial effect of divorce decrees, a state may refuse 
to give effect to a limited divorce, while it would recognize a decree of ab-
solute divorce, Pettis v. Pettis (1917) 91 Conn. 6o8, 101 Atl. 13. 
43 Restatement § 114 comment a. 
44 There is no authority, GooDRICH 415. 
45 See DEGAND, 5 Repert. 559 and (with reference to the almost identical Bel-
gian law) PouLLET, nos. 50o-5o4; Novelles Belges, z D. Civ. Divorce, nos. 
1760, 1761. A report was issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and reproduced in the decision of the German RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 
RGZ. 374, Clunet 1939, 122; an excellent discussion by MEZGER, "Scheidung 
von Franzosen im Ausland im Licht der neuesten franzosischen Recht-
sprechung," Festschrift Lewald ( 1953) 317-337; BATIFFOL, "Recognition in 
France of Foreign Decrees Divorcing Spouses of Different Nationality," 4 
Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 574-581. 
46 The subject matter of the practice is extended by LEREBOUR&-PIGEON-
NIERE 333 no. 310 to all judgments which modify a legal situation ( Gestal-
tungsurteile in the German doctrine). 
47 The principle initiated by the Court of Cassation in 186o (infra n. so) 
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Neither the conditions nor the scope of this rule are 
settled, with respect to which the courts seem to enjoy al-
most absolute discretion. One condition certainly is that the 
decree conform to the French rules of choice of law 47a and 
that the court was competent under the rules of its own law.48 
The requirements for the international jurisdiction of the 
divorce court are rather obscure; modern writers do not 
seem to be satisfied unless the jurisdiction complies with the 
French rules or, at least, no French jurisdiction for the 
instant case had existed.48a Often, public policy may inter-
vene, especially when a fair opportunity for defense appears 
to have been lacking.49 
Without being made executory by exequatur, a foreign di-
vorce decree has the effect of forming a proper basis for 
remarriage before a civil official 50 and has been held in a 
much discussed decision to mark the beginning of the three 
was confirmed and formulated in Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185; 
App. Aix (July 9, 1903) D.1905.2.73, S.1906.2.257; cf. WEISS, 6 Traite 41 ff.; 
and with final clarifications in Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377; cf. 
::\'ll30YET, 5 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1931) 479· Occasionally, it is true, exequatur is asked 
and granted without apparent necessity; see App. Agen (July 29, 1936) 
Revue Crit. 1937, 721 and the Note, ibid. (annulment in Chile). 
470 See, e.g., Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 412; Cour 
Paris (Oct. 30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825. 
4
" Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 
1935) Revue 1936, 519 (the Supreme Council of the Armenian Church in 
Constantinople no longer had divorce jurisdiction). 
480 BATIFFOL, Traite 836; NIBOYET, 6 Traite no. 1951-1956. In view of arts. 
q, 15 C. C. a French defendant "has to waive French jurisdiction, even if 
only impliedly by not contesting the foreign jurisdiction, see, e.g., Swiss BG. 
(]an. 14, 1953) 79 BGE. II 7, 9· , 
49 Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185; Trib. civ. Seine (June 29, 1938) 
Clunet 1939, 61 (rejecting a decree of Cuernavaca, Mexico). Cf. App. Aix 
(March 27, 1890) and Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 25, 1892) S.1893.1.505; Cour Paris 
(July 2, 1934) Revue Crit. 1936, 500 (recognizing a decree of the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island granted by default against the husband who was 
notified of the decree and failed to appeal; the note finds this holding "too 
absolute"); Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1948) Revue Crit. 1949, II3, affirmed by 
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 22, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951, 167 (nonrecognition of Reno 
divorce); Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 8o6 (nonrecognition 
of California divorce obtained by default). 
5° Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, 186o) S.186o.1.210. The writers base the custody 
of children on the foreign divorce decree. 
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months during which a divorced wife under French law 51 
must claim, or otherwise lose, any participation in marital 
community property.52 These decisions are understood to 
express the idea that a final foreign divorce decree is assimi-
lated to a French decree. A foreign judicial separation, if 
recognized, may be converted into divorce. 53 
(b) Application for exequatur, however, is necessary not 
only if execution is sought, as for alimentary rights 53a or 
rights of restitution, but also if, in litigation between the 
spouses, one of them denies the validity of the divorce. In a 
case where divorce had been granted in the United States 
at the instance of the husband, the wife sued for divorce 
again in France; the mere fact that she challenged the 
American decree persuaded the Court of Cassation to pre-
vent recognition otherwise than by means of exequatur pro-
ceedings. 54 Further, the regular record of divorce at the 
registry of civil status, essential for terminating marital 
liability of spouses against third persons, cannot be obtained 
without exequatur.55 
The decree of exequatur must be sought in a special pro-
ceeding in the same way and under the same conditions as 
in all cases of foreign judgments. Just what is the subject 
matter of this proceeding is highly controversial, but there 
is no doubt that, despite all contrary theories, the courts 
reserve to themselves in addition to the general control 
51 C. C. art. 1463. 
52 Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377 cited supra n. 47· 
53 Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.1922.1.137; S.1923.1.5; Trib. dep. Alpes-
Maritimes (Oct. 25, 1927) Revue 1928, 328. 
53a Cour Paris (Oct. 30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825. 
54 Cass. (req.) (Nov. u, 1908) Revue 1909, 227, Clunet 1909, 753, 
S.l909.1·572. 
55 Trib. civ. Seine (May 19, 1926) La Loi, Dec. 30, 1927; Cass. (civ.) 
(Jan. 9, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951, 313; contra: Trib. civil Seine (April 26, 
1950) Revue Crit. 1952, 734· Cf., on the effect of omission of transcription, 
Trib. civ. Seine (May 27, 1938) Nouv. Revue 1938, 326. Marginal entry in 
the register is allowed but has informational, not legal, effect. 
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mentioned under (a), the right to unlimited re-examination 
of every point of procedure and substantive law and even of 
the facts of the case,56 although they may not exercise this 
control completely in every case. Ordinarily, they will in-
vestigate whether the divorce was based on a ground ac-
knowledged by the French municipal law. Where, for in-
stance, a Swiss court pronounced divorce on the ground of 
disruption of marriage (C. C. art. 142), the decree was not 
recognized, the cause not being existent under French law. 57 
Recent decisions, however, on the basis of the acquired rights 
theory, have been quite liberal in recognizing, for example, 
foreign decrees based on mutual consent.58 But it has rather 
astonished the commentators that the Court of Appeals of 
Paris, in an exclusively foreign case involving an Argentine 
husband and his American wife, refused exequatur to a di-
vorce decree of the Court of Monaco on the ground that the 
husband had in fact never resided in Europe, although both 
parties had been fully represented in the suit and only the 
parents of the husband wanted to prevent recognition of 
the divorce in order to keep their son from concluding an-
other marriage. 59 French courts always feel repugnance to 
collusive influence on judicial acts. 
This system has been adopted in several countries 00 but 
00 GLASSON et TISSIER, 4 Traite de Procedure Civile {ed. 3, 1932) nos. 1015, 
1016 and 5 ibid. Suppl. no. 1015 bis. 
But there is a distinctive trend against such a revision of the foreign de-
cree, Cour Paris {Nov. 10, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 615 (approving note 
MOTULSKY); BATIFFOL, Traite 855, 571. 
57 Trib. civ. Seine (June 10, 1936) D. H. 1936. 420. 
58 Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 412; Cour Paris (Oct. 
30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825. 
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (June 18, 1952) 15 Pasicrisie Lux. 4II {German 
decree based on disruption). 
"
9 Court Paris (March 24, 1930) Revue 1930, 272 criticized by NIBOYBT, 
ibid. In the decision of Cass. (req.) {Nov. II, 1908) 8.1909.1.572, supra n. 
54, a divorce decree of Pensacola, Florida, was declared ineffective because 
the husband was found to have obtained the decree by declaring under oath 
false facts supporting jurisdiction. 
eo See, for instance, for Belgium cases cited in Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 
(supra n. 45); recently Cass. (Jan. 16, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 813. 
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has been criticized by French 61 as well as by I tali an writers, 62 
who have influenced their courts to the extent that, according 
to the opinion now prevailing in Italy, a foreign judgment 
never has binding effect unless it has been rendered executory 
by proceedings of delibazione. 63 
4· Germany 64 and Austria 65 
The statutory provisions laid down in section 328 of the 
German Code of Civil Pr9cedure concern the conditions of 
both recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
general. Since 194 I, the recognition of a foreign matri-
monial decision is, as a rule, exclusively declared by a judicial-
administrative agency.66 This regulation is complete and the 
most elaborate of all, but questionable in form and sub-
stance; its most serious defect was the requirement of reci-
procity (C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 5, par. 2). In recent 
For Brazil: C. C., Introductory Law of I942, art. I5. As to the former prac-
tice, see Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I920) no. 7I4, 24 Revista Sup. Trib. (I920) 
356; App. Civ. Rio de Janiero (Dec. 9, I922 and April IS, I926) no. 540S, 8I 
Revista Dir. Civ. (I926) I74 ff.; App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 25, I927) 
no. 2.980, 86 Revista Dir. Civ. (I927) 389. 
Uruguay: Exequatur is required for all purposes, ALFONSIN, Regimen In-
ternacional del Divorcio (I953) I4I, I47· 
61 BARTIN, I Principes § I90; NIBOYET 952 ff. nos. 8so-8sz; PERROUD, 5 
Repert. 384 nos. I47, I48; BATIFFOL, Traite 849 ff. 
6 2 ANZILOTTI, I Rivista (I9o6) 227; s ibid. (I9IO) I31; see further cita-
tions in MORELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 289 n. I. 
6 3 Italian C. Civ. Proc. ( I940) arts. 796 ff., generally without re-examina-
tion of the contents of the foreign judgment. In most of its recent bilateral 
treaties, however, Italy has required an action for executory confirmation 
only for the purpose of forcible execution, see PERASSI in I7 Rivista (I925) 
I09; UDINA, Elementi 95· Thus, in relation to Switzerland, no exequatur is 
required; see note of the Italian Government to the Swiss Government, BBl. 
I938, II 499 no. 8. A comprehensive survey in MIELE, II riconoscimento delle 
sentenze matrimoniali straniere ( 1949). 
64 STEIN-JON A&-SCHONKE, I ZPO. § 328 II; RAAPE 4I 8-424. 
65 The German decree of Oct. 25, I94I, § 24, enacted also for Austria and 
upheld there after I945 (SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/5o) 458) 
declared § 328 of the German C. Civ. Proc. applicable. 
6 6 Decree of Oct. 25, I94I, § 24. 
Competent for declaring the recognition are the Ministers of Justice of 
Austria, East Germany and of the Lander of West Germany, respectively. 
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years, especially the rules on jurisdiction in matrimonial mat-
ters directly relevant for the recognition of foreign decrees 
have been modified several times, the last change having 
occurred in Western Germany in I957·ssa The final result 
may be briefly presented as follows. 
There are two general grounds which exclude recognition 
of any foreign decree: if the foreign court at the time of 
recognition would not have jurisdiction according to German 
law (C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. r),66b or if the decree is 
at variance with German public policy (ibid., no. 4). 
In addition, a foreign decree may have to comply with 
various requirements: 
(a) Where both parties are nationals of the country of 
divorce, a final divorce decree is almost always granted 
recognition and enforcement; 67 such a decree is even ex-
empted from the administrative procedure establishing its 
recognition.68 Seldom can the matter be connected with Ger-
man interests closely enough to affect public policy.69 
(b) A decree concerning two foreigners is also certain 
66a The Law of June z8, 1957, has replaced C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 by §§ 6o6-
6o6b. 
66b German jurisdiction has to be derived from C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6 and 
6o6b. 
67 RG. (Feb. 28, 1938) JW. 1938, 1518; see also RG. (Jan. 5, 1925) 109 
RGZ. 383, JW. 1925, 765, Clunet 1926, 173 (Czechoslovakian decree); KG. 
(Dec. 21, 1935) ]W. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 (Hungarian decree 
upon ground of alleged collusion of the parties). The same !}oint of view 
was observed in Austria, see Walker 729, 730. 
68 Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24 par. 4· If one of the spouses is resident in 
Germany and if he or his spouse is stateless or the ensuing decree wiii be 
recognized by the husband's national law, either spouse may sue in Germany, 
C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6-6o6b. Since jurisdiction, in these cases, is granted in 
Germany, recognition depends on reciprocity, C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2. 
Hence, even with respect to foreigners, recognition was excluded in many 
cases until the Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24 par. I sentence 3 authorized 
reciprocity to be waived and C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2 (in Western Germany 
§ 6o6a, as amended 1957) restricted, for purposes of recognition, German 
jurisdictional claims. 
69 RAAPE 419. A divorce decree validly rendered by the national court of 
the spouses by default was recognized, although not in conformance with 
German divorce procedure, LG. Dresden (Oct. 16, 1935) JW. 1935, 3493· 
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to be recognized if it is rendered at the marital domicil and 
recognized by the husband's national country.70 
(c) Where one party is of German nationality, the di-
vorce decrees of many countries were not recognized because 
reciprocity of recognition was not guaranteed. 71 Recent legis-
lation has mitigated the requirement of reciprocity. Since 
1941, reciprocity may be waived.72 Further, in spite of 
German jurisdiction and without regard to reciprocity, a 
foreign matrimonial decision may be recognized, if the 
defendant (in the foreign suit) is a foreign national or if 
the defendant's residence is, or the last common residence 
of the spouses was, abroad or if the defendant asks for 
recognition.73 
If none of these conditions is fulfilled, reciprocity with 
the state of the judgment has to be established. The list of 
countries guaranteeing reciprocity, however, is not altogether 
confined to those countries that have concluded treaties on 
recognition with Germany or to those recognizing all Ger-
man judgments; it suffices that German divorce decrees are 
regularly recognized. Therefore, the list has been believed 
to be rather comprehensive. 74 
7° C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6, 6o6b, EGBGB. Art. I7 par. I; cf. RAAPE, IPR. 301. 
The OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I935) JW. I935, 3488 held a Mexican decree 
void because obtained in a shocking manner. It is doubtful whether German 
public policy should have been invoked since the husband was an American 
citizen domiciled in New Jersey and the wife had lost her German nationality 
by her marriage, JONAS, JW. I936, 283, LORENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 326. 
The decree would not have been recognized in New Jersey, however, if 
properly attacked, and could be disregarded for this reason in Germany. 
71 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 5, par. 2 exempting from reciprocity does 
not apply when there is German jurisdiction, which exists always if a 
German national is involved, see supra note 68. 
72 Decree of Oct. 25, I941, § 24 par. I sentence 3· 
73 C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6a. This provision has to be read in conjunction with 
C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2 as described supra note 68; it dispenses, for the 
purpose of recognition, in some cases with the consequences of the inclusive 
German jurisdictional claim and therefore with reciprocity. 
74 See especially WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 88-92; and for in-
stance AG. Hannover (Oct. 26, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, no. 73 (Uruguay); KG. 
(Dec. I9, 1932) ibid., no. 74 (Yugoslavia). 
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However, relations with Great Britain and the United 
States in particular are in doubt. Leading authorities declare 
that in neither country is there any certainty of recognition 
because courts in common law countries are prepared to re-
examine the jurisdiction of the individual German tribunal 
and that English courts in particular may inquire into the 
question of fraud. 75 On the contrary, as a practical matter, 
one may presume that, in most courts of the United States, 
German divorce decrees rendered at the domicil of one party 
are enforced with greater probability of excluding defenses 
than in Germany.76 
Again, even if reciprocity is dispensed with or if the di-
vorce is rendered in one of the countries with which recipro-
cal recognition is assumed to exist, such as Denmark, Nor-
way, or the Netherlands, it must comply with a number of 
other requirements. Recognition is denied, if the losing 
defendant is a German national and in the suit was not 
served personally through the German authorities; 11 or if 
divorce was granted on a ground unknown to German law 
and without stating facts which constitute a sufficient ground 
for divorce under German law; 78 or if divorce was denied 
to the disadvantage of a German party, while it should have 
been granted according to German law.79 Conformity with 
German public policy includes, in the case of German par-
ties, numerous possibilities, most of which are cov~red by 
75 STEIN-}ONAs-ScHONKI!, I ZPO (ed:l7, I949) § 328 VIII E no. 2I (now 
recognizing reciprocity with the United Kingdom), no. 53; RAAPE, 2 D. IPR 
(ed. I) r8s considers the position of England and Sweden not clear. 
76 See FELLER, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit von U rteilen amerikanischer Gerichte 
in Deutschland," ]W. I93I, 112; Ruo. MuELLER, "Die Anerkennung von 
Urteilen, Besch!Ussen und Anordnungen ausliindischer Gerichte und von aus-
liindischen Schiedsspriichen im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," 
5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 905 (on divorce) 927; KG. (May 3, I93S) JW. I935, 
2750 (as to Illinois). 
77 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 2; RG. (June IS, I936) ]W. I936, 2456. 
78 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. r no. 3; cf. EG. art. I7 par. 4· 
70 Same provision as supra n. 78. 
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the other conditions of recognition.80 In fact, not often is a 
foreign divorce concerning a German subject recognized 
except by virtue of some international treaty. 
5. Soviet Union 
In consequence of the principle that either spouse was 
able to terminate the marriage at his pleasure, it was pre-
sumed in Soviet Russia that any act of an authority in other 
countries designed to dissolve a marriage of Soviet citizens 
is supported by the intention of at least one party and there-
fore valid as a nonregistered divorce. A decree of the Peo-
ple's Commissary of Justice of July 6, 1923,81 stated that 
every dissolution of marriage obtained in a foreign country 
according to the local laws will be recognized in the U.S.S.R., 
irrespective of where and when the dissolved marriage was 
celebrated, unless the marriage of a Soviet citizen has been 
dissolved or annulled on formal grounds contrary to the will 
of both spouses. 82 No provision has been held necessary in 
the case where only one party is of Soviet nationality.83 
In consequence of the radical changes in the family legis-
lation of 1944, Soviet Russia now claims exclusive jurisdic-
tion for the divorce of spouses when both are Russian na-
tionals but seems to recognize foreign divorces affecting only 
one Russian spouse. 83a 
80 RAAPE 4IO. 
81 Sec. 2 of the Decree, which in German translation was reproduced and 
analyzed together with the Circular letter of the People's Commissary of the 
Interior of June 2, I92I, no. I9 and the Decree of the Commissary of Justice 
of Feb. 2I, I927, by H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht in der Sowjetunion (I927) I, 
in 4 Die Zivilgesetze der Gegenwart 7I; H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht Sow-
jetrusslands (I924) 69; MAKAROV, Precis 399; see also German RG. (June 24, 
I927) IPRspr. I926-27, no. 70; Swiss BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE. II 225, 
2281 23 I. 
82 On the limitation expressed in the last sentence, see German RG. (April 
4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24, 27. 
83 MAKAROV, Precis 400 with hypothetical comment. 
saa HOYER, Anerkennung (supra n. I) 34; see supra p. 427 n. go. 
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6. The Hague Convention on Divorce 
By the Hague Convention on Divorce, article 7, the mem-
ber states agree to recognize a divorce or separation decreed 
by a court competent according to the Convention, provided 
the dispositions of the Convention have been observed, and, 
in case the decision has been rendered by default against a 
defendant who fails to appear, he has been cited in accord-
ance with the special provisions of his national law for the 
recognition of foreign judgments.84 
A divorce or separation decreed by an administrative juris-
dictional authority shall likewise be recognized everywhere, 
if the law of each of the spouses recognizes such divorce or 
separation. 
Since under articles I and 2 the national law of the parties 
must be observed by the divorce court, recognition depends 
upon a re-examination of facts and motives.85 
The Convention is understood not only to authorize but 
to obligate the courts to refuse recognition, if the treaty re-
quirements are not satisfied.86 
7. Latin-American Conventions 
The Montevideo Treaty provides for reciprocal recogni-
tion of divorces decreed at the matrimonial domicil, 87 or at 
the last matrimonial domicil, in case the parties have been ju-
dicially separated or, according to the recent draft, the wife 
has been deserted and has not established a new domicil of 
her own.88 This simple principle was incorporated in the 
84 For comment see MEILI-MAMELOK, IPR. 240 § 45· 
85 LG. Miinchen I (Jan. 17, 1908) 4 Z. Rechtspflege Bayern (1908) 295· 
86 App. Milano (Nov. 21, 1906) Monitore 1907, 133, 3 Rivista (1908) 390, 
Clunet 1908, 1267; KosTERS 528; LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Vol-
kerrechts und der Diplomatie 470 VII; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 571 n. 104; VREE-
LAND 229. 
87 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 13, (1940) art. 15. 
88 Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. 59 par. 2 with art. 9· 
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C6digo Bustamante which for once, abandoning its neutrality 
to the criterion of the personal law, prescribes that the law of 
the matrimonial domicil is to apply.89 Of course, the court 
must have observed the treaty requirements respecting the 
applicable law, which are not quite so simple in the Havana 
Convention as in the Treaty of Montevideo. The reserva-
tions for non-recognition vary in scope. The C6digo Busta-
mante 90 reserves to "each contracting state the right to per-
mit or recognize, or not, the divorce or new marriage of per-
sons divorced abroad, in causes which are not admitted by 
their personal law." The reservation contained in the new 
draft of the Montevideo Treaty is much more restricted; it 
covers only the case where the country of celebration does 
not permit divorce and grants the right to refuse recognition 
on this ground only to this country.91 
8. The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law of 193 I 92 
This Convention assures reciprocal recognition, without 
confirmation or re-examination, of all decisions rendered in 
matrimonial causes according to the treaty provisions. Ac-
tions for separation or divorce between nationals of the par-
ticipating states are decided, under the basic rule of these 
provisions, according to the law of the state where both par-
ties are domiciled or where they had their last common domi-
cil, if one of them is still domiciled there. 
There are, thus, no defenses to a divorce decree of another 
Scandinavian country, except that the case does not come un-
der the Convention or, perhaps, that the matter is pending 
in the forum. 93 
s9 Art. s6. 
90 Art. 53, see comment by BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes 
de Rio 121. 
91 (1940) art. 15(b). See supra p. 458. 
92 Art. 22 referring, among others, to arts. 7, 8, 10. 
93 Art. 7 par. 1. 
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Other inter-Scandinavian conventions provide for the mu-
tual enforcement of alimentary awards (Feb. 10, I 93 I) and 
other judgments (March 16, I9J2) .94 
9· Bilateral Treaties 
Before the first World War, very few conventions existed 
for securing mutual enforcement of judgments; the most out-
standing is still in force-the French-Swiss Treaty of June 
I 5, I 8 69, which, according to present prevailing opinion, is 
applicable also to divorce decrees.95 In the nineteen-twenties, 
a wave of international adjustment in Europe brought about 
a series of treaties for reciprocal judicial assistance, espe-
cially through negotiations of France, Germany, Italy, and 
the states succeeding the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.96 
The latter group of conventions has been revitalized and 
substantially broadened since World War ll_96a 
Great Britain, however, while also endeavoring to estab-
lish a system of reciprocal recognition upon a treaty basis, 
"
4 See BLOcH, 8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 627, 636. 
"
5 See SEcRET AN, Revue 1926, 199; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 574 no. 193. The 
contrary view formerly frequent in Switzerland is maintained by GAUTSCHI, 
z6 S]Z. 1929, 1. The treaty also covers recognition of measures ancillary to 
divorce, such as awarding custody of children. See Cass. (req.) (Nov. 3, 
1936) Clunet 1937, 293· The French-Belgian Treaty of July 8, 1899, was 
facilitated by the identical codes; see on the content, PERRour,; 5 Repert. 409. 
Also still in force is the Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador of June 18, 
1903 on international private law, art. XVI of which deals with divorce, only 
to deny the right of remarriage if the divorce fails to agree with the law of 
the other state. 
96 Generally, W. ]ELLINEK, Die zweiseitigen Staatsvertrage iiber die Aner-
kennung ausliindischer Zivilurteile (with texts) ( 1935). 
On the French-Italian Treaty of June 3, 1930, see PERROUD, Clunet 1934, 
275; on art. 3 of the German-Swiss Treaty of Nov. 2, 1929, 109 League of 
~ations Treaty Series (193Q-1931) 274, see VoRTISCH, 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 
17; KG. (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577; JoNAS, ibid.; LoRENZ, 7 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. no. 33· On the application of the Italian-Swiss Treaty of Jan. 3, 
1933, to matters of status, see App. Roma (Nov. 27, 1934) with Note, ScERNI, 
3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 31 and the cases cited infra p. 521, n. roo. 
ona A contracting party's divorce decree is recognized if one of the spouses 
was a national of the decreeing court when its decision came into force, 
unless there is a prior judgment within the recognizing country, see DROBNIG, 
5 Am. J. Comp. L. (1956) 487, 495· 
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has concluded only two treaties with foreign countries, the 
first of which, with France, declares itself inapplicable to 
matters of status and capacity 97 and the second, with Bel-
gium, renders inoperative its most important provision with 
respect to these matters.98 
Il. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS 
As the general doctrine of recognition and enforcement of 
judgments ought to be discussed in its proper place, topics 
involved in this problem, such as jurisdiction of the foreign 
court, finality and conclusiveness of the decision, reciprocity, 
opportunity for defense, and fraud, cannot be treated at 
length here. There are, however, a few typical situations 
found in the field of foreign divorces, which permit compara-
tive survey. Courts in contemplating such groups of cases 
may apply different legal categories to obtain the same re-
sult; indeed, several of the numerous legal requisites for 
recognition may be invoked at once without entirely exact dis-
crimination, if a court feels that the foreign divorce decree 
should not be accepted. 
I. Scope of Recognition as Contrasted with Enforcement 
Recognition, as contrasted with enforcement,99 has more 
importance in the matter of divorce decrees than in ordinary 
judgments, but the effects of recognition are not uniformly 
determined. 
(a) Usually, as a minimum effect, a foreign divorce de-
cree which agrees with the essentials for recognition can be 
97 Treaty of Jan. 18, 1934, art. 2 § 3b, 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1936-1937), 183 at 186. 
98 Treaty of May 2, 1934, art. 4(3), 173 League of Nations Treaty Series 
( 1936-1937) 291 at 299. 
99 Cf. Restatement § 42(d); YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sen-
tences arbitrales," 2 Memoires de l'Academie lnternationale de Droit Com-
pare, part 3, 357; Hague Draft of a Convention on Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments, arts. I and II, Actes de Ia Cinquieme Session 193. 
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set up as a defense against the alleged existence of the mar-
riage in any suit for separate maintenance or restitution of 
conjugal rights, for separation, or for divorce, etc., without 
bringing an action on the judgment or, on the continent, 
without an application for an executory decree.100 
(b) Likewise, the decree provides full evidence of the dis-
solution of the marriage before a civil official or other mar-
riage officer when remarriage is attempted.101 The conditions 
of its fitness for recognition are to be examined by the officer 
or any authority or any court supervising him and not 
through an action on the judgment.102 
(c) The effects of a divorce on the name of the wife, on 
her ability to be reinstated in her former nationality, or on 
her domicil, fall within the scope of mere recognition.103 
1
''" France: Cass. ( req.) (March 3, 1930) 8.1930.1.377; Cour Paris (] uly 2, 
1934) Revue Crit. 1936, soo; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 1935) Revue Crit. 
1')36, 519. 
Belgium: Cass. (Jan. r6, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 810. 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 328; RG. (June 24, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no. 
]0. 
Greece: App. Athens, no. 33, (1926) 37 Themis 470 (not recognizing an 
• \merican divorce) ; but cf. TENEKIDES, Clunet 1937, 598. 
Italy: App. Torino (July 25, 1930) Monitore 1930, 9II, 5 Z.ausi.PR. 
( 19 3 r) 84+ (see also five Italian decisions, ibid. 843, concerning recognition 
outside the Hague Convention); App. Fiume (June 10, 1937) 29 Rivista 
( 1937) 398, Clunet 1938, 932; cf. SCERNI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp .. (1934) 340; 
but see supra p. 519, n. 96. 
Scotland: The Court of Sessions, Outer House, by Lord Moncrieff, in Arnott 
v. Lord Advocate [1932] Scots L. T. 46, in recognizing an Ohio decree, 
granted a decree of declarator for exceptional aid, while as a rule the grant 
of a decree to give validity to the domiciliary decree which already had uni-
versal validity would "be a trespass against international comity." 
Switzerland: App. Bern (July 6, 1935) 72 ZBJV. (1936) 429; cf. II 
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 669 (divorce of Swiss nationals in Oregon recognized with-
out action because the award required no enforcement); cf. also BECK, NAG. 
378 no. r6o. 
101 Belgium: App. Liege (Jan. 29, 1924) Jur. Liege 1924, 76; cf. PoULLET 
628 n. 4· 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, r86o) S.r86o.r.21o; see supra p. 508. 
Germany: RAAPE 416 VII r. 
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. 379 no. 161. 
1°2 See citations in preceding note. 
10a BECK, NAG. 379 no. 161. 
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(d) While the decree is entered upon the records of civil 
status without the steps necessary for enforcement, accord-
ing to the German and Swiss regulations/04 in France, on the 
contrary, transcription in the register of civil status is denied 
unless a decree of exequatur is obtained.105 
(e) Recognition nowhere covers the enforcement of pe-
cuniary duties arising from the decree or of rights to exercise 
custody over children, or other provisional orders.106 It has 
been asserted,107 and seems correct, that recognition of a 
foreign divorce repugnant to the domestic principles of the 
forum may be granted, while executory enforcement would 
be denied. In the Netherlands, foreign divorces may not be 
executed and enforced at all but are capable of being recog-
nized.108 
2. Scope of Res Judicata 
Is full faith and credit due to a foreign decision dismissing 
an action for divorce on the merits? This question has arisen 
on the Continent, because generally defeat in a lawsuit as 
well as victory may constitute res judicata. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that a subject of the forum should not be 
barred from suing under his own law after having been re-
jected under a foreign law less favorable to him. In fact, in 
Switzerland foreign decrees denying divorce to a Swiss citi-
104 Germany: RG. (May r8, 1916) 88 RGZ. 244 against former practice 
of lower courts; but the declaration of recognition by the competent Minis-
ter of Justice has to be made (Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24). 
Switzerland: Civil Status Regulation § n8 par. r. 
1os Trib. civ. Seine (May 19, 1926) cited supra p. 510, n. 55· 
Italy: C. Civ. Proc. ( 1940) art. 796. 
Portugal: Decree on Civil Status of Dec. 22, 1932, art. 391 § 2. 
However Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments c. 3 § 7, re-
quires a confirmation of the foreign divorce decree for the celebration of a new 
marriage in Sweden. 
106 BECK, NAG. 381 no. 168. 
107 }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE, in Republica de Colombia, Comisi6n de 
Reforma del C6digo Civil (193Q-1940) 217, 218. 
108 See I BERGMANN (ed. 2) 404. 
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zen are said not to be entitled to recognition.109 A better con-
sidered solution is given in Germany; a foreign judgment 
unfavorable to the application of a German national is recog-
nized, if the decision is in conformity with German divorce 
law.110 
In the United States, the binding force of a judgment dis-
missing a suit for divorce on the merits seems to be virtually 
the same whether it is rendered by a domestic or a foreign 
court. It could hardly be otherwise, since the divorce court 
applies its own law, and the forum of recognition does not 
re-examine the merits. 
3· Divorce Without Judicial Litigation 
Many legislators and even treaty-makers are so accus-
tomed to contemplate contentious proceedings and a decree 
of a state court as the only way to obtain divorce, that they 
overlook the possibility of other forms of divorce being used 
abroad. The difficulties of interpreting the pertinent nar-
rowly drafted texts are increased in numerous systems, for 
instance, in the elaborate but contradictory and incomplete 
German enactments,111 by failure to coordinate the proce-
dural rules on recognition of foreign judgments with the 
choice of law rules on the extraterritorial effect of private 
acts and by failure to regulate clearly the recognition of for-
eign acts of administrative justice.112 
Recognition of foreign forms of divorce unknown to the 
forum is traditionally barred by public policy with respect to 
nationals or subjects of the forum, as distinguished from 
1°9 See BECK, NAG. 377 no. 157. 
uo See RAAPE 410 V 1. 
111 See supra p. 512. 
112 See on the "inchoate" state of the Anglo-American doctrine of admin-
istrative acts, YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," 
2 Memoires de I'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 at 
354-
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foreign married couples. But the general trend is in the direc-
tion of replacing the former reluctance to recognize foreign 
modes of divorce by a broader-minded outlook. 
(a) Decisions of foreign ecclesiastical courts are probably 
everywhere treated as equivalent to decrees of ordinary 
courts. The minority opinion is, however, that religious di-
vorces should be recognized even when they are not sup-
ported by the consent of the state in whose territory they are 
rendered,113 provided only that they are recognized by the 
state of which the parties are nationals-a species of renvoi. 
The prevailing view 114 requires an ecclesiastical court to be 
authorized by the state where it is sitting, as well as by the 
state of which the parties are nationals or domiciliaries, 
according to the principle governing status. 
Illustration: Orthodox Russians are divorced by the 
Council of the Orthodox Church in Paris, Polish Jews by a 
rabbi in the Netherlands, divorces are not recognized by the 
country where pronounced nor under the prevailing opinion 
in third countries, but recognized by the national law. Sup-
posing that the domicil was in the home country, the answer 
would probably be negative also in American courts. 
Recognition of a religious decree means giving full civil 
effect to the divorce. Where a Bulgarian national of Ortho-
dox faith had been married in the Netherlands to a Dutch 
woman according to both temporal and ecclesiastical cere-
monies and the Bulgarian Church decreed divorce, the Ortho-
dox tribunal of course considered only the religious marriage 
and ignored the Dutch civil ceremony. But a Netherlands 
113 See 3 FRANKENSTEIN 560 n. 70 and the decisions cited by him. 
114 3 ARMINJON §§ 34, 35; M. WoLFF, IPR. 2o4; NussBAUM, D.IPR. 164 
n. 5; this also seems to be the meaning of American cases such as In re Ru-
benstein's Estate ( 1932) 143 N. Y. Misc. 917, 257 N. Y. Supp. 637; In re 
Spondre (1917) 98 N. Y. Misc. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943; Miller v. Miller 
(1911) 70 N. Y. Misc. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787; Leshinsky v. Leshinsky 
(1893) 5 N.Y. Misc. 495, 25 N.Y. Supp. 841; cf. FREEMAN, 3 Treatise of 
the Law of Judgments (1925) 3095 § 1510 formulating the condition "if 
valid where given." 
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court recognizing this divorce should not have assumed that 
the Dutch civil marriage remained undissolved.115 
(b) Divorce or separation pronounced by an administra-
tive jurisdictional authority has been expressly declared rec-
ognizable by the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7, 
par. 2), provided that the national law of either spouse rec-
ognizes such act. This leaves the national laws free to de-
cide. But there is no reason why, under any system of nation-
ality or domicil, a decree rendered in the name of the King of 
Denmark 116 or by bill of Parliament (if still available) 
should not be recognized as readily as a court decree; the 
protection against arbitrary dissolution seems greater than 
in many courts.U7 
It is true that administrative jurisdiction over divorce is 
usually given upon the basis of a mutual agreement of the 
parties, and this circumstance raises a doubt that we may con-
sider separately. 
(c) In fact, non-contentious proceedings, if followed by a 
decree of any independent authority, need not necessarily be 
regarded as an obstacle to recognition at a forum where 
mutual agreement is excluded by the municipal law. But in 
11
" Rb. Amsterdam (March 3, 1930) W. 1930, 12175 approved by 3 FRANK-
ENSTEIN 409 n. 2; analogously LG. Berlin (May 23, 1949) IPRspr. 1945-
1949 no. 68. 
116 On recognition of a Danish royal decree in Italy, see Trib. Roma (April 
8, 1908) Clunet 1910, 67o; Germany: KG. (Jan. 23, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939, 
1015 no. 38, 9 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1943) 230, has pronounced the principle 
that the Danish Royal decree, as an administrative decree, is to be recog-
nized but depends on the same conditions as a judicial decree and fulfills all 
requirements of German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 by analogy. In the instant case 
recognition was refused, the husband being a German and domiciled in 
Germany, according to § 328 no. I. For a Danish husband, Reg. Praes. 
Schleswig (Jan. 23, 1932), see StAZ. 1932, 197, b; for a Danish couple, the 
husband being domiciled in Brazil, see Brazil Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. 31, 1933) 
21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26. Cf. for various opinions, WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 78 n. 485 and VALLADAO, "Homologo~;ao de Decreta Real 
de Div6rcio," Estudios de Direito Internacional Privado (1947) 499-525. 
117 CHESHIRE 380, declaring inconceivable nonrecognition in such cases, 
goes too far in extending recognition to any local form. See also KEITH, 
"Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (1935) 4 at 11. 
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such cases difficulties have been experienced with respect to 
subjects of the forum of recognition and also with respect 
to foreigners when the forum reviews the grounds for 
divorce.118 
A particular problem exists with regard to the conversion 
of a foreign limited divorce into a domestic absolute divorce. 
In several countries, a judicial separation may be trans-
formed into a divorce a vinculo without proving new 
grounds, after some time has elapsed since the separation. 
This institution usually presupposes contentious litigation, in 
which the disruption of the marriage has been examined by a 
court before granting separation. If so, a separation obtained 
abroad upon a mere mutual agreement, as is possible in 
Chile, Italy, the Netherlands, in the countries of Austrian 
law, and others, cannot suffice as the only ground for an ab-
solute divorce at the forum; this has been held in Belgium, 119 
France/20 Hungary,121 Switzerland,121a etc. It is also agreed 
118 For instance, French courts refused recognition to a judgment on 
"acquiescence," regarding the procedure as affected by "irregularity," arg. 
C. C. art. 92 (new, art. 249); likewise Swiss App. Freiburg i. Ue., IO SJZ. 
I76, no. 49· But recent French decisions have recognized foreign decrees 
based on mutual consent even though French parties were involved, Cass. 
(civ.) (April I7, I953) Revue Crit. I953o 4I2; Cour Paris (Oct. 30, I954) 
Revue Crit. I954, 825. In many countries the matter is in doubt; also under 
the Hague Convention, see 3 FRANKENSTEIN 567. 
119 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 4, I9I3) KOSTERs--BELLEMANS 2I8. 
1 2° France: Cour Paris (May I4, I902) I4 Z.int.R. (I904) IOO (separation 
in Chile); App. Amiens (March 2I, I906) Clunet I906, 1138; App. Grenoble 
(May 23, I924) Revue I924, 222; Cass. (civ.) (July 6, I922) Clunet I922, 
7I4 (Ferrari case no. I); Cour Paris (July 11, I930) Revue I930, 68o. Trib. 
civ. Seine (July IS, I935) Nouv. Revue I935, 553; Cour Paris (Feb. 4, 1937) 
Clunet 1937, 283 (decree of the Italian Consular Tribunal in Alexandria on 
the basis of Italian law )-all concerning Italian mutual agreements. Cf. 
LEREBOUR8--PIGEONN!ERE 367 § 339a, against BARTIN, I Principes 424 § 171; 
cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 328 § 319. 
Of another character is the Argentine separation of a Chilean man and a 
French woman in the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 13, 1898) Clunet 1921 
(sic), 215. 
121 Hungarian law applied for the province of Burgenland by the Austrian 
Supreme Court (April 25, 1925) 37 Z.int.R. (1927) 393 in the matter of an 
Austrian mutual agreement of separation from bed and board. 
121a BG. (July 2, I953) 79 BGE. II 337· 
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that the Hague Convention, in providing that separation 
ought to be recognized by the participant states (art 7), 
means a separation pronounced by a court upon contested 
proceedings.122 
Although these limitations are reasonable, the German 
courts took an intransigent attitude in construing the dis-
solution of the conjugal union, which was the only separa-
tion admitted by the Civil Code, as a unique institution, indis-
pensable for conversion under the Code, and hence irreplace-
able by any foreign type of separation.123 
(d) The forms of divorce permitted by the laws of Soviet 
Russia have engendered special problems. Under the initial 
Soviet legislation of I9 I 8, a divorce could be obtained either 
by mutual consent and official registration or by application 
of one party to a court, notice to the other party by summons, 
and a decree which the court was bound to give. The mar-
riage law of I926 emphasized still more sharply, by aban-
doning any court action, the nature of divorce as a private 
declaration that may be pronounced by one of the spouses 
without cause. It is said that, if the marriage has been re-
corded, registration of divorce is possible but not essential, 
except under the Ukrainian Family Law of May 3 I, I926, 
which recognizes only registered marriages and divorces, and 
under the White Russian Code (art. 23), if a factual mar-
riage has been judicially established.124 The Family Protec-
tion Law of June 27, I936 (art. 27) orders the. registrars 
122 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5· 
123 See supra p. 466, n. r87. The Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 2, provided for 
the conversion of any separation; but it is disputed whether the provision 
is still in force. 
Rather narrow-minded is the refusal of a Danish appellate court (!Z}stre 
Landsret, Feb. 19, 1952, U.f.R. 1952, 631, 20 Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514) to con-
vert a South African judicial separation obtained by the Danish husband 
into a divorce on the ground that the South African separation, unlike its 
Danish counterpart, has a permanent character and cannot be converted. 
124 This seems to be the thesis of MAURACH, 3 Z.osteurop.R. ( 193 6) roo, 
xo6. I do not assume any responsibility as to the statements on Soviet law. 
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to summon the parties to appear at the registrar's office but 
does not change the divorce law.125 
Whether these various forms can be recognized has been a 
much discussed question, especially in Germany. The Ger-
man Reichsgericht finally established the view that all Rus-
sian types of divorce may be recognized in application to non-
Germans domiciled in Soviet Russia 126 but that the forms 
now in use whereby the private dissolution of marriage is not 
declared by any sort of decree, though possibly registered, 
are unable to affect the marriage of a German spouse.127 For 
Russian nationals domiciled and divorced in Russia, recog-
nition seems to be unquestioned everywhere; thus, a seem-
ingly absolute rejection of Russian divorces in Italy,128 for 
instance, cannot be taken literally. But Russian divorces, 
which may be recognized in Switzerland,m have been refused 
recognition with respect to their own nationals in Poland.130 
Opinions in England are in conflict; the thesis of Cheshire 
that consistency demands recognition of any Russian divorce 
form with respect to a married couple in Russia, irrespective 
125 See WERTHER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938} 437: the official Sovetskaja Justi-
cija warned that art. 18 of the Family Law remained in force. 
126 RG. (April 4, 1928) 121 RGZ. 24; RG. (Feb. 28, 1938} 92 Seuff. Arch. 
244, JW. 1938, 1518; and the unanimous opinion of writers; see FREUND, 
]W. 1928, 88o. 
127Leading case: RG. (April 22, 1932) 136 RGZ. 142, 146; see also the 
decision of Feb. 28, 1938 cited in the preceding note. A Russian divorce de-
cree before 1926, involving Germans, was recognized in the decision of the 
RG. (April 4, 1928} 121 RGZ. 24, assuming that the wife's adultery which 
under Russian law was not to be stated in the Russian decree, was the real 
cause of the divorce, and this was a sufficient ground under German law, 
though irrelevant under the Russian; this method is no longer applicable to 
Russian divorces without decree. 
128 App. Milano (June 30, 1927) 19 Rivista ( 1927) 575; affirmed by Cass. 
(June 14, 1928} Foro Ital. 1929, 44; Cass. (March 17, 1955) Rivista 1955, 
380 {the court did not consider the validity under Russian law of a uni-
lateral repudiation effectuated in 1947!). 
129 Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1928, II 310 no. 17; a unilateral divorce 
by declaration of one spouse is excepted as offending public policy by BECK, 
NAG. 391 no. 197. 
130 Poland: Supreme Court (Feb. 5, 1931) 6 Z.f.Ostrecht {1932) 383. ~lith 
respect to Latvia see the note in I Z.osteurop.R. ( 1934-1935} 82. 
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of the nationality of the parties or the place of celebration,131 
results in a perfect parallel to the doctrine of the Reichs-
gericht, nationality being replaced by domicil. It is doubtful, 
however, whether a court in America would make use of 
such a doctrine. Since in this country the domicil of one 
party is deemed to support jurisdiction for divorce, analogy 
would result in recognizing a Russian divorce where one 
party is domiciled in Soviet Russia and the other in the 
United States. For the purposes of immigration, the State 
Department recognizes such a divorce.132 
Recent Soviet legislation. The special problems of Soviet 
divorces have been alleviated by the introduction, in 1944, 
of a judicial divorce proceeding.132a 
(e) The same principles that applied in Germany to Rus-
sian divorce procedures have prevailed in German courts and 
probably elsewhere, with respect to the arbitrary repudiation 
of a marriage by the husband under old patriarchal regimes, 
such as the Jewish, the Egyptian, or the former Turkish law. 
True, it would be intolerable for a foreign husband to be al-
lowed to send his bill of divorce to his wife from a place 
within the forum. 133 But there is. nothing to affect the ter-
ritory of the forum where a customary right to divorce is 
exercised abroad and both parties are members of the same 
creed and nationality which permit such dissolution.134 A 
131 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 36s. For the actual British cases see infra n. 134. 
KEITH in DICEY, Append. 939 and in 16 Bell Yard (193s) 'ID-12, supra 
n. 117, seems to reject Russian divorce of an "English marriage" because 
they lack a proceeding of judicial character. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 
4 D. L. R. so suggests recognition of mutual agreements in the country of 
common domicil but non-recognition of any decree without due notice to the 
defendant and a fortiori of a unilaterally registered divorce declaration. 
MAKAROV, Precis 404 recommends recognition of registered and judicial uni-
lateral divorces but not of non-registered divorces of Soviet citizens. 
132 HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law (1941) 383. 
132a See supra p. 416 n. 9a. 
133 LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402, cf. supra p. 449, n. liS; 
see, however, Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (no. 2) [19s3] P. 220. 
134 Case of Helene Bi:ihlau, a noted writer, who had married a Moham-
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court, however, may feel interested in the wife's right, if 
she is, or was until the marriage, a subject of the forum.135 
4· Jurisdiction 136 and Procedure of the Divorce Court 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction. No foreign divorce decree is 
recognized when exclusive jurisdiction is claimed at the forum 
where recognition is sought. This is the case in England, 
Argentina, etc., if the matrimonial domicil is located within 
the forum, in Hungary, Soviet Russia, Poland, etc., with 
respect to nationals of these countries,137 and in many coun-
medan, LG. Miinchen (Sept. 28, I904) I4 Z.int.R. ( 1904) 585; OLG. Miin-
chen (March 24, I905) I6 ibid. (I906) 38; Bay. ObLG. (Sept. 29, I905) I6 
ibid. (I906) 286; OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 22, I909) 20 ibid. (I9IO) 529, 
Clunet, I906, II73· See also LG. Dresden (Dec. 22, 193I) IPRspr. 1932, no. 
72 (Egyptian repudiation). 
The British cases Spivack v. Spivack (I930) 46 T. L. R. 243 and Sasson 
v. Sasson [I924] A. C. I007, although distinguishable by some particulari-
ties, are arguments for an analogous doctrine; see CHESHIRE 3 82. On the 
problematic case of Rex v. Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammer-
smith, ex parte Mir-Aiiwaruddin [I9I7] I K. B. 634, 6:p, see CHESHIRE 38o-
383; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 
Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I935) 9I; KEITH, I6 Bell Yard (I935) 10, supra 
n. II7. 
135 OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, I927) StAZ. I927, 219 and AG. Dresden 
(Oct. 6, I930) IPRspr. I93I, no. I50 (former German nationality of the wife) 
refused recognition of Egyptian or Turkish tribunals. Where one spouse is a 
German national, the RG. now requires a foreign "judgment" according to 
BGB. § I564, RG. (April 4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24; RG. (April 22, I932) 136 
RGZ. I4Z (on Russian divorces supra n. I27). The Biihlau case, supra n. I34, 
and that of OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, I927) IPRspr. I926-27, no. IO would 
probably be decided by non-recognition nowadays. 
England: Maher v. Maher [I95I] P. 342, adopting both reasons of the 
Hammersmith case (supra n. I34), viz. marriage in England and non-
judicial divorce. 
136 On the subject of jurisdiction with respect to foreign judgments in gen-
eral, comparative studies have been undertaken by LORENZEN, "The Enforce-
ment of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (I9I9) 188, 268; 
YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," 2 Memoires 
de l'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 and "The En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev. 
(I935) II29; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. I6I ff., 44I and his Principles 229 ff.; GuT-
TERIDGE, "Le conflit des lois de competence judiciare dans les actions per-
sonnelles," 44 Recueil I933 II III. As to the special field of recognition of 
divorce decrees, see the conclusions of VREELAND's book, Validity of Foreign 
Divorces 326 ff. 
137 Supra p. 426. 
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tries, if the parties are domiciled in and nationals of such 
countries. 
(b) International jurisdiction.138 Despite the many con-
fusing differences relating to the jurisdictional requirements 
of recognition in the enactments and doctrines of the world, 
there is one condition universally observed, viz., that the 
court of judgment must have had jurisdiction in the interna-
tional sense, i.e., according to the conceptions of the forum 
where recognition is sought. A better considered formula 
demands only that courts of the state of judgment, not just 
the court of the instant case, be competent in the eyes of the 
law of the forum. 
The most firmly established ground for defense to a for-
eign decree in this country is that neither party was domiciled 
at the divorce forum. 139 This, in general, or even the absence 
of the matrimonial domicil,140 is a defense everywhere,141 
with the important exception, however, that under the na-
tionality principle divorce may be decreed by the national 
138 On the conception see NEUNER, Internationale Zustandigkeit ( 1929) and 
in 13 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1938) part I, 349. 
139 Restatement §III. See I BEALE III.I. For decisions invalidating for 
this reason Mexican divorces see Note I43 A. L. R. I313 ff. 
140 Apart from the English and Argentine materials, see, for the Brazilian 
practice under the former law, Sup. Trib. Fed. (Oct. 6, I906) 2 Revista dir. 
civ. ( 1906) 373 (a Portuguese court was incompetent to render a divorce, the 
defendant husband being domiciled in the Federal District of Drazil). In the 
case Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) 64 Revista dir. civ. (I922) 505, the 
husband was both domiciled and naturalized in Brazil. 
141 See for instance German C. Civ. Proc § 328 par. I in connection with 
§ 6o6 par. I; France: Seine (April II, I935) mentioned by BATES, "The 
Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 322 at 325 
n. IO (Reno decree, neither party residing in Nevada). 
Both this rule and the American principle were egregiously ignored by 
OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I935) JW. I935, 3488 and its critics, JoNAS, JW. 
I936, 283 and LORENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 322 no. 253, discussing a strange 
"new way" believed necessary by the court to justify not recognizing a frivo-
lous Mexican divorce granted the husband, an American domiciled in New 
Jersey, against his wife, who had been formerly and afterwards became a 
German national but was an American at the time of the decree. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g par. 3; a divorce of a Swiss domiciled in the 
Gnited States is recognized if rendered by the judge of the domicil but not 
if rendered in Mexico, Just. Dept., BBl. I938, II 499 no. 9· 
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state without the fulfillment of domiciliary requirements. 142 
This is the foremost consideration in the struggle against the 
"divorce mills," but it also has a much less desirable effect on 
the various cases where the wife is considered by the divorce 
court to have a separate domicil but is not so considered in 
the forum where recognition is sought.143 
(c) International treaties. A remarkable advance has 
been conceded to the principle of domicil in recent interna-
tional treaties. The C6digo Bustamante (art. 52) pro-
claimed international jurisdiction for divorce to be at the 
matrimonial domicil, in contrast with the general policy of 
the Convention not to specify the personal law (art. 7) and 
despite the protest of Brazil, which then followed the na-
tionality principle.144 The Franco-Italian Treaty of June 3, 
1930, on the enforcement of judgments (art. II, par. r) 
secured recognition for the decisions of the court of the domi-
142 France: Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.I93I.I.2-1-7· 
Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2. 
Brazil: S. Ct. (Jan. 31, 1933) 21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26. 
English courts generally are not supposed to recognize such jurisdiction. 
They have recently been said, however, to give effect to a decree rendered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction dealing with its own nationals, both of 
whom had agreed to submit their dispute to that tribunal "as a clear, final 
and binding decision upon all the world." See Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 
19 at 28 per Langton, J. This would mean that the parties can dispose of the 
question of jurisdiction. 
143 There is a line of decisions rejecting American decrees for this reason 
in Canada: see Thompson v. Crawford [1932] 2 D. L. R. 466 (Ont. 1932), 
aff'd [1932] 4 D. L. R. 206, 41 0. W. N. 231 (Nevada decree with consent 
of the husband), cf. FALCONBRIDGE, 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. 37i Wyllie v. Martin 
(1931) 44 B. C. 486, [1931] 3 W. W. R. 465 (California decree); MacDon-
ald v. Nash [1929] 4 D. L. R. 1051 (Manitoba court did not recognize the 
Nevada decree); Gilbert v. Standard Trusts Co. [1928] 4 D. L. R. 371. 
Italy: App. Trieste (July 19, 1933) 25 Revista (1933) 469 and citations 
(on the occasion of a Swiss annulment of marriage). 
Belgium: supra p. 436, n. 71. 
144 See Reservation of the Delegation of Brazil in signing the Treaty of 
Habana, and the law enforcing the treaty, Diario Off. (Jan. II, 1929); see 
also EsPINOLA's letter to the Conference of Habana of January 27, 1928, and 
the full statement by EsPINOLA, printed with the judgment of the Federal 
Supreme Tribunal May 14, 1937, App. Civ. no. 6831, 26 Rev. de Critica 
Judiciaria 361, 364. 
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cil or, in their absence, decisions at the residence of the de-
fendant, without excepting status matters, and the same de-
vices have been adopted in other European treaties,145 despite 
the fact that all the countries involved are traditional fol-
lowers of the nationality principle. 
(d) Opportunity for defense. Due notice of the divorce 
suit, whether considered an independent requirement or a 
requisite of jurisdiction is often qualified to exclude service 
by publication, as was done until1942 in a minority of states 
of the United States.146 It is not a new experience that "every 
country claims for its own courts wider extraterritorial au-
thority than it concedes in return to foreign tribunals." 147 
This position is also taken in countries which allow service 
by publication in their own rules of procedure.147a 
Lack of due notice may be cured, according to many rules, 
by the personal appearance of the defendant. But it is the 
second most used ground of defense to a foreign divorce de-
cree rendered by an ill-reputed court. Another typical case is 
that in which the husband in suing abroad causes the notice 
to be sent to a false address of the wife to impair her de-
fense; this case has also been handled in the category of 
fraud or public policy.148 
145 153 League of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 135, 141. It is interesting 
to see how vigorously the Italian Supreme Court, leading the judicature of 
the country of Mancini, in interpreting the Italian Treaty of April 6, 1922, 
with Czechoslovakia, emphasizes the importance of the husband'!! domicil for 
jurisdiction in matrimonial causes; Cass. (April 26, 1939) Giur. Ita!. 1939, 
I, 1, 879, affirming App. Roma (July 19, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1938, I, 1314, Giur. 
Ita!. 1938, I, 2, 452, Clunet 1939, 177. 
1-16 VREELAND 328 enumerates with some doubts: District of Columbia, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming. 
147 Cave, J. in Heinemann & Co. v. Hale & Co. [1891] 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 83, 
87; cf. YNTEMA, supra n. 136, at 396. 
147n However, the English courts are very reluctant to speak of an offense 
against "natural justice" in these cases: Boettcher v. Boettcher [1949] W.N. 
83; Igra v. Igra [1951] P. 404. 
148 Drastic illustrations: 
England: Rudd v. Rudd [1924] P. 72 rejects a decree of the state of Wash-
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Other particulars of the proceedings of the judgment 
court are not re-examined as a general rule,149 except under 
the French system of unlimited control. But when the defense 
is believed to have been obstructed, for instance with respect 
to evidence,150 some way is usually found to protect the of-
fended interest; modern regulations contain express clauses 
for this purpose.151 It may be quoted, incidentally, that the 
Federal Supreme Court of Mexico has, in repeated decisions, 
declared divorce statutes of such states as Yucatan and 
Campeche unconstitutional on the ground that they impair 
the right of defense.152 
ington of the United States, the plaintiff husband having mailed a copy of 
his application to an English address where his wife had never lived, and 
by advertising the suit in a Seattle newspaper which she never read. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74, 79 refused recognition 
to a Spanish divorce because the husband, knowing that his wife lived in 
Switzerland, did not notify her of the proceedings; in this case not even the 
judgment was served on her; BG. (March II, 1948} 5 Schwz. Jahrb. (1948) 
217. 
Canada: Delaporte v. Delaporte [1927] 4 D. L. R. 933, 61 Ont. L. R. 302. 
France: Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, 1908) S.1909.1.572, Revue 1909, 227 (United 
States decree; the husband had falsely pretended not to know the wife's 
residence). See also infra n. 150. 
149 England: In Crowe v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557, [1937] 2 All 
E. R. 723 it is expressly stated that the defense based on fraud, as author-
ized in Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209, is limited to fraud in affecting jurisdic-
tional facts. 
1 50 The United States: In Bethune v. Bethune (1936} 192 Ark. 8II, 9+ S. \V. 
(2d) 1043 a Mexican decree was refused recognition on several grounds 
among which insufficient evidence is mentioned. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (June 19, 1931) Clunet 1932, II04 (fraudu-
lent statements to make the defense impossible). 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, 1938) Clunet 1939, 87 and (June 29, 
1938) Clunet 1939, 61 (both regarding Mexican decrees and fraudulent ma-
noeuvres of the husband to impair the defense of the wife). 
In the Argentine case, Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Plata (Nov. 21, 1939) 68 J. A. 
577 a Mexican decree was rejected because no contact whatever with the 
divorce state existed. 
151 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 8 and all recent treaties on enforce-
ment of judgments. 
German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2, etc. 
In France "freedom of defense" is always considered an essential and in 
some decisions indicated as flowing from natural justice, quite as in England; 
see PERROUD, 5 Repert. 337 no. Il8. 
152 See S. Ct. (May 9, 1934) 41 Seman. Jud. part 1, 191; S. Ct. (May 12, 
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S· Anti-Divorce Policy of the Forum 
(a) Nationals of the forum. If a:bsolute divorce is for-
bidden by the municipal law of a country, it is perfectly un-
derstandable under the principle of nationality that the sub-
jects of the forum are also prohibited from divorcing abroad. 
This interpretation seems obvious to the Italian courts, which 
will not recognize a foreign absolute divorce where both, or 
even only one, of the parties have been of Italian national-
ity.153 The same point of view obtains in Spain 154 and was 
held in France before divorce was reestablished in 1884.155 
All the recent French divorces of Italians, like that in the 
Ferrari case, are naturally regarded as invalid in Italy and 
have been criticized in France also, precisely because they are 
inconsistent with former practice as well as with the fraud 
theory of the French courts.156 
But this attitude is not the only one possible. In Brazil the 
matter is in doubt and has formed the subject of the most 
diverse decisions involving the submission of foreign divorce 
decrees for homologa~ao, i.e., confirmation for the purpose 
of enforcement. Some authorities had considered a foreign 
divorce as capable of full recognition in case the wife was of 
Brazilian nationality, the personal law of the husband being 
decisive for status questions.151 The prevailing opidion, how-
I 93 6) 48 ibid. part 2, 2290; S. Ct. (July 8, I 93 3) 3 8 ibid. part 2, I442; S. 
Ct. (Nov. 29, I933) 39 ibid. part 3, 2547· 
On the American reaction to Mexican divorces see HAcKWORTH, 2 Digest 
of International Law (I94I) 384. 153 Cass. Torino (June 6, I9I9) Revue I92o, 498; Cass. Roma (Nov. I3, 
I9I9) Revue I920, 498; App. Milano (Dec. 7, I9I6) Clunet I9I8, 3I2; App. 
Milano (March 3, I92I) Monitore 1921, soo; Clunet 1922, 194; App. Firenze 
(March 10, 1923) Monitore 1923, 401, Clunet I923, 1021; App. Genova 
(Feb. 28, I938) Rivista 1939, 331, Clunet I939, 171 (English divorce of two 
Italians having married in England). 
H 4 Unanimous opinion, see MANRESA, I Comentarios a) C6digo Civil Es-
pafiol 99; INGLOTT, 115 Revista Gen. Legis). y Jur. (1909) 258, 288. 
155 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, 186o) S.186o.1.210. 156 See supra p. 476. 157 See RoDRIGO OcrAviO, Le droit international prive dans Ia ll~gislation 
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ever, held for a long time by a majority of the Federal Su-
preme court and adopted by Rodrigo Octavio when he 
joined the Court/58 was that the foreign husband may re-
marry abroad, but that homologa{ao with respect to effects 
of divorce in Brazil is to be limited to property effects which 
a Brazilian judicial separation can also produce. Such partial 
enforcement was also granted when both parties were of 
Brazilian nationality/59 The new law of 1942, despite its 
principle of domicil, provides that a foreign divorce of two 
Brazilian parties is not recognized; if one of them is a Brazil-
ian, the divorce is recognized with respect to the other who, 
however, may not remarry in BraziU60 This provision seems 
to place husband and wife on an equal footing; it probably 
does not interfere with the enforcement of property effects.161 
Still another solution was given by a surprisingly liberal 
construction of the former Austrian prohibition of absolute 
divorce for Roman Catholics. In its last thirty years, the Aus-
trian Supreme Court admitted that, if one spouse 162 was a 
bresilienne no. 61; BEVILAQUA 322 n. 19 and in 6 Repert. 167 no. 41. V\7 here 
the husband was of Brazilian nationality and domicil, the Sup. Trib. Fed. 
(July 24, 1920) 64 Revista dir. civ. (1922) 505 spoke of Jack of jurisdiction 
of the Portuguese court. 
l58 Sup. Trib. Fed. (Aug. 28, 1929) no. 86o, Clunet 1932, IIII; the opinion 
of RODRIGO 0CTAVIO is also published in II Arch. Jud. Suppl. (1929) I9i· 
See ten other decisions ( 1913-1933) in GUIMARAES, II Brasil-Acordaos 167 
no. 29.229, particularly that of Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) also in Clunet 
1919, 402. 
159 In this sense, the most general opinion is summarized in the decision of 
the App. Div. of the Distr. Fed. Court no. 4830 (Jan. 29, 1935) 115 Revista 
dir. civ. (1935) 155, Clunet 1936, 975· Sup. Trib. Fed. (July r, 1942) no. 
1.032, 64 Arch. Jud. (1942) 194· 
160 Lei de Introdu.;;ao art. 7 § 6; EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 1067. 
The recognition of a divorce of two foreign spouses is usually granted 
without limitations (e.g. Sup. Trib. Fed. Dec. 26, 1946, 116 Revista For. 
(1948) 62) against a minority of the judges who want to exclude remar-
riage in Brazil; this opinion prevailed in Sup. Trib. Fed. (June 17, 1946) 
II3 Revista For. (1947) 385. 
1 61 EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 1067 no. 3, however, declares that in the case of 
two Brazilian spouses foreign divorce will not be recognized for any effect. 
1 62 Divorce of two Catholic Austrian spouses, of course, was not recog-
nized, OGH. (Nov. 6, 1934) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung 1935, 15, 8 Jahrb. H. E. 
( 1936) No. 619. 
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foreigner at the time of the marriage or even only at the 
time of suit, a foreign divorce not only had full effect for 
him but also freed the other party, although the latter was 
of Austrian nationality and Catholic religion.163 
Courts of third countries facing contrasts between the 
law of the divorce court and the personal law have sometimes 
felt themselves to be in a dilemma; some have recognized a 
divorce irrespective of the public order of the national law, 
where their own public policy was not offended.164 But actu-
ally courts generally follow their own principle on status 
questions. An Italian national who has obtained a divorce in 
the United States is not allowed to remarry in France, Ger-
many, Cuba, or any other country following the nationality 
rule. 165 Under the Swedish statute, however, the exception 
obtains that, if a party's marriage has been dissolved in one 
country and he is prohibited from remarrying under another 
foreign law, i.e., his personal law, his second marriage should 
not be annulled on this ground.166 
(b) Marriage celebrated within the forum. The Argen-
tine Civil Marriage Law 167 declares that a party to an Ar-
gentine marriage cannot remarry after a foreign absolute 
divorce. The prevailing, though contested, interpretation 
considers the foreign dissolution of a marriage celebrated in 
Argentina invalid 168 and the foreign dissolution of a foreign 
marriage valid, even to the extent that the parties may re-
marry in Argentina. Consistently with the principle .of domi-
cil, no distinction is drawn according to the nationality of 
the parties. 
The situation is still more striking with respect to the 
163 /nfra notes 224, 225. 
164 See, for instance, Trib. Seine (Nov. 18, 1901) Clunet 1902, 103. 
165 Cf. RAAPE 424; differently 3 FRANKENSTEIN 100, 563. 
166 Swedish Marriage Law of 1904, c. 2 § 2. 
167 Art. 7· 
168 See supra p. 464, n. 178. 
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Treaty of Montevideo on civil international law, which ex-
pressly forbids the dissolution of a marriage celebrated in a 
country not permitting divorce (i.e., a participant state) .169 
The courts of Uruguay feel authorized, by the clause of the 
Final Protocol reserving public policy, to pronounce divorces 
of Argentine nationals domiciled in Uruguay without any 
regard to the place of celebration of the marriage.170 In Ar-
gentina, while there remains some doubt about the Civil 
Code, there can be none concerning the express provision of 
the treaty (art. 13), requiring that the law of the place 
where the marriage was celebrated must concur with the law 
of the matrimonial domicil in permitting a divorce. This pro-
vision inserted in favor of Argentine law leaves the Argen-
tine courts no choice in refusing recognition to Uruguayan 
divorces of parties married in Argentina.171 A second 
marriage celebrated in Uruguay is considered null,172 i.e., as 
either adultery or concubinage with appropriate effects, 173 the 
children illegitimate,174 the wife unable to obtain maintenance 
or, after dissolution of the second marriage, alimony.175 All 
this construed under the sanction of an international treaty 
169 The courts are decided on this point; see RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. 
Priv. 319; 2 Vrco 87, and recently Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Cap. (Dec. 30, 1940) 
21 La Ley 440 (marriage celebrated in Delaware, U. S., dissolved in Monte-
video) with dicta for the case of marriages celebrated in a country where 
divorce is prohibited. 
17° For a recent example see Ap. Montevideo (Feb. I9, I94I) 39 Rev. Der. 
Juris. Adm. 82. Opinion of CALANDRELLI cited and aproved by Cam. civ. 2 
de Ia Cap. {Dec. 30, I94o), supra n. I69. 
171 Recent surveys on the attitude of the Argentine courts: 5 Boletin del 
Instituto de Enseiianza Practica de Ia Facultad de Buenos Aires (I939) I99; 
Note in 39 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (I941) 82. 
172 Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Cap. (May 8, 1931) 35 Jur. Arg. 94I; (Nov. I4, I932) 
IOI Gac. del Foro 100; Cam. civ. I de Ia Cap. (Sept. I2, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg. 
37I and {Feb. 19, 1934) 45 ibid. 270; and after others (Oct. 24, 1938) 35 Jur. 
Arg. 94I. 
173 Cam. civ. I de Ia Cap. {Sept. 12, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg. 371-408; Cam. civ. 
2 de Ia Cap. (Nov. I4, I932) IOI Gac. del Foro 100. 
174 2 Vrco 8I no. I09b. 
175 Ap. Buenos Aires (March I4, 1935) Revista del Foro (Peru) I935, 952, 
954, Clunet I937, I24. 
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sounds strange.176 All these complications will be alleviated 
for the future in consequence of the introduction of divorce 
in Argentine law in 1954. 
Under the new draft of the Montevideo Treaty, third 
member states are to recognize any divorce rendered at the 
marital domicil; this, of course, restores the full impact of 
the domiciliary principle, which is otherwise considerably re-
stricted by the present treaty.177 
In Chile, the matter is covered by three sections not quite 
consistent, from which it has been concluded that persons 
married in Chile, whether Chileans or foreigners, if divorced 
abroad, may not remarry in Chile, although their foreign re-
marriage would be recognized. 178 
(c) Foreigners. Divorce of foreigners by a foreign decree 
has usually been recognized despite a municipal law hostile 
to divorce, although often after some hesitancy. The forum 
is considered not really interested in the status of foreign-
ers.179 Moreover, a foreign divorce has been regarded as 
creating vested rights.180 
The French Supreme Court, at the time when divorce was 
forbidden in France, held that a foreign divorcee could 
marry a Frenchman in the country.181 Along the same line of 
thinking, Italian courts, after having been divided on the 
176 2 V1co 84. Yet the new draft, art. 15, changes nothing in this particu-
1 ar, except that the Argentine courts will not be explicitly compelled by the 
wording of the treaty to maintain the prevailing interpretation of art. 7 of 
their Civil Marriage Law. 
177 Treaty on international civil law, draft of 1940, arts. 15 and 59· 
178 Chile, C. C. arts. uo, 121; Ley de Matrimonio Civil, art. 15. See VELOSO 
CHAVEZ, Derecho Internacional Privado (1931) 117, 118. 
179 See QUADRI, 3 Guir. Comp. DIP. no. 32. 
18° Cf., e.g., NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 1936, 130; ZULETA (Colombian), Comi-
si6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil {1939-1940) 96; SoTo, ibid. 233· 
181 French Cass. (civ.) {Feb. 28, 186o) D.186o.1.57, S.1861.1.21o; cf. 
Cour Orleans (April 19, 186o) D.186o.2.82 {same case); Cass. (civ.) (July 
xs, 1878) D.1878.1.340, Clunet 1878, 499· For justification see 3 ARMINJON 44, 
suggesting that the most practical and also most equitable solution is not to 
question what has been done in the domain of another system. 
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question for a long time, are now prepared to grant a decree 
of exequatur for foreign divorce decrees concerning non-Itai-
ian parties, including former Italian nationals,182 and do not 
object to the remarriage of such parties in Italy/83 This lib-
eral attitude suffers an exception, if any, only in the case of a 
marriage celebrated in Italy in accordance with a canonical 
ceremony and with civil effects/84 for such a marriage is ex-
clusively subjected to the ecclesiastical tribunals and there-
for susceptible only of annulment and separation from bed 
and board.185 
While in Italy a canonical ceremony is always voluntary, 
since a secular form also exists, in Spain every marriage of 
Catholics pertains to the Church.186 But even an American 
citizen, not a Catholic, married in Spain and divorced any-
where, is considered unable under Spanish law to remarry in 
Spain.187 Likewise, the Polish Supreme Court held that, under 
182 See infra n. 221. 
183 App. Roma (Oct. 29, 1884) Clunet 1886, 62o; App. Milano (Nov. 29, 
1887) Clunet 1889, 168; Cass. Torino (Aug. I, 1922) Clunet 1923, 391; Cass. 
(April 8, 1931) Foro Ita!. 1931, I, 546, Clunet 1932, 222; App. Milano 
(April 23, 1931) Clunet 1932, 519 (Hungarians divorced in Hungary). 
184 A pure ecclesiastical ceremony does not count here because it is of no 
effect under Italian law. 
185 App. Milano (Dec. 27, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1216, Clunet 1939, 
763, 19 Rivista ( 1940) 99, on the basis of Cass. (June II, 1934) Foro Ita!. 
1934, I, 1062; Cass. (Aug. 6, 1949) Foro Ita!. 1949, I, 908. Contra: App. 
Brescia {Nov. 9, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1222, Clunet 1939, 763; and App. 
Brescia (Oct. 27, 1938} Rivista 1939, 407. Cf. Bosco, 25 Rivista (1933) 38. 
186 Spanish C. C. arts. 42, 75 ff.; Trib. Supr. {March 31, 19II) Revue 191+, 
635· 
187 In the prevailing opinion, the law of Spain is identified with Canon Law 
to the extent that, on principle, no divorce a vinculo is either granted or 
recognized, even to non-Catholics, despite their national law permitting it. 
Trib. Supr. {March 31, 19II) Revue 1914, 635; Direcci6n General de Re-
gistros y Notariado (Oct. 3, 1952) Revista Espan. Der. Int. 1952, 933; LA-
SALLA LLANAS 139; TRIAS DE BES, Estudios de derecho internacionaJ privado 
429 n. 2 and Der. Int. Priv. no. 143. It is no true exception that a foreign 
civil marriage of Catholics may be divorced abroad; the marriage itself is 
invalid in the eyes of Canon Law; See COVIAN, Art. Divorce in 12 Enciclo-
pedia Jur. Esp. 446, 448. For other literature, cf. SERIN, Les conflits de lois 
dans les rapports franco-espagnols en matiere de marriage, de divorce et 
de separation de corps ( 1929) 87. 
In Brazil to the same effect Ct. App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 2, 1919} 55 
Revista dir. civ. (1920) 523, Clunet 1921, 990; but see supra n. 159· 
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the applicable Polish law, an American citizen of Catholic 
faith who had been married and divorced in the United 
States could not remarry in the former Austrian and Russian 
part of Poland.188 
Particular rigor obtained in Brazil, as the courts, despite 
their former nationality principle, generally denied recog-
nition to foreign divorces not only of Brazilian nationals but 
also of foreigners domiciled in BraziU89 In spite of the domi-
ciliary principle prevailing in the new law of 1942, the courts 
have interpreted the pertinent provision ma as an exception 
in favor of the national law. Consequently, divorce decrees 
of foreigners Jomiciled in Brazil are recognized.189b 
(d) Bigamy. It must be noted that nonrecognition in the 
cases discussed under (a) and (c) supra does not mean that 
remarriage following the divorce is bigamous in the criminal 
sense. Even the Spanish Supreme Court, after having de-
clared invalid a German divorce of a German national who 
had undergone a Catholic marriage ceremony in Spain, re-
fused to consider his remarriage bigamous because in accord-
ance with his national law he could well think his action justi-
fied.190 As the Treaty of Montevideo has been understood 191 
and as its new draft expressly states,192 entering upon a 
second marriage after divorce at the matrimonial ,domicil 
188 Polish S. Ct. (Dec. 17, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 47· 
189 The principle has been stated, although breaking it by majority vote by 
a very cautiously framed exception, in the decision of the Sup. Trib. Fed. no. 
993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 on the ground of jurisdictional con-
siderations that may be questioned. 
189a Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7 § 6. 189b Supr. Trib. Fed. (June 27, 1949) 93, Arch. Jud. (1950) 229; Supr. 
Trib. Fed. (May 3, 1954) II2 Arch. Jud. ( 1954) 577· 190 Trib. Sup. (April 7, 1915) 12 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (Chile) 
( 1915) part 3, 9, Clunet 1917, 732, Revue 1919, 6u (the divorce in the case 
was invalidated by Trib. Sup. (March 31, 19u) Revue 1914, 635, cited 
supra p. 540, n. 187). 191 Argentina: Cam. crim. de Ia Cap. (July x, 1932) 38 J. A. 1237. See also 
2 VICO 81 no. 109a. 192 (1940) art. 15b. 
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does not constitute bigamy under any law in the member 
states, including Argentina. 
6. Requirement of Similar Grounds 
(a) In most states of the United States, at English com-
mon law,193 and in many other countries, it is immaterial 
whether the ground upon which a foreign divorce is based is 
adequate under the law of the forum too. 
(b) In a number of jurisdictions, however, domiciliaries 
or nationals, as the status principle may be, are protected 
against foreign divorce decisions, unless there is agreement 
with the divorce grounds established by the lex fori. 
An important example is given by the New York courts, 
whose traditional policy so far has been to refuse to recog-
nize any decree of divorce obtained "upon grounds insuffi-
cient for that purpose in this state, when the divorced defend-
ant resides in this state and was not personally served with 
process and did not appear in the action." 194 This policy 
seems to be in accord with Gould v. Gou!d, 193 dealing with a 
French decree. However, the last mentioned limitation evi-
dently is affected by Williams v. North Carolina. 
British subjects, domiciled in England, Northern Ireland. 
or Scotland, but living in British possessions, may obtain di-
vorce in the local courts under the Indian and Colonial Di-
193 The doubt whether the lex domicilii abroad could also govern the case 
of an English marriage was removed by Harvey v. Farnie [1882-1883] 8 
App. Cas. 43; Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] I Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906] 
P. 209 by Sir Gore11 Barnes at 2I7; the principle was recently confirmed 
by Mezger v. Mezger [I936] 3 AU E. R. I30, [I937] P. I9 (conduct short of 
adultery under § I568 German C. C.). 
Similarly, Canada: Leigh v. Leigh (Ont. Ct. App.) [1937] I D. L. R. 773 
(Michigan decree on the ground of desertion to Canadian residence). 
Greece: 6 Repert. 430 no. 98. 
194 Johnson v. Johnson (1933) I46 N. Y. Misc. 93, 95, 261 N. Y. Supp. 
523, 526; the rule has been steady since Jackson v. Jackson (18o6) I N. Y. 
(Johns. Cas.) 424; cf. Beeck v. Beeck (I925) 211 App. Div. 720, 208 N. Y. 
Supp. 98. 
1 95 (I923) 235 N. Y. I4, I38 N. E. 490. 
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vorce Jurisdiction Act of 1 9 2 6; among other conditions, 
the grounds of divorce must be those recognized by English 
law. loa 
An analogous restriction with respect to foreign divorces 
of their nationals obtains in a number of countries following 
the nationality principle.197 
In Germany, however, it is sufficient that the foreign de-
cree state facts which constitute valid grounds for divorce 
under German law/"8 although the decree may have been 
based upon other grounds or no grounds at all or upon mu-
tual agreement. This theory of substitute ground is a conces-
196 Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, x6 & 17 Geo. V, c. 
40; 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 3 5: Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940, 
301; Colonial and other Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction) Act, 1950, 14 & 
I 5 Geo. VI, c. 20. 
197 France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, 1918) Clunet 1918, n82 (even with 
respect to foreigners). Trib. civ. Seine (June xo, 1936) D. H. 1936, 420 
(exequatur denied one spouse being of French nationality and the ground for 
divorce not agreeing with French law). NIBOYET 754 bases the rule on the 
idea that there is no vested interest. As to the recent liberal trend, see supra 
pp. 508 ff. 
Greece: Trib. Athens, 47 Tbemis 582, Clunet I937, 597 {Turkish decree). 
The Netherlands: H. R. {Nov. 24, I9I6) W. I0098; Rb. Rotterdam (June 
28, 1935) W. 12991 {South African decree). Does H. R. {April I, I938) W. 
193 8, no. 989, however, give the judge discretion even over status judg-
ments? See VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1939, 204, 208. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on private international law, art. I7 § 3 provides that 
Polish law must be applied; in more recent practice, however, recognition is 
denied unless a treaty assures reciprocity, see supra p. 427, n. 28. 
Portugal: {probably also beyond the domain of the Hague Convention) 
see CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 pars. I and 2. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335 and (May 13, I938) 
64 BGE. II 76 at 78 (if one of the spouses is a Swiss National and domicili-
ary, the rule of NAG. art. 7g par. 3 that Swiss jurisdiction and law give 
way to the foreign domicil is inapplicable). 
Cuba: Divorce law (Decreto-Ley) 206 of May IO, I934, art 58: Foreign 
divorce judgments between Cubans and foreigners are recognized if the 
basis of the judgment was equal or analogous to any of the divorce grounds 
recognized in the above Decreto-Ley 206. 
In Peru a similar principle seems indicated by the decision of the Lima 
court of Oct. 4, 1935, Revista del Foro I935, 9I3 1 Clunet I937, 124, recog-
nizing dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Peru between a foreign dip-
lomat and a formerly Peruvian woman, because the divorce was based on 
grounds recognized in the recent Peruvian C. C. 
198 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 no. 4 in combination with EG. art. 17 par. 4. as 
interpreted by RG. (April 4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24. 
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sion to a more liberal conception of migratory divorce but 
gives meager justification for the fortuitous chances cf 
searching in a foreign decree for facts held irrelevant by the 
foreign court. 
(c) A corresponding regard for the legislation of third 
states is shown by the Swedish law,199 providing that a di-
vorce decree rendered by a foreign authority may not be rec-
ognized unless a ground for divorce existed under the law 
of the state whose nationals the parties were. 
7· Evasion 
(a) Fictitious change of personal law. The requirements 
of similar grounds and also in part of jurisdiction result in a 
bar to subjects of the forum who seek dissolution of their 
marriages abroad under easier conditions than they find at 
home. Indeed, a considerable number of the cases which have 
been termed evasion from or circumvention of the domestic 
provisions on divorce are sufficiently dealt with under the 
heading of exclusive jurisdiction of the forum or lack of in-
ternational jurisdiction of the divorce court. 
(b) Fictitious change of domicil. Fictitious change of 
domicil occurs in the frequent cases where the parties falsely 
assert that a domicil exists within the divorce forum, as de-
manded both by the divorce court and the court of recogni-
tion. The British 200 and Swiss 201 authorities consider collu-
sion or fraud going to the root of the jurisdiction as a de-
fense against recognition. Similarly, all American courts 
seem to hold that recognition is not due to a divorce obtained 
under a "residence simulated for this purpose" or not estab-
lished "bona fide with intention of a permanent domicil." 202 
1 99 Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § 5· 
200 Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209; cf. Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19; 
Crowe v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557· 
2o1 BECK, NAG. 359 no. xoo with literature. 
202 See cases in 27 C. J. S. ( 1941) Divorce § 332 n. II; see also ScHOULER, 
Domestic Relations § 1983, 2101; I WHARTON § 228. 
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This rule has been developed, in contrast to the English doc-
trine, 203 under the standard of the state where the judgment 
is rendered and not of the forum of recognition. With re-
spect to divorce decrees, however, the result·is hardly dis-
tinguishable, and this is true also of the five state statutes 
and various court practices 204 that contemplate the same fac-
tual situation from the angle of the evaded domiciliary law. 
The Massachusetts and Maine statutes preceded and the 
statutes of Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin followed 
and adopted the evasion section of the otherwise ill-fated 
Uniform Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act; 205 they 
deny force to a foreign decree of divorce if, to use the word-
ing of the former Delaware statute: 206 
"any inhabitant of this State shall go into another State, 
territory or country in order to obtain a decree of divorce for 
a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this State, 
or for a cause which is not ground for divorce under the laws 
of this State." 
This text with its twin clauses, however, is puzzling. In the 
second clause, "inhabitant" clearly means, as it does gener-
ally, a domiciliary who has remained domiciled in the state. 
This case, "or for a cause, etc.," may be fairly well defined 
by assuming that the parties were in fact continuously domi-
ciled in the state of recognition and that they or the plain-
tiff fraudulently alleged that they were domiciled in the di-
vorce forum and, furthermore, that the ground upon which 
the decree was rendered is no cause for divorce in the state. 
The first case, "cause which occurred, etc.," looks mysteri-
ous. "Inhabitant" must have the same meaning as in the sec-
zoa See YNTEMA, supra n. 136, 387. 
204 VREELAND 329 places twelve states in this category. 
205 The Uniform State Law was drafted by the Divorce Congress of Phila-
delphia in November, 19o6, and approved by the Commissioners but finally 
retired by them to be replaced by the draft of a Uniform Divorce J urisdic-
tion Act of 1930, based on other principles. 
206 Del. Rev. C. (1935) § 3525, identical with the model. 
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ond alternative, and this seems to be generally agreed, since 
the statutes, with the possible exception of New Jersey, are 
not applied where the parties move to another state for pur-
poses other than to obtain a divorce.207 If, thus, the first case 
is also concerned with a fictitious foreign domicil, what is left 
for the second case? For, if all causes that occurred during 
the residence of the parties in the state are precluded from 
consideration by the divorce forum, what other cause can 
practically be in question? Perhaps the draftsmen thought 
that even a cause which is legally sufficient in both jurisdic-
tions should be averred and decided exclusively by the court 
at the actual domicil; thus, the first clause would favor the 
jurisdictional and the second the substantive law of the domi-
cil. But there is no confirmation of such an interpretation 
to be found anywhere. Vreeland, the sole critic, contents 
himself with rejecting the entire clause as indefensible on 
principle. 208 
It appears doubtful, whether these provisions can be rec-
onciled with the standards set by the United States Supreme 
Court in the first Williams case 209 for the recognition of for-
eign divorces. 209a 
(c) Fictitious change of nationality. In a less obvious 
way, change of nationality has also sometimes been termed 
fictitious and hence regarded as incapable of supporting rec-
ognition of a divorce granted under the new national law. 
For a better understanding, one ought to remember the mi-
207 See I WHARTON § 229 for the Massachusetts statute; Note in 7 Minn. L. 
Rev. ( 1923) 240 and especially as to and against some mysterious decisions 
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Note, 21 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1923) 922; Goon-
RICH ( ed. I) § 127 n. 39 j VREELAND 135, 330. 
208 VREELAND 340. We may presume a connection with the obscure limita-
tions of jurisdiction discussed supra p. 488. 
209 Williams v. North Carolina (1942) 317 U. S. 287. 
209&The Delaware statute (see supra p. 545), as amended 1945, has 
dropped the express provision against recognition, see Del. Code Ann. 
(1953) 13 § I5JI. Similarly, the Wisconsin provision ~eems to be superseded 
by the adoption of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 1948 (Wise. Stats., 
1953, § 247·22). 
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gratory divorces, typified by the pilgrimages of Americans to 
Paris, Reno, and Chihuahua. When divorce was forbidden in 
France, the Bauffremont-Bibesco case discussed below was a 
celebrated example. Austrian Catholics went over the Hun-
garian border for divorce. Italians, whose law still prevents 
absolute divorce, emigrated to Fiume to be divorced, so long 
as that city did not belong to Italy. 
The Bauffremont case was the cornerstone of a French 
doctrine of fraude a la loi, which, enjoying for a time great 
prominence, opposed evasion of the law of the forum by 
agreements, adoptions, and gifts, as well as by divorces and 
judicial separations, the latter, however, being known as the 
classic domain of this doctrine. 210 The princess of Bauffre-
mont, Belgian by birth and French by marriage, changed her 
citizenship by naturalization in the then independent German 
state of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and was there divorced under 
her new personal law; then she married the Rumanian prince 
Bibesco. The French Court of Cassation declared the natu-
ralization of the woman, as well as her divorce and remar-
riage, fraudulent and void, these acts having occurred for the 
sole purpose of escaping from the prohibitions of the French 
law .211 This doctrine has been followed in other French de-
cisions and by Belgian, Italian, and Latin American courts, 212 
but has slowly lost its force in France itsel£.213 The writers 
are aware that the acquisition of a foreign citizenship is an 
exercise of foreign state sovereignty that cannot be denied.214 
210 DEGAND, 5 Repert. 554 no. So. 
211 Cass. (civ.) (March 18, 1878) 8.1878.1.193; see also the similar case 
Vidal, Cour Paris (June 30, 1877) Clunet 1878, 268, where the 'fraud was 
agreed upon by both parties. 
212 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Aug. 5, 188o) Clunet 188o, 508 (in the same 
affaire Bauffremont); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 19, 1882) Clunet 1882, 364. 
Italy: App. Torino (July 22, 1912) 6 Rivista (1912) 588, Revue 1914, 187; 
App. Trento (Feb. 26, 1930) 23 Rivista (1931) 248. 
213 PERROUD, Clunet 1926, 19; AVDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 226; J. DoN-
NEDIEU DE VABRES 481; cpntra: DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83. 
214 See especially the Italian writers ANZILOTII, 6 Rivista ( 1912) 595; 
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Moreover, the conception of fraude a la loi has made way in 
prevailing theory for a more general and elastic idea of pub-
lic policy. 
In Italy, however, where the subject of forbidden divorce 
remains of particular importance, courts and writers insist 
that a change of nationality may well be simulated by the 
parties for divorce purposes, i.e., not seriously intended, 
which is different indeed from acts so intended to evade the 
law. If they intend in reality to remain Italians and formally 
to regain their Italian citizenship at the first possible mo-
ment, especially when they have not transferred their domicil 
to their alleged new homeland, according to an express re-
quirement of the Italian nationality law, 215 they may have 
acquired a second nationality abroad but not lost the Italian 
one. Since they have double nationality, they are treated, ac-
cording to the rule,216 as nationals.217 
(d) Effective change of personal law. Indeed, the main 
doctrine of divorces in fraudem legis has been abandoned in 
France.218 By changing nationality, a party changes his per-
sonal law automatically. Divorce under the acquired statute 
is said to be fraudulent not against the prohibition of divorce 
but against the law of nationality, and consequently the for-
mer country cannot react through private lawsuits, though 
UDINA, Elementi no. 137; also FEDOZZI 277, 482, although he retains a dis-
tinct theory of fraud. 
215 Act no. SSS of June 13, 1912, art. 8. 
-216 See supra p. I 30. 
217 Cass. Torino (April u, 1921) IS Rivista (1923) rs3; App. Brescia 
(Jan. 24, I923) Clunet I924, 2s7; App. Genova (May 24, 1923) Clunet 
1924, 1129. Cf. the writers cited in note 214 supra. 
In France, LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 123 no. IOS contends that the courts 
are unable to set aside the acquisition of a foreign nationality by an indi-
vidual but are able to restore his character as a Frenchman, if the conditions 
of naturalization have been proved fictitious, the naturalized person never 
having intended to settle outside of France. 
2LB Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, I922) Clunet 1929, I2S8; Trib. civ. Seine (July 
IS, I93S) Clunet 1936, 867. With respect to the underlying theory, cf. ]. DoN-
NEDIEU DE VABRES 481 n. 4• 
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it may refuse the person's reinstatement to his previous 
nationality. 
Italian courts have recognized most of the Fiume di-
vorces 219 and similar decrees that came before them.220 The 
highest court recently confirmed the principle, hitherto pre-
vailing though contested, that exequatur is not denied a for-
eign decree, even if the parties were formerly of Italian 
nationality.221 
Italy, however, resorts to political measures against for-
mer Italians divorced abroad. Ordinarily, they are barred 
from regaining I tali an citizenship,222 and an Italian intending 
to marry such a person was not likely to obtain a governmen-
tal authorization prescribed by Fascist discriminatory legis-
Iation.223 
The Austrian Supreme Court went so far as to recognize 
not only the divorce of a former Austrian of Catholic faith 
who had become a Czechoslovakian citizen, but also the un-
married status of the other party who had remained an 
:\ustrian national, 224 and to consider unmarried an Austrian 
"
10 The divorce decrees of Fiume granted to Italian nationals have finally 
been confirmed on the whole by Royal Decree of March 20, 1924, no. 352 art. 
+; cf. App. Roma (May 31, 1927) Giur. Ita!. 1927, I, 2, 400. 
22
" E.g. App. Milano (Nov. 24, 1920) Monitore 1921, 18, Clunet 1921, 
625; and now in the first place Cass. (June 8, 1932) Foro Ita!. 1932, I, 1452, 
25 Rivista (1933) 91; App. Bologna (June 4, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1936, I, 2, 
.p2 (Hungarian decree); App. Trieste (April 22, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937, I, 
2, 298 (Greek decree). There are contrary decisions, however, where the 
Hague Convention does not eliminate the question, see e.g. Cass. Roma (May 
15, 1928) Clunet 1931, 758; App. Roma (Dec. 15, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1937, 
I, 2, 209 (Turkish decree). 
221 Cass. (July 13, 1939) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1097, Rivista 1940, 478, the 
court recalls the plenary decision of Cass. Rom a (Dec. 30, 1911) Foro Ita!. 
1912, I, 148 and others; cf. the note ibid. 
222 Law of June 13, 1912, no. 555 on nationality, art. 9· 
223 Law of November 17, 1938, no. 1728, art. 2, abrogated by law of Jan. 
20, 1944; see SERINI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev. 
( 1943) 293· 
224 OGH. (June 30, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 814 no. 460; Clunet 1938, 
354· This liberal practice was initiated by the plenary decision of Dec. rr, 
1924, 6 SZ. no. 396, Judikatenbuch no. 18, and continued in numerous later 
decisions, for instance OGH. (May rr, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108; (Nov. 14, 1934) 
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Catholic woman who had changed to a foreign nationality, 
obtained a divorce, and then resumed her Austrian citizen-
ship.22s 
The Tribunal of Amsterdam had recently to decide a case 
which could be regarded as a true prototype of a fraudulent 
divorce.226 A Dutchman clandestinely acquired Estonian na-
tionality and, on the basis of a brief residence in Riga, ob-
tained a Latvian divorce from his wife under the rather 
scandalous procedure of Latvia. The court acknowledged 
that the woman had become an Estonian citizen without 
knowing it and thereby was subjected to the law of that na-
tionality. Fortunately, the judges found an older agreement 
of maintenance which could be taken as a basis for allocating 
adequate compensation to the wife. This rule also obtains in 
Brazil. 227 
An important limitation is contained in the Hague Con-
vention on Divorce (art. 7 in conjunction with art. 4). It 
may be illustrated by the following example. Italian spouses 
acquired Hungarian nationality and obtained a divorce in a 
Hungarian court on the ground of desertion; the time of the 
desertion was calculated by including six months during 
which the parties still had been of Italian nationality. Rec-
ognition was refused in Italy.228 
8 Jahrb. HR. I93S, no. 28; (Sept. 24, I93S) 8 J ahrb. HR. I93S, no. 216I, 
with the exception, however, of that of OGH. (March 27, I93S) 8 Jahrb. HR. 
I93S, nos. IS64, IS6s, Clunet I93S, 1028. Cf. WALKER 63S· 
225 OGH. (May u, I932) I4 SZ. no. 108, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 327; OGH. 
(Oct. 8, I93S) J.BI. 1936, 103; Clunet 1937, 33S· Cf. WALKER in I KLANG's 
Kommentar 32I, 322. 
22 6 Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 22, I936) W. I937, no. 47· 
2 27 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I67 no. 43· 
228 See ultimately App. Firenze (Feb. 2S, I933) 2S Rivista (I933) 467; 
Cass. (Nov. IS, I932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 39I no. Io4; Cass. (Jan. IS, I937) 
Foro Ita!. I937, I, 2I7, Giur. Ita!. I937, I, I, I20 and the literature cited by 
MoNAco, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. IS3· 
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8. Additional Application of Public Policy 
With all the many specific obstacles to recognition of for· 
eign divorce decrees, it seldom happens that the subsidiary 
intervention of public policy in its general functions is in-
voked. Just one case may be reported; the Tribunal de Ia 
Seine rejected the prayer of a French woman for recognition 
of a German decree of divorce which declared her guilty of 
anti-German utterances-a paradoxical treatment of the 
applicant.229 
9· Renvoi 
An interesting regard for the personal law has been intro-
duced into the English and the New York law by a practice 
related to renvoi. In the English case of .Armitage v . .Attor-
ney General, 230 a divorce decree granted in South Dakota was 
recognized in England, because it would have been recog-
nized in New York where the matrimonial domicil was. It is 
generally concluded therefrom that any decree affecting the 
status of husband and wife which is held valid by the private 
international law of the domicil, is effectual in England. 231 
New York courts have established an analogous practice 
in connection with their well-known special rule by which 
they refuse to recognize as binding a foreign divorce decree 
against a spouse domiciled in New York, who was not per-
sonally served with process. Although the rule is said to be 
for the protection of New York citizens, in the case where 
the defendant is domiciled in another state, th~ courts of 
229 Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 23, 1922) Clunet 1923, 295 criticized by 3 FRANK· 
ENSTEIN 543 n. 16. For the disregard of penal prohibitions to remarry con-
tained in foreign divorce decrees see SECRETAN, Revue 1926, 219, and supra 
p. 305, n. 169. 
2so [ 19o6] P. 135. 
231 CHESHIRE 375; cf. FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and 
Divorce," [1932] 4 D.L.R. 1, 44, now Essays 736, and supra pp. 498-500. 
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New York make their position dependent upon the effect 
given to the decree in the state of the defendant's domicil 
when rendered. 232 Extension of this renvoi has been advo-
cated as a vigorous contribution to greater uniformity.233 
In an analogous way, under the principle of nationality, 
as we have seen, consistency requires that a divorce rendered 
in a state other than the national state should be recognized 
in third countries, if recognized in the national state.234 Thus, 
indeed, some uniformity is achieved. 
Illustrations: (i) (AG. Hannover (Oct. ro, 1931) 
IPRspr. I932, no. 73.) Both parties were of Argentine na-
tionality; they had married in Argentina. A divorce obtained 
in Uruguay was not recognized by the German court, be-
cause it was not recognizable under Argentine law. 
(ii) (KG. (Feb. II, I938) JW. I938, 870.) The hus-
band of Austrian nationality and Catholic faith was domi-
ciled in Budapest, Hungary; the wife had acquired Hun-
garian nationality. The divorce rendered in Hungary was 
sufficient to allow the woman to remarry even under Austrian 
practice. 235 This Austrian practice has to be followed, said 
the Court of Appeals of Berlin. 
232 Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106; Dean v. Dean 
( 1925) 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844; Powell v. Powell ( 1925) 211 App. Div. 
750, 208 N.Y. Supp. 153; cf. Restatement, New York Annotations § II3, 86. 
233 39 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1926) 640; LoRENZEN, "Renvoi in Divorce Proceed-
ings Based upon Constructive Service," 31 Yale L. J. (1922) 191, 194; Lo-
renzen suggests applying this doctrine to foreign parties; this seems possible 
without difficulty if we conceive of the New York rule as based on domicil 
rather than on the citizenship of the parties. 
234 Austria: WALKER 730. 
Czechoslovakia: C. Civ. Proc. (1950) art. 641 par. 2. 
Germany: supra n. 165. 
In France, a similar result should follow from the two generally adopted 
requirements for recognizing a foreign decree, that it must originate from a 
court having jurisdiction by French conceptions and that the decision should 
agree with that obtainable in application of French conflicts law; but see the 
controversy reported in xo Repert. xso. 
Switzerland: controversy, see BECK, NAG. 396 no. 12. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Arnheim (Jan. 20, 1955) N.J. 1955 no. 789 (recogni-
tion of Florida decree divorcing American husband and Dutch wife since 
decree would be recognized at last common domicil of parties, i.e. New 
York). 
235 Supra n. 224. 
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A further case brings us to a combined application of the 
New Y ark rule and this European rule. 
(iii) (KG. (Oct. 14, 1932) IPRspr. I932, no. I47.) 
Both parties were Germans who had emigrated to the United 
States, seemingly to New York. The wife established domicil 
in Reno and obtained a divorce there. The husband lived at 
the commencement of the suit in Brooklyn and later in Man-
hattan. The first condition for recognizing the Nevada de-
cree in Germany was (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, no. I) that the 
courts of the state to which the foreign tribunal belongs are 
competent according to German laws, i. e., of the domicil of 
the husband (C. Civ. Proc. § I 3 par. I) at the decisive mo-
ment of the divorce suit (C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I). The 
Court of Appeals of Berlin held that the "state" to which 
the Reno court "belonged" was Nevada and not the United 
States, an obviously correct statement.236 But the court dis-
missed the suit for recognition for the sole reason that the 
husband was not domiciled in Nevada but in New York. It 
should have asked the question whether a New York court 
would recognize the decree, although the answer might have 
been in the negative on the ground of the special rule of New 
York. 
If the domicil of the defendant husband, at the time of the 
commencement of the action had been, for example, in Con-
necticut and later in New York, the Nevada decree would 
have been recognized in Connecticut-upon the mere per-
sonal service of the husband in Connecticut 237-and there-
fore also in New Y ark, since commencement of the divorce 
action is regarded as the decisive moment for fixing jurisdic-
tion. In consequence, the German court would have to recog-
nize the divorce, whatever the German theory as to the time 
element may be . 
. r-·-
236 Cf. also annotation on the case, I Giur. Comp. DIP. ISO no. 39· 
231 Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve ( 1914) 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (regard-
ing a South Dakota decree). 
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III. CoNCLUsioNs 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in recent times, 
has evidently found it necessary to smooth out the compli-
cated conditions of mutual recognition of divorce decrees 
among the states. Thus far, the Court has increased the im-
port of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in two respects. The 
Davis case 238 has declared that a party contesting in the di-
vorce state the validity of a divorce on the ground of lack of 
jurisdiction, for instance, by appeal, forfeits his right of col-
lateral attack in all other states. The first Williams case 239 
enlarges the domain of compulsory recognition by elimina t-
ing the defense based on lack of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant. 
This second step effectuates a far-reaching simplification 
of the rules on recognition. Moreover, and this is a point 
well to be noticed, an ancient remainder is eradicated, to the 
great benefit of rational procedure; the lawyers of this coun-
try customarily think of "personal jurisdiction" as based on 
determinate manners of service of process. But the manner 
in which a defendant is cited to attend the trial seems out of 
relation to modern circumstances. What does it practically 
mean in our days, whether a party receives a summons to 
appear in court by the hands of a sheriff or marshal, by Fed-
eral mail, or by any reliable means of communication at 
whatever place in the United States? A husband or wife, in 
particular, may very well be required to traverse any dis-
tance in the country in such a vital cause. The costs of travel 
may make a difference, but, at that, the matter of bearing the 
costs may or may not need a general reform. On the whole, 
the ruling that the dom:icil of one party supports divorce ju-
risdiction, according to most of the state statutes before the 
Williams case and under the Constitution according to this 
238 Supra p. 505. 
289 Supra p. 501. 
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decision, is not so much of an innovation as a clarification 
and simplification of the subject. 
However, this change of law will signify salutary prog-
ress only if the domicil of at least one of the parties in the 
divorce state remains a basic postulate, strongly enforced by 
all courts involved. It is not very encouraging that this point 
was discarded so easily in the decision of the first Williams 
case. The necessity of a serious and honest domicil has be-
come the only remaining protection of deserted spouses and, 
what is more, of the divorce legislations so ambitiously ad-
vanced in individual states. Without this last barrier, it 
would be true that the laxest divorce practice would prevail 
over all others. 
In the light of this experience, the tendency of the Davis 
case or, to be specific, the application of the "boot strap doc-
trine" to divorce, is frankly to be regretted. If divorce juris-
diction be assumed on a fake affirmation of domicil, the mis-
take is not effaced by its repetition. Courts may be inclined to 
construe a defendant's acquiescence to allegations of domi-
ciliary facts or to a judgment as effective waiver of the right 
of collateral attack, although this clearly runs against the old 
established principles prohibiting parties to a matrimonial 
cause from disposing of their rights. But to treat a protesting 
party like an agreeing one, in conflict with the principle that 
a party specially appearing for the purpose of denying juris-
diction should not lose thereby his analogous defense in an-
other state, is particularly bad law in a field where truth 
should prevail. 
The most effective weapon to fight evasion would be the 
requirement of a "minimum residence," if sternly observed 
in granting jurisdiction by the court of divorce and likewise 
in other courts when they re-examine the existence of a bona 
fide domicil in the divorce state. Quite recently, Lorenzen 
also has suggested that residence should extend over a rea-
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sonable period of residence, "say six months" and seriously 
considers that the Supreme Court or Congressional legisla-
tion should require such period as a requisite of due process. 
This corroborates my postulate, with the difference that Lo-
renzen admits mere residence as sufficient, on these condi-
tions, as a fair basis for jurisdiction in divorce. 240 In my 
opinion, jurisdiction in these cases has been stretched as far 
as it may reasonably be, if it is to be grounded in the domicil 
of only one party. That such domicil should be replaced 
altogether by a mere temporary residence of one party is an 
idea that is becoming familiar through the operation of the 
divorce mills, but which grievously encourages the evil of 
migratory divorce. 
As to international relationships, the present chaos can be 
remedied only by thorough reforms of the domestic and con-
flicts laws. The claims of countries following the national 
law principle must be decisively relaxed; on the other hand, 
the irresponsible attitude with which lex fori is applied m 
other countries ought to be renounced. 
240 LORENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. ]. ( 1943) 341, 
35Z· 
CHAPTER 13 
Effects of Divorce 
I. EFFECTS OF NoN-RECOGNIZED FOREIGN DIVORCES 
I. View of the Country of Divorce and of Third States 
I N the United States, it is possible that a divorce pro-nounced in one state may not be recognized in a sister state, because the court did not possess the jurisdiction 
required under the Constitution. In such cases, it is disputed 
whether the divorce is valid in the state where it was de-
creed.1 But if so, as is commonly agreed, both parties to the 
dissolved marriage are undoubtedly able to remarry in the 
state of divorce, although not in every other state. 
Yet, in comparable situations in countries following the 
nationality principle, other solutions have been reached. In 
France 2 and Switzerland/ an Italian (or a Spaniard, a Chil-
ean, a Colombian), whose national law forbids the dissolu-
tion of his marriage, is not permitted to remarry, despite his 
divorce in a French or Swiss court. Such a divorce may have 
1 For invalidity, Restatement §§III, 113 comment g. Supra p. 502, n. 22. 
2 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 1919) S.1921.2.9, Revue 1919, 543; cf. NIBOYET, 
S.1921.2.9; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 no. 92; BATIFFOL, Traite 527. Contra; Trib. 
civil Seine (March 17, 1948) Revue Crit. 1948, 112 (approving note Nmo-
YET) ; HOLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorce," Le droit international prive de Ia 
famille ( 1954) 167. It is notable that the reporting judge at the Cassation 
Court in the Ferrari case considered remarriage in Franc.e quite possible for 
the Italian husband; see Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 104. LEREBOUR&-
PIGEONNIERE 400 no. 338 is of the same opinion, although he thinks the hus-
band would be unable to sue for divorce. 
3 Swiss Circular Letter (June 29, 1929) Clunet 1930, 539 advises civil offi-
cials to refuse remarriage to an Italian whose marriage has been dissolved 
in Switzerland; BG. (Nov. II, 1954) So BGE. I 427. Contrary, however, 
on the ground of public policy Regierungsrat Kanton Ziirich (Oct. 16, 1952) 
48 SJZ. (1952) 376, 19 Z.ausi.PR. (1954) 659. 
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been granted either by inadvertence or on a theory like that 
of the Ferrari case, whereby one party of French nationality 
is entitled to divorce irrespective of the national law of his 
spouse.4 
In Germany, the question whether an Italian divorced in a 
German court for some exceptional reason-for instance be-
cause the wife was of German nationality-could be permit-
ted to marry in Germany, has been difficult. In such case, 
which should prevail: the authority of res judicata owing to 
a domestic judgment, and in consequence the man be consid-
ered unmarried, or compliance with the Italian family law 
ordained by private international law, and the capacity of the 
man to remarry be denied (EG. art. 13)? While the older 
decisions followed the first, procedural, line of thought, 5 
numerous writers have insisted on the requirement allegedly 
posited by the principle of conflicts law 6 and by this construc-
tion have impressed several courts.7 Opposition to this view 
exists 8 and is justified. It is well-nigh absurd to regard a per-
son divorced at the forum as married. Should he succeed in 
having the new marriage celebrated, not even those who rec-
ognize the foreign impediment presume to regard it invalid.9 
Dutch and Belgian courts have realized that divorce 
4 Supra pp. 475-479. 
5 KG. (March 13, I9II) 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 331, aff'd RG. (March 21, 
1912) JW. 1912, 642. 
6 LEWALD n8 no. 163; STEIN-}ONAs-ScHONKE, I ZPO. § 328; RAAPE 404; 
M. WoLFF, IPR. 212; 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. 401; and particularly 3 
FRANKENSTEIN IOI n. 159; ibid. 102; NEUMAYER, "Ehescheidung und Wieder-
erJangung der Ehefiihigkeit," 20 Z.ausi.PR. (1955) 66-85. MELCHIOR 251 
reaches the same result on his theory of the preliminary question. 
7 0LG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, 1923) 43 ROLG. 347; AG. Hannover (1928) 
IPRspr. 1929, no. 71 and especially KG. (July n, 1924) StAZ. 1924, 306; 
KG. {Oct. 17, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 62; KG. (March 7, 1938) JW. 1938, 
1258 no. 27; LG. Weiden (Feb. 28, 1953) NJW. 1953, 1955. 
8 BAR, 8 Z.int.R. ( 1898) 463; REICHEL, Ausliinderscheidung, 124 Arch. Civ. 
Prax. zoo; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 163 n. 2, and cf. 439; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 77 n. 479; MASSFELLER, JW. 1938, 1259· 
9 KG. {March 13, 19II) 24 ROLG. 19, approved on this point by RAAPE 
404; KG. (March 7, 1938) JW. 1938, 1258 no. 27. 
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should never mean dissolution of the marriage for one party 
and continuance of marriage for the other. A Spaniard of 
Catholic faith, mistakenly divorced in a Netherlands court, 
was permitted to remarry in the jurisdiction in view of the 
formally binding force of the Dutch decision and of the rec-
ord in the register of civil status.10 In Belgium, as we have 
seen, courts for the same reason either deny divorce to a 
couple of mixed nationality, when the personal law of one 
party is hostile to divorce, or grant dissolution with effect 
for both parties.11 
A similar problem arises in a third state when a foreign 
divorce decree is not recognized by the personal law. Again, 
the opinion classifying the question as concerning capacity to 
marry rather than the effects of divorce, has found favor. 12 
In fact, in this case, refusal of remarriage is not in open con-
flict with the authority of the forum, so that the primary rule 
for questions of status may have free play. 
2. View of the Personal Law 
The country to which a party belongs will normally deny 
any legal effect to a foreign divorce which it does not recog-
nize; maintenance will be granted as by virtue of a valid mar-
riage. Thus, remarriage or further marriages of either party 
will be considered invalid, the issue illegitimate, et cetera. A 
maintenance order, predicated on the assumption of jurisdic-
tion in rem by a foreign divorce court, even though issued in 
personam, has been regarded as void in England, because the 
foreign court was considered incompetent to grant divorce 
and the order was ancillary to divorce.13 
10 Rb. Rotterdam (April 14, 1930) W. 12197· 
11 Supra pp. 478-479. 
12 See for France: AumNET, II Recueil 1926 I 236; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 
no. 91; for Brazil: Trib. Sup. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402; for 
Germany the authors supra n. 6. 
13 Simons v. Simons [1939] 1 K. B. 490. 
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In actual fact, of course, any divorce subjects the conjugal 
union to a most severe shock.14 The facts that one party has 
instituted an action for divorce, that this party has remarried 
and cohabited with a new spouse, may each constitute a 
ground for divorce by the other party, if divorce is allowed 
at all in the home country.15 The same result is reached 
through those statutory provisions in the United States 
whereby the procuring of a divorce outside the state by one 
party gives the other party a ground for divorce, although 
these provisions also cover other cases.16 
A foreign decree, however, may be partially recognized in 
the country of the personal law. Thus we have seen that in 
some cases a foreign spouse has been regarded as released 
from the bonds of marriage, while the spouse who is a sub-
ject of the forum remains bound. Under the Ohio statute, 
this particular case entitles the latter to a divorce.11 The out-
14 3 ARMIN JON 50 thinks indeed that a prohibition of divorce by the law of 
the forum should be directed exclusively against a second marriage, the mari-
tal union being hopelessly destroyed by the foreign divorce. Cf. DEGAND, 5 
Repert. 556 no. 88. Refusal to restore conjugal community after a foreign 
divorce is not considered desertion in Denmark; see l\1UNCH-PETERSEN, 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 748 n. 96. 
1 5 England: Adultery, at that time the only ground for divorce, was found 
in Clayton v. Clayton [1932] P. 45; in Lankester v. Lankester [1925] P. 114 
a similar result would have been adjudicated but for connivance of the ap-
plicant in the foreign divorce. 
Germany: ObLG. Bayern (May 24, 1924) 2 Jahrb. FG. 148; OLG. Konigs-
berg (Oct. 29, 1914) Pas. Mschr. 1914, 157, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164 
n. 2. LG. Berlin (Jan. 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 1307 (adultery committed by cele-
bration of a marriage "by dispensation" in Austria). Doubts in other deci-
sions were concerned with the requisite of fault for divorce, which is no 
longer indispensable under German law. 
1 6 Florida: Stat. ( 1941) § 6 s.o4, No. 8: "that the defendant has obtained a 
divorce from the complainant in any other state or country." 
Michigan: Stat. Ann. (1937) § 25.86, No.6: "And the circuit courts may, in 
their discretion, upon application, ... divorce from the bonds of matri-
mony any party who is a resident of this state, and whose husband or wife 
shall have obtained a divorce in any other state." Cf. supra p. 433· 
Ohio: Code Ann. (1953) § 3105.01 {]): "procurement of a divorce with-
out this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who pro-
cured it is released from the obligations of the marriage while such obliga-
tions remain binding upon the other party." 
17 See preceding note. 
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standing example of one-sided effect ascribed to divorce is 
presented in this country by the special rule in New York 
that, in the absence of personal jurisdiction, a foreign decree 
of divorce obtained against a spouse domiciled in New York 
is good by estoppel as to the libelant but not good as to the 
respondent.18 Under the Brazilian practice mentioned 
above/9 the Brazilian party to a mixed marriage dissolved 
abroad remained married in the eyes of Brazilian law, but 
the non-Brazilian spouse was capable of remarrying even in 
Brazil.20 The new Brazilian law seems to reverse the latter 
rule. 21 
Moreover, a foreign divorce a vinculo, though not recog-
nized in Brazil, is given the same effect upon the property of 
the spouses as a Brazilian separation from bed and board; 
this concession has been termed the only possible compro-
mise.22 
II. EFFECTS OF VALID DIVORCES 
The effects of divorce or, pursuant to another conception, 
the continued effects of marriage after "dissolution" 23 are 
usually discussed in the United States with respect to ( 1) ali-
mony, ( 2) dower, and ( 3) custody of children. In recent 
times, civil law lawyers have used broader categories for each 
of these subjects; they distinguish the influence of divorce 
18 People v. Baker (1879) 76 N.Y. 78, 32 Am. Rep. 274, consistently fol-
lowed; see Restatement, New York Annotations § 113 at 8 5· 
19 Supra PP· 535-536. 20 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 167 no. 41. 21 Brazil: Lei de Introdu~;ao ( 1942) art. 7 § 6. 22 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402. 23 NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. z) 21. It need hardly be mentioned that no problem 
exists with respect to the fact that every divorce decree, if recognized, deter-
mines the time, the extent, and the conditions for terminating the bond of 
marriage. E.g., a Belgian court grants exequatur to a French divorce without 
requiring that the decree be recorded within two months, as is necessary for 
a Belgian decree, by a different interpretation of art. 264 of the Civil Code 
common to both countries; Trib. civ. Termonde (Oct. 17, 1936) Rechtsk. 
Wkbl. 1936-1937, 1634, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 183. 
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upon (I) personal relations between husband and wife, ( 2) 
marital property, and ( 3) parental rights. 
For the purpose of conflict of laws, further division of the 
subject is necessary. On the one hand, we must distinguish the 
inquiries: (a) whether the divorce court has power under its 
own law to decide upon those effects or some of them; (b) if 
it has power so to decide, which law it must apply; and (c) 
whether its decision is recognized and enforced in other ju-
risdictions. On the other hand, there are analogous problems 
in case a divorce decree has been rendered in one jurisdiction 
and a related suit, as for alimony or custody, is brought in 
another. 
Not all these diverse problems have been dealt with ex-
plicitly, although some have been vividly discussed in a few 
countries and others are engulfed within other topics. There 
is no point in subjecting all these questions to one sole con-
flicts rule. Earlier writers in Europe contended that all effects 
of divorce are governed by the national law, whereby ordi-
narily the law presiding over the divorce was meant. 24 But 
the conflicts rules derived from the nationality principle have 
been differentiated; there are different rules for personal re-
lations of the spouses, for property relations, for parental 
rights and duties incident to the granting of divorce, and, 
moreover, there exist problems peculiar to marriages of 
mixed nationality. The prevailing tendency, briefly reported 
below, favors in each topic application of the rule that is 
called for by the most nearly related sphere of family life. 
We still find rules of broader scope in a few regulations, 
characterized by the preponderance of the last matrimonial 
or common domicil. For instance, a Danish court will recog-
nize not only the limitations on the right of remarriage re-
sultant from a divorce decree of the foreign matrimonial 
domicil, but also its legal effects on the property of the par-
24 See, e.g., 2 FIORE no. 695; also though more careful, WEiss, 3 Traite 702. 
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ties.26 By article 55 of the C6digo Bustamante, "the law of 
the court before which litigation is pending" determines the 
judicial consequences of the action and the terms of the 
judgment with respect to the spouses and their children. It 
seems that this court is ordinarily that of the matrimonial 
domicil. Particularly elaborate is a provision of the Scandi-
navian Convention on Family Law, in which divorce jurisdic-
tion with certain exceptions is fixed at the last common domi-
cil. It seems instructive to reproduce this provision: 
In connection with petitions for separation or divorce, the 
same or another authority of the divorce state may decide 
also on the provisional suspension of conjugal rights to prop-
erty division, damages, alimony, and parental rights. (Art. 
8, par. I.) 
Claims later instituted concerning alimony or parental 
rights are decided in the state in which the defendant spouse 
is domiciled. This applies also to modification of awards ren-
dered in another of the participant states. If, by the law of 
the state in which separation or divorce has been pronounced, 
alimentary sums for a separated or divorced party may not 
be awarded or increased, no such decision can be made in the 
other participant states. (Art. 8, par. 2.) 
In rendering decision under articles 7 and 8 in each state, 
the law there in force is to be applied. Decisions, however, on 
division of property or on damages always must be based on 
the law applicable to the conjugal property relations accord-
ing to article 3· (Art. 9, par. 1.) 
For civil law countries, it should be borne in mind that 
jurisdiction is a matter entirely different from choice of law; 
the former is not here involved. 
1. Effects on Personal Relations between Husband and Wife 
(a) Name, capacity, gifts, etcetera. What law deter-
mines, for instance, whether a divorced wife ought to resume 
25 MuNcH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747 n. 94· 
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her maiden name, to retain that of her husband, or to have 
her choice as under the common law? Should a divorce court 
determine this question according to its own family (or 
other) law, or according to the same family law that was ap-
plied in granting the divorce, or according to the law that 
governed the personal relations of the parties during cover-
ture? The subject matter includes, among other things, ali-
mony, a topic presenting peculiarities. 
(i) The law of the forum. The application of the domes-
tic law seems natural within systems that make the matri-
monial domicil the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and choice 
of law in granting and recognizing divorce. But also in Swit-
zerland, although divorce is not granted unless the for-
eigners' national law accords, Swiss law determines every 
divorce decree and its ancillary effects.26 
In the United States, probably the law of the divorce 
forum governs. Except for alimony, however, the question 
seems not to have been discussed. 
(ii) The law of divorce. To control the effects of divorce, 
the decidedly prevailing opinion on the European Continent 
has selected, among the various possibilities offered by the 
nationality principle, the law under which the marriage was 
dissolved.27 In Germany, this is the national law of the hus-
26 See supra p. 461 and ibid., n. 169. 
OG. Zurich (Dec. 8, 1937) 38 BI. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 1939, 105 no. 42 therefore 
states that even if in the national courts the effects of divorce would not be 
expressed in the divorce decree itself and established by rules different from 
the Swiss rules, a Swiss divorce decree always causes Swiss law to be applied 
to all problems of damages and moral compensation, support, property, etc. 
27 France: for status and capacity see DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 86; 
NIBOYET nos. 642, 753 pars. 6 and 7 and 5 Traite 443 ff.; BATIFFOL, Traite 
527. 
Germany: RG. Plenary Decision (June 25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175, 9 Z.int.R. 
(1899) 382, Clunet 1900, 161; KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 (explains 
in agreement with the dominant opinion that EG. art. 17 par. I also governs 
the effect of divorce on personal relations such as name and alimony, while 
the reservation in par. 4 for German law is inapplicable). 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. n, I9II) 37 BGE. I 400 (foreign divorce of Swiss 
nationals); cf. BECK, NAG. 398 no. 16; ibid. 375 no. 148. 
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band at the time when the divorce suit was instituted (EG. 
art. 17, par. 1); in France, the national law of the parties or, 
in case of diversity, the law of the matrimonial domicil. This 
rule refers to problems such as: 
What name the wife ought to bear; 28 
Whether restrictions on the wife's capacity to contract dis-
appear automatically with the end of the marriage; 29 
Whether gifts between the spouses may be revoked; 30 
Whether confidential communications between the spouses 
remain privileged in testimony.31 
In addition, agreements between the spouses concerning a 
future divorce, since not operative during coverture, do not 
Similarly Guatemala Law on Foreigners of Jan. 25, I936, as amended I944, 
art. 38. 
The Hague Convention on Divorce contains no rule on the effect of di-
vorce, see LEWALD in Strupp, I Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der Diplo-
matie 47I VIII. 
28 France: Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937· 72 (the national law of 
the foreigner); Cour Paris (June I6, 1904) Revue I905, I46 (French law 
applied to the name of an American ex-wife because of renvoi); Trib. civ. 
Seine (Dec. 22, I923) Gaz. Trib. I924.2.204 (Frank Jay-Gould, after his 
divorce [see the New York case of Gould v. Gould cited suPra p. 542], sued 
his former wife and the Alhambra Theater in Paris to enjoin them from 
advertising her performances under the name of Edith Kelly-Gould; the 
injunction was granted under French C. C. art. 299 because the defendant 
had submitted to French law in the divorce suit with the collateral argu-
ment that New York law permitted the same right to the plaintiff). For 
literature see PILLET, I Traite Pratique 627; TAGER, Clunet I933, 96. 
Germany: law of divorce, not the personal law of either spouse: KG. (Oct. 
I3, I9I6) 33 ROLG. 343; LG. II Berlin (May 2o, I927) IPRspr. I926-27, 
no. 75; cf. KG. (Dec. I7, I926) IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 74; differentiating 
FICKER, "Der Name der geschiedenen Ehefrau im deutschen internationalen 
Privatrecht," I6 Z.ausi.PR. (I950 /5I) 32-43. 
Switzerland: controversial; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. IS; BECK, NAG. 
373 no. 145, ibid. 466 nos. 226, 227; cf. ibid. 398 no. 16, ibid. 4I4 no. 67. 
A Swiss divorced woman must resume her premarital name, but if a 
woman after a foreign divorce recovers Swiss nationality, she is entitled to 
the name she has according to the foreign law. See Just. Dep. BBl. 1924, II 
24 no. 2; GAUTSCHI, 26 SJZ. 22; Government of Bern, 27 S]Z. 137, no. 23. 
29 RAAPE 430 no. 6; M. WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. I) I32 n. I4· In France BAR TIN, 
who had advocated the law of the forum, now suggests with WEISS, 3 Traite 
702, the personal law of the woman; see BARTIN, 2 Principes 311 § 316. 
30 RAAPE, IPR. 303. 
31 This point familiar in American law is not expressly mentioned in the 
European literature. 
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pertain to the law of marital relations but to that of di-
vorce.32 According to this law, such agreements may be licit; 
if so, resort to a divergent public policy of the forum seems 
unnecessary to German courts.33 French judges, however, 
always suspicious of an intention to facilitate divorce by con-
sent, are inclined to assume that such agreements constitute 
an offense to the French public order.34 
(b) Alimony following a foreign divorce. 35 In accordance 
with an old conception, in England divorce ended any duty 
of support between former spouses. Therefore, no action can 
lie to obtain alimony after a divorce a vinculo, whether pro-
nounced by an English or a foreign court.35a A recognized 
foreign decree of divorce even terminates a former English 
maintenance order.36 
In the United States, many difficulties have been encoun-
tered. Although the English conception that the duty of sup-
port does not survive the dissolution of the marriage has not 
been maintained in this country, only this English back-
32 Germany: KG. (Sept. 25, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (Hungarian law); 
OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 1798; cf. RAAPE, IPR. 303; 
LORENZ, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 102. 
3 3 Cf. also KG. (Dec. 21, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466. 
34 See Cass. (req.) (July 29, 1929) Revue 1931, 33+; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 
26, 1938) Nouv. Revue 1938, 567 (where the decree was rendered in France) 
and the decisions cited in Nouv. Revue 1938, 570 n. x, and contra: CosTE-
FLORET, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 215 no. 121. 
3 5 See especially HARWOOD, "Alimony after a Decree of Divorce Rendered 
on Constructive Service," 24 Kentucky L. J. ( 1936) 241. See }A COBS, "The 
Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. 
(1939) 250; Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) u8o; Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 
(1942) 596; SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for Judicial 
Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1943) 321. On the 
enforcement of alimentary decrees throughout the world, see International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des 
obligations alimentaires (Rome, 1938). 
3Sa But the court can provide for alimony in the divorce decree or within a 
reasonable time after the decree absolute, Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 
s. 19; Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1950, Rule 44 (1); TOLSTOY, The Law and 
Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes ( 1954) 137. 
36 Pastre v. Pastre [1930] P. So, 82 (French divorce); Mezger v. Mezger 
(1936) 155 L. T. R. 491, [1937] P. 19, Clunet 1937, 138 (German divorce). 
Contra: Wood v. Wood [1957] 2 All E. R. 14 (C. A.). 
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ground seems to explain a certain opinion that has proved 
very strong in the past, viz., that the rendering of the divorce 
decree is the last moment for alimony to be recovered. 
Where such a doctrine is invoked against a suit for alimony, 
undesirable situations may arise. Thus, a divorce court in 
one state may refuse to order the defendant to pay alimony, 
because it knows that according to the prevailing opinion, it 
does not have the necessary jurisdiction in personam. 37 Yet, 
the court of another state having the required personal juris-
diction, regards a suit for support after divorce has been pro-
nounced as impossible. The result is the same as when the 
foreign court awarded alimony but did not have proper 
jurisdiction. 
The diversity of jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in 
personam presents a second source of difficulties. Paradoxi-
cally, it follows from the historical development, that the re-
quirements for service of process on the defendant in such 
ancillary actions in personam, as enunciated by the Supreme 
Court, are greater than in divorce suits. It seems a neglected 
fact that the social importance of marriage and its dissolu-
tion surpasses the significance of any alimentary orders. The 
result of this divergence is the doctrine of "divisible di-
vorce" under which it is held that alimony claims, whether 
adjudicated or not prior to a foreign ex parte divorce, do 
survive the sister state divorce decree. 37a 
A third unexpected complication arises from interference 
of the estoppel idea. In cases where a wife sued for divorce 
in a jurisdiction powerless to grant alimony but where the 
right thereto was at issue, she has been deemed to have 
waived her claim to alimony once and for all by choosing 
such a divorce court. This all too technical idea, which has 
87 This has been contested but is now treated as settled. See 2 BEALE 1435. 
37a See supra p. 566. 
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not been adequately criticized, is so faulty that its influence 
should not go far. 
Finally, difficulties of another kind are encountered when 
an alimentary order is sought to be enforced in another juris-
diction. In particular, orders which may be altered have been 
considered to lack the finality necessary for enforcement. 
It would not be helpful to discuss all these disturbances at 
length. Recent writers assure us that the entire doctrine is in 
an evolutionary stage, and that extraterritorial effect is given 
to decrees for alimony "with very great completeness." 38 
Courts and statutes show themselves more and more anxious 
to overcome formalistic obstacles, to help deserted wives 
and children. The indigent ex-husband has also found more 
favor than before. Through such an evolution, the American 
doctrine approaches the views of the European laws. 
In civil law countries, the nature of the duty incumbent 
upon a former spouse is far from undisputed in theory; does 
it follow from a breach of the marital duties? That it does 
was the leading idea of older codifications, including the Ger-
man Civil Code. Or is the family relation partly conserved 
despite the dissolution of the marriage tie? Modern doc-
trines are inclined in some degree, indeed, to consider the ob-
ligation imposed by law as an effect of the former family re-
lation and therefore as belonging to the field of family law 
rather than to the domain of ordinary obligations ex lege. 
In any case, the existence of such obligations is not doubted; 
their incidence is continuously extended. For instance, the 
recent German marriage law no longer maintains that only 
an exclusively guilty ex-spouse can be required to support the 
innocent other party; it declares it to be sufficient that the de-
fendant was mainly at fault in disrupting the marriage and 
even allows equitable awards beyond this limit. Thus, since 
alimony rests on the same foundations as any family law in-
as SAYRE, z8 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 333, supra n. 35· 
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stitution, no technical impediment obstructs the application 
of a foreign alimentary regulation. Moreover, litigation for 
alimony is usually separable from the divorce suit so that 
nothing prevents an action for alimony being brought in an-
other country than that where the divorce was pronounced. 
Difficulties arise, however, first, because a foreign divorce 
is quite often refused recognition and, secondly, because of 
the intervention of some distinct local policy at the court 
where the award is sought. 
In Germariy, the law of divorce is applied with nicety; it 
signifies the law of the husband at the time when the action 
for divorce was instituted.39 
In France, it seems that the law governing marital rela-
tions during coverture is preferred, 40 the alimentary obliga-
tion being traced back to the marital duty of support. Bar-
tin, however, limits this classification to that part of the 
39 KG. (Feb. 16, 1909) 19 ROLG. 106, 20 Z.int.R. (1910) 227, Clunet 
I911, 286 (without any doubt) ; LG. Altona (March I9, I926) JW. I926, 
I357 (Danish law denying judicial remedy applied); KG. (Feb. 9, 1929) 
IPRspr. I929, no. I5; OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, I936) JW. 1936, 1798. 
This practice was in force before the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, see RG. (June 
25, I898) 4I RGZ. 175 (supra n. 27) and RG. (July II, I898) JW. 1898, 
545, 9 Z.int.R. (I899) u6, Clunet I9oo, 635· In the case of a German hus-
band, a technical difficulty was presented by the requirement of guilt of the 
defendant and innocence of the applicant when the foreign decree of divorce 
contained no statement on the matter. But this obstacle could be overcome; 
see KG. (May 3, I935) JW. I935, 2750, and also RAAPE 426 II I; the ques-
tion is certainly not worse under the new law. 
The Italian Court of Cass. (May 3, I934) Monitore I934, 889 gives much 
weight to the statements and awards of the foreign divorce decree but seems 
to decide the case according to Italian law perhaps because the plaintiff 
wife had recovered her Italian citizenship. 
40 NIBOYET 753 and Traite no. 1429. However, the majority of the writers 
and the courts seem to base the alimentary obligations on the lex fori, BATIF-
FOL, Traite 528; HoLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorce," Droit international 
prive de Ia famille ( I954) I73· 
In Portugal, CUNHA GoN<;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 695 seems to advocate 
application of the husband's national law under the same viewpoint. 
In accord the Swedish Supreme Court, H.D. (March 12, 1934) N.J.A. 1934. 
77 (alimony between German spouses divorced in Sweden governed by 
German law). 
Argentina: Camara xa de Apelaci6n de Ia Plata (May 28, 1945) 39 La 
Ley (I945) 534· 
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money award that the French courts base on article 301 of 
the Civil Code, while other grants of alimony under the 
heading of damages should be governed by the law of the 
place of wrong.41 
Jurisdiction for alimony is assumed in the Netherlands at 
the instance of domiciled persons on the basis of foreign di-
vorces. Here again the law applied seems to be the lex fori.' 2 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has taken another view in con-
sidering the problem of jurisdiction. If the divorce was ren-
dered abroad, even if involving Swiss citizens, jurisdiction 
for ancillary effects is not exercised, unless the foreign courts 
refuse to assume jurisdiction because of the Swiss domicil of 
the party; 43 in such event, the Swiss court is required to in-
tervene in order to prevent a denial of justice,44 the lex fori 
being applied.45 
2. Effects on Marital Property 
If a foreign decree of judicial separation has been recog-
nized, it must be examined, in the first place, to determine 
whether it is intended to terminate the property regime. 
With this purpose in mind, French courts have stated that 
an Italian separation by mutual agreement and judicial con-
firmation,46 as well as a Spanish separation from bed and 
41 BARTIN, 2 Principes 313. 
42 See BW. amended by § 828a Rv. {Law of May 16, 1934, S. 253) and 
H. R. (April 5, 1937) W. 1937, no. 661 declaring that the alimentary duty 
falls under the first book of the Code and also if based on a divorce pro-
nounced in Germany. Cf. H. R. (March 8, 1934) W. 12752 for a decree of 
the Netherland Indies; see other cases in II Z.ausl.PR. ( 1937) 210. 
43 BG. (March 29, 1928) 54 BGE. II 85; BECK, NAG. 370 nos. 133 ff.; ibid. 
420 nos. 89 ff. 
44 BG. {Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, Praxis 1937. s6. On modification 
of a domestic decree, if the defendant is domiciled abroad, see BG. (Nov. 
22, 1935) 61 BGE. II 225, Clunet 1938, 973, and criticism ibid. 974· 45 Constant practice since BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; see BG. 
{Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, 267. 
46 Cour Lyon (June 3, 1926) 8.1928.2.121. 
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board 47 does not have the effect of property separation 
(separation de biens), which the French separation de corps 
has under the Civil Code (art. 3 I I) .48 But a separation from 
bed and board rendered in a Netherlands court necessarily 
effectuates a separation of property under article 298 of the 
Civil Code; 49 if the parties be Germans, therefore, this ef-
fect would not be recognized by their national courts. 50 
All remaining questions concerning property regimes must 
obviously be answered by the law governing the property re-
lations of the parties during coverture. For instance, after a 
dissolution of community property by an absolute divorce, 
whether a domestic divorce or a foreign divorce recognized 
as valid, the mode of partition of the community fund is natu-
rally governed by the law governing marital property. 51 
Often a marital property settlement or a statute provides 
explicitly what must be done in case of divorce. Where such 
provision is lacking, a rule applicable in the event of the 
death of one spouse may reasonably be resorted to, while the 
lex fori of the divorce court is ruled out. 52 
In agreement with this view, in common law countries the 
effect on movables of any divorce, domestic or foreign, and 
in Argentina of a foreign recognizable divorce, is governed 
by the law of the husband's domicil at the time when the 
movables were acquired; the effect on immovables by the law 
of the situs. In accordance with this rule, a wife's claim to 
dower depends upon the law of the situs regarding dower 
and estoppel rather than upon that of the divorce court, un-
47 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 13, 1908} Clunet 1908, 832. 
48 BARTIN in 7 Aubry et Rau 402, and NIBOYET 752 are in doubt whether 
this effect belongs under the heading of rules on marital property or those on 
the personal relations of husband and wife. 
49 Rb. Haag (Dec. Io, 1929) 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 849; Rb. Almelo (June 
24, 1931) W. 12370 and App. Arnhem (June 29, 1932) W. 12627, II 
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 209 no. 59· 
5o M. WoLFF, IPR 212; STAUDINGER-ENGELMANN § 1586 III A, c(4). 
51 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan, 25, 1882) Clunet 1882, 74· 
52 DEGAND, 5 Repert. 558 no. 96; NIBOYET 752 II I. 
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less the implications of the divorce decree as to dower be rec-
ognized at the situs.53 In France, in conformity with the con-
flicts rules on matrimonial property and in contrast with the 
conflicts rules on inheritance, immovables are not subject to 
special treatment. 54 
The question, too, whether or when an agreement to regu-
late property relations after divorce is valid, has appropri-
ately been decided according to the law governing marital 
property during coverture. 55 
A particular position is taken in the United States when di-
vorce courts are empowered to make dispositions of property 
of the spouses or to adjudicate damages between them. It 
would seem that a corresponding order of the court ought to 
supplement the regulation of property between the parties. 
In connection with the unsettled extraterritorial effect of 
personal decrees of a court of equity, dispositions of this 
kind, particularly when one party is ordered to convey land 
in another state to another party, have produced interstate 
difficulties. 56 
3· Custody of Children 
American courts disagree greatly on the conditions under 
which a court has jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to settle 
53 On the effect on the wife's claim for dower, see HARPER, "Effect of For-
eign Divorce upon Dower and Similar Property Interests," 26 Ill. L. Rev. 
(1931) 397; HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN and BROWN, Cases 650 n. 32. 
54 App. Monaco (May 7, 1910) S.I912.4.25, Clunet 1910, 1327; App. Mon-
aco (March r6, 1912) Revue 1912, 789. 
55 KG. (Dec. 21, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 {agree-
ment valid under Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 92, recognized accord-
ing to EG. art. 15, setting art. 17 (law of divorce) aside). Contra: KG. 
{Sept. 25, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (applying EG. art. 17 not only to ali-
mentary but also to property agreements). 
56 Enforcement was granted at the situs, probably in view of fraud com-
mitted against the order in Spalding v. Spalding ( 1925) 75 Cal. App. 569, 243 
Pac. 445; Matson v. Matson (1919) 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127; Mallette 
v. Scheerer ( 1916) 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182; refused in Bullock v. Bul-
lock ( 1894) 52 N. ]. Eq. 561, 30 At!. 676; Fall v. Fall ( 1905) 75 Neb. 104, 
113 N. w. 175· Cf. STUMBERG 126. 
EFFECTS OF DIVORCE 573 
a dispute concerning custody of the children. It is disputed 
whether a pronouncement of this sort affecting the children 
is to be treated as a judgment in personam or as a judgment 
in rem. Statutory power conferred on a divorce court to 
award custody, however, seems to be recognized in other 
states 57 unless circumstances are changed, provided both 
parties were residents of the divorce forum and the child, 
therefore, had no other domicil. For, in the most widespread 
and authoritative opinion, jurisdiction to determine the cus-
tody of children is primarily located at the domicil of the 
child.58 Modifications of a decree by a foreign court in th~ 
best interest of the child or of the parents are admitted inso-
far as the original decree, as is the rule, lacks finality. 58a 
There is concern expressed in the literature, however, that 
the jurisdiction of the forum for awarding custody should 
not be obtained unilaterally by one spouse, drawing the child 
away without the other's consent. 
Every court in the United States applies its own municipal 
law, so that again there is no question of choice of law. In 
England and Argentina, and under the Conventions of 
Montevideo and of the Scandinavian States, the forum coin-
cides with the conjugal domicil. In France, the lex fori, 
rather than the personal law, is applied, even in cases such as 
the Ferrari case, where only one of the spouses had acquired 
French nationality; 59 but probably not where two foreigners 
are concerned and the child is of foreign nationality too. 60 
57 Restatement§ 146; see Z7 C. J. S. (1941) Divorce § 329. 
58 Restatement §§ 117, 145. GooDRICH, "Custody of Children in Divorce 
Suits," 7 Cornell L. Q. (1921) I and GooDRICH § 324- A disturbing element 
is the view "that a court having jurisdiction to award the custody retained 
jurisdiction to modify its award although the domicile of a child has been 
changed in the meanwhile to another state," LORENZEN, "Developments in the 
Conflicts of Laws 190Z-194z," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) at 798. 
58a New York ex rei. Halvey v. Halvey (1947) 330 U. S. 610. 
59 Cour Paris (Dec. ZI, 1937) Gaz.Pal.2938.1.405, D. H. 1938.186, Clunet 
1938, 48z. 
6° Cf. WEISS, 3 Traite 7oz; HOLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorces," Le droit 
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In Germany, however, the conflict of law problem has 
been thoroughly separated from that of jurisdiction and ex-
tensively discussed. The lex fori was applied in a single case 
where the divorced wife of foreign nationality had later ac-
quired German nationality, on the ground that the domestic 
regulation (BGB. § 1635) was mandatory.61 But this con-
struction has been generally rejected as an excessive expres-
sion of the exigencies of public policy. According to another 
opinion the relationship between the former spouses as re-
spects custody of the children was considered governed by 
the law determining the right to divorce (EG. art. 17), 
while other matters would fall under the conflicts rule deter-
mining the parent-child relation (EG. art. 19) .62 But prevail-
ing opinion now holds that every right of a parent to cus-
tody, education, or visiting affects the children's interest and 
has to be determined by the law that governs legitimate filia-
tion.63 Where German spouses have been divorced abroad by 
a recognized decree but custody was not awarded in accord-
ance with German family law, the order is regarded as a 
temporary measure only.64 
In the Netherlands also, not the law of the forum, now re-
peatedly applied to govern divorce, but the ordinary conflicts 
rule on parental and filial relations is applied.65 Accordingly, 
international prive de Ia famille ( 1954) 174. But Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 29, 
1904) Clunet 1905, 187 has applied French law to decide the provisional 
custody of the children in a suit of an American wife against her Turkish 
husband. 
61 RG. (Feb. 20, 1913) 81 RGZ. 373· 
62 HABICHT 143, 152; LEWALD 120, 137. Another opinion suggested simply 
applying EG. art. 17 (law of divorce), see NIEDNER 54, art. 17 comment 4d; 
NIEMEYER, IPR. des BGB. 157; RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) pre!. no. 6 to § 1616. 63 KG. (March 6, 1929) 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 413; KG. (Feb. 10, 1933) JW. 
1933, 2065; KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750; KG. (May 12, 1938) Nouv. 
Revue 1939, 251; OLG. Breslau (May 9, 1938) Dt. Recht 1939, 869 following 
RAAPE 482; Bay. ObLG (March 21, 1952) Bay. ObLGZ 1952, 74; see also 
RAAPE, IPR. 303; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164 n. 4· 
64 See decisions of KG. preceding note. 65 See Rb. Amsterdam (June 24, 1937) W. 1937, no. 970; Hof Amsterdam 
(Feb. II, 1937) W. 1937, no. 950. 
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the law of the child governs, while in Germany that of the 
father is applicable. The classification is the same, however, 
and would be suitable to any country. 
By this time, it should be understood everywhere that cus-
tody of children or any other incident of parental relations 
is not a matter substantially ancillary to divorce, although 
the divorce court may have power to take care of these mat-
ters and a divorce is a seasonable occasion to regulate cus-
todianship. If the court applies its own family law, as it does 
in this country, it should qualify its application in the not in-
frequent cases where the applicant has been able to choose 
the forum at will. Whatever the principle of assuming juris-
diction may be and whatever the binding effect of an award 
of custody, the applicable law should be determined in con-
formance with the standard adopted in filiation matters. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March I, 1928} Clunet 1928, 482 (personal law 
of Australian parents applied in principle). 
Italy: Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) Rivista 1933, 281 (Italian law, the 
Parents having, after Hungarian divorce, recovered Italian nationalty). 
CHAPTER 14 
Annulment of Marriage 
I. ANNULMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM DIVORCE 
C ONFLICTS rules determining the extraterritorial effect given to annulment of marriage are con-cerned in the first place with any decree or judg-
ment declaring a marriage void or annulling it and intended 
to operate in rem throughout the world, i.e., with the effect 
of res judicata for all persons. These rules, however, must 
evidently also be applied to annulments, such as those in cer-
tain of the states of the United States, that are conclusive 
only against the parties and those claiming under them. All 
types of void and voidable marriages are included. 
Annulment is no longer confused with divorce, as it was in 
former times,t although some American statutes still speak 
of divorce granted for antenuptial causes such as bigamy, 
incest, duress, physical incapacity, or near kinship. 2 It is cer-
tain that a decree of "divorce" in such cases has nullifying 
effect.3 In exact terminology, nullity cannot be based on 
grounds other than those existing at the moment of the 
solemnization of the marriage, while divorce must have a 
cause either posterior to the celebration or at least continu-
ing during coverture. In the law of conflicts, this seems to be 
accepted.4 
1 COKE on LI'ITLETON (HARGRAVE and BUTLER) 235a; BLACKSTONE 440· 
2 I VERNIER §§ so, 68, 70, 72, 73; ScHOULER, Domestic Relations §§ 1154, 
II 55; Reese v. Reese ( 1929) 128 Kan. 762, 280 Pac. 751. 
3 See 27 C. J. S. (1941) 537-538. 
4 Restatement § II5 comment c; Sorenson v. Sorenson ( 1924) 122 N. Y. 
Misc. 196, 202 N. Y. Supp. 62o, 625. 
Brazil: App. Civ. Capital Sao Paulo no. 6441 (Aug. 5 and July 27, 1912) 
6o Gaz. Jur. Sao Paulo (1912) 195. 
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Nevertheless, the Restatement mentions annulments, the 
causes of which antedate the marriage but the effects of 
which operate only from the time of the decree.5 These are 
considered in the Restatement according to the rules of con-
flicts established for divorce rather than those relative to an-
nulment.6 It is difficult to understand the reason for this 
treatment. The Swiss Code and also the German law as re-
cently reformed contain precise parallels; they provide for 
rescission of marriages on grounds that existed at the time of 
the marriage celebration and with the effect of terminating 
rather than annihilating the bond of marriage.7 The effect 
described is similar to divorce. Yet, for the purpose of con-
flict of laws, the Swiss and German institutions have rightly 
been classified in the category of annulment. They are gov-
erned by the personal law of the person entitled to sue and 
not by the law which would govern divorce.8 Annulment can 
never be governed by the law of the forum, as divorce is in 
the United States. The reasons are perfectly understood in 
0 Restatement § II5(2). I BEALE§ II5.2 asserts that in most states annul-
ment takes effect at the time of the decree of annulment and therefore takes 
place at the present domicil. A contrary statement that such effect is pre-
scribed by only a few statutes is to be found in 38 C. J., Marriage § 139 with 
the citation of New York only, for which state the Restatement, New York 
Annotations, § II5 (2) declares that no such annulment exists there. In fact 
the text of the New York Domestic Relations Law § 7 on marriage "void 
from the time its nullity is declared by the court of competent jurisdiction," 
has been construed as meaning retroactive operation of the judgment and 
destruction of the marriage ab initio. See Matter of Moncrief ( 1921) 235 
N. Y. 390, I39 N. E. 550; SEALY, Law of Persons and Domestic Relations 
(ed. 2, I936, New York) 562; HAMMILL, "The Impediment of Nonage," 
3 The Jurist (I943) 475, 477 n. II. 
6 Restatement § 136(a). 
7 Swiss C. C. art. 132. 
German Marriage Law of I946, § 37 par. I which provides that the effects 
of a rescission of a marriage are determined according to the provisions 
concerning the effects of divorce. 
8 RG. (May 7, 1936) I5I RGZ. 226 classified the Swiss action annulling 
the marriage under EG. art. 13 par. I; R.<\APE, 2 D.IPR. ( ed. I) 145; his 
assertion that the wife does not lose the nationality acquired by the mar-
riage (at I75) is inexact; cf. for Switzerland, BECK, NAG. 263 no. 159. 
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this country; 9 an impediment vitiating the celebration of a 
marriage must be evaluated under the law establishing the 
requirements of that celebration. 
II. ANNULMENT OF THE MARRIAGE OF FOREIGNERS 
1. Jurisdiction 
(a) Court of the place of celebration. When marriage was 
conceived of primarily as a contract,10 jurisdiction for decid-
ing on its validity or invalidity was throught to be vested 
naturally in the tribunal of the place of celebration. This is 
still the rule in Argentina,11 and as recently as 1938 a court in 
Paris tried to justify French jurisdiction over a marriage of 
foreign parties by a similar argument.12 
The English authorities asserted the jurisdiction of the 
English courts to annul English marriages until recent 
years.13 The present decisions are understood to say that 
where the parties are domiciled abroad, the jurisdiction loci 
celebrationis of the English courts is neither exclusive nor 
complete; it concurs with that of the foreign domicil and is 
restricted to absolutely "void" marriages, such as those viti-
ated by bigamy or the non-observance of formalities. Annul-
ment of "voidable" marriages on the ground of coercion, es-
sential error, or impotence, was considered exclusively re-
served to the domiciliary court, because it effects a change of 
status.14 This distinction seems formalistic.14a In order to 
o Cf. on this point, the explanation of GooDRICH 320. 
1o I BEALE 5IO professes this conception and strongly advocates the juris-
diction of the place of celebration. 
11 2 VICO no. 79· For Spain see GoLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 297. 
12 Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, I938) Revue Crit. I938, 668, Clunet I939• 87. 
1 3 Simonin v. Mallac ( I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; Linke v. Van Aerde ( I894) 
IO T. L. R. 426; Valier v. Valier (I925) I33 L. T. R. 830 and the prob-
lematic cases Ogden v. Ogden [I9o8] P. 46 and Sottomayor v. De Barros 
[I877] 3 P. D. I, [I879] 5 P. D. 94· Expressly overruled for voidable mar-
riages in Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420 (C. A.). 
14 Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I93I] P. 29; see the important comment by 
CHESHIRE 344; Goddard, L. J., in a dictum in Simons v. Simons [I939] I 
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alleviate the hardship caused to English wives of husbands 
domiciled abroad, l4b a statutory amendment now grants an 
exceptional jurisdiction as in divorce cases, viz., in favor of a 
deserted wife and in case of a wife who for three years has 
been ordinarily resident in England.14c It has also been 
pointed out that, in view of the British reluctance to recog-
nize a change of domicil, a place where the parties live(with-
out, however, being there domiciled) and have been married, 
provides a natural forum to try the validity of the marriage.15 
In the United States many cases have favored the older 
English rule,16 and some statutes have also preserved it, at 
least under certain circumstances.17 Thus, the jurisdiction of 
the place of celebration has not completely disappeared.17a 
But it no longer has a significant role-the principle of domi-
cil has decidedly won out.18 
K. B. 490, 498, summarizes the law to the effect that since I748 the court of 
the place of celebration has been regarded as having jurisdiction to pro-
nounce the marriage null and void for failure of due celebration. The prob-
lem was ignored in Easterbrook v. Easterbrook [I944] I70 L. T. R. 26; see 
Note, 6o Law Q. Rev. ( I944) 115. 
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S. C. I934) [I934] 0. R. 588, [I934] 
4 D. L. R. 90; W. v. W. (Manitoba, C. A.) [I935] I W. W. R. 293; cf. 
FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I932] 4 D. L. R. 2, 28 ff.; 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
I90 no. 88. See also READ, Recognition and Enforcement 243· 
Ha But it has been approved by the Court of Appeal, de Reneville v. de 
Reneville [I948] P. Ioo; Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420. 
14b Especially by the strict domiciliary rule for voidable marriages, see 
e.g. the cases cited in preceding note. 
14c Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, s. I8 (I). 
15 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard (I935) 
4 at I6; Hutter v. Hutter [I944J P. 95; favorable language in de Reneville 
v. de Reneville [I948] P. 100 (C. A.) on p. 116 per Lord Greene, M. R., and 
in Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420 (C. A.) on p. 433 per Somervell, L. J., 
recently confirmed by Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [I956] P. 115 
(C. A.). MoRRIS, Cases I79 criticizes the entire doctrine. 
16 See I BEALE 511; GooDRICH 420, and, as a recent illustration, Mayer v. 
Mayer ( I929) 207 Cal. 685, 696, 279 Pac. 783, 788. 
17 See I VERNIER § 52 table XXI and Supplement. 
17a It seems to be concurrent; see Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum (I946) ziO 
Ark. I86, I9o, I94 S. W. {zd) xo12, 1013. 
18 See McMuRRAY and CuNNINGHAM, "Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a 
Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country," I8 Cal. L. Rev. 
(I930) xos. 
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(b) Court of the domicil. At present, the regularly com-
petent court is that of the domicil, and this is true, not only 
in the countries which use domicil as the test for determining 
status and consider paramount the interest of the domiciliary 
state in the validity of the marriage bond,19 but even in the 
countries generally following the principle of nationality. 20 
The motive of the rule is to permit domiciled foreigners to 
bring their matrimonial causes before the local courts instead 
of compelling them to travel to their national countries. 
As the matrimonial domicil is normally at the husband's 
domicil, the latter is usually regarded as decisive. There are 
exceptions not unlike those for granting divorce; 21 they can-
not be discussed here. 
In contrast with divorce, which is refused to foreigners in 
a number of states when the jurisdiction of the forum is not 
recognized by the homeland/2 jurisdiction for annulment is 
not made dependent on such considerations, except perhaps 
in Switzerland.23 
19 GooDRICH 420. 
zo The United States: Restatement § 115; GooDRICH 420. 
England: Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [1931] P. 29, cited supra n. 14. 
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S. C.) [1934] 0. R. 588, [1934] 4 D. L. 
R. 90; Diachuk v. Diachuk (Manitoba, K. B.) (1941) 49 Man. R. 102. 
South Africa: Ex parte Oxton [1948] 2 S. A. L. R. IOII, 1016 (in case of 
a void marriage one party's domicil is sufficient). 
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 62; text 
of 1940, art. 59· 
France: (if there is no domicil abroad) Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1927) 
Revue 1928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 3, 1930) Revue 1930, 460. 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6; cf. KG. (June 4, 1934) IPRspr. 1934. no. 
141; same for a declaratory statement that the marriage is non-existent: RG. 
(Jan. 5, 1925) 109 RGZ. 384. 
Switzerland: The domicil of the plaintiff spouse is considered decisive by 
BECK, NAG. 252 no. 123. 
21 Restatement § II 5 and about eleven state statutes allow suit to be brought 
in the country where either party resides; see 1 VERNIER § 52. For England 
see supra p. 579· 
22 German C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I was until 1941 limited by par. 4 only 
with respect to divorce; see KG. (Nov. 7, 1935) 27 Warn. Rspr. 192; 3 
FRANKENSTEIN 203 n. 85. 
23 OG. Zurich (Oct. 10, 1928) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. (1929) 139, no. 66, Clunet 
1930, 524. To the contrary effect, App. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 24 SJZ. (1927-
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(c) Court of the national country. Consistently with the 
nationality principle, in practically all Continental countries 
nationals of the forum may sue for annulment irrespective of 
their domicil.24 In a few countries this jurisdiction is exclu-
sive of foreign courts. 25 Sometimes a court defies its own gen-
eral principle of domicil in order to help a national of the 
forum. 26 
Moreover, for a wife who had belonged to the forum up 
to the time of her marriage, jurisdiction is assumed without 
difficulty on the consideration that a void marriage did not 
actually change her nationality. 
The provisions of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
are not applicable to annulment.27 
2. Applicable Law 
(a) Rule. It has been explained above 28 that the rule 
embodied in section 136 of the Restatement is universally 
adopted. A court will apply the sanctions of the same law 
that is applied in ascertaining whether a marriage has been 
validly celebrated.29 While in the United States this means 
that generally the law of the place of celebration alone is 
1928) 235 no. 54 assumes that the legislator forgot the case, and that the Ger-
man provisions furnish the best solution; in the instant case jurisdiction is 
granted to a former Swiss woman who married an Italian in Switzerland. 
24 Cf. for instance France: Cour Paris (May 28, 188o) Clunet x88o, 300; 
GouLf, 9 Repert. 8o nos. 403 ff. 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6, 6o6b no. 2. 
Switzerland: App. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 24 SJZ (1927-1928) 237. 
25 Supra PP· 426-427. 
In the Netherlands, art. 154a of the BW. has been interpreted as requir-
ing a petition of the Dutch State Attorney and annulment by a Dutch court; 
see Rb. s'Gravenhage {August 26, 1938) W. 1939, no. 36. 
26 See, for instance, Denmark: Ostre Landsrets Domme (May 12, 1920) 
U.f.R. 1920, 628, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 866, applying, moreover, the Danish law 
instead of that of the domicil. 
27 KG. (June 14, 1913) 27 ROLG. 108; RG. (May 7, 1936) 151 RGZ. 226. 
28 Supra pp. 247• 309· 
• 
29
• See LASALA LLANAS 130, 133; TRfAs DE BEs 83, xoo. In Spain the juris-
diction of state courts applies to few nullity cases only for which the writers 
seem to favor the lex fori. 
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
consulted, with the sole exception of certain absolute prohibi-
tions of the law of the domicil of either party, in most coun-
tries formalities and intrinsic validity are tested by different 
criteria. The law of the forum, so significant for divorce, 
in principle is immaterial for annulment.80 
In consequence, the judgment usually pronounces the kind 
of nullity provided for by the applicable law rather than that 
of the lex fori. The German Supreme Court, for instance, in 
a case where a Swiss national obtained an annulment on the 
ground of having been deceitfully induced to enter into the 
marriage, adopted the sanctions of the Swiss Civil Code 
rather than those of the German law, and declared the mar-
riage void ex nunc only, with the effects ordained by Swiss 
law.31 The Swiss Federal Tribunal declared a marriage void 
under the Austrian law of the parties whereby the marriage 
was retroactively destroyed (Allg. BGB., § I 6o), holding 
no support for the time previous to the judgment to be due, 
contrary to Swiss law (C. C. art. 132, par. 2) .82 
(b) Policy of the forum in favor of marriage. The prin-
ciple described above has been limited by special clauses in 
favor of the marriage in Sweden and Switzerland. The Swed-
ish statute provides that a marriage between two foreigners, 
formally valid but void because of an intrinsic defeat under 
the national law of one or both of the parties, should not be 
annulled in Sweden, unless it is also void under Swedish law 
or unless the King orders the foreign law to be applied.38 
The Swiss statute contains another clause; a marriage cele-
80 This has been confirmed, against contrary opinion in Switzerland, by 
BG. (Dec. 2, I943) 69 BGE. II 342, 344-
31 RG. (May 7, I936) I5I RGZ. 226; cf. MASSFELLER, JW. I936, I949; 
LORENZ and ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 54· 
32 BG. (Feb. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 75 no. 2. 
33 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of I90+. c. 2 §I. 
Finland : Law of Dec. 51 I 929, § 9· 
Chile: C. Sup. (Sept. 26, 1939) Gac. Trib. I939 II I82, likewise refused 
annulment of a German marriage on a ground of German law unknown to 
the forum. 
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brated abroad, invalid according to the laws of the place of 
celebration, cannot be declared invalid in Switzerland, unless 
it is also invalid according to Swiss law.34 Hence, no marriage 
is annulled for formal defects. The Federal Tribunal, in a 
recent decision, restricts this provision to Swiss citizens.85 
Both provisions give substance to the otherwise very ob-
scure rule that traditionally goes through the Continental 
literature-that, even in the field of conflicts law, public 
policy of the forum is more favorable to the marriage after 
its celebration than when its celebration is still pending. In 
general, the difference between curable and nullifying defects 
is taken care of by the private law distinction between direc-
tory and mandatory prohibitions of marriage, and there is 
usually no question but that this distinction is observed in ac-
cordance with the law governing marriage requirements, 
without consulting the laws of the forum. 
(c) Policy of the forum against the marriage. The forum 
may nevertheless impose its own grounds for impeaching a 
marriage. American courts, exercising jurisdiction for annul-
ment, are inclined to consider nullity on the ground of 
bigamy or incest without regard to the law of the place of 
celebration or that of the domiciJ.36 Moreover, in particu-
larly shocking cases, public policy will be affirmed. 87 In Eu-
rope, the best formulation of prohibitive public policy seems 
to agree with the result attained in practice in this country 
34 NAG. art. 7f par. 2. 
85 BG. {Dec. 2, 1943) 69 BGE. II 342, 345· Many other doubts exist. 
GAUTSCHI, "tl'ber die Anerkennung ausliindischer Eheschliessungen" 27 SJZ. 
321, 323 explained that foreign marriage may be simply contested by col-
lateral attack so long as they have not been recorded in the Swiss register. 
36 See STUMBERG 284. Expressly Philippine C. C. ( 1949) art. 71. 
37 In Cunningham v. Cunningham ( 1912) 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845, Clu-
net 1913, 663, an 18-year-old girl married the valet of her parents secretly in 
New Jersey; the Court annulled the marriage on the ground of nonage and 
lack of parental consent according to the principles of discretion prevailing 
in New York irrespective of the unsettled question whether the marriage was 
valid in New Jersey. 
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and in England with respect to polygamous marriages. A 
marriage valid under the law applicable according to the 
ordinary rule of conflicts will be regarded as valid at the 
forum, provided not only its celebration but also its existence 
within the forum does not offend the local public order.38 In 
this field, it may happen that any law may be applied in order 
to help a deceived woman.39 
(d) Adjustment of the applicable law. We may recall 
here the conflicts arising out of the varied scope of annulment 
of marriage in the national laws. While under Soviet Russian 
law a marriage was very simply dissolved but could not be 
annulled, some German writers suggest either that a Soviet 
marriage may nevertheless be annulled 40 or that it may be 
dissolved,41 on the assumption that the Russian institution of 
divorce also covers the ground of the German annulment. 
Analogous cases may occur everywhere. 
But where divorce is forbidden and annulment allowed on 
an abnormal scale, especially by a broad construction of er-
ror in marrying, neither divorce nor annulment will be 
granted to foreigners against their personal law. 
III. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ANNULMENTS 
In the recognition of foreign annulments, reference may be 
made in every respect to the principles governing the recog-
nition of foreign divorce decrees. The Restatement, § I IS, 
even considers the matter identical with dissolution of mar-
riage by divorce. 
38 See, for instance, RAAPE 8o2; M. WOLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 
402. 
39 Brazil, Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 20, 1932) App. Civ. no. 3533, 23 Arch. 
Jud. 421 applied the New York law to the marriage of a German wife 
with a husband, native of Austria and naturalized United States citizen, in 
view of the fact that under German law, applicable to a deceived party, her 
action was lost by limitation. 
40 3 FRANKENSTEIN 196. 
41 RAAPE, IPR. 274· 
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Thus, it has been decided according to this principle in 
England that a nullity decree pronounced by the court of the 
foreign matrimonial domicil is entitled to universal recog-
nition; while this was first settled only with respect to a mar-
riage celebrated abroad, 42 it has now been declared also in 
the case of an English marriage. 43 The distinction between 
void and voidable marriages 43a is here again held relevant. 
A decree at the husband's domicil annulling a void marriage 
is denied recognition if the wife acquired the husband's domi-
cil only by virtue of the purported marriage.43b 
In France, it has been held that in the event one party is 
of French nationality, French law must be applied and a de-
cree of exequatur is indispensable for recognition.44 
In Italy, jurisdiction of the state courts is not exclusive/5 
but a canonical marriage with civil effect celebrated in Italy 
after the effective date of the Concordat cannot be annulled 
by any temporal tribunal.46 A fraudulent, i.e., not serious and 
42 Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. (H. L.) 641. 
43 This point, left open by the House of Lords in the Salvesen case, was 
decided more definitely than in De Massa v. De Massa [1939] 2 All E. R. 150 
(Note, 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932) 13; CHESHIRE 36o}, in Galene v. Galene 
[1939] P. 237, [1939] 2 All E. R. 148 (English marriage, French domicil of 
the husband, French decree of nullity on the ground of want of the father's 
consent; the decree was recognized irrespective of the choice of law). 
43a See supra p. 578. 
43b Chapelle v. Chapelle [1950] P. 134 (Maltese decree avoiding a mar-
riage celebrated in England by Maltese man with English woman both liv-
ing thereafter in Malta). 
Contra, in parallel cases but on different grounds de Bono v. de Bono [1948] 
2 S. A. L. R. 802 (separate domicils, domicil of one spouse sufficient for 
recognition); Vassallo v. Vassallo [1952] S. Aust. S. R. 129, 135 (common 
domicil, in spite of void marriage). 
44 See VALERY 838 no. 594, and 1074 no. 749, and the French diplomatic 
note in RG. (March 19, 1936} 150 RGZ. 374· 
45 Cass. (July 22, 1930) Testa v. Rosasco, Giur. Ita!. 1930, I, 1041; see 
Swiss Federal Tribunal (June 17, 1932) 58 BGE. II 190. On the requisite 
of domicil for recognizing a Swiss decree of annulment see PERASSI, 25 Rivista 
( 1933) 473· 
46 App. Milano (June 27, 1933) Giur. Ita!. 1933, IV, 222, 25 Rivista (1933) 
260; cf. FEDOZZI 456; App. Torino (March I, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937, I, 2, 
212, Clunet 1938, 929; Cass. (June II, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934. I, 1061; App. 
Trieste (Nov. 29, 1934) Clunet 1937, 165; Cass. (June 25, 1949) Foro Ita!. 
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effective, change of domicil by the parties does not create in-
ternational jurisdiction for annulment.47 
Where a foreign annulment based on the incapacity of a 
party has applied a law other than the national law of the 
party, the court of the national country, following the prin-
ciple of nationality, will not recognize the decree.48 But it 
will, if the legal provisions are fairly similar.49 
A curious combination of recognition and exclusive juris-
diction is illustrated by an Austrian case of 19 3 7. 50 The mar-
riage of an Austrian with a Yugoslav woman was annulled 
by the competent ecclesiastical court in Yugoslavia. The Aus-
trian court found that the decree was to be recognized under 
the treaty existing between the two countries. But to satisfy 
formally the constant axiom that the Austrian courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the status of nationals, the marriage 
was again annulled. This recalls certain duplications of di-
vorce, such as in Michigan. 51 
Public policy may prevent the recognition of foreign de-
crees if granted, e.g., because of difference of faith. 51a 
1949, I Sox. An ecclesiastical tribunal is a court: RG. (Dec. 16, 1920) Warn. 
Rspr. 1921, no. 35· 
Excepted are the cases enumerated in the Law of May 27, 1929, art. 12, 
in which an Italian civil court is competent: Cass. (June 19, 1952) Rivista 
1953. 463. 
47 App. Genova (Aug. II, 1936) Monitore 1937, 237, Clunet 1937, 910. 
48 Italy: Cass. (June II, 1937) Foro Ita!. 1937, I, 1371. 
49 App. Trieste (Sept. 17, 1936) Monitore 1937, 17, Clunet 1937, 389 (de-
cree of Lima, Peru, annulling the Italian marriage of two Italians on the 
ground of impotence according to the Peruvian C. C. (1852) art. 167, art. 107 
of the Italian C. C. being similar "in substance"). While Swiss nullity decrees 
based on impotence are also generally recognized, in the case of App. Milano 
(May 28, 1936) Monitore 1936, 456, Clunet 1937, 164, recognition was re-
fused for other reasons, among which was the fact that the allegedly in-
capable woman had a living child; in this respect an element of re-trial en-
tered under the guise of public policy. Contra: Cass. civ. (June II, 1937) Giur. 
Ita!. 1937, I, I, 762; and see on the problems involved, PAGANO, Note to Cass. 
civ. (April I7, I939) Giur. Ita!. I939, I, I, 705; App. Bologna (Jan. I6, I939) 
Giur. Ita!. I939, I, 2, 309. 
50 OLG. Graz (March 3I, I937) 55 Zentralblatt ( I937) 437 no. 248. 
51 See supra pp. 433, s6o, n. x6. 
51a App. Firenze (April 17, I953) Rivista I954, 129 (Israeli decree declar-
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IV. EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT 
1. Partly Effectual Void Marriage 
A delicate question concerns the phenomenon that a void 
or annulled marriage may nevertheless produce legal conse-
quences. There are institutions marking a middle ground be-
tween valid and invalid marriages; the most widely known 
and, indeed, the most benevolent 52 of them is the French 
mariage putatif, which has its roots in the canon law and its 
ramifications in numerous jurisdictions including Louisiana,S8 
Quebec,"1 and Latin America.55 Yet French writers and 
courts disagree hopelessly on the proper conflicts rule. 
Illustration: In the case of Stephens v. Falchi, which came 
up in Quebec,S6 the parties were domiciled and married in 
ing null a civil marriage in Italy between Italian woman and Israeli hus-
band). 
52 French C. C. art. 20I declares that marriage that has been declared null 
produces nevertheless civil effects as regards both the spouses and their chil-
dren when contracted in good faith. According to art. 202, if only one of the 
spouses acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in 
favor of this spouse and the children born of the marriage. This provision 
goes so far as to treat the protected persons as though the marriage were 
valid. Furthermore, it includes all possible defects of marriage and even 
non-existent marriages; see Cass. ( req.) (March I4, I933) D.I933.I.28, Gaz. 
Pal.r933·1.966; cf. for an invalid ceremony before an English consul, Cour 
Paris (Jan. I6, I895) Clunet I895, I057, and for bigamy, Trib. civ. Seine (May 
n, I933) Gaz. Pal. I933.2.202; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Nouv. Revue 
1937, 85; Cour Paris (March 30, I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 353· In the case 
of a marriage of Canadians from Quebec before a Catholic priest in France, 
see Berthiaume v. Dastous [I930] A. C. 79, supra p. 229; cf. LEE, "Cases on 
the Conflict of Laws from the Law Reports of the British Dominions ( I93S-
1937)," 2I Journ. Comp. Leg. (I939) 28. Finally, good faith is presumed; cf. 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, I Precis 229 No. 478; BINET on Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 5, 
19I3) D.I9I4.I.28I. To contrary effect, e.g., the Belgian Rb. Antwerp (Oct. 
28, I939) Rechtsk. Wkbl. 889 no. I46, declares that a non-recorded religious 
marriage between Polish Jews in Warsaw is non-existent and does not pro-
duce the protection under C. C. art. 20I. 
58 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) arts. 117, 118 identical with French C. C. 
arts. 20I, 202. 
54 C. C. Lower Canada: arts. I63, I64. 
55 See on the law of Chile, with comparative notes, R. M. ECHAVARRfA, 
"Apuntes sobre el matrimonio putativo y Ia bigamia," 34 Rivista Der. Jur. y 
Ciencias Soc. (I937) part I, 37· 
56 Stephens v. Falchi (Queb. K. B.) [I937] 3 D. L. R. 6os, aff'd by Sup. Ct. 
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Montreal and divorced in a French court. The woman then 
married in Paris an Italian, Falchi, who was domiciled in 
Italy. A marriage settlement was expressly made subject to 
Italian law. The Stephens divorce was invalid under the law 
of Quebec (and, hence, also in Italy). Therefore, the second 
marriage was "annullable." 57 Suppose it was annulled. 
Should the provisions of the French, the Italian, or the Que-
bec statutes be applied to determine whether the second hus-
band married in good faith, and whether he could sue for the 
usufruct arising from the settlement? 
Are there no such questions in the common law countries? 
In England, in fact, there are none, since an annulment of a 
marriage seems to annihilate all its effects. The courts of 
many of the states of the United States, however, have the 
power, by or without a statute, to grant alimony or compen-
sation in the decree of annulment and to dispose of the prop-
erty of the spouses "as in divorce." 58 It has probably never 
been doubted that such powers are to be exercised exclusively 
in accordance with the rules of the forum, even when the 
voidness of the marriage was based on the fact that the par-
ties had gone through a formally defective marriage cere-
mony in Louisiana or that one of them had been incapable of 
marrying as a domiciliary of Louisiana. 
In both England and the United States, however, prob-
lems of conflicts law have arisen with respect to the legiti-
macy of children born of void marriages.59 
On the effects which a putative marriage exercises on the 
personal rights and duties of husband and wife, the following 
of Canada [1938] S. C. R. 354; cf. LEE, 21 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1939) 28, 
supra n. 52. 
57 Because the marriage never was annulled, the court awarded the usu-
fruct flowing from the marriage settlement according to Italian law, upon a 
complete, though unconvincing, reasoning under the French law of the place 
of celebration. It is not clear why the doctrine of putative marriage is also 
mentioned. 
58 See I VERNIER §53· 
59 See infra n. 73· 
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theories have been advanced by writers and adopted by 
courts on the Continent and especially in France: 
(a) The personal law should govern, a theory that com-
prises several propositions: 
(i) If both parties are nationals of the forum, the law of 
the forum should be applied under all circumstances.60 The 
same should be done, if the personal law of both spouses 
contains rules approximately similar to the lex fori. 61 
(ii) In mixed marriages, the old rule that the law of the 
husband governs the personal marital relations has been ex-
tended to questions of what effects of marriage survive an 
annulment.62 · 
{iii) According to another opinion, where one party is a 
French national, this party should always enjoy the far-
reaching benefit of the French Civil Code, article 299.63 In 
a generalized and now widely adopted version, a party hav-
ing married in good faith enjoys the benefit which may be 
granted to him by his nationallaw.64 
(b) Some courts have applied the law of the forum "for 
6° Cass. (civ.) (March 25, I889) Clunet I889, 642 and other decisions; see 
VALERY I076 no. 750. 
61 App. Alger (June 28, 1887) Clunet I889, 6I6; Trib. civ. Seine (June 
I6, I906) Clunet I907, I42; App. Agen (July 29, I936) Revue Crit. I937, 
72I. 
62 App. Alger (May 26, I879) D.I88o.2.I6I; App. Orleans (Jan. 10, I894) 
Clunet I894, 536; Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet I898, I08o; Cour Paris 
(Feb. I5, I950) Clunet I95I, I90; PILLET, I Traite 566 no. 268; Nmo-
YET 737 no. 627; CUNHA GoNc;ALVES, 1 Dire ito Civil 687. Contra: 2 ARMIN-
JON 460 reproaches the writers that they forget that the existence of a mar-
riage is precisely in question. But see the text against this pseudo-logic. 
BATIFFOL, Traite no. 447, pleads for the personal law of each spouse. 
63 VALERY I076 no. 750; AumNET, Clunet 1930, 322; NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 
I934. I34 and 5 Traite 335 n. I (d), 366. 
64 WAHL, Note to Cass. (civ.) (July 30, I9oo) S.I902.1.225; cf. App. Alger 
(May 26, I879) S.I879.2.28I; Trib. civ. Seine (May 11, I933) Revue Crit. 
I934, I29; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Revue Crit. I938, 84 (ex-
pressly against the lex fori and the lex loci celebrationis and for the per-
sonal law); BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I2 § 29I; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 358 DO. 
333; in Italy, FEDOZZI 455· 
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reasons of justice and good morals" 65 or without any justifi-
cation.66 
(c) A theory allegedly flowing from general principles, 
and for this reason preferred by recent German writers, con-
siders that the law violated by the attempted marriage is 
the naturally competent law to determine what legal effects 
are left to the apparent conclusion of the marriage.67 
As a matter of fact, the French courts have always found 
a ground for applying the French provision in favor of a 
French party, unless his or her bad faith was proved or both 
parties had fraudulently evaded the French marriage re-
quirements, in which case good faith was considered absent. 68 
This practice involves exaggerated protection of nationals 
and is a measurably excessive extension of public policy to an 
ordinary rule of private law, as Batiffol has pointed out.69 
6 5 App. Aix (Feb. 13, 1912) Clunet 1913, 1229; Trib. civ. Tunis (June 14, 
1906) Clunet 1907, 439; and a general trend described by BATIFFOL, Revue 
1937. 433· 
66 Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, 1913) Clunet 1916, 170; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 
10, 1912) Clunet 1916, 178; Cour Paris (Nov. 12, 1913) Clunet 1916, 178; 
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 650 (Orthodox Serb and 
French woman married in Serbia by Catholic priest; on the lack of motiva-
tion see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432); Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) 
Revue Crit. 1939, II9 (Italian wife, later of French nationality). 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (July 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige (1933) 
174 (lack of consent by the English father of the bride). 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 12, 1933) 28 Arch. Jud. 456 in the case of a 
Brazilian woman separated by judicial decree, marrying in New York an 
Englishman, held that she and her issue were not entitled to any rights of 
putative marriage, because she must have known her disability to remarry 
(this result could be reached in several ways). An analogous case of a Bra-
zilian woman was decided to the same effect by Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, 
1913) Clunet 1916, 170. 
67 CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 56; 2 ARMINJON 46o; AUDINET, II Re-
cueiJ 1926 I 175 at 210 and in Clunet 1930, 322; Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 1900) 
D.1901.1.317, S.1902.1.225. 
Germany: KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht ( 1928) § 39 A III at 144, and M. 
WOLFF, IPR. 196; RAAPE 339, 451; rejected by the Reichsgericht (Nov. II, 
1937) JW. 1938, 108 infra n. 73· 
68 Cour Paris (Aug. 3, 1898) Clunet 1898, 1080. 
69 BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432. To the opposite effect, § 1344 of the 
German BGB. is believed of public order by RAAPE 340; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 55; M. WoLFF, IPR. 197· 
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A suitable theory may perhaps be derived from the opin-
ion described under (a), ( ii), referring to the law of the 
husband. We should, however, consider on the one hand that 
the conflicts rules by no means have to be identical for per-
sonal relations between husband and wife (maintenance, 
name of the wife, alimony), property relations, custody of 
children, and succession on death.70 On the other hand, the 
protection which the French, German, Swiss, and other sys-
tems in varying degree grant to an innocent pseudo-spouse 
should be technically construed as a residuum from the 
parties' attempted marriage, some shelter left in the ruins 
of the house. The benefit to that party is not so much an 
effect of the violation of prescriptions, as suggested in con-
nection with the opinion under (c) , as it is an effect of the 
marriage despite its "nullity." We may observe generally 
that what in legal terminology is called void may neverthe-
less have some effects. Such rudimentary consequences, how-
ever, must lie within the framework of the normal effects 
which the transaction would have had if it had been valid. 71 
Hence, it is submitted that all relations between the parties 
should be determined by the law that would have been ap-
plied to the respective kind of relation, had the marriage 
been valid.12 Consequently, in common law countries the 
personal relations of the parties should be treated according 
to the law of the domicil on the ground of which jurisdiction 
has been assumed. Suppose a party to a marriage celebrated 
in Louisiana was under age and the marriage therefore void, 
10 See 2 ZITELMANN 751 and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 217 (not one but several dif-
ferent "statutes"). But for property relations, the latter (3 FRANKENSTEIN 
396), like his adversary, RAAPE, 340, applies a separate personal law of the 
wife in contradiction to the German Code, EG. art. 15. 
71 See my construction of "damages from reliance": RABEL, "Der sogen. 
Vertrauensschaden im schwei2erischen Recht," 27 Z. Schweiz. R., N. F. (1908) 
291 ff. 
12 This suggestion seems to agree with some remarks of DIENA, 2 Prine. 156 
and UDINA, Elementi 180 n. 130. 
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either because the party was domiciled at the time in Louisi-
ana or because of the law of his or her domicil applied by 
Louisiana according to its domiciliary principle. The per-
sonal relations of the parties have to be treated without 
regard to the Louisiana doctrine of putative marriage, if the 
marriage is annulled in a common law state where the parties 
are now domiciled. This solution agrees with the result of a 
lex fori theory but is based upon the lex domicilii as govern-
ing the personal effects of marriage. With respect to mov-
ables, the law obtaining at the domicil when the movables 
were acquired governs, as it would if the marriage were 
valid, in favor of the party acting in good faith, et cetera. 
The status of children born of void marriages must cer-
tainly be treated under the law governing legitimacy 73 ( un-
less a special rule is devised as in the C6digo Bustamante),14 
and the share which a pseudo-spouse may be allotted in the 
distribution of assets of the other party is governed by the 
rules on inheritance/5 Whether an innocent wife may also 
acquire the nationality of the husband by a putative marriage 
is a matter of public law; in France, the question is now 
73The United States: Restatement§ 137 and comment; Moore v. Saxton 
(1916) 90 Conn. 164, 96 Atl. 96o; Green v. Kelley (1917) 228 Mass. 6o2, 
118 N. E. 235; McNamara v. McNamara (1922) 303 Ill. 191, 135 N. E. 410. 
Cf. on the statutory provisions declaring legitimate the issue of prohibited 
marriages I VERNIER § 48 j 4 ibid. § 247· 
England: The rule would be the same if Shaw v. Gould (In re Wilson's 
Trusts) (1865) L. R. I Eq. 247 had not partly disturbed the doctrine; 
CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 387 asks for overruling and FosTER, "Some Defects in the 
English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 
89 for a reform law. 
Germany: RG. (Nov. II, 1937) ]W. 1938, xo8 (against RAAPE 451); KG. 
(July 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 2526, Clunet 1938, 341; also KG. (Dec. 9, 1921) 
42 ROLG. 97i KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83: they apply the law 
governing filiation, i.e., EG. arts. 18 and 19. 
Contra France (law of the husband): Cour Paris (Feb. 15, 1950) Clunet 
1951, 190; Trib. civil Seine (March 31, 1952) Revue Crit. 1952, 330. 
74 C6digo Bustamante art. 49 as compared with art. 57· 
75 See supra p. 404. 
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expressly negatived against the former apparently prevailing 
opinion which included it in the "civil effects" of marriage/6 
2. Protection of Third Parties 
Under a probably general American rule, a man is liable 
for necessaries furnished to a wife to whom he is not legally 
married, if he lived with her and held her out to the world 
as his wife. 77 The conflicts rule on necessaries, as stated in 
section 459 of the Restatement, recognizes an implied au-
thorization by the husband, either as part of the law of the 
man's domicil or under circumstances defined by the law 
of the state where the necessaries are furnished. Is this rule 
applicable also if the man is not a husband legally? No 
reason seems to exist why the answer should not be in the 
affirmative. 
A related question was prompted by the provision of the 
German Civil Code protecting a third person who has en-
tered into a transaction with, or obtained a judgment against, 
a spouse of a void marriage. The nullity cannot be set up to 
defeat his rights, if it was not pronounced in a judgment and 
was unknown to him ( BGB. § 1344, German Marriage Law 
of 1946, § 27). It has been suggested in Germany that this 
domestic provision be extended by analogy to international 
situations, i.e., where German spouses have celebrated an 
invalid marriage abroad and live in the forum, or foreign 
spouses whose marriage is void under their national law are 
domiciled in the forum. 78 Third parties should be protected 
against the effects of a nullity not stated in a judgment and 
unknown to them. 
76 Code de Ia nationalite (1945) arts. 42, 43· As to the former view see App. 
Douai (April I, 1936) D.1936.2.70, with note by RouAsT; Revue Crit. 1937, 
75, with note by CALEB at 78; see also VALERY 237 no. zoo; NIBOYET 194 
no. 147; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 3) 124 no. 104. 
77 Frank v. Carter (1916) 219 N.Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549; Jordan Marsh Co. 
v. Hedtler (1921) 238 Mass. 43, 130 N. E. 78. 
78 M. WoLFF, IPR. 197. 
PART FIVE 
PARENTAL RELATIONS 
CHAPTER 15 
Parent and Child 1 
l.. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
r. Subject Matter 
XTER dealing with marriage and divorce rules, American case books on conflict law and the Re-statement finish the chapter on family or status law 
with the four topics of legitimacy, adoption, custodianship 
of parents, and guardianship. We shall see, as we have seen 
in considering the subject of marriage relations, that the 
relationships created by legitimate birth, legitimation, and 
adoption have a broader scope in the civil than in the com-
mon law. For instance, under the civil law, support is an 
important incident of legitimate as well as of illegitimate re-
lationship and is governed in principle by the personal law, 
while in the Restatement it is treated separately and left to 
the law of the forum. To do justice to all legislations, we 
have to divide the matter into smaller topics, viz., in the first 
place, ( i) legitimate birth, ( ii) legitimation, (iii) rights and 
duties of legitimate parents, ( iv) adoption, and ( v) illegiti-
macy. On the other hand, custodianship, which in the com-
mon law is the inclusive and essentially homogeneous reposi-
tory of all rules concerning infants, must, for the purposes 
of our survey, be subdivided into two different parts. Family 
1 Among the special articles on the subject reference will be made more 
particularly to RAAPE, "Rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," 50 Re-
cueil 1934 IV 405, and to TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy, and Recog-
nition in the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691. 
For a comparative survey of the municipal laws, see VEITH, Kindschafts-
recht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. 770; for materials, vols. x and 2 of 
BERGMANN'S work. 
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law principles are embodied in the rules that determine the 
rights and duties of parents as such, while the constitution of 
other guardians and the management and supervision of the 
estate of a child or any other ward may be better treated in 
connection with the administration of other estates. Our dis-
cussion, therefore, will be limited to the matters more closely 
allied with the special consideration of family law. 
The existing written conflict rules differ, as in other re-
spects, also with respect to their subject matter. While, for 
instance, the recent Italian code contains one provision on 
the relationship between parent and child, 2 the German In-
troductory Law 3 has different provisions relating to ( 1) 
legitimacy as the origin of legitimate relationships, ( 2) the 
relationship between parents and a legitimate child, (3) the 
relationship between an illegitimate child and his mother, 
( 4) the duties of support of the illegitimate father, ( 5) le-
gitimation and adoption, and ( 6) custodianship of all kinds. 
And, whereas Germany treats legitimation and adoption 
together,4 Poland joins legitimation and recognition,5 Swit-
zerland legitimation, recognition, and adoption,6 and the 
C6digo Bustamante/ as well as the recent Greek code,8 have 
one rule on legitimation alone. 
2. Institutions Involving an Act of a Party 
(a) In some statutes of this country, the term adoption 
is given to the institution otherwise known as legitimation 
by voluntary declaration. Moreover, legitimation in the 
proper sense is often confused with the qualified recognition 
2 C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I. 
3 EG. arts. 18-23. 
4 EG. art. 22. 
5 Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 22; cf. China: Law of 
1918, art. 13; Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18. 
6 NAG. art. 8. 
7 Arts. 6o-62. 
8 C. C. ( 1940) art. 22. 
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by a parent through which an illegitimate child obtains an 
ameliorated position, although remaining illegitimate. Also, 
in some other countries, the terminology oscillates. In fact, 
there are in this field many institutions of mixed character 
existing in the world. For the purpose of the law of conflicts, 
however, it is of primary importance to distinguish the fol-
lowing groups of institutions: 
(i) Acts through which an illegitimate child receives the 
full status of legitimacy (legitimation in the ordinary sense). 
(ii) Acknowledgment of paternity or maternity whereby 
(as by certain other circumstances) an illegitimate child may 
receive an improved position without reaching the full posi-
tion of a legitimate child. This group includes very different 
degrees of position. The child may be assimilated to a legiti-
mate child in most respects, or it may, on the contrary, be 
granted only particular prerogatives, as under those numer-
ous statutes of the United States which confer nothing but 
rights of inheritance upon a recognized child.9 
(iii) Recognition as a condition for any effect of illegiti-
mate filiation as required in the French and in the other legis-
lations following the French system. 
( iv) Institutions of a still more restricted nature such as 
the faculty of the husband to give his name to an illegitimate 
child of his wife under Austrian and German laws.10 
(b) The broad distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children is considered fundamental, legally as well as 
socially, except in a few countries. It would seem natural, 
therefore, that the same conflicts rules should govern legiti-
macy by birth, legitimation, and adoption, insofar as by 
these institutions the full degree of legitimacy is reached. 
9 See, for instance, Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (2d) 464; cf. Note, 29 
Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 258. 
10 Austria: Allg. BGB. § 165 par. 2; Germany: BGB. § 1706 par. 2; see 
infra p. 656, n. u. 
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On the other hand, we can understand that conflict rules with 
respect to illegitimacy are different from those governing 
legitimacy by birth. However, existing rules do not alto-
gether agree with these simple distinctions. 
(c) Recognition of foreign institutions has been strongly 
influenced by some aprioristic doctrines : 
(i) The influential English doctrine that a status un-
known to the forum cannot be recognized has considerably 
impeded the progress of reciprocal recognition of institutions 
regarding parent and child. As stated in our general dis-
cussion in Chapter 5, the hope is justified that this doctrine 
may be cunsidered overruled.11 
( ii) American courts are inclined to recognize foreign 
acts but to give them the same effect as ascribed to the most 
nearly related domestic institutions. This doctrine is prefer-
able to the English rule just mentioned, but it too is unsatis-
factory. By such an approach, e.g., a child, illegitimate 
abroad, has been treated as legitimate at the forum for 
purposes of inheritance. 
(iii) The idea mentioned under ( ii), inexact in applica-
tion to illegitimacy, is perfectly right with respect to legiti-
macy. In the various countries, the status of legitimate 
children, though qualified by different minor features, is regu-
lated in an essentially similar manner so far as the personal 
relations between parent and child are concerned. Hence, 
recognition of a foreign created legitimacy means that a 
child born or legitimated or adopted in one country will be 
treated as legitimate in another, with the incidents deter-
mined by the law of the forum. This means also that, if the 
domicil or the nationality determinative of personal status is 
changed, the rights of legitimate parents and children are 
transformed accordingly. This mutability of parental rela-
11 Supra pp. 188-193· 
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tions is a phenomenon that has only begun to attract some 
attention.12 
3· Liberal Trends 
Recently, some well-meaning courts and writers have tried 
to counteract the narrowness of traditional doctrines. Thus, 
it has been postulated that the personal law of the child 
should govern rather than that of the parent, 13 or that public 
policy should override any conflicts rule referring to a for-
eign law less favorable to legitimacy than the domestic law.14 
But the advantage of the child can only be secured by a con-
flicts rule that directly refers to that law most favorable to 
the child in each particular case. Conflicts rules formulated 
in this manner 15 have proved to be of difficult application in 
German law.16 Moreover, consideration of family policy 
should be left to substantive legislation, except in a very re-
stricted domain of public policy, where courts consider 
foreign bastardy statutes as plainly backward and a disgrace 
to the law. 
II. LEGITIMATE BIRTH 
A. RULES 
I. Personal Law of the Parent 
Common law and civil law agree in submitting the ques-
tion of birth in lawful wedlock to the personal law of the 
parent. The tests are domicil or nationality respectively. 
American law, however, disagrees with all others by the 
distinctly proclaimed principle of determining the child's 
12 RAAPE 464 III I. Application to English law has been attempted by 
MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law 
Q. Rev. (I94I) IIZ, 126. 
13 See infra p. 604-
HTAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 700, 70I, supra n. I,' cf. ibid. 7I5. 
15 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 2I par. 2. 
16 See RAAPE 211 ff., 359 ff. on EG. arts. I2, 16, par. 2. 
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legitimate relationship to each parent separately.17 In fact, 
such an equal position of men and women, although apt to 
create complicated situations with respect to the child, may 
be considered fair to all parties. In other countries, however, 
the law of the male parent is applied to determine the legiti-
mate relationship also between mother and child in order 
to maintain the unity of the family and particularly in view 
of the consequences for the nationality of the issue. 
The head of the family whose law governs legitimacy is, 
in the German law, correctly characterized as "the husband 
of the mother." To say that legitimacy is predicated on the 
personal law of the "child's father" is a tautology that has 
caused confusion to English writers.18 
Hence, under American law, if the parents are domiciled 
in different states at the time of the birth of the child, the 
law of each party's domicil decides his relationship to the 
child. Where, for instance, the marriage of the parents is 
recognized as valid in Iowa and considered invalid in New 
York, the child is legitimate as to the mother, domiciled in 
the first state, and illegitimate as to the father, domiciled in 
the second state. Under English law, the child would be ille-
gitimate with regard to both parents. 
Contacts: domicil or nationality. The domicil of the father 
or mother is the test in the United States. The domicil of the 
father, as head of the family, is the test in England and the 
other countries generally following the domiciliary prin-
ciple.19 
17 Restatement § 137, cf. ibid. § 138. 
18 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 380, caught in that tautology which he believes to be 
a "theory," feels compelled to state that "practicability must not be sacrificed 
to theory"; see now CHESHIRE 395· 19 England: CHESHIRE 393, 395· 
Argentina: 2 Vrco no. 140. 
Denmark: BoRuM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 52; BoRuM 125. lZ)stre 
Landsret (June 14, 1949) 20 Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514. 
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI ( 9). 
The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law starts pronouncing 
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Nationality of the mother's husband is decisive almost 
everywhere in the rest of the world. 20 The personal law has 
to govern because the stability of the family, the honor of 
the married woman, and her marital rights stand upon this 
matter.21 An exorbitant exception in favor of the lex fori is 
made by a National Socialist law of 1938 that extends the 
application of the German laws to the contestation of legiti-
macy in the case where only the mother is of German na-
tionality at a certain date. 22 
Renvoi is applied according to general rules. 23 
in art. I6, unchanged by the text of I940, art. 20, that "the law that governs 
the celebration of the marriage determines legitimate birth and the legitima-
tion by subsequent marriage." However, the next section (art. I7, text of 
I940: art. 2I) submits "the questions of legitimacy other than those concern-
ing the validity or nullity of the marriage" to the domiciliary law. This 
means probably that art. I6 is corrected by art. I7; the special rule on mar-
riage, as in the other countries, governs only the question whether the mar-
riage, or subsequent marriage, is valid. This seems to be the opinion of 2 
VIco, no. I74· But why has art. I6 not been cancelled at least in I940? 
20 Austria: Decree of Oct. IS, I94I, § 9; WALKER 782 n. II (the Austrian 
law of parent and child has stayed in force). 
Belgium: POULLET 46I no. 387. 
Belgian Congo: C. C. (1895) book I, art. I2. 
Czechoslovakia: Law of March II, I948, s. 20. 
Finland: Law of I929, § I8. 
France: prevailing opinion; cf. BATIFFOL, Traite 532. Contra: Cour Paris 
(June 21, I955) Revue Crit. I955, 529 (common domicil of the spouses). 
Germany: EG. art. I8. 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I7 par. I. 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § I7 (with reservation in favor of 
children with Hungarian domicil or nationality). 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 1. 
Switzerland: NAG. arts 8 and 32 (for Swiss domiciliaries). 
China: Law of 19I8, art. I2. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 17. 
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, on private international law, § 29. 
Treaties: H ungarian-Czechoslovakian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of 
March 6, 1951, § 23, and the parallel Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of August 
8, I953, § 24, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. ( I956) 487, 492. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. I8. 
Sweden: H. D. (Jan. 27, 1953) 22 Z.ausi.PR. (I957) 287. 
21 LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 375 no. 346. 
22 Cf. EG. art. 18 par. 2, added by art. 2 § 8 of the Law of April I2, I938, 
to modify and complete family law provisions and on the condition of apa-
trides (RGBI. I, 38o). 
23 Germany: RAAPE 487 whose illustration however is questionable; M. 
WoLFF, IPR. 216 no. 6. 
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2. Personal Law of the Child 
The personal law of the child has been advocated by a few 
writers/4 although sparsely applied in actuallaws.25 Accord-
ing to this opinion, it would be material in this country 
whether the child's domicil at birth is with the father or the 
mother.26 In a country following the principle of nationality, 
the child's national law cannot be found without knowing 
whether it is legitimate; thus nationality would depend upon 
legitimacy, and this again upon nationality. Such a vicious 
circle, it is true, may be avoided by legislation on nationality 
whereby the child acquires a nationality of its own on the 
ground of jus soli or a temporary nationality which may 
suffice for provisional legal situations. It must be conceded, 
furthermore, that the traditional system based on nationality 
is weakened to the extent that separate nationality of wife 
and child has been recognized. But the idea of applying the 
child's law instead of that of the parent seems to come 
simply from the desire to employ in the forum of the child 
once more the law of the forum. 27 It is still the dominant 
opinion that the child's domicil or nationality is perfectly 
immaterial, 28 the reason still proclaimed being that the ex-
istence and unity of the family is at stake.29 
Indeed, if the state of the child's domicil is said to have a 
24 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 27; AuniNET no. 625, see contra: SuRVILLE 447 
no. 305; DUGUIT, Clunet, 1885, 353 1 359; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 
57, 61. 
Belgium: see RoLIN, 2 Principes 137 no. 613; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 
618 no. 581. 
25 C6digo Bustamante art. 57· Art. 8 sentence 2 of the French law of July 
24, 1921 concerning the conflicts law of Alsace-Lorraine, refers to the law of 
the child the "proof of filiation," whatever that means. Two decisions of the 
court of Bucharest to this effect, conflicting with others, are cited by PLASTARA, 
7 Repert. 68 no. 198. 
26 TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 597, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 602. 
27 See, e.g., LEREBOUR5--PIGEONNIERE 378 no. 349 (B). 
28 Germany: unanimous opinion, see RAAPE 447; Bay. ObLG. (March 22, 
1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE. I 230. 
29 DIENA, 2 Prine. 179; RAAPE 447· -
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concurrent interest in its status, 30 this interest is negligible 
compared with the interest of the family. Moreover, the 
interests of the child are not, and certainly should not be, 
more protected by the court of his domicil than by any other. 
And the law of his domicil may as well be unfavorable to the 
child as favorable. 
3· Time Governing Ascertainment of Applicable Law 
The decisive and natural time for determining the appli-
cable law is considered to be the moment when the child is 
born. In the German and other enactments, it is added that, 
if the child is born after the death of the mother's husband, 
the personal law of the husband at the time of his death 
governs; 81 in a generalized version, the same rule applies in 
the case of any dissolution of the marriage occurring before 
birth. 32 
It follows that the law determining whether a child is 
legitimate is immutable; no change of status of parent or 
child after this date alters the result. This is in sharp con-
trast to the fact that a voluntary change of status elected by 
the husband before the child's birth may influence its legiti-
macy. 
Precisely in view of this liberty of the father, occasionally 
the decisive time has been assumed to be that of the concep-
tion rather than that of the birth,S3 a solution generally held 
30 TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 603, supra n. 1. 
31 Germany: EG. art. 18. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 18 par. 2. 
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 20. 
China: Law of 1918, art. 12, 2nd sentence. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 17, 2nd sentence. 
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § 29 par. 2. 
Treaties: see the provisions cited supra n. 20. 
82 Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 17 par. 2, in agreement with the German in-
terpretation of EG. art. 18; cf. RAAPE 449· 
83 Denmark: App. Copenhagen (July 17, 1916) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 866 
no. 7· SURVILLE 447 no. 305 advocates a fiction of earlier birth where it would 
be more favorable to the child; RAAPE 448 would like an exception to the rule 
in the case of a fraudulent change of nationality. 
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impractical, because birth can be ascertained much more 
easily than conception.34 But an American author 85 has 
recently suggested that "the rule should be stated in terms 
of the creation of legitimacy by the law of the domicile of 
the parents either at conception or birth of the child." He 
thinks that the writers and the courts have been wrong in 
regarding only the time of birth or have overlooked the 
possibility of the parents' change of domicil between concep-
tion and birth of the child. Yet, no mistake has occurred in 
the formation of the rules. The purpose of conflicts law is 
not the same as that of substantive private laws. These may 
consider a child born during the time of wedlock as legiti-
mate (as common law does) or declare a child en ventre sa 
mere as already born inasmuch as this fiction is advantageous 
to the child (as Roman law does). Conflicts law refers to 
one legislation and leaves it to this legislation whether to go 
back from birth to conception. The suggested terms would 
essentially modify the rule; this seems inadvisable, if for no 
other reason than because of the wide uniformity already 
reached. Moreover, the law of the time of birth has been 
adopted in the different legislations, because this is a fact 
that can be ascertained without any fiction. 
4· Soviet Russia and Other Socialist Countries 
The law of Soviet Russia and other socialist countries 
knows only one category of parent-child relations: it does 
not admit any difference between legitimate and illegitimate 
children. 86 How, therefore, ought we to classify in a Western 
court children whose parents were domiciled in or nationals 
of these countries? Are they to be regarded without distinc-
3 4 ScHNITZER 430, concerning Swiss law. 
B5 TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at S97, supra n. I. 
86 RSFSR Code of family law ( I926) art. 2S; Chinese Marriage Law of 
April IS, 19SO, art. IS (16 Z.ausl.PR. (19SO/S1) IZ3) j SCHMIED, "Das 
Familienrecht der Volksdemokratien," 17 Z.ausl.PR. (1953) 227-243, 239 ff. 
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tion as legitimate or illegitimate? 37 The second answer is 
absurd, and, since these laws intend to abolish the category 
of illegitimate children, the solution must be the same as in 
the case of the statute of Arizona which declares all children 
the legitimate offspring of their natural parents. 38 In the 
latter case, indeed, there is no doubt regarding the effects 
in a foreign court. 
B. SCOPE OF THE RULES 
I. Validity of Marriage as Condition 
The first condition for legitimacy by birth is normally a 
valid marriage between the mother and the man alleged to 
be the father. Validity of the marriage, therefore, is a "pre-
liminary question" in examining legitimacy according to the 
law governing lawful birth. But this law does not extend to 
the validity of the marriage. It is universally agreed that 
the law governing the formal and the intrinsic validity of 
marriage according to the rules discussed above in Chap-
ters 7 and 8 are applicable also to this question. Even the 
writers who regularly assign preliminary questions to the law 
governing the principal question agree that marriage is al-
ways, without exception, tested according to its own par-
ticular rule of conflicts. 39 
A remarkable consequence occurs where a foreign mar-
riage is regarded as valid under the main conflicts rule of the 
forum. Children born of such a marriage are considered 
legitimate, even if the personal law of the parents at the time 
of the birth considers the marriage invalid.4° For illustration, 
37 The question has been discussed with reference to legitimation by the 
writers cited infra p. 621, ns. II3, II4. 
as Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §27-4.ox; see comment in Fladung v. Sanford 
(1938) 51 Ariz. 2II, 75 P. (2d) 685; Hazelett v. State (1940) 55 Ariz. 141, 
99 P. (2d) 101. 
39 MELCHIOR 259 § 173; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 148, 206 (with 
different explanations). 
40 WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 148, 214. 
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if two Greeks, being of Orthodox faith and domiciled in 
Greece at the birth of a child, had gone through a temporal 
marriage ceremony in Paris, the marriage, though con-
sidered invalid in Greece, is recognized as valid in most coun-
tries; in the latter countries, the children must, therefore, be 
considered legitimate, provided that they would be so under 
Greek family law if the marriage had been celebrated by a 
Greek Orthodox priest. 
There are complications also on the opposite side of the 
problem. The forum may regard a marriage as invalid either 
in accordance with the law governing marriage, for instance 
because formalities are lacking,41 or despite this law for 
reasons of public policy respecting polygamy, incest, or 
adultery. We might well question the wisdom of holding a 
Chinese marriage of Chinese domiciled persons invalid for 
local purposes as being polygamous; but if we do so, the 
marriage cannot be regarded as valid for the purpose of 
personal relations. Even if the law governing legitimacy 
(for instance the law of the parent's domicil at the time of 
the birth) recognizes such a marriage, the special conflict 
rules on marriage prevail.41a 
The situation is different, of course, where the law govern-
ing the problem of legitimacy accords legitimacy without a 
valid marriage.42 This situation will be considered later.43 
41 A religious ceremony without civil marriage is non-existent in Germany, 
under EG. art. 13 par. 3• Is the father's national law recognizing the mar-
riage applicable to the parental relations? No: OLG. Miinchen (March 10, 
1921) 42 ROLG. 98; Yes: KG. (July 9, 1937) HRR 1937 no. 1446. 
4la Contra numerous cases: 
England: In re Bischoffsheim [1948] Ch. 79, 92 (legitimacy of child gov-
erned by the Ia w of the domicil of his parents at his birth irrespective of the 
original invalidity of their marriage). 
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 25, 1952) 25 SZ. (1952) no. 285, Revue Crit. 1955, 
no {child of consular marriage, invalid in Austria, valid under Bulgarian 
law, legitimate). 
Germany: see infra n. n7. 
42 For this reason only, the criticism by 1 FRANKENSTEIN 236 on the deci-
sion of OLG. Miinchen (supra n. 41) is justified. 
43 See infra pp. 610 ff. 
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2. Presumptions of Legitimacy 
The well-known presumptions for establishing birth in 
lawful wedlock, which form the main body of the municipal 
regulations of legitimacy, are not mere rules of evidence; 
they are substantive law.44 This may safely be alleged with 
respect to any present legislation and seems to be acknowl-
edged almost everywhere. Hence, the law applicable to le-
gitimacy governs the questions at what time, and under what 
circumstances, the presumption of legitimate birth arises, on 
what ground the presumption may be rebutted/5 within what 
period, by whom,46 and against whom, legitimacy may be 
contested or action for a declaratory statement denying 
legitimacy may be brought; what events terminate the right 
to disown the child, whether alleged recognition of paternity 
may be revoked, under what conditions and in what time/7 
and similar problems. In particular, European courts apply 
the provision of a foreign personal law to determine the time 
within which an action for contesting paternity must be 
brought; for instance, an Austrian 48 or a Swiss 49 husband is 
given a period of three months for this action. 
H France: WEISS, 4 Traite 25; LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 375 no. 347 j BATIF-
FOL, 8 Repert. 4I2 no. 52. 
Germany: RAAPE 460 j 4 FRANKENSTEIN 22. 
Quebec: Lefebvre v. Digman (I894) 3 Rev. de Jur. I94 and others; see 
I }OHNSON 339· 
45 E.g., OLG. Miinchen (May I5, 1933) 29 Z.Rechtspflege Bayern (I933) 
278; 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I35 no. 48 (the Austrian law of father allows proof 
of the impossibility of cohabitation, even though he was at the same place as 
the mother). 
46 E.g., Swiss BG. (June zo, I923) 49 BGE. II 317 (children born in Swit-
zerland during the formal existence of their mother's marriage with a Ger-
man are not entitled to contest their legitimacy, according to the German law 
of the time). 
47 One year in Germany (BGB. § 1594 par. I) ; one or two months in 
Louisiana (Rev. Civ. C. Ann. ( 1932) art. I91) ; one month in Turkey (C. C. 
of Feb. I7, 1926, art. 242) ; etc. 
48 Austria: Allg. BGB. § I 58; RG. (Jan. I2, I939) HRR. I939, no. 376 (4) ; 
OLG. Naumburg (Dec. 3, 1936) HRR. I937, no. II46. 
49 Swiss C. C. art. 253; LG. Mainz (June 6, I926) 4I Z.int.R. (1929) 4I5, 
IPRspr. 1929, no. So. See also KG. (Feb. 28, 193I) JW. 1932, 2296, IPRspr. 
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3. Public Policy 
Public policy is not interested in regard to the problems 
just mentioned. 
However, as usual, French courts reserve many provisions 
of their code for imperative application, irrespective of the 
nationality of the parties. This is done, for instance, with 
that French rule, which exists also in Louisiana/0 that a hus-
band is not allowed to disown a child by alleging and proving 
his own impotence; such a source of scandal must be closed, 
the French courts think. 51 
C. CHILDREN OF INVALID MARRIAGES 
(a) United States: general rule. Many statutes in the 
United States legitimize the issue of certain or of all pro-
hibited marriages. 52 Marriage, in this case, is not a condition 
precedent to legitimacy. The comments on these statutory 
provisions have made it perfe_ctly clear that legitimacy is not 
an incident of marriage, but an independent subject. Hence, 
the law of the domicil of the parents, whose relationship to 
the child is in question at the time of birth, determines legiti-
macy or illegitimacy.53 It is the same conflicts rule as though 
the marriage were valid. 
I932, no. 89 (father a national of the former Kingdom of Poland). Trib. civ. 
Bruxelles (April 28, I9IO) Pasicrisie I9IO. III. I95· Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb. 
6, I9I4) Clunet I9I4, 993 (Bavarian, became father in I893). Contra: OLG. 
Frankfurt (Dec. 3-I7, I925) JW. I926, 2858, IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 77· 
SOLa: Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (I932) art. I85. 
51 Even in France: WEiss, 4 Traite 23; PouLLET 460 no. 386. Many French 
decisions deal with the form necessary for foreign documents of birth, see 
]. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 385. 
52 See I VERNIER § 48, 4 VERNIER § 247· 
53 Restatement § I37 and comment. Moore v. Saxton (I9I6) 90 Conn. I64, 
96 At!. 960 (bigamous marriage, birth in California); Green v. Kelley (I9I7) 
228 Mass. 6o2, uS N. E. 235 (bigamy); Harding v. Townsend (I932) 280 
Mass. 256, I82 N. E. 369 (bigamy); apart from the special rules of New 
York (discussed belo·w on p. 612) exceptions for public policy are rare; see 
Greenhaw et a!. v. James, Executor (I885) So Va. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 603 
(miscegenous marriage). 
As to polygamy see TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 594, 7II supra 
n. I. 
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Sometimes this conflicts solution has been explained as 
due to the policy of favoring the innocent issue,64 which 
naturally forms the reason of the statutory provisions. This 
is an erroneous transplantation of social purposes from the 
substantive law into international private law. The law of 
the domicil of the parents applicable under our rule may be 
decidedly more favorable to the child than the law govern-
ing the marriage. 
(b) England. The rule is the same in England with the 
exception that the House of Lords' decision in Shaw v. 
Gould 55 has disturbed the problem in the case where a child 
is born to a marriage not recognized in England, because a 
previous divorce of one parent is not recognized there. In 
the case mentioned, the child was declared illegitimate, al-
though the father was domiciled in Scotland at the time of 
the birth and Scotch law had no objection to legitimacy. This 
decision has been sharply disapproved by recent English 
writers. In their opinion, the court should have recognized 
the legitimacy of the children under Scotch law, while ap-
propriately refusing to recognize the validity of the mar-
riage. Cheshire 56 suggests that the case should be overruled, 
while Foster 57 thinks a statutory enactment is necessary. 
Against this criticism, American writers have emphasized 
the interest of the English law in the matter because of the 
English domicil of the mother. 58 But under English as well 
as generally under Continental conflicts rules, the child's 
relations to both parents are governed by the personal law 
of the father alone, that of the mother being entirely 
immaterial. 
H Cf. cases cited by TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 595, 697, supra 
n. I. 
55 In re Wilson's Trusts, Shaw v. Gould (I86s) L. R. I Eq. 247, aff'd I868 
L. R. 3 H. L. 55· 
56 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 387. 
57 FOSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (I935) 84, 89. 
58 2 BEALE 706; TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 6oo, supra n. I. 
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Also, New York courts have declined to recognize legiti-
macy under similar circumstances, viz., when, according to 
the New York "special rule," a foreign divorce and, in conse-
quence thereof, a remarriage was invalid and the child was 
born during the second marriage. 59 This evidently must be 
taken as a part of the general policy of New York courts 
against marriages that are "polygamous, incestuous, or pro-
hibited by law," 60 the New York courts resolving for them-
selves what marriages are to be so qualified. In the leading 
case, Olmsted v. Olmsted, the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided that by such an attitude the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause was not violated,61 but it remains uncertain 
whether the independence of state doctrines would likewise 
be maintained in cases other than those where inheritance of 
real estate or a remainder under a will is at issue and only 
immovables in the state are involved.62 However this may 
be, the peculiar policy of the courts of New York has been 
severely and convincingly criticized, in particular with re-
spect to a repetition of the doctrine in the Bruington case of 
19 3 6 63 after the legislature of New York had begun to fol-
low the trend of courts and statutes benevolent to children.64 
(c) Germany. The prevailing American rule has its exact 
counterpart in the German practice.65 The national law of 
59 Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N. Y. 458, 467, 83 N. E. 569, 571, aff'd 
216 U. S. 386, see infra n. 61 (bigamous subsequent marriage with following 
divorce from first wife); In re Thomann's Estate (1932) 144 N.Y. Misc. 497, 
258 N. Y. Supp. 838 (divorce not recognized in New York for lack of per-
sonal service, remarriage in Russia). 
60 See In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N.Y. Misc. 34 at 37, 289 N. Y. 
Supp. 725 at 729 (children of bigamous marriage). 
61 ( 1910) 216 u. s. 386. 
62 See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 691, 692, supra n. 1. 
63 Supra n. 6o. 
64 Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049, 1054; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. 
( 1940) at 710, supra n. 1, 
65 RG. (Nov. n, 1937) JW. 1938, 108; KG. (Dec. 9, 1921) 42 ROLG. 97; 
KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83; KG. (July 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 
2526, Clunet 1938, 341. 
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the pseudo-husband is applied in determining legitimacy, 
whether this law acknowledges legitimacy irrespective of the 
good faith of the parties 66 or conditionally upon the good 
faith of one party (putative marriage) .61 The Reichsgericht 
has expressly rejected the theory that the law governing the 
nullity of the marriage should determine also whether or 
not the children are to be considered legitimate. 58 
(d) Other countries. The policy practiced in other coun-
tries probably runs along similar lines. French writers, it is 
true, advocate again the exclusion of children born in adul-
tery, from any recognized legitimacy,69 but even this restric-
tion is not certain.70 
Ill. LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE 
An old institution of civil law but unknown to the British 
common law and expressly rejected by the Statute of Merton, 
legitimation by the marriage of the child's natural parents, 
has been introduced by statute in all but three jurisdictions 
in this country,11 in all of the common law provinces of 
Canada during 1920 to 1928,72 and in England by the 
Legitimacy Act, 1926.73 
An important difference exists on the question whether in 
addition to the marriage some recognition of the child is re-
quired. This requirement, in contrast to the German tradi-
66 E.g., Swiss C. C. art. I33· 
67 E.g., French C. C. arts. 201, 202; Ita!. C. C. (1865) art. II6, C. C. 
( 1942) art. 128; German BGB. § 1699. 
68 RG. (Nov. II, I937) JW. 1938, 108 rejecting RAAPE 499· 
69 See especially LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE 377 no. 348. 
7° Compare the practice whereby the spouse in good faith and his or her 
children of the bigamous marriage enjoy the benefit of putative marriage. 
See supra pp. 587-593 and particularly Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Nouv. 
Revue 1938, 353· 
71 4 VERNIER § 243· 
72 I JoHNSON 344 n. I; for Ontario see Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, II 
Geo. V, c. 53, as amended 1927, Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. 187 s. I, same in Rev. 
Stat. Ontario 1950, c. 203. 
73 16 & I7 Geo. V, c. 6o. 
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tion, exists in the Latin systems and in almost half of the 
American statutes, a fact regretted by Vernier 74 as incon-
sistent with the purpose to improve the status of children 
born out of wedlock. It ensues from this system that a child 
may be considered legitimate only in relation to one parent. 
Moreover, the French system takes into account which 
parent is first to recognize the child. 
A. RULES 
1. Decisive Time 
English courts, starting from the thesis that legitimacy is 
determined by the law of the child's domicil of origin, viz., 
his father's domicil at the time of his birth, regarded it es· 
sential that this law recognize the possibility of legitimation 
by a later marriage.75 This artificial theory, already rejected 
by Savigny/6 has been eradicated in England by the Legiti· 
macy Act of 1926 77 but has nevertheless been adopted as a 
common law rule by Beale 78 and the Restatement.79 The 
ancient basis for this rule, namely, that birth may give the 
child a certain faculty to be legitimized,80 appears in the 
older English doctrine and also in Beale's theory in the form 
of a supposed logical necessity that the child must have a 
"potential legitimacy" by the law of the father's domicil. 
Probably no American decision of actual importance reflects 
this preconceived idea.81 However, under the circumstances, 
74 4 VERNIER § 243• 
75 In re Wright's Trusts (I856) 2 K. & J. 595, 6o4; In re Goodman's Trusts 
(1881) 17 Ch. D. 266; In re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. D. 637; In re Grove, 
Vaucher v. Treasury Solicitor (I888) 40 Ch. D. 216. For history and criti-
cism see MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 
57 Law Q. Rev. (1941) n2, II5-122. 
76 SAVIGNY 338 § 380, tr. by GUTHRIE 302. 
77 Legitimacy Act, I926 §I (1) for English and § 8 (I) for foreign domi-
ciliaries. 
78 2 BEALE 706-709 §§ 139.1 and 139.2. 
79 Restatement § I37· 
8° C/. SCHAEFFNER, Entwickelung des Internationalen Privatrechts (Frank-
furt, 184I) 49 § 37, tr. in GuTHRIE's translation of SAVIGNY 308. 
81 See cases in 73 A. L. R. 941, 952 ff. and cf. MINOR 216 ff.; Notes, 20 Harv. 
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Scott, L. J ., in In re Luck ( 1940), 82 was justified in thinking 
the theory to be connected with the American law, although 
eliminated from the English. He stated: 
"The very idea of attributing to a newly-born child, to a 
filius nullius, a sort of latent capacity for legitimation at the 
hands of the natural father to whom he is denied any legal 
relation, seems to me an even more absurd legal fiction and 
even less convincing than that mythical contract of marriage 
supposed by the canonists to have been entered into at the 
moment of procreation." 
In England,83 as well as in the United States,84 it has be-
come perfectly certain that, in the case of a subsequent mar-
riage, the time when the child was born is of no importance. 
Also in other legislations, although some provisions con-
tain obscure elements,85 as a rule the applicable law is simply 
that of the time of legitimation. In some texts, this is empha-
sized with the express statement that the status of the parent 
at the time of the conception and of the birth are imma-
terial.86 Such a statement corresponds in the broader field of 
legitimacy in general with the idea that legitimacy is acquired 
or denied by the law of the time when it originates, whether 
by birth or by marriage or by decree or "any other cause," as 
is the formula of the recent Finnish law.87 
We may take 'it that where, under the legislation thus 
governing, an act of legitimation is void, it cannot be helped 
L. Rev. (1907) 400; 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1051 n. 15; also STUMBI!RG 333-
334, although he surprisingly acknowledges the "logic of the English point 
of view"; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 619, 62o, 628, supra n. 1. 82 /n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 864, 912. 
83Jn re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. D. 259· 84 Stack v. Stack (1887) 6 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.) 280, 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 416; 
Dayton v. Adkisson ( 1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 603, 17 Atl. 964; De Wolf v. Mid-
dleton (1893) 18 R.I. 810, 31 Atl. 271; cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049, 
1051 n. 15. 85 Especially art. 315 (new 349) of the Argentine Civil Code is defectively 
drafted. 
86 E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. 315 (new 349). 
Portugal: Law for the Protection of Children of Dec. 25, 1910, art. 2. 87 Finland: Law of 1929, § 22; cf. Poland: Law of 1926, § 22. 
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by later events. This is also the general proposition of the 
American cases.88 The status created at the time of a subse-
quent marriage (or any other act of legitimation) is per-
manent. 
Adequate application of this principle to the legislations 
of the French system (where a formal acknowledgment of 
paternity or maternity is an essential part of legitimation by 
subsequent marriage) depends upon the question whether 
recognition is allowed after the marriage. In the older style 
of these enactments, the recognition had to take place before 
or as part of the act of celebrating the marriage,89 so that 
the status was fixed at the moment of the marriage. 90 Now 
the French and some other municipal laws permit recognition 
of paternity or maternity after a subsequent marriage, 91 and 
either postpone the effect of legitimation until the later 
event 92 or make it retroactive to the time of marriage.93 It 
may well be concluded that the decisive moment for the 
choice of law also is deferred to the time of recognition. The 
personal law of this later moment decides on the question of 
retroactivity. Such a view might be suitable also to this 
country, where in many jurisdictions acknowledgment must 
be added to a subsequent marriage in order to complete 
legitimation and is generally permitted after the marriage.94 
BB Smith v. Kelly (I85I) 23 Miss. I67 (subsequent marriage during domicil 
in South Carolina does not legitimate an issue previously born; the later 
domicil of the family in Mississippi was of no avail). For the general rule 
see In re Presley's Estate ( I925) 113 Okla. I6o, I64, 240 Pac. 89, 93; 
TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 6I7, supra p. 597, n. I, and infra p. 630, 
n. I69. 
89 Code Napoleon art. 331, widely copied. 
9o WErss, 4 Traite 90. 
9 1 Spain: C. C. art. I2I; France: C. C. art. 33 I as amended by Laws of 
Dec. 30, 19I5 and of April 25, I924. 
92 Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 283, "or from the day of a recognition posterior 
to the (subsequent) marriage." 
93 Spain: C. C. art. I23. The preliminary draft of the Italian Civil Code 
( I930) art. 320 followed this rule; cf. Relazione sui progetto ( I931) 167. 
94 In the case of Smith v. Kelly, supra n. 88, af 170, the father would have 
been able, according to the said view, to add to fhe ineffective South Caro-
linian marriage an acknowledgment in Mississippi. 
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Such a supplement to a previous act of legitimation may 
likewise be accomplished in the case when the parent has ac-
quired a new personal law. The provisions of this new law 
determine the decision without regard to any former per-
sonal law. Suppose the parents have married after the birth 
of the child, when they were domiciliaries or nationals of a 
country whose law does not know legitimation by marriage. 
If they change their personal status afterward and their 
new personal law allows legitimation and considers a be-
lated recognition sufficient, such recognition can be effected 
accordingly. 95 
2. Contacts: Usual Rules 
(a) Law of Domicil. The law of the domicil of the 
parents at the time of marriage governs legitimation by sub-
sequent marriage in England and in the United States. It is 
quite possible that a child, in view of its illegitimacy, has a 
separate domicil at that time, but this does not count.96 
Analogous rules obtain in Argentina, 97 Switzerland (with 
respect to foreign legitimations by foreigners) ,98 and the 
other countries following the domiciliary principles.99 
95 See RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 405, 441. Similarly, a Swiss court has 
held that a marriage which had no legitimizing effect under the law of the 
originally Italian husband would gain that effect after the husband acquired 
Swiss nationality, Appellationshof Bern (Sept. 3, 1951) 9 Schwz. Jahrb. 
(1952) 247· 
96 Restatement § 140, comment b adds, it is true, a caveat that the law of 
the child's domicil might be sufficient to grant legitimation; but the basis for 
this allegation is not apparent. 
97 Argentina: C. C. arts. 313-315 (new 347-349), very difficult to under-
stand. ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 330, calls these articles manifestly 
contradictory; Vrco does not attempt any comment. Such an attempt was 
risked by the Berlin KG. (Feb. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 96. 
98 Switzerland, NAG. art. 28. In the case of a husband of Swiss nation-
ality, the application of Swiss law is provided by the Federal Constitution, 
art. 54· See BuRcKHARDT, Kommentar der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung 
513 ff.; BEcK, NAG. 246 no. 106. 
99 Denmark: BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 53; BORUM 127. 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 126. 
Uruguay: Ap. Montevideo (April 27, 1910) Clunet 1914, 674. 
Brazil: Introductory Law ( 1942) art. 7, apparently covering the problem. 
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(b) Law of Nationality. The national law of the father 
at the time of marriage or recognition governs the problem 
under most European conflicts laws/00 
3· Personal Law of the Child 
Under some of the more recent conflicts legislations, how· 
ever, the personal law of the child is observed in determining 
the question whether legitimation requires certain conditions 
to be fulfilled in the person of the child, such as consent by 
the child or its guardian.101 
Occasionally the national law of the child has been claimed 
to govern legitimation as a whole.102 This opinion has been 
generally rejected, however.103 The contrary view prevails 
100 Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § I3 par. I. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, 462, PouLLET 465 
no. 395· 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 29. 
Finland: Law of I929, § 22. 
France: prevailing opinion, see PILLET, I Traite 644 no. 313· SuR VILLE 459 
no. 313; NIBOYET 770 no. 65I (2). BATIFFOL, Traite 532. 
Germany: EG. art. n par. I. 
Greece: C. C. ( I940) art. 22. 
Guatemala: see MATOS no. 274 (except where the child is not under pa· 
rental power) but, under the actual laws, it would be more consistent to apply 
the domiciliary test. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I8. 
Poland: Law of I926, art. 22. 
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 3I. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 8; where the marriage is celebrated in Switzer· 
land, see BG. (May 3I, 19I9) 45 BGE. I I 55, 163; BG. (Jan. 28 and May 20, 
1914) 40 BGE. II 295, 302. BECK, NAG. 171 no. 64. If the father is a Ger· 
man or an Italian, authorization by the court is needed, Just. Dept., Bundes· 
blatt 1941, II03 no. 8, II04 no. 9· 
101 GEBHARD, Draft I ( 1881) § 22, Gebhardsche Materialien 7· 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 3 x. 
China: Law of 1918, art. 13. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18. 
C6digo Bustamante art. 6o, but see infra n. 109. Cf. BAR § 102, n. 4· How· 
ever, what conditions of such kind are provided for in actual legislations? 
RAAPE 559 deals with the requisite of consent by a child of full age. 
102 In France a few decisions about 1926-1927 were to this effect· also 
BARTIN in 9 AuBRY et RAu § 546, 81, n. 8 ter,· see also for the Netheriands, 
MULDER 121-124. 
108 For France, see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. 14; J. DONNED!EU 
DE YABRES 497• 
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for the good reasons that legitimation is an effect of mar-
riage, that one law should govern the family as a unit, and 
that the child's entrance into this family should not be pre-
scribed by another legislation. The English Act of 19.26 
refers distinctly to the law of the father's domicil, because 
otherwise a domiciled Englishman could be burdened with a 
child legitimized abroad.104 It is equally certain in the United 
States that neither the law of the domicil of the child nor 
that of the mother controls any acts of legitimation by the 
father.105 Moreover, if the child's own law is adverse to the 
legitimizing effect of marriage, the child should not suffer 
therefor .106 
In a third opinion, the law of both parent and child must 
concur for every requisite in allowing legitimation.107 As 
usual, such a doctrinary cumulation of laws is a very incon-
venient solution. 
4· Rules on Effects of Legitimation 
Most of the rules mentioned determine both the act of 
legitimation and the effect of this act. In some codifications, 
however, special rules have been provided with respect to 
the effects of legitimation.108 The C6digo Bustamante, in 
particular, states that: 
104 See Note, 7 Cambr. L. J. (I94I) 405. 
105 Blythe v. Ayres (I892) 96 Cal. 532, 572, 3I Pac. 9I5i In re Presley's 
Estate ( I925) II3 Okla. I6o, 240 Pac. 89. 
106 PILLET, I Traite 647 no. 3I5i POULLET (ed. 2) 5I4 no. 395; Nouvelles 
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 620 no. 59I; RAAPE 55I (b), 558 (b); Trib. civ. Seine 
(Dec. ZI, I916) Clunet I9I7, I4I9; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, 1857) D.I857.1.423, 
s.1858.I.294. 
107 France: Isolated decisions. 
Italy: DrENA, 2 Prine. I8g. 
The Netherlands: KOSTERS sso; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. zoo. C6digo 
Bustamante art. 6o in fine. 
Brazil (under the former law): BEVILAQUA, I C6digo Civil (ed. 6, 1940) 
Introd. art. 8 no. IS. 
108 Japan: Law of I898, art. 18 par. 2. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. I3 par. 2. 
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"The effects of legitimation and the action for contesting a 
legitimation are governed by the personal law of the 
child." 109 
It seems that this rule is destined in the first place to take 
care of the case where the legitimated person has retained 
his separate nationality and under his national law becomes 
of full age earlier than under that of the parent,110 but the 
fact that by such an event parental power is terminated rests 
upon the nationality law and upon the law of status and is 
not an incident of the parent-child relation. 
5· Renvoi 
As is their wont, French and German courts apply 
renvoi,111 and English courts follow in applying any law that 
is applied at the domicil of the parent. It was in fact a case 
of legitimation that gave rise to the celebrated judgment 
upon renvoi of Lord Maugham in In reA skew.112 
6. Soviet Russia and Other Socialist Countries 
The problem offered by the Soviet Russian and other 
socialist laws and those American statutes which make no 
distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy has been 
more discussed in connection with the subject of legitimation 
109 Art. 62. 
11o See BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 74· 
111 France: Cour Paris (March 23, 1888) 8.1888.2.131, Clunet 1889, 638 
(Irishman); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 21, 1916) Clunet 1917, 1419 (Englishman 
from Mauritius); Trib. civ. Saint-Brieue (June 26, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951, 
520. 
Germany: K.G. (Nov. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 88; and in the same case, 
KG. (Feb. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no 96 (marriage of an Argentinian dom-
iciled in Florida, law of Florida applied); LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 10, 1932) 
]W. 1933, 193 (Englishman if domiciled in the Netherlands, Dutch law 
applied). 
Italy: a decision of App. Firen2e (Jan. 23, 1919) 12 Rivista (1918) 288, 
against the current Italian doctrine. 
112 In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Clunet 1931, 175, followed in Collins v. 
Att. Gen. [1931] 47 T. L. R. 484, 145 L. T. 551. Cf. 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 62o. 
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than with that of legitimate birth. A German court has held 
that the child of a Russian who married the German mother 
after the birth was illegitimate, because the Russian law d~es 
not know legitimation.113 However, as the Russian law does 
not discriminate and as under German law the child who 
was, before the marriage, an illegitimate relative of the 
mother, would become by the marriage a fully recognized 
child of both parents, legitimacy agrees with the spirit of 
both legislations involved.114 An analogous view is certainly 
appropriate in this country where the parents of a previously 
born child marry in Arizona.115 
B. SCOPE 
r. Validity of the Marriage 
Conforming to principles mentioned before, the validity 
of the marriage is to be determined under the ordinary rules 
concerning the formalities, on one hand, and the intrinsic 
validity of marriage, on the other. 
Illustration: The parents, Frenchmen, having lived in 
concubinage in France, went to New York and continued 
there to live together. French courts made the recognition 
of the marriage dependent upon the question whether their 
relation had assumed at some time the character of a com-
mon law marriage under New York law, and this is pertinent 
also to legitimation.116 
There is, however, a tendency to regard the subsequent 
marriage as valid if it is valid under the law governing the 
legitimation.117 
113 St.AZ. 1930, 44, cited with apparent approval by NussBAUM, IPR. 172 
n. 6. 
114 This solution was foreseen by RAAPE 568, 569; and RAAPE, so Recueil 
1934 IV at sos. 
11s See supra n. 3 8. 
116 See the case of Trib. civ. Havre (Feb. 14, 1907) and App. Rauen (Feb. 
z6, 1908) Clunet 1909, 1057; the question was left open only because the 
recognition of maternity was missing in any case. 
117 Germany: LG. Koln (Feb. zo, 1953) MDR. 1953, 488, Revue Crit. 1955, 
no; LEWALD 130. Contra: RAAPE, IPR. 357· 
Other cases, see supra n. 41 a. 
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2. Conditions and Effects of Legitimation 
Where the marriage is valid under all laws concerned, the 
conflicts rule is applicable to the questions : 
(i) Whether legitimation follows from the marriage al-
ways, or never, or not for the issue from adulterous or in-
cestuous cohabitations, 118 or only for certain privileged 
classes of children. 
Whether legitimation is invalid where it is proved that 
the child has not actually been begotten by the husband or 
borne by the wife of the marriage; 
Whether consent of the child is required,119 etcetera. 
( ii) Regarding the acts sometimes required in addition to 
the marriage ceremony, particularly the formal acknowledg-
ment of paternity or maternity as required by the French 
Civil Code, art. 33 I, and its many followers. 120 This pro-
vision has been applied by the French courts as an incident 
of the personal law to Frenchmen at the forum and 
abroad.121 Likewise, where the man is of Bulgarian national-
ity, a court in Germany (where no such requisites exist) 
requires recognition by both parents according to the Bul-
garian provision.122 Conversely, where foreigners marry in 
the Netherlands, the Dutch requisite of recognition is re-
leased in favor of the national law not requiring recog-
nition.123 
Since in the new text of the French Civil Code, art. 23 I, 
postnuptial recognition is allowed but must be effectuated by 
118 France, England, Italy, the Netherlands, etc. 
119 Chile: C. C. art. 210 (adult child); art. 211 (child with tutor or cura-
tor). 
120 La. Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (1932) art. 198. Belgium: C. C. art. 331, cf. 
342(b). The Netherlands: B. W. art. 327. 
121 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 20, 1879) S.1879.I.417; Cass. (civ.) (April 20, 1885) 
D.1886.1.23; Cass. (req.) (July 8, 1886) Clunet 1886, 585. 
122 KG. (Nov. 29, 1929) HRR. 1930, no. 882, IPRspr. 1930, no. 85 (on the 
ground that the Bulgarian provision requiring recognition is not meant for 
evidence of the procreation only). 
123 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 201. 
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court proceedings, this requirement, too, is to be considered 
a part of the substantive personal law 124 rather than a 
formality with territorial effect.125 
(iii) Respecting the effect attached to legitimation: 
Whether legitimation is effective from the time of mar-
riage or retroactively from the birth or from the date of 
recognition (Anglo-Canadian laws, for instance, prefer the 
effect from birth) ; 126 
Whether already existing children born in wedlock retain 
rights of "primogeniture"; 127 
Whether rights normally included in legitimacy are de-
nied; 128 
Whether in particular the child receives the name of the 
father.129 
3· Invalid Subsequent Marriage 
A delicate question arises, if the subsequent marriage is 
considered invalid at the forum; under what law should we 
determine whether, nevertheless, the child is legitimized? 
Express municipal provisions are made in the German and 
Swiss Civil Codes/80 whereby the rules of putative marriage 
should be applied by analogy. Such an analogy is convenient 
also in the field of the law of conflicts. In the same way that 
124 BATIFFOL; 8 Repert. 424 no. 124; a strange case of application: Trib. civ. 
Rochelle (May 29, 1934) Clunet 1935, 370. 
125 SURVILLE, Clunet 1916, 769, 780. 
126 See Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, II Geo. V, c. 53, as amended I927, 
Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. r87 s. I, also in Rev. Stat. Ontario I950, c. 203 and r 
JOHNSON 344 n. I. The time of the marriage is maintained as date of effec-
tiveness of the legitimation in Quebec, C. C. art. 239· 
127 Cf. Austrian Allg. BGB. § I6I. 
128 Germany: cf. Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 192I) 42 ROLG. 105 (Czecho-
slovakian decree of legitimation withholding rights of inheritance). 
129 See E. H. PERROUD, Clunet 19II, 503; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I6I n. 40. 
130 BGB. § I72I; Switzerland: EGGER, 2 Kommentar zum Schweizerischen 
Zivilgesetzbuch art. 258 (I) (b). In France, the same solution obtains, 
PLANIOL-RIPERT-BOULANGER, I Traite e)ementaire de droit civil ( ed. 5, I950) 
385 no. rosi. 
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the personal law of the parent at the time of the marriage 
determines whether legitimacy is dependent or not upon a 
valid marriage, the law governing legitimation by subsequent 
marriage should determine also the effect of an invalid subse-
quent marriage.131 
In the United States it has been contended, however, that 
where the marriage was void no effect could be recognized 
with respect to the children.132 As a matter of fact, the stat-
utes conferring legitimacy on children, irrespective of the 
intrinsic validity of the marriage, have overlooked the case 
of a subsequent marriage, but it may be asked whether courts 
should not grant analogous application 133 by virtue of the 
liberal construction generally given these beneficial statutes. 
Were this done by the domiciliary law, no other jurisdiction 
would have any reason to refuse recognition. 
The inverse case that the marriage is considered invalid 
under the personal law but valid under the internal rules, 
has been discussed in Germany; the father's personal law 
was said to determine the parent-child relationship in this 
case also.134 
4· Acquisition of Nationality 
Nationality of the parent is regularly transferred by legiti-
mation to the child in the Continental European laws. This 
raises peculiar problems, particularly in France.135 English 
law excluded until 1948 this acquisition of nationality.136 
131 In this sense also 4 FRANKENSTEIN 153 (d), while RAAPE 570 follows 
his theory referred to, supra p. 613, n. 68. 
132 2 BEALE 708 n. 5· The decision in the Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4 
U. D. Dist. Haw. 568, cited by BEALE, does not seem to support this view, but 
it has been expressed in Adams v. Adams ( 1891) 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260 
even with respect to the liberal California legislation. 
133 Cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049, 1051 n. 16. 
134 RAAPE, JW. 1934, 2951; same in 50 Recueil 1934 IV 405, 487 no. 63 
against other opinions. 
135 Code de Ia nation a lite (I 945) art. 34· 
136 The rule of Abraham v. Att. Gen. [1934] P. 17 was changed by the 
British Nationality Act, 1948, s. 23. 
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5· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Forum 
Much thought has been given to those municipal provi-
sions which prevent legitimation of the children conceived 
or born in polygamous, incestuous, or bigamous relations. 
There is no such provision in most American jurisdiction~ nor 
in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, nor Switzerland. 
The Venezuelan Civil Code expressly permits legitimation 
by subsequent marriage even though the parents were in-
capable of marrying at the time of the conception.131 The 
former text was similar, but it prohibited the recognition of 
children born to such marriages.138 Yet British and French 
influence has prompted a great number of provisions against 
such a legitimation. Recent French reforms modifying the 
famous article 335 of the Code N apoltfon brought only 
partial relie£.139 
(a) United States. The courts of New York persist in 
their general policy of outlawing the children of "pro-
hibited" marriages.140 In the other states, the weight of au-
thority recognizes the domiciliary law without objection 
stemming from an opposed local policy.141 
(b) England. According to the British Legitimacy Act 
of 1926, the offspring of an adulterous union cannot be legiti-
137 Venezuela, C. C. ( 1942) art. 227 par. 2. 
138 Venezuela, C. C. (1922) art. 248 par. 2, cf. art. 233. 
139 Amended by Law of Dec. 30, 1915; cf. Ital. C. C. (1942) arts. 251, 281. 
140 See Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, aff'd 216 
U. S. 386 and In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N. Y. Misc. 34, 289 N. Y. 
Supp. 725, cited supra notes 59 and 6o respectively. 
141 Mund v. Rehaume (1911) 51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159 (near relation-
ship); Moore v. Saxton (1916) 90 Conn. 164. 96 Atl. 96o (bigamy); Succes-
sion of Caballero (1872) 24 La. Ann. 572 (miscegenation); Green v. Kelley 
(1917) 228 Mass. 6o2, 118 N. E. 235 (bigamy); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 
Commissioner of Immigration (1927) 21 F. (2d) 801 (polygamy); see also 
Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore ( 1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 
Atl. 497 at 499· The case of Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4 U. S. Dist. Haw. 
568, where recognition of children of a Chinese marriage was withheld, has 
been called unfortunate and unsound, Note, 31 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1917) 892. See 
also McNamara v. McNamara (1922) 303 Ill. 191, 135 N. E. 410 (legitima-
tion by conduct). 
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mated when the parents are domiciled in England, but no 
such express clause has been added in section 8 ( 1) dealing 
with marriages celebrated while the spouses are domiciled 
abroad. By reasonable interpretation, it has been held that a 
child born of a father with a foreign domicil is legitimated 
according to the domiciliary law without interference by 
English public policy.142 
(c) Continent. Similarly, legitimation is recognized in 
France when foreign nationals marry abroad/48 except in 
the case where the parents, both formerly French, have 
abandoned their nationality for the purpose of evading the 
French provision against legitimation of adulterines.144 
However, the problem has been much discussed,145 and an 
increasingly nationalistic attitude of the Court of Cassation 
has made from what is left of article 335 of the Civil Code, 
after repeated modifications, a rule of ((ordre public inter-
national." 146 This possibly means that adulterine children 
142 In re CoJiins v. Att. Gen. [I93I] 47 T. L. R. 486, I45 L. T. 55 I. 
CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 39I n. 2, raising a formalistic doubt, is too much impressed 
by the opinion of a Chancery official. 
143 Cour Paris (Aug. 2, I866) S.I866.2.342; Cour Paris (July 2, I926) 
Clunet I927, 77· Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, II54· 
144 Cour Paris (July I6, I902) Clunet I903, 392 (French parties had be-
come Swiss citizens). 
145 On the different opinions and the stages of development of the cases see 
WEiss, 4 Traite 94; VALERY 1147 no. I. 8o8; NIBOYET 77I no. 652; LERE-
BOURs-PIGEONNIERE 373 no. 348; BARTIN, 2 Principes 359 § 324 (critical); 
Notes to Cass. (civ.) (March 3I, I930) by SAVATIER, D.1930.1.II3 and BATIF-
FOL, 8 Repert. 425 nos. I34 ff. and Revue Crit. I934, 6I5. 
1
.W Cass. (civ.) (March 3I, I930) D.I930.I.II3 at u8, S.I93I.1.9 and ibid. 
at I77, Case Note by GENY; Clunet I930, 650, Revue Crit. I934, 615 (a 
Russian, Reweliotty, married and being father of children by this marriage, 
had an illegitimate child in France by one Struve, whom he married after 
having been divorced from his first wife. Both parents had acknowledged the 
child. The Czarist law admitted legitimacy, and the Soviet Russian law ig-
nores any qualifications of children. The Appeal Court refused recognition 
for the double reason that the child, being of French nationality, was subject 
to French law. LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 2) 4I2 no. I, and 4I5 n. I stresses 
the point that the Supreme Court did not disapprove of the second ground, 
although it did not examine it. Similar in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles 
(March 27, I930) Pasicrisie I930.3.I73 and Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. I3, 1930), 
both in Revue I933, 358, even for the case where recognition was made 
abroad, on the worn authority of 5 LAURENT 554 no. 266. 
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cannot be legitimated where any one of the three persons in-
volved is of French nationality or a part of the facts hap-
pened in France. The courts are apprehensive that the people 
may become accustomed to polygamy I 
Where all three persons are of foreign nationality, how-
ever, the objection of public policy is unlikely to be raised 
in a European court.147 But renvoi may have an influenGe on 
these considerations. For instance, where an Englishman was 
domiciled and married in the Nether lands, a German court, 
by renvoi from the national English law, applied Dutch law 
in determining that the premarital issue was not legitimized 
because born in adultery.148 
Also on the grounds of public policy, the Appeal Court of 
Hamburg 149 refused to recognize a legitimation valid under 
Dutch law, where an unmarried woman of German national-
ity, mother of a German child, married a Dutchman and both 
parties recognized the child as their own. The German 
courts, like those of some American jurisdictions, 150 regard 
as necessary for legitimation that the man marrying the 
mother shall in fact be the father. The Court extended this 
requirement to the foreign legitimation of a German child, 
on the ground that, if the child is not actually an offspring of 
the married couple, its interest ought to be protected as is 
done through the other form of legitimation, viz., in the 
course of legitimation by state authority. This reasoning re-
sults, however, in creating a double status of the child as 
legitimate abroad and illegitimate at the forum/ 51 and should 
not be followed in the jurisdictions mentioned above. 
147 Cf. KOSTERS 538, 554-
148 LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 10, 1932) JW. 1933, 193, IPRspr. 1933, no. 51. 
149 OLG. Hamburg (Aug. 16, 1935) Hans. RGZ. 1935, B 495 no. 135. 
tso Pike v. Standage (1919) 187 Iowa 1152, 175 N. W. 12; Helm v. Goin 
(1929) 227 Ky. 773 at 778, 14 S. W. (2d) 183; Eichorn v. Zedaker (1924) 
109 Ohio St. 609, 144 N. E. 258; Harper v. Harper (1932) 159 Va. 210, 165 
S. E. 490; Mooney v. Mooney (1912) 244 Mo. 372, 148 S. W. 896. 
151 Cf. EcKSTEIN and LORENZ, notes to the decision in 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
no. 132. 
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6. Permissive Public Policy of the Forum 
Occasionally, the father's law prohibiting legitimation has 
been disregarded for reasons of a benevolent local policy.152 
French courts affirmed the effect of legitimation under 
French law where an Englishman married a French woman, 
although legitimation was not yet recognized by English 
law.153 This may be the right decision, provided the couple is 
domiciled in France.154 
7· Law of Situs 
The famous English case of Birtwhistle v. V ardill 155 has 
retained authority, inasmuch as a state where land is situ-
ated may require birth in lawful wedlock for the capacity of 
inheriting land, although in other respects foreign legitima-
tion by subsequent marriage is recognized, and certainly in 
England it has been recognized in all respects by the law of 
1926.156 Very few American cases have followed this doc-
trine/57 more suitable, indeed, to old feudal institutions. 
152 LG. Frankfurt am Main (Dec. 6, I953) 20 Z.ausi.PR. (I955) 34I (criti-
cal note by NEUHAUS); LG. Karlsruhe (May I5 1 I952) IPRspr. I952-53 no. 
I95a; RAAPE 562(a), 563, in the case of a Belgian domiciled in Germany 
who in adultery had a child by a German woman, later married the mother 
of the child in Germany. 
153 Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, I857) S.I858.1.293 (sounding as though French 
law were always applicable); Cour Bourges (May 26, I858) S.1858.2.532, 
D.I858.2.178; App. Rouen (Jan. 5, I887) Clunet I887, I83; Cour Paris 
(March 23, 1888) Clunet I889, 638, approved by VALERY II48 no. II 8oz; 
but disapproved by most writers, see WEISS, 4 Traite 96 ff.; DESPAGNET 838 
no. 277; SURVILLE 46I no. 3I3. 
154 NmoYET 734 no. 625 II, but contra 5 Traite 490. 
155 (1826) 5 Barn. & C. 438; (1835) 2 Cl. & F. 571; (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 895· 
156 See FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Characterization," 15 Can. Bar 
Rev. (I937) 2I5 at 242 (giving information on the Canadian legislation). 
157 Alabama: Lingen v. Lingen ( I871) 45 Ala. 4I0 (no recognition of any 
status created by foreign legitimation); Florida: Statutes (I941) § 73I.23 (7); 
Williams v. Kimball ( 1895) 35 Fla. 49, 16 So; 783; Pennsylvania: 48 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) § I67 (Act of May I41 I857, P. L. 507, §I); 
Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs (1859) 34 Pa. 126. Contra: see Note, 46 Yale L. ]. 
(I937) I049 and cf. on the cases TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 7I5, 
supra n. I. 
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IV. LEGITIMATION BY OTHER AcTs 
"Legitimatio per rescriptum principis," by which the em-
peror in the Roman imperial epoch elevated a child to the 
status of legitimacy, has been preserved in numerous civil 
law countries. The state's chief acted on the instance of the 
father, or of both parents, or upon the father's wish ex-
pressed in a will.158 In some countries, the legislature 159 or 
the monarch or state president was replaced by courts.160 
This method has been followed in a few common law juris-
dictions of the United States.161 
Moreover, kgitimation may be effected by parental ac-
knowledgment or by conduct of public repute, so as to place 
the child upon the footing of a legitimate child. Thus, in 
eight states of the Union by oral or written, and in Michi-
gan, by written acknowledgment,162 legitimation is performed 
for all intents and purposes.163 We are not dealing now with 
institutions conferring limited rights upon an illegitimate 
child. The subject includes, however, those kinds of legitima-
tion which give the child a full position of legitimacy minus 
the right of inheritance, as in Delaware and formerly 
Czechoslovakia.164 
158 E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § 162. 
Germany: BGB. § 1723. 
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 198 ff., C. C. (1942) art. 284 ff. 
The Netherlands: BW arts. 329, 330. 
Spain: C. C. art. 120. 
159 See, e.g., the Arkansas special statute of Oct. 27, 1835, referred to in 
Scott v. Key ( 1856) II La. Ann. 232. 
160 Peru: C. C. (1936) arts. 314, 319; Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 251, 
C. C. (1942) art. 230. See also Switzerland: C. C. art. 260. 
161 Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee; 4 VERNIER 181 § 245· 
162 4 VERNIER § 244. 
163 4 VERNIER 183 § 246. 
164 4 VERNIER § 245· Allg. BGB. § 162 replaced by the Family Law of Dec. 
7, 1949. In fact, faced with a Czechoslovakian decree of legitimation, the 
Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 1921) 42 ROLG. 105 held that the status was con-
cerned and the act should be recorded at the civil status register. 
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I. United States 
The conflicts rule of the United States, in the evidently 
prevailing opinion, 165 is the same as that concerning subse-
quent marriage; the law of the domicil at the time of the 
act governs. It does not matter whether the foreign legiti-
mation has been executed in a form not known at the forum, 
as for instance by a special statute, nor whether the child 
would have been barred from legitimation by the policy of 
the forum. These principles have been very clearly ex-
pressed.166 Also, the child's domicil is not taken into con-
sideration; a legitimation by acknowledgment has been up-
held in California despite the English domicil of the child,167 
quite as, conversely, the Virginia statute of r 8 66, legiti-
mating colored children, was refused application in Massa-
chusetts in respect to a father who was domiciled there, al-
though the child resided in Virginia.168 A domicil of the 
father or even of all parties at a time posterior to the legiti-
mating act is without importance.169 
2. England 
No case had occurred in England before the Legitimacy 
Act of 1926, where a foreign legitimation other than by 
subsequent marriage was in question/70 and the Act likewise 
limited itself to recognizing English and foreign legitima-
165Restatement § 140; STUMBERG 331. The author of the Note in 46 Yale 
L. J. ( 1937) 1046, 1053 thinks that the doctrine is in a "chaotic condition," 
but this contention is not well supported by the few deviating cases and the 
absence of authority as to certain details. 
166 See, e.g., Adkins, J. in Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balti-
more (1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 At!. 497; Buchanan, J. in Scott v. Key (1856) 
II La. Ann. 232 (legitimation by special statute of Arkansas legislature) 
quotes with STORY§ 51 from BOULLENOIS: "Habilis vel inhabilis in loco domi-
cili est habilis vel inhabilis in omni loco." 
167 Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915. 
168 Irving v. Ford (1903) 183 Mass. 448, 67 N. E. 366. 
169 Eddie v. Eddie (1899) 8 N.D. 376, 79 N. W. 856; In re Presley's Estate, 
Anderson v. Presley (1925) 113 Okla. x6o, 240 Pac. 89, supra p. 616, n. 88. 
170 Supra p. 613. 
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tions by marriage. Soon afterwards, however, in the case of 
In re Luck, it happened that an Englishman, when domiciled 
in England, procreated an illegitimate son and, while domi-
ciled in California, acknowledged him pursuant to the Cali-
fornia Civil Code, section 230, by receiving the child into his 
family with the consent of his wife and by obtaining a decree 
of legitimation from the time of birth. It would have been 
a reasonable expectation that the legitimation should simply 
be recognized under the law of the father's domicil at the 
time of the act, by analogy to the rule laid down in the law 
of 1926. The father's domicil at the time of the birth should 
be of no significance. However, the Chancery judge reached 
this result by resorting to the child's law,171 which was an 
unwarranted breach with the principles in force. Two of the 
three Lords of Appeal were apparently so strongly under 
the spell of the dogma abolished by the Legitimacy Act, 
that they refused recognition because of the father's English 
law as of the time of the birth of the child.112 The resulting 
decision is obviously regrettable.173 
3· National Law of Parent 
In the countries following the nationality principle, the 
rules are the same as in the case of a subsequent marriage. 
Hence, a foreign legitimation agreeing with the national law 
of all parties is recognized, even though the specific pro-
cedure is unknown to the forum. For example, French courts 
respect a foreign legitimation by state authority although 
unknown to French municipallaw.174 
111fn re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 323 at 329. 
1 72/n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. (C. A.) 864 at 890. 
173 See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 621-627, supra n. 1; MANN, 
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. 
(1941) 112, u8-122; FALCONBRIDGE, Comment in 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 
37, 42, also criticizes the dissenting vote of Scott, L. J. 
174 See Cour Paris (April 13, 1893) Clunet 1893, 557; WEISS, 4 Traite 101; 
VALERY 1150; POULLET 469 no. 395· 
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Where the parties are of different nationality, usually the 
father's law alone is applied.175 
But with respect to legitimation by acts other than mar-
riage, it is convenient to require the consent of the child or 
of some competent agent on its behalf, as municipal legisla-
tions frequently provide,176 and there is a tendency to apply 
such provisions of the child's law as an exception to the rule 
referring to the father's law. The German statute (EG. art. 
22, par. 2) directly provides that in the case of a German 
child the consent of the child or of the persons and courts 
charged with the care of it should be secured in accordance 
with the German rules.177 French courts and certain writers 
require application of French law every time that any party 
is of French nationality.178 
4· Argentine Doctrine 
Another application of local public policy, enunciated in 
Argentina, is that a legitimation by act of a foreign state 
should not be recognized because "it presents a privilege." 119 
V. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN LEGITIMATION 
Much discussion has been devoted to the relations existing 
between the above-mentioned rules and the conflicts rules 
concerning succession upon death. 
175 See for instance App. Bern (May II, 1939) 36 SJZ. (194o-1941) 128 
no. 23. Swiss C. C. arts. 260 ff. applied although the woman and the child 
were Germans. For an opposite view requiring that the parties and the 
authority rendering the decree belong to the same state, see WEiss, 4 Traite 
104; contra: RoLIN, 2 Principes 158 no. 628. 
176 Cf., for instance, German BGB. § 1726 in contrast to § 1719 (legitima-
tion by subsequent marriage); Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 320; Venezuela: C. C. 
(1942) art. 233· 
177 It is controversial whether this rule is applicable to foreign children. 
The prevailing answer is in the negative. See RG. (July II, 1929), 125 RGZ. 
266; RAAPE 549; NUSSBAUM, IPR. 173, n. 3· 
The Czechoslovakian statute on private international law of 1948, § 31, 
generalizes by providing that the requirement of consent by the child or any 
other persons is governed by the child's national law. 
178 See the criticism by CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 57, 73· 
179 2 VIco no. 171 at 127. 
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1. Validity of Legitimation as a Preliminary Question 
There is a general problem respecting the law applicable 
to legitimation or adoption, when either one is a condition 
for an individual's sharing in a succession upon death.180 
Where a claim to participate in a distribution of assets, gov-
erned by the inheritance law of state X, is based on a legiti-
mation created in state Y, should the validity of the legiti-
mation be adjudicated under the law of X or Y? This 
question occurs in its purest form in third states; should a 
court in state Z apply its ordinary conflicts rule concerning 
legitimation or does application by such court of the inheri-
tance law of X by implication include the conflicts rule of X 
regarding legitimation? (There is, of course, nothing to 
recommend the lex fori of X, or the substantive legitimation 
law of X as such.) The problem is significant only where the 
conflict rules on inheritance and those on legitimation or 
adoption result in contrasting solutions. No case in the Eng-
lish or American practice to illustrate this contrast has been 
found by Robertson,181 and only one German decision of the 
kind has been found. In this case, an Alsatian in adultery 
had a child by a woman whom he afterwards married. He 
acquired French nationality by the Treaty of Versailles but 
died in Germany. As well known, Frenchmen cannot legiti-
mize adulterine children, but Germans are allowed to do so. 
As the man's succession under the German conflicts rule was 
governed by French law, the court decided to apply French 
rules of conflicts. Under the French conflicts rule concerning 
legitimation, as the court understood it, the legitimation 
operated in favor of the child in spite of its adulterine posi-
tion, because the parties were German at the time of their 
subsequent marriage. Acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
1so The logical necessity of applying the law of the state of inheritance to 
the preliminary question has been expounded by MELCHIOR § 175; WENGLER, 
8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 148 at 166; also RoBERTSON, Characterization 137 ff. 
1s1 RoBERTsoN, ibid. 135, 151. 
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child, the court therefore ordered that it share in the 
succession.182 
The case is instructive in two respects and helps us to dis-
tinguish two problems. 
One of these problems, neglected in Europe, holds an 
interest in this country, in view of the persistent effort to 
separate statutes of legitimacy (or status) from statutes of 
distribution. In the French law, the statute of distribution 
furnishes only the words: ((enfants et descendants" (C. C. 
art. 7 3 I). Legitimacy, of course, is presupposed, but an 
adulterine child is only indirectly excluded by reason of its 
incapacity to be legitimized. And only the conflicts rule on 
legitimation prescribes that the ban on adulterine children 
ceases where all facts happened abroad and at the time did 
not concern a French national. This seems, in fact, to be the 
averred doctrine; 188 at least the German court was entitled 
to assume its correctness. 
We may conclude that, if recognized at all, the foreign 
act is valid in our jurisdiction as measured by its own law. 
It cannot be recognized for the purpose of family law and 
eliminated for the purpose of distribution. 
What the European literature discusses, however, con-
cerns the other problem, namely, whether the German court 
should have decided the validity of the legitimation accord-
ing to its own German conflicts rule on legitimation,184 in-
stead of following the provisions of French law because it 
governs the succession/85 The individual case gives no solid 
basis for arguing this question, since the legitimation could 
not be denied validity in any event; it had been effectuated in 
Germany by parties then of German nationality. Arguments 
182 OLG. Karlsruhe (March 20, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 96, Revue 1932, 
702. 
183 SAVATIER, D.1930.1.IJ6j LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 2) 318 no. 279· 
1 84 RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 494· 
185 LEWALD, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 454· 
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of practical convenience may be considered. If such pre-
liminary questions are subjected to the statutes regulating 
inheritance, consistent application of these statutes may be 
facilitated. On the other hand, by applying constantly the 
law indicated by the forum's special conflicts rules on legiti-
mation or adoption, consistency in deciding the effects of the 
same marriage or adoption is promoted. The latter con-
sideration appears preferable. 
2. Effect of Foreign Legitimation on Inheritance Rights 
Where a child has been legitimized under the law of state 
X and an inheritance is governed by the laws of state Y, 
should the effect of the legitimation on the inheritance be 
determined under the inheritance law of X or Y? This much 
discussed question has no serious significance, if we under-
stand legitimation to mean an act elevating the illegitimate 
child to full legitimacy. The analogous question concerning 
foreign adoption is less simple, because an adoption may pro-
duce various degrees of rights. It is obvious that full recog-
nition of a foreign legitimation assimilates the child to legiti-
mates in the sense of any statute of distribution which does 
not except legitimized children, an exception practically oc-
curring only in anachronistic applications of the Statute of 
Merton.186 
VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND CHILD 
A. RULES 
A comparative survey of this topic has to face a situation 
similar to that encountered with respect to the effects of mar-
riage. The Continental systems start from a comprehensive 
notion of parental power, historically derived partly from 
the Roman patria potestas, partly from the Germanic munt, 
186 See cases cited supra p. 628, n. 157. 
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and result in the recognition of a status governed by the per-
sonal law of the parent. In common law, much is left to the 
rules concerning contract, tort, and support; the remaining 
small domain of domiciliary law is difficult to define. 
Even so, we may be astonished at the scarcity of conflicts 
rules that are discussed in this country with respect to paren-
tal rights and duties. The Restatement ( §§ 144-148) de-
votes to parental power as a status only one conflicts rule, 
subjecting "custodianship" of a legitimate child to the law 
of the father's domicil at the time of birth, and treats juris-
diction for modifying custody in a few sections. Support and 
domicil are dealt with separately, but neither personal prop-
erty of a child nor the authority of a parent to act for the 
child are expressly mentioned in the chapters on property and 
contracts, respectively. Such subjects as personal services and 
earnings of children do not seem to fit under any rule of the 
Restatement. This neglect, of course, is not accidental. 
Whereas Wharton and Story dedicated some space to the 
differences of civil and common law conceptions about this 
matter, subsequent writers seem to reduce the "status" of 
legitimacy to custodianship, which word, used in this con-
nection, probably means no more than personal care and 
education, excluding maintenance (which otherwise may be 
included in the term). Exactly as with respect to matrimonial 
rules, the methods of civil law and common law are diver-
gent; concentration of the effects of legitimacy under the 
aspect of family law in the Continental conception contrasts 
with dispersal into several topics in the American system. To 
account for all implications of the personal law, we have to 
base our survey upon the broader scope of the civil law 
doctrines. 
1. Personal Law of Father 
Wherever the unity of the family law is in the foreground 
of thought, the personal law of the father is deemed to de-
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termine the relation between both parents and the child, 
even when, as today, wife and child may have separate per-
sonal laws. This has remained the rule especially in Ger-
many, Italy, Belgium, J apan,187 and in the French dominant 
opinion,188 where the national law of the father governs the 
entire complex of relations, as well as in other countries, 
including Switzerland/89 where the law of the father's domi-
cil governs. 
Correspondingly, in this country, "custody" is governed by 
the domiciliary law of the father, 190 although sometimes the 
opinion is expressed that parental power should always be 
subject to the local policy of the parties' momentary resi-
dence.191 The only exception to the rule of the foreign domicil 
should be urgent public policy, and this not so often as is 
generally claimed. 
1 87 Nationality: 
Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § IO. 
Germany: EG. art. I9 sentence I. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I. 
Belgium: ROLIN, 2 Principes IOO no. 587, 646; POULLET 436 no. 374; 
Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 759· 
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. I. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 20. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. I5. 
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 30 par. I. 
Iran: C. C. art. 964. 
188 France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. I3, I873) S.I873.I.I3, Clunet I874, 245; Cass. 
(civ.) (March I4, I877) S.I878.1.25, Clunet I878, I67 (in this case the 
parents were Frenchmen and the child a foreigner). See NIBOYET 784 no. 674, 
and for cases ibid. 784. no. 675; in 5 Traite 372 ff., the author pleads for the 
application of French law if only one of the parties is a French national! 
SURVILLE 472 n. I; PILLET, I Traite 659 no. 328. BATIFFOL, Traite 54I ff. 
189 Domicil: Switzerland: (for Swiss citizens abroad) NAG. art. 9· Treaty 
of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1940, art. I8, correcting the 
existing art. I4. Uruguay: C. C. (as amended I94I) art. 2396. 
1 90 Restatement § I44 combines this rule with § 30 declaring that the child 
normally shares the father's domicil, thus no change of award of custody 
would occur regularly against the law of the father's domicil under § I45· The 
same rule applies to support, Berkley v. Berkley (I952) 246 S. W, (2d) 804. 
191 See especially I WHARTON §§ 253, 254· For England, WESTLAKE § 4 
infers from the old case of Johnstone v. Beattie (I843) 10 Cl. & F. 42, II3, 
II4 that the authority of a foreign parent over his child living in England is 
recognized to the extent to which an English parent would have similar 
authority, whatever that means. 
PARENTAL RELATIONS 
2. Cases of Different Nationalities 
The now frequent cases where the parties have different 
personal laws are treated variously. 
(a) Certain writers of the civil law countries, now fol-
lowed by some legislations and courts, suggest that a per-
sonal law of the child different from that of his father should 
prevaiJ.l92 The favorite argument for this view is that pa-
ternal power in modern law serves only the welfare of the 
child; this is true, but it is no argument for the national or 
domiciliary law of the child. 
The problems of the common law lie on another plane. 
British law, followed in this instance in Scotland/98 recog-
nizes the jurisdiction of the child's domicil as competent, 
although not exclusive. Likewise in this country, "the state 
of domicil of the child can change the custody of the child 
from one parent to the other, or to, or from both." 194 The 
courts apply their own substantive laws, but the doctrine of 
the child's domicil by operation of law corrects this apparent 
rupture of the system.195 So long as the family lives together, 
there is no question at all; even if the community is disrupted 
by one parent abandoning the child or by separation or di-
vorce of the parents, the child is considered domiciled with 
one of the parents. 
(b) The Polish and Czechoslovakian laws have adopted 
1 92 Finland: Law of 1929, § 19. 
C6digo Bustamante art. 69 (with broad exceptions on which later). 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 17 par. 2, reserving, however, Hun-
garian law if this is more favorable for the child and the child lives in 
Hungary. 
France: SURVILLE 468 no. 319, ibid. 472 no. 320 n. 2; DESPAGNET 821 no. 
269 II; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 716, 718; WEISS, 4 Traite 27, 146, 
164; Cour Paris (Aug. 5, 1908) Clunet 1909, 173. 
Brazil: 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA IIO. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 18, 1934) W. 12791 (authority of 
the father, a foreigner, over a Dutch child, determined by Dutch law). 
193 Ponder v. Ponder [1932] Session Cases 233, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 123. 
194 Restatement § 145· 
195 Restatement § 3 3· 
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the last national law common to both parties, as in conjugal 
matters.196 
(c) The recent Greek Code, elaborating the subject mat-
ter, makes the relation between legitimate parents and their 
child dependent: (i) upon the national law that was last 
common to the father and the child, (ii) in absence of such, 
upon the law of the father at the birth of the child; (iii) if 
the father is dead, :Upon the last law common to the mother 
and the child; and ( iv) in absence of such, upon the law of 
the mother at the death of the father. This symmetrical 
solution solves all possible cases but is arbitrarily chosen. 
Moreover, in both this and the Polish regulations, paternal 
rights and duties are determined by a law that may be alien 
to both parties for the time being.197 
(d) In another opinion, both laws are to be cumulatively 
applied.198 
(e) Also the law more favorable to the person sued on 
account of an obligation of parent-child relationship has been 
advocated.199 
(f) The law of the forum has been applied, where one 
party was a national of the forum, sometimes as an expedient 
because of the unsettled conflict laws, but in France as a 
declared policy where either the father or the mother is of 
French nationality, even though the child be a foreigner. 200 
196 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I9; criticized by 
ScHNITZER ( ed. I) 209 n. I; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international 
law of I948, §§ 2I, 22. 
19 7 Greece C. C. I940, art. I8. See also infra p. 652. 
198 2 ZITELMANN 889; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 70, n. I6I; CAVAGLIERI 242; FEDOZZI 
502; Trib. Venezia (Jan. 30, I932) 24 Rivista ( I932) I06; see contra: 
RAAPE 464. 
199 E.g., Cass. Ita!. (July 3I, I93o) Monitore I93I 1 I32. 
20° Cass. (civ.) (Jan. I3, I873) S.I873.I.I3, D.I873.I.297. Cf. ROLIN, 2 
Principes I87 no. 649. Cass. (civ.) (March I4. I877) S.1878.I.25, D.I877.1.385; 
cf. Clunet I878, I67. App. Bordeaux (July 23, 1897) Clunet I897, 1028; 
NmoYET, 5 Traite 472 ff. 
Germany: German law applied where the mother is of German nationality 
and the child stayed with the mother in Germany, see RG. (Feb. 20, 1913) 81 
RGZ. 373; OLG. Miinchen (Aug. 24, I938) HRR. I938, no. I463. 
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3· Renvoi 
Where the rule refers to foreign law, renvoi may be ap-
plied.2ol 
B. SCOPE OF THE RULES 
1. Maternal Rights 
The rules outlined above determine what rights the 
mother has during the father's lifetime and after his death. 
Illustration: After the death of his German father, a son 
was entrusted to an uncle in Italy and later was released 
from his German nationality. It was held that, under German 
conflicts law, the mother, being of German nationality, re-
tained her maternal powers, so that no guardian was to be 
appointed. 202 
2. Personal Care 
The content of paternal or maternal rights embraces 
"care, advice and affection," 203 in other words, personal care 
and education. Religious education is included, insofar as it 
is considered of private concern 204 and the foreign law does 
not offend public policy by compromising religious free-
dom.205 The law governing parental relations extends to the 
action by which a parent entitled to custody sues the other 
parent for restitution of the child; 206 in the prevailing opin-
201 Germany: (although EG. art. 27 does not expressly order renvoi in this 
case), RG. (Dec. 29, 1910) JW. 1911, 208, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 336 (Australian 
party); Bay. ObLG. (March 13, 1912) 13 Bay. ObLG. 136, 26 ROLG. 257; 
Bay. ObLG. (April 22, 1922) 42 ROLG. 126 (New York parties); KG. (April 
17, 1914) 32 ROLG. 31 (Russian from Baltic province); Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 
16, 1925) 24 Bay. ObLGZ. 270. 
2o2 OLG. Dresden (Jan. 16, 1900) 21 Ann. Siichs. OLG. 309 no. 15. Similar: 
A Dutch widow has no maternal power and therefore cannot be authorized 
by the court like a German mother to alienate her child's immovables, KG. 
(Oct. 10, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15. 
20s Simonds, J., In re Frame [1939] Ch. D. 700, 704. 
204 KG. (July 26, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (1905) 325. 
205 DIENA, 2 Prine. 191; RAAPE 476. 
206 RG. (Nov. 14, 1912) 68 Seuff. Arch. 163, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 316 
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ion, also after a divorce, this law excludes the law under 
which the divorce has been granted.207 
The French decisions are divided; the majority apply 
French law under the color of public policy, 208 and an English 
court is likely to follow the same method in the case of a 
ward of the court. 209 In the United States, it seems difficult 
to tell in what cases a court may be inclined to apply a for-
eign law. Correction and chastisement have always been 
indicated as an example of parental power limited by the 
territorial habits of the place where they are exercised.210 
Probably a parent's renunciation of his right to visit would 
be held contrary to public order, as has been held in Ger-
many.211 
The requirement of parental consent to the child's mar-
riage, as discussed earlier, is included in parental rights 
under civil law, while it is categorized with formalities ac-
cording to the traditional British view and is, without quali-
fication, subject to the law of the place of celebration under 
the American conflicts rules. 
3· Duty of Providing a Dowry 
Whether a parent has a duty to settle property as a dowry 
for his daughter, as he had under the German law but not 
under Dutch law, is a question determinable under the rules 
outlined above. 212 
{Austrian law); RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 (Bulgarian 
law; the form of procedure, however, is subject to the law of the forum); LG. 
Stuttgart (Nov. 12, 1953) 19 Z.ausi.PR. (1954) 152 with note Kaser. 207 Supra p. 573; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. &, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 84. 
208 See Trib. civ. Seine (June 18, 1934) D. H. 1934. 471, Clunet 1935, 619 
and the practice reviewed by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427 ff. who wishes 
that a foreign personal law be observed with vigilant criticism rather than to 
be neglected; Cour Paris (July 13, 1951) Clunet 1952, 612. 
209 See In re B-'s Settlement, B- v. B- [1940] Ch. 54· 210 1 WHARTON § 254; Codigo Bustamante art. 72. 211 KG. {Nov. 14, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 8. 
2 12 RG. (April 12, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449· 
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4· Protecting Interference by Courts 
Many cases have dealt with the power of courts to protect 
children who are resident at the forum, against parents who 
are foreigners. German courts are ready to recognize that 
it is primarily a matter of the personal law of the parent, 
whether and under what conditions parental rights can be 
abridged or terminated. Such remedies as are provided in the 
Italian or the Dutch civil codes have been found sufficient.213 
Where the national law did not offer an adequate basis for 
intervention of the German court, temporary measures were 
always permitted.214 Incidentally, where the welfare of a 
child resident within the country appeared to be menaced, 
public policy was often invoked in favor of the local reme-
dies, but this view has been challenged recently. 215 
A similar practice in favor of the personal law exists, for 
instance, in the Netherlands.216 In Switzerland parents domi-
ciled within the country are subject to Swiss law under the 
domiciliary principle itself. 217 
213 KG. (June 5, 1921) 53 Jahrb. FG. A 56 (Italian law); KG. (Nov. 28, 
1913) 45 Jahrb. FG. A 18 (Dutch law). See also KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) JW. 
1935, 3483 (applying Austrian law); Bay. ObLG. (Dec. 6, 1933) JW. 1934. 
699 and Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, nos. 63, 
64 (Lebanese law). 
214 RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 and cited writers. In a 
constant practice sec. 63 par. I (2) of the Law on Youth Welfare of July 9, 
1922, providing for emergency education of depraved children, is applied to 
foreigners. See RG. (June 30, 1927) 117 RGZ. 376; RG. (May 22, 1933) JW. 
1933, 45, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 137 no. 51. 
215 KG. (Jan. 12, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 62 denies jurisdiction as to 
foreigners if any one of the parties interested in an order regulating custody 
or right of visitation is not to be found within the territory of the state. OLG. 
Miinchen (May 18, 1938) HRR. 1938, no. 1281, (although the child was at 
the forum, depriving the Bulgarian father of his powers was held excluded 
because the Bulgarian law did not recognize such a measure). 
216 The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (Jan. 13, 1939) W. 1939, no. 286 
(although the wife was Dutch and the parties lived in the Netherlands, Aus-
trian and German Jaws were applied as the child's national law, the mother 
was entrusted with the personal care, and the father excluded from visiting 
the child). 
217 BG. (Sept. 29, 1927) Praxis 1927, 456. The powers of a Dutch father 
(domiciled in the Netherlands) are characterized under Dutch law: BG. 
(Feb. 3, 1939) 65 BGE. I 13. 
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The lex fori at the domicil of the child simply is applied in 
the United States 218 for controlling and transferring custody. 
The Bustamante Code expressly reserves the law of the 
forum, depriving the parents of their power "by reason of 
incapacity or absence, or by judgment of a court." 219 To 
justify the similar practice of the French 220 and the Bel-
gian en courts, an author who is otherwise not favorable to 
extending public policy has adduced that mistreatment of a 
child arouses public indignation and harms morals.222 
Also in the countries prepared to observe foreign law, 
temporary residence is sufficient not only to bring provisional 
legal aid to the child so long as the national country does 
not assume its care, 223 but also to assist a father or mother in 
coercitive actions against a child, according to the local 
law."24 
5. Parental Interest in Child's Property 
The Roman paternal "dominium" in all family property 
had given way in the imperial period to a right of "adminis-
tration and enjoyment" upon property acquired by the chil-
dren and not excepted from this right. Property either of 
infants or of children less than eighteen years old is still 
subject to such paternal encroachment in many civil law 
218 Restatement § 148. 
219 Art. 72. 
22° France: Law of July 24, 1889 as amended Nov. 15, 1921; on the applica-
tion to foreigners see PILLET, Clunet 1892, 5, and 1 Traite 66o no. 328; WEISS, 
4 Traite 157; App. Colmar (March 28, 1935) Clunet 1936, 642. 
221 Belgium: Law of May 15, 1912 on Protection of Minors; for application 
of provisions on the forfeiture of parental power to foreigners see App. Liege 
(July xo, 1917) Pasicrisie 1917.2.254; Trib. Liege (Nov. 23, 1917) Pasicrisie 
1918.3.82. 
222 BATIFFOL> Revue Crit. 1937, 418, 429 and Traite 543, 544· 
223 For this situation see Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 64; 
Swiss BG. (Feb. 3, 1939) 65 BGE. I 13 (where it is stated that art. 7 of the 
Hague Convention on custody does not cover the case). 
224 Italy: Cass. Torino (April 13, 1909) Clunet 1910, 673 (Spanish parties). 
Germany: KG. (Dec. 16, 1938) JW. 1939, 350 (Danish mother and daugh-
ter). 
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countries, 225 including Louisiana.226 By some American stat-
utes, 227 a parent has control of the property given by him to 
the child, although only as an administrator. Such control in 
the predominant interest of the child, with or without 228 duty 
to account for the revenue, is frequent in modern legisla-
tions.229 Common law and the legislations of Sweden and 
Czarist and Soviet Russia do not contain any such legal 
powers of parents, but at common law parents have a right 
to the earnings of the child, which right affects the property 
as well as produces obligations. In other countries, on the 
contrary, earnings are a favorite exception to the manage-
ment or usufruct of the parents. 
In the law of conflicts, immovables must be treated sepa-
rately, because of their particular position at common law. 
(a) That immovables are governed by the lex situs also 
in regard to the paternal rights, 230 was a doctrine shared by 
many statutists and older French authors. 231 In more recent 
times, no civil law text has followed this doctrine, 232 except 
225 E.g., France: C. C. art. 384. 
Germany: BGB. §§ 1649, 1652. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 292. 
Italy: C. C. {1865) art. 228, C. C. (1942) art. 324. 
Argentina: C. C. art. 287 {new 32I). 
Brazil: C. C. art. 389. 
Mexico: C. C. art. 430. 
Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 398, 8. 
Japan: C. C. arts. 890, 891. 
China: C. C. art. 1088 par. 2. 
226 La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart. 1932) art. 223. 
227 Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri; see 4 VERNIER 23 § 232. 
228 E.g., Austrian Allg. BGB. § I 50. 
229 See VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 782. 
230 STORY § 463; WESTLAKE § 166. 
231 See CoLMET-DAAGE, Revue de droit fran<;ais et etranger 1844, 401, 406; 
TROPLONG, 2 Droit civil explique, privileges et hypotheques, no. 429 {the legal 
hypothec upon French immovables of a guardianship has been established 
abroad, since the "statute" is a "real one"). 
232 Legal provisions in Germany: EG. art. I9; Poland: Law of I926 on 
international private law, art. I9; Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 20 par. 
I; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of I948, s. 23; C6digo 
Bustamante art. 70. 
Doctrine and practice in Belgium and France: see 6 LAURENT 36 §IS; 
PARENT AND CHILD 
the Montevideo Treaty of I 889; 233 its new draft of 1940 
joins the general doctrine of the civil law, that the entire 
assets of the child are governed uniformly by the personal 
law. 234 This is the domiciliary or national law, ordinarily of 
the parent, while in the C6digo Bustamante it is again the 
law of the child. 235 For instance, the usufructuary interest 
allowed to a parent by the French Civil Code (art. 3 84) is 
said to depend upon the personal law of the parties.236 
But lrow is this mutual recognition among the countries 
adhering to the personal law to be effectuated? For illustra-
tion, the French and German paternal rights in the real 
property of a legitimate child are of different nature. The 
French right is an ordinary usufruct; the German one has a 
special character and is not recorded in the land register; 
they differ also as to the periods of duration. If the father is 
of French nationality, should his right be transformed with 
respect to German immovables into a German uNutznies-
sung"? 237 This suggestion would amount to applying the law 
of the situs as at common law. The system of personal law 
requires rather that the French type of right be recognized 
in its true nature in Germany; 238 consequently it should be 
recorded in the German public register to satisfy the require-
ment of the law of situs for creating an ordinary usufruct.289 
ROLIN, 2 Principes I83 no. 646; WEISS, 4 Traite ISO, ISI; Cass (civ.) (Jan. 
13, I873) D.I873.I,297; Cass. (civ.) (March I4, I877) S.I878.I.25, D.1877.1. 
385, Clunet I878, I67. 
For the provisions of German EG. art. 28, Polish Law of I926, art. I9 
par. 3, and Czechoslovakian law of I948, s. 23 respecting the Anglo-Ameri-
can treatment of immovables, see supra p. 367. 
233 Treaty on international civil law (I889) art. IS. 
284 Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. I9. 
235 Art. 70. 
236 8URVILLE 469 no. 3I9. 
287 This was suggested by RAAPE 463, 476, 487. 
238 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. ( I93 I) 24I, 278. 
239 4 FRANKENSTEIN 49· 
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(b) Personal property of the child is submitted every-
where to the personal law, i.e., the domiciliary law 240 or the 
national law 241 of the parent. 
The C6digo Bustamante limits the domain of the personal 
law, by the proviso that no prejudice shall arise in foreign 
countries "to the rights of third parties which may be granted 
by local law and the local provisions in respect to publicity 
and specialty of mortgage securities." 242 In the other coun-
tries this limitation is included in the rules on property 
themselves. 
6. Authority of Parent 
A parent generally is entitled to represent his child in pri-
vate transactions or court proceedings dealing with its per-
sonality as well as its property. The system of personal law 
embraces all connected problems, such as the question 
whether the parent is able to act on behalf of the child by 
force of law, or must be appointed guardian, or needs au-
thorization by a court or a family council for the special pur-
pose. 
Illustration: A German prince had a minor son who was a 
British subject. The question for what transactions on behalf 
of the son's property the father needed the consent of the 
court controlling guardianship was decided by a German 
court in accordance with the father's German law. (EG. art. 
19; BGB. § 1643).243 To the same effect, an English 
father, 244 a Dutch mother, 245 and an American father 246 
240 1 WHARTON §255 (adhering to German writers). 
241 See, e.g., German EG. art. 19; NrBOYET 78 5 no. 67 5· 
242 Art. 71. 
243 KG. (March 14, 1910) 39 Jahrb. FG. A 198 (expressly rejecting the 
application of the child's law). 
244 LG. Darmstadt (Sept. 9, 1907) 9 Hessische Rechtsprechung (1909) 13 
no. 6. 
245 KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15, 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 239, 242. 
246 AG. Tauberbischofsheim (June 14, 1910) 20 Z.int.R. (1910) 545· Other 
German cases: RG. (Feb. 9, 1925) 110 RGZ. 173 (a Polish father needed 
authorization by the Polish court for disposing of a German immovable under 
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were deemed, according to their respective laws, to be with-
out authority to represent their children, so that temporary 
trustees had to be locally appointed. 
The practical difficulties and great costs involved in pro-
curing sufficient authority in some states of this country have 
thus come to be noticed in German courts. In one case, for 
this reason, the American father preferred to let the child's 
property remain in Europe.247 
It is doubtful, however, whether such observance of for-
eign law is usual in many countries. Common law conceptions 
are opposed to subjecting dealings with immovables to the 
personal law, and this view is shared in certain civil law coun-
tries.248 As to movables, the law governing contracts enters 
into competition. Finally, peculiar considerations of conven-
ience have a strong influence upon all rules respecting ad-
ministration of estates. For these reasons, the subject ought 
not to be discussed further at this place. 
7. Duties of Support 
Support due to children by parents and to parents by chil-
dren is in most countries the subject of specific obligations de-
pendent on legitimacy.249 There is the same contrast as in 
matrimonial matters, 250 between the rule asserted by the Re-
statement ( § 4 58) 251 of applying the law of the forum and 
the Polish law). RG. (March 28, 1931) JW. 1932, 588 (an Italian mother, 
living with the child in Germany, needed authorization by an Italian court). 
KG. (April 8, 1914) Recht 1914, no. 2691 (an Austrian father must have the 
consent of court for repudiating the child's share in a succession on death, 
etc.). 
247 OLG. Dresden (March 4, 1913) 35 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 63, 13 Z.int.R. 
(1903) 467. . 
248 In the Netherlands the personal law of the parent governs also in 
respect to immovables; see for cases VAN HASSELT 91 § 9· 
249 In the United States, most statutes provide maintenance for natural chil-
dren while in twenty jurisdictions only legitimate or legitimized children 
have the right to support, see 4 VERNIER § 234· 
250 Supra pp. 349-350· 
251 For important complements, see Restatement, New York Annotations 
306 § 457· 
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the systems established upon the assumption of familiar 
duties to support.252 In such countries as France, the law of 
the forum is applied only as a check upon the foreign na-
tional law under the theory of public policy, but it operates 
on a large scale.253 Also in England, it has been considered a 
common law rule that "liability of a father to maintain his 
son must be determined by the law of the place of the fa-
ther's domicil." 254 It has been inferred from this rule that 
generally any alimentary liability is governed by the law of 
the domicil of the person against whom a claim is made. 255 
This seems a doubtful conclusion. Should not the law of the 
head of the family govern? 
8. Determination of Domicil of the Child 
The old rule of private law confers upon the child the 
domicil of his father by operation of the law, irrespective of 
the factual circumstances. 256 This is still so much a normal 
conception that in interpreting the Treaty of Versailles a 
minor has been considered resident at the place where his 
father or guardian was residing. 257 Modern conceptions, how-
2 52 Germany: According to the dominant opinion, EG. art. 19 is applied 
(law of the parent); see LG. Frankfurt (Oct. 29, 1931) J\V. 1932, 2307, 
IPRspr. 1932, no. 91. Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1930) Monitore I93I.I.I32 no. 10 
(prefers the personal law more favorable to the debtor!). 
253 NAST, I Repert. 400 no. 38. In Belgium: the same trend of the courts is 
noticed by PoULLET 435 no. 373, who advocates the standard of the forum 
only as minimum award; cf. supra p. 349· 
254 Salter, J., in Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] 2 K. B. 90, 96. 
Berkley v. Berkley (1952) 246 S. W. (zd) 804 (recovery by mother of 
money expended for support of child). 
255 DICEY (ed. 5) 55I Rule I43 (i) (2), 550 n. i, dropped in ed. 6. Siam: 
Law on private international law of I939, § 36 par. I. 
256 Thus, the German BGB. § II said simply: A legitimate child shares the 
father's domicil. Restatement§ 30. Swiss BG. (June 6, I907) 33 BGE. I 371, 
378. The English cases have not properly decided whether a child really re· 
tains its father's domicil as of the birth invariably throughout minor age; see 
FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 87. 
257 Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. I9/Dec. I4, I927, Feb. 1, 
1928) 7 Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 502, commenting 
on art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
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ever, have established exceptions to the rule in more and 
more countries.258 Moreover, the cases in which the child 
shares in the domicil of the mother are not identical in the 
various jurisdictions. 
Of general interest is the case where the husband of the 
mother contests the child's legitimacy by a suit at the court of 
his own domicil on the ground that this is the legal domicil 
of the child. It has been objected that the law there in force 
is operative only when the child is born in lawful wedlock, 
which the plaintiff denies. However, the German Reichsge-
richt encounters this argument of a vicious circle (unduly 
popular in the law of conflicts) by the consideration that a 
child is to be regarded as legitimate so long as its position is 
not destroyed by judgment. 259 
Characterization. But the main question is, which law, the 
personal law or the law of the forum, should operate in de-
termining domicil by force of "law"? The general idea pre-
vailing in this and other countries has been that, for the 
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, "domicil" has to be char-
acterized according to the local law of the forum. 260 The 
Reichsgericht, however, declares that the foreign family law, 
as the personal law of the father, is applicable even though 
the problem is of a procedural character. 261 Jurisdiction in 
particular for disputing legitimacy, thus, becomes a privilege 
of the court at a domicil recognized by the country of the par-
ent, a limitation of jurisdiction highly desirable in matters of 
status regarding the entire family. 
Other difficulties have been realized in practice, where a 
parent having custody deserts the child. To impose upon a 
child the domicil of an emigrated father, as a German court 
258 Cf. Restatement §§ 31 ff. Also §II of the German BGB. (supra n. zs6) 
has been altered by the Law of June 18, 1957. 
259 RG. (Jan. IZ, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376. 
26° France: App. Toulouse (May zz, 188o) Clunet, I88x, 61. 
261 RG. decision, n. Z59 supra, and former decisions. 
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believed to be the law,262 is indefensible. The Restators have 
found a better answer, but they maintain a fictitious domicil 
of the child at the place of the parent who last abandoned 
it.263 A wholly satisfactory solution would probably be found, 
if the habitual residence of the child were substituted for 
the legal domicil, whenever the family life is definitely dis-
rupted. 
9· Tort 
It may be briefly noted in recalling the analogy of marital 
relations that in this country actions for tort between parents 
and child as well as responsibility of a parent for wrongful 
acts of a child are purely tort matters, while in civil law they 
are primarily incidents of the family law. 
C. CHANGE OF STATUS 
I. Mutability of Incidents of the Child's Status 
As we have seen, legitimacy once created under the per-
sonal law of the parent, either by the birth of the child or by 
legitimation, is a permanent status. However, the content of 
the rights and duties flowing as incidents from this status is, 
in the dominant opinion, modified by a change of the personal 
law deemed to be decisive for the child's status. 264 The same 
is true where custody has been awarded or transferred by 
court order; the meaning of this custody is altered, if parent 
and child (at common law) move to another jurisdiction or 
(in most civil law countries) change their nationality, even 
though the decree regularly will be recognized until re-
examination of the situation of the child at the new forum of 
the parties. 
This phenomenon is the same as the better known change 
26 2 Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, no. 64. 
263 Restatement§ 33, to be read with Restatement §§ 21, 54 and 109. 
264 The subject is treated principally by RAAPE 464. 
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of incidents of personal property rights where a movable is 
transferred to another state. We have encountered a third 
instance in the transformation of non-pecuniary matrimonial 
relations. 265 Such mutability is a general feature of rights of 
an absolute character. 
Illustrations: (i) An American citizen and his fourteen-
year-old daughter, a rich heiress from her mother, move to 
France. Hereby the father acquires (by change of domicil 
and renvoi) a usufruct upon the movables and French im-
movables belonging to the daughter and not subject to a 
trust. The usufruct is recognized in all other countries. 
( ii) An Italian married couple went to Hungary and ac-
quired Hungarian nationality in order to obtain divorce. 
Afterwards both were restored to Italian citizenship. By this 
fact, Hungarian law lost any influence upon further decisions 
concerning the custody over the children.266 
2. Different Personal Laws 
In the case where only one of the two parties, either the 
parent or the child, changes his status, the decision depends 
on the person whose law governs under the conflicts rule. 
Illustration: A minor German Girl, by her marriage to a 
Greek national, lost German and acquired Greek nationality. 
But under her new Greek status, she neither became of age 
nor subject to a guardianship of her husband. A German 
court held that as article 19 of the Introductory Law to the 
Civil Code considered only the national law of the parent, 
the change of nationality did not affect the father's authority 
to act on her behal£. 261 
This rule, however, has been replaced in the Polish, Greek, 
and Czechoslovakian Codes by rules referring to the last 
national law common to both parties.268 
265 Supra p. 326. 
2 66 Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) 25 Rivista (1933) 281. 
267 OLG. Dresden {June 28, 1926) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 78, cf. BGB. 
§ r63o par. r and § 1633. 
268 Supra p. 638. 
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Illustration: In the example just given, the result in a 
Greek court would be the same. But if the father alone 
changed to American nationality and not his daughter, their 
relations would under the Greek rule remain governed by 
German law, both before and after her marriage to the 
Greek national. 
This imitation of a rule good for protecting a wife against 
her husband's arbitrary change of status is questionable. The 
father is free to take minor children into a new citizenship 
without their consent. Why then, should he be bound by their 
unchanged nationality? Nevertheless, German law has a 
similar rule, which forms an exception in favor of the lex 
fori; if a German parent changes nationality while the child 
retains German nationality, German law governs/69 
3· Non-retroactivity 
By reasonable interpretation of the conflicts rule, a change 
of status does not operate with retroactive effect upon the in-
cidents of parental relations. The name of the child, an 
emancipation performed under the former law, income from 
the child's property once devolved to the parent,270 remain 
unaffected. For instance, under the German Civil Code 
( § 1620), a daughter had a right to a trousseau in the case of 
marriage. The Italian Supreme Court granted a suit of a 
girl, formerly of German nationality but Italian by marriage, 
against her German mother, on the ground that the marriage 
only perfected the mother's pre-existent obligation.271 The 
German Reichsgericht decided to the same effect in a case 
where a German father had acquired Swiss nationality.272 
Such interpretations, restricting the impact of the change of 
269 EG. art. 19 sentence 2. No analogous application to foreign children is 
permitted in the prevailing opinion, see LEWALD 132 no. 183; RAAPE 469. 
21o STAUFFER, NAG. 62 no. 2. 
271 Cass. Ita!. (July 31, 1930) 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 844. 
272 RG. (April 12, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449· 
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status, are certainly more valuable than any theory of vested 
rights of parents and children. 
No American doctrine on this subject seems to exist. Re-
sults similar to those described could be reached by an anal-
ogy to the doctrine obtaining in the case of matrimonial 
property. Thus each single incident would be governed by 
the law of the parent's domicil at the time of the incident. 
CHAPTER 16 
Illegitimate Children 1 
I. MoTHER AND CHILD 
AWOMAN and her child born out of wedlock are considered to be in blood relationship; in the legisla-tions of the French type, however, no claim can be 
based upon it before the mother recognizes the child. The 
relationship is characterized either as "illegitimate" and of 
a special nature or assimilated to the regular mother-child 
relation constituted by wedlock. Differences exist also in 
almost every particular. They are mirrored by the multi-
formity of the conflicts rules. 
1. Contacts 
The law of the forum is applied in the United States 2 and 
under the present Montevideo Treaty.3 
1 Comparative substantive law: 
ROBBINS and DEAK, "The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: 
A Comparative Study," 30 Col. L. Rev. ( 1930) 308-329 (a historical sum-
mary). 
FREUND, Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Coun-
tries, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 42 (1919). 
Illegitimacy, Standards of Legal Protection for Children Born out of Wed-
lock, Report of Regional Conferences, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bu-
reau, Publ. No. 77 (1921). 
LUNDBERG, Children of Illegitimate Birth and Measures for their Protection, 
U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 166 (1926). 
TOMFORDE, DIEFENBACH, WEBLER, Das Recht des unehe)ichen Kindes und 
seiner Mutter im In-und Ausland (ed. 5, 1953). 
REXROTH, Uneheliche Kinder, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1938) 633-676. 
2 U. S. Restatement § 454· 
3 Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law (1889), art. 18: The 
rights and duties resulting from illegitimacy are governed by the law of the 
state in which they are claimed to be exercised. 
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Pre I. art. VI ( 10). 
Codigo Bustamante art. 63 as to the declarations of maternity. 
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Most countries refer to the personal law of the mother, 
tested by her domicil 4 or nationality. 5 
Minority solutions refer to the child's personal law 6 or 
resort to the so-called distributive application of both parties' 
laws, so as to determine the duties of either party by his or 
her law. 7 
The English law is sui generis. Only English law is ap-
plied, and then only if the child is born in England or, if born 
abroad, of English parents.8 
2. Scope 
The applicable law covers the questions: 
Whether the mother enjoys a power analogous to that of 
a legitimate father; 
What other rights she may have over the child's person 
and property; 9 
4 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 53; BoRUM 126. Also BAR, 
§ 204 was of this opinion. 
5 Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, §II. 
Germany: EG. art. 20 with regard to Germans but generally extended to 
foreigners. RG. (May 13, 19II) 76 RGZ. 283; KG. (July 9, 1924) 50 Z. 
Ziv. Proz. (1926) 337; OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. 26, 1926) 37 Z.int.R. (1927) 
388. 
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 19: last common national law; in absence of such 
the national law of the mother at birth. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I. 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 20: Where the laws of mother and child differ, 
the last common national law; conforming Czechoslovakian law on private 
international law of 1948, §§ 25, 26. 
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law § 30 par. 2. 
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 2, 3 (but child's law if more favorable). 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 17, 1936) W. 1936, no. 721 
(speaking of a case where both parties were of the same foreign nationality 
at the time of birth of the child). 
6 Finland: Law of December 5, 1929, § 20. 
Codigo Bustamante: art. 64 as to the name of the child. 
7 Japan: Law of June 15, 1898, art. r8; China: Law of Aug. 5, 1918, arts. 
16, 17. For details see infra p. 659. 
8 2 HALSBURY ( 1938) 583 no. 804. 
9 Rb. Haag (Nov. 29, 1934) W. 1936, no. 652 (authority of the mother 
acknowledged under German law, while under Dutch law a guardian ought 
to have been appointed). 
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Whether the child bears the name of the mother/0 and 
whether the mother's husband may give his name to the 
child; 11 
Whether it shares her domicil by force of law; 12 and 
The question of alimentary duties of each party. 
As the above-mentioned conflicts rules differ greatly from 
those on legitimacy, a court may have to consider a person 
an illegitimate child of his mother under one law and a legiti-
mate child of his father under another law, as, for instance, 
by German conflicts rules, where the father is of Finnish na-
tionality and the mother a German.13 This split result ap-
proaches American principles.14 Equally surprising is the out-
come in a French case where a Polish man and an Italian 
woman both recognize their child. By the father's recogni-
tion the child acquired Polish nationality, and consequently 
Polish law was applied; under Polish municipal law the 
mother had authority to act in the name of the child, while 
under her own Italian law this authority would have be-
longed to the father.15 
The inclination of French courts to apply French law 
against all their own principles has inspired one of the most 
objectionable decisions of the Court of Cassation. A French 
mother recognized her illegitimate daughter, after the lat-
ter's marriage to an Englishman had made her a British sub-
ject, and sued for support. Although a reciprocal action of 
the daughter would have been determined (and denied) by 
1o C6digo Bustamante art. 64 (law of child). 
11 German courts and prevailing doctrine, see RG. (Nov. 23, 1927) 119 
RGZ. 44; NUSSBAUM, IPR. 175; RAAPE 497 ff. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 25, 1923) W. 11072. 
Contra: the Czechoslovakian Law of 1948 on private international law, 
§ 28, referring to the national law of the child. 
12 HABICHT 158. 
13 RAAPE 500. 
14 Suf>ra pp. 601-603. 
15 Triv. civ. Nice (Feb. 2, 1903) Clunet 1903, 859. Cf. Italian C. C. (1865) 
art. 184 par. 2. 
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English law, the mother's claim for aliments was granted 
under French law, which, in the court's conception, conferred 
upon the mother "an imprescriptible right of recognizing the 
child." 16 The fact that the affection of this mother for her 
daughter was evidently discovered only after about twenty 
years when wealth had come to the latter should exclude any 
equitable considerations that might otherwise move a court. 
Change of status. As a rule, a change of the personal law 
on which the choice of law depends is determinative, the re-
lationship between mother and child, of course, being de-
termined originally according to the law applicable at the 
time of the birth. Yet, the German Code (EG. article 20) 
reserves application of German law in the case where the 
mother becomes a foreigner and the child remains a German. 
This contrasts unfavorably with the Dutch conceptions under 
which a foreign child retains what rights it acquired by birth, 
although the mother may acquire Dutch nationality and not 
recognize her child according to Dutch law.11 
II. FATHER AND CHILD 17a 
r. Classification 
Today in the domestic laws, some right of a child to sup-
port by his illegitimate father is universally known. The 
nature of the claim varies greatly, however; it may be based 
on a natural obligation, a liability to exonerate the public 
relief organizations from avoidable charges, tortious acts 
accompanying the cohabitation (rape, seduction, etcetera), 
the simple fact of cohabitation itself, or the fact of impreg-
16 Cass. (civ.) (March 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1938, 653, Nouv. Revue 1938, 
120, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 124, criticized by BAT!FFOL, Revue Crit. 1938, 655. 
17 VAN HASSELT, Supplement 32. 
17a An excellent survey of the German conflicts rules on the subject by 
NEUHAUS, Die Verpllichtungen des unehelichen Vaters im deutschen inter-
nationalen Privatrecht ( 1953). On Swiss law, AUBERT, L'action en recherche 
de paternite, 12 Schwz. Jb. (1955) 103 ff. 
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nation. InN orway and Finland, an obligation to pay alimony 
is imposed on any man who has cohabited with the mother 
during the critical period (so-called pay-father), the liability 
being entirely severed from any presumption of paternity. 
In addition to the support for the child, if a man is as-
sumed to be the true father, other incidents may be included 
in the relationship between the parties, such as those concern-
ing the name of the child, care and education, marriage im-
pediments, inheritance rights of the child, alimentary rights 
of the father, et cetera. The municipal laws acknowledge 
more or fewer of such incidents, and some of them establish 
a gradation according to different situations. For instance, 
the Swiss Civil Code includes, besides the ordinary protection 
of children born out of wedlock, the award of "status" to a 
child either by recognition or, in certain cases such as seduc-
tion, by judgment (art. 3 23). A special kind of "illegitimate 
relationship" is created with effects on name, care and educa-
tion, and nationality; courts may even confer parental power 
on the father. Also, the ordinary lawsuit for support may 
vary in correspondence with the varying structure of the 
rights allotted. The child may be provided with a simple ac-
tion for payment of money, or with an action seeking a for-
mal declaration of paternity, or, combining these two types 
of remedy, with a petition for incidental declaration of pa-
ternity constituting res judicata and for adjudication of pay-
ments. 
Many other differences of the municipal regulations have 
made the corresponding conflicts rules a field of utter con-
fusion, often deplored; public policy, playing a dominant 
role, adds complication. 
In most countries, the conflicts rule is unsettled. Where 
statutory provisions exist, they are imperfect or need con-
struction. As a typical example, article 21 of the German In-
troductory Law refers to the mother's national law only for 
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the purpose of determining the support duty of the father. 
Extension of this rule to the entire relation between father 
and child was assumed for a time and embodied in the Polish 
Law of I 926 (article 2 I, paragraph I) .17b Opinion prevail-
ing now prefers for substantial reasons, to take the limita-
tion of the rule literally and to reserve all problems other 
than those related to support to the father's personallaw.18 
An action for support, however, although combined with a 
demand for a preliminary declaratory statement of pater-
nity, is considered to fall under the enacted rule.19 
Recent legislators are aware of the broader sphere of the 
problem. The Finnish Law of I929 establishes different 
rules, the mother's personal law governing generally, while 
the illegitimate father's law determines inheritance rights.20 
The C6digo Bustamante assigns to the personal law of the 
child the rules concerning its right to a name, determining 
the proofs of filiation, and regulating the child's inheritance 
(article 57), but applies the lex fori to the right of mainte-
nance (article 59) .21 Also, a draft of the Greek Civil Code 
made similar distinctions; the Code rejecting them is clearly 
intended to cover the entire ground, like the Polish law.22 A 
similar distinction follows from the Swiss statute, which sub-
jects status questions, especially of domiciled foreigners, to 
the national law (NAG. article 8), but purely alimentary 
17b Greece: C. C. art. 20. 
18 See LEWALD 145 no. 203; RAAPE 529 ff. and IPR. 345; M. WoLFF, IPR. 
218; LG. Konigsberg (May 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 66; OLG. Frankfurt 
am Main (August 15, 1953) StAZ. 1953, 253; OLG. Dusseldorf (March r, 
1957) Ehe und Familie 1957, 182. Contra: NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 176 n. 4, 
against whom 4 FRANKENSTEIN 108 n. 2. 
19 LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Aug. 17, 1932) JW. 1933, 191, IPRspr. 1933, no. 48. 
20 HERNBERG, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 107. 
21 In the French and English translations, 86 League of Nations Treaty 
Series ( 1929) No. 1950, pp. 137, 270, article 59 is incorrectly restricted to 
legitimate children. The French translation of article 57 is mistaken in ren-
dering "legitimidad" by "paternite," 86 ibid. p. 137. 
22 Draft, art. 25 par. 2 (Revue Crit. 1938, 348); see MARIDAKIS, II 
Z.ausl.PR. (1938) 124; C. C. (1940) art. 20. 
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suits, according to general principles, to the law of the de-
fendant's domiciU3 The courts classify the above mentioned 
action for declaration of "status" as a status in the sense of 
the first group, and they therefore treat it as belonging to 
exclusive Swiss jurisdiction. 24 The Dutch H of den Haag 
recognized in 1937 an ordinary Swiss judgment condemning 
a Dutchman as illegitimate father to pay alimony, although 
he would have been able to prove the defense of plurium 
concumbentium (several cohabitants), exonerating him un-
der Dutch, though not under Swiss law; the problem was 
thought to concern the status of the child, determinative in 
the opinion of the Court.25 The Dutch Supreme Court, how-
ever, subsequently held that support is not relative to status, 
because a preliminary declaration of paternity is no more 
than a mere fact; hence, the law of the defendant Dutchman 
was applied.26 
Without doubt, a conflicts rule limited to the duty of sup-
port is insufficient to cover the field, and it may well be that 
the contacts should be chosen differently for support and the 
other incidents of illegitimate parenthood. 
2. Contacts 
The rule applying the law of the place of conception was 
originated by the tort idea in European common law prac-
23 BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503; BG. (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. 
I ros; BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92. 
24 The action is available only against Swiss nationals before Swiss courts; 
see BG. (July 6, 1916) 42 BGE. II 332; BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503; 
BG. (Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 338. Where the defendant is an Italian, 
Italian law governs, and an action for declaration of status, if any, must be 
instituted in Italian courts, Cour de Justice, Geneve (June 21, 1928) 36 SJZ. 
( 1939-1940) 203 no. 141. 
25 Hof den Haag (April 26, 1937) W. 1937, no. 538. 
26 H. R. (April r, 1938) W. 1938, no. 989. For criticism see VAN DER FLIER, 
Grotius 1939, 190 and citations. An analogous decision: Hof Arnhem (Nov. 
15, 1938) W. 1939 no. 299 (illegitimate child born in Czechoslovakia, and of 
Czech nationality, defendant of Dutch nationality; the alimentary duty be-
longs to the patrimonial law; the personal law includes, at the most, the 
declaration of paternity); recently, H. R. (Dec. 2, 1955) N. J. 1956 no. 33· 
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tice 27 and was until recently applied in Sweden. 28 Sometimes, 
the birthplace replaces the less practical place of conception. 29 
Numerous rules subject the entire matter to the law of the 
forum, 3 ') eithe~ because the matter is regarded as of impera-
tive policy or because it lacks a convincing classification. 
Personal law is applied in very different conceptions, as 
determined by: 
The domicil of the mother at the time of the conception 
or birth; :n the domicil of the man 32 at the time of concep-
27 Former German common law: LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Jan. 25, I893) 3 
Z.int.R. (I893) su. 
28 Swedish Sup. Ct. (Hogsta Domstol) (Aug. I8, I9I5) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 
87I (Swedish defendant, cohabitation in Hamburg; exceptio plurium con-
cumbentium admitted according to German law), overruled by H. D. (April 
I3, I946) IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/so) 502 (lex fori). 
29 The Netherlands: H. R. (Feb. 7, I9I9) W. I0393, N.J. I9I9, 322. Italy, 
interprovincial law: Cass. (April 30, I926) Giur. Ita!. I926, I, r, 1055· 
Italy: Cass. (March 6, I953) Rivista I954, 99, Revue Crit. 1954, 37I (in the 
case of a nonrecognizable child). 
30 SAVIGNY § 374 at p. 279 j tr. by GUTHRIE p. 254· 
United States: Restatement §454: "No action can be maintained on a for-
eign bastardy statute." C6digo Bustamante art. 59 (for aliments). 
Austria: OGH. (Feb. I9, I924) 6 SZ. no. 66; OGH. (March 4, I937) I9 
SZ. no. 70; WALKER 8I5 and in I KLANG's Kommentar 328. But see infra n. 
35. 38. 
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June 22, I915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865; 
Criminal and Police Court Copenhague (May 4, I897) IO Z.int.R. (I900) 293. 
Finland: Law of I929, § 2I sentence I (for aliments) ; § 2I sentence 2 (for 
all claims against Finns). 
Norway: Sup. Ct. (Sept. 24, I953) 25 Nordisk Tidsskrift (I955) 49, Clunet 
I955. 456. 
Sweden: Sup. Ct. (April I3, 1946) IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/so) 502j MICHAEL!, 
Internationales Privatrecht (I948) 225 ff.; HuLT, Foraldrar och barn enligt 
svensk internationell privatriitt ( I943) II2 ff. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (June 29, I925) W. II424i but contra 
Hof den Haag (May 20, 1927) W. u8I4i Rb. Maastricht (April 28, I932) 
W. 12684 and almost all other decisions; see infra n. 3 8. 
The Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. I8, Treaty of Montevideo (I940) 
art. 22 provide that the rights and duties concerning illegitimate filiation are 
governed by the law of the state in which they ought to be "effective." 
Similar, Nicaragua C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI ( IO). It is highly obscure as to 
what this means. 
st Domicil of the mother: 
(a) At the time of birth: older Prussian practice, see Gebhardsche Ma-
terialien 2I6. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 5, I956) 82 BGE. II 570, 575, overruling the refer-
ence to the law of the man's domicil at the time of conception, infra n. 33· 
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tion; 33 the domicil of the man as defendant at the time of 
the commencement of the action; 34 the national law of the 
mother; 35 of the child; 36 of both cumulatively; 37 the national 
law of the man; 38 of the man and of the child, cumulatively.39 
(b) At the time of conception: last Prussian practice before 1900 following 
the thoroughly considered Plenary decision of the Obertribunal (Feb. 1, 1851) 
37 Entsch. no. 1; FoERSTER-Eccws 1 Theorie und Praxis des Preussischen 
Privatrechts (ed. 5, 1887) 64; alleged Norwegian practice, but controversial, 
see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 128 and now supra n. 30. 
32 Domicil of the man: 
England: Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] 2 K. B. 90, per Salter, 
]. ; WESTLAKE 105 § 58a concludes convincingly that "the liability of a father 
to maintain his son is determined solely by the law of the father's domicile." 
But BEALE 1433 § 457.2 infers the primary importance of the place "where 
support is needed," meaning probably the domicil of the child. 
Norway: Sup. Ct. (1918) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 873 no. 52. 
33 Switzerland: BG., Civ. Div. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92, follow-
ing BG., Constitutional Division (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. I 105; Bern 47 
ZBJV. 663, no. 43; BG. (April 3, 1952) 78 BGE. II zoo. See ScHNITZER I 429. 
Overruled by the decision supra n. 31. 
34 France: NIBOYET, Notions Sommaires ( 1937) 192 no. 320. Former obiter 
dictum of the Swiss BG. (Oct. 2, 1913) 39 BGE. II 495, 499; BG. (Oct. 22, 
1919) 45 BGE. II 503. 
35 National law of mother: 
Germany: EG. art. 21. 
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 12. 
Czechoslovakia: Draft of Code on International Private Law, § 36 (1), 
adopted by Sup. Ct. Briinn (Dec. 9, 1927) ]W. 1928, 1476; contra the law of 
I 948, see infra n. 36. 
36 National law of the child: 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Aug. 29, 1900) 84 0 Direito 547 (inheritance by 
will). 
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 27 (except 
where both father and mother are domiciled in Czechoslovakia, sentence 2). 
Finland: Law of 1929, § 21 in fine (claims other than for aliments against 
foreigners). 
France: some decisions before the first world war following 5 LAURENT 515, 
523 ff. and other writers; again in increasing consistency: Cass. (req.) (June 
8, 1921) Mihaesco, Revue 1924, 73; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 20, 1925) Tomatis, 
8.1925.1.49, D.I925.1.177, Clunet 1925, 709, Revue 1925, 532; Cass. (civ.) 
(April 1, 1930) D.1930.1.89, Clunet 1930, 973, Revue 1930, Cass. (req.) 
(March 5, 1935) Fernandez, D.1935·1.57, Revue Crit. 1935, 775, Nouv. Revue 
1935, 58; Cass. (civ.) (July zo, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 694; Cass. (civ.) 
(Dec. 8, 1953) Revue Crit. 1955, 133· 
Similar for foreign children: Cass. (civ.) (June 21, 1935) Gaz. Pal. 1935· 
2.348; App. Colmar (June 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1934, 809. 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 2, 1913) W. 9557, Clunet 1920, 
765 (child born in the Portuguese colony of Loanda, Dutch father, Portu-
guese law); Rb. Rotterdam (June 25, 1934) N. ]. 1935, 960 ("constant prac-
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3. Public Policy 
(a) After having produced every possible opinion on the 
subject, the French doctrine now struggles to keep a balance 
between the personal (national) law of the child, which is 
applicable in theory, and the French law which is applied on 
many grounds. In the first place, French law prevails where 
French nationality depends on filiation, since it ought never 
to be based on a foreign law.40 "The question of filiation is 
tice"); Rb. Haarlem (Nov. 2, I926) W. n697 {termination of alimentary 
right). Cf. also I VAN HASSELT 78 j VAN DER FLIER, Grotius I937, I66 j VAN DER 
FLIER, Grotius I939, I90. This practice was overruled by H. R. (April I, 
I938) N. ]. I938 no. 989, cf. infra n. 38. 
Belgium: Cass. (March 20, I94I) Pasicrisie I94I I 86, 10 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
( I944) I72; Cour Gand (March II, I954) Pasicrisie 1955 II 50. 
Codigo Bustamante art. 57 ( cf. art. 59). 
37 National law of mother and child cumulatively: 
Poland: Law of I926, art. 21 (except where both father and mother are 
domiciled in Poland, art. 2I par. 2). 
Writers, especially in Italy, see MoRELLI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1934) 
III 142 no. 476. 
38 National law of defendant: 
Austria OGH. {Feb. 8, 1938) 20 SZ. 64, no. 34· Cf. ibid. 265, no. 128; but 
see for public policy, infra n. 44, and for the statute of I94I, supra n. 35· 
France: Courts in former periods, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 381 n. 2, 
and still App. Poitiers (Jan. 29, I929) Clunet 1929, 1046; SURVILLE 448 no. 
306; NIBOYET 757 no. 645, 763 no. 649, and NIBOYET, Note S.1925.1.305. 
Netherlands: Present prevailing practice, Hof Arnhem (Feb. 26, 1952) N.J. 
1953 no. 507; Rb. Amsterdam (April 8, I954) N. J. I954 no. 639. 
Germany: for problems other than alimentary, see supra n. 18. 
Greece: C. C. { 1940) art. 20. 
Italy: Cass. (Oct. 21, 1925) 17 Rivista (1926) 515; App. Milano {May I2, 
193I) Monitore I93I, 6I2, sanctioned now by C. C. art. 20 par. I, as inter-
preted by the prevailing opinion, MaN ACO, L'efficacia I74; MoRELLI, Ele-
menti 125. 
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 2 {but child's law if more favorable, par. 3). 
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 17 {but Hungarian law if child has 
Hungarian domicil or nationality). 
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 36 {only support). 
39 National law of father and child: 
France: a few decisions after the war, see J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 494 
n. 5· 
Italy: Cass. {April 7, I932) Foro Ita!. Rep. I932, Filiazione 686 nos. 38, 
39; Cass. (July IO, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I45 no. 75· 
4° Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 30, 1920) D.I92I.I.I77, S.I921.1.24I, Clunet 1923, 
89; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, and March 3I, 1930) D.I930.1.II3, S.1930.I.321. 
Cf. GAUDEMET, Rev. Trim. D. Civ. I92I, 2I8; see supra p. 149· This practice 
is now codified by the Code of Nationality of 1945, art. 27. 
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (June 2I, I955) 16 Pasicrisie Lux. 362. 
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absorbed by the higher one of nationality." 41 Only once, in a 
decision of the Court of Paris, does the private law question 
seem to have been duly isolated.42 Where a child is born in 
France, it is thought invested with a provisional French na-
tionality and, for this reason, subject to French law; more-
over, it cannot lose this provisional nationality except by 
French law or a foreign law similar to the French.43 
(b) In an analogous way the law of the forum prevails 
in some other countries, when one party 44 or the defendant 45 
is a subject of the forum, or both parties 46 dwell within the 
forum. The Polish law declares Polish law applicable (in-
stead of the common nationality of mother and child at the 
time of birth), if both father and mother are domiciled in 
Poland at the time of birth and Polish law is more favorable 
to the child.47 German law refuses to impose upon a German 
defendant a duty of support beyond what the internal law 
grants.48 These exceptions to the personal law do not leave 
41 Trib. Nancy (Feb. 13, 1904) D.1904.2.249· 
42 Cour Paris (Nov. 4, 1932); cf. Cass. (civ.) (July 21, 1933) Revue Crit. 
1934, 405 ff., criticized by LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 414 n. I. 
43 Cour Paris (July 2, I926) D. H. 1926. 44I, Clunet 1927, 77· 
44 Austria: OGH. (1938) 20 SZ. 265, no. 128 (dictum). 
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hiijesteret) (June 22, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 865 
and Western Court (Vestre Landsret) (Oct. 4, 1928) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 
924 (mere residence of the father at the commencement of the action suffices 
for application of Danish law). 
The Netherlands: often, although not consistently, see I VAN HASSELT 79 
and Supplement 3I ff. 
45 Switzerland: OG. Ziirich (Oct. 13, 1936) Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. I938, 39, no. 
21. 
46 Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG. 
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 7; LG. Dusseldorf (April 23, 
1951) IPRspr. 195o-51 no. 106 (Norwegian mother and child); RAAPE, IPR 
344 f. (controversial). 
47 Poland: Law of I926, art. 21 par. 2. Similarly Czechoslovakia: Law of 
1948 on private international law, § 27 sentence 2. 
48 Germany: EG. art. 21 last clause: "No greater claims, however, can be 
enforced than what have been constituted by German law." Understood as 
merely protecting Germans, RGR. Kom., n. 2 before § 1705; LG. Hartenstein 
(Nov. I8, 1929) IPSspr. 1930, no. 79· What is the equivalent of an award 
under the German law? See for illustration cases in IPRspr. 1930, nos. 8o-83. 
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 194I, § 12 sentence 2. 
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § 36 par. 2. 
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much space to the pretended principle. There are yet others. 
(c) Where, as between foreign parties, their national law 
excludes suits involving the question of paternity, the action 
is dismissed as a rule by courts following the nationality prin-
ciple. Thus, the Italian provision before 1939, that no ac-
tions lay on the ground of paternity except in the cases of ab-
duction or rape, was observed in Germany, 49 France, et 
cetera. On the other hand, the action is also rejected where 
the national law allows but the municipal law of the forum 
refuses the claim. So long as the famous maxim of the Code 
N apo!Con (article 340) was in full sway that uza recherche 
de la paternite est interdite," foreign children were unable to 
sue their foreign parents in France, 50 and the same prohibi-
tive policy operated in Italy,51 the Netherlands,52 Guate-
mala,53 etcetera. 
The French courts have transferred this doctrine to their 
mitigated provision, as it has stood since 1912.53a No action 
is admitted, unless the precautions and conditions precedent 
provided in the present article 340 are fulfilled, i.e., unless 
paternity appears manifest by written evidence or recogni-
tion. In this opinion, foreign laws more liberal than the 
French offend the public order aiming at "the honor and 
peace of families." 54 Laws which render paternity actions 
still more difficult than the French have free play.55 
49 LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 3I, I931) JW. I932, I4I5 1 IPRspr. I932, no. 93, 
against RAAPE 52I. Dutch parties: no action according to BW. arts. 338, 342 
par. I, 343 par. I, 344, LG. Leipzig (Sept. 23, I933) IPRspr. I933, no. 49· 
But see below n. 63. The new Italian C. C. (I938) art. 267, C. C. (I942) art. 
269, recognizes four grounds for action. 
50 Contra, 2 FIORE 272 no. 733, 279 no. 739, 283 no. 741. 
51 FEDOZZI 496. 
52 BW. art. 342 par. I. In accordance, Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 4· 
53 MATOS 324 ff. nos. 27I 1 272. 
53nThe law of July IS, I955 has further amended the Code civil, espe-
cially by granting a claim for support to adulterous and incestuous children. 
54 Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 20, I925) S.I925.1.49; and in most definite manner 
Cass. (civ.) Rohmann c. Kellerhals es-qual (March 26, I935) S.I936.I.89, 
D.I935·I.6I, Nouv. Revue 1935, 58, Revue Crit. I935, 768; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 
30, I938) Gaz. Pal. I939.I.203, Nouv. Revue I938, 838. 
55 See the criticism of BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1934, 618; ibid. I935, 617. 
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To illustrate special points, domestic provisions respect-
ing the time limit within which the child's conception is pre-
sumed are often held to be imperative. The old Prussian 
practice did not follow this view; whether the European com-
mon law, determining the time as running from the 3ooth to 
the I82nd day, or the Prussian Landrecht, fixing it from the 
2 85th to the 2 I Oth day should be applied, was determined 
according to the domicil of the mother.56 But the courts of 
Austria 57 and France 58 refused to deviate from their own 
rules. Also, whether a defendant whose cohabitation is 
proved may raise the defense of several cohabitants is de-
cided by contradictory rules, according to the personal law or 
the lex fori,S 9 etcetera. 
Reasonably, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that 
the exception allowed the defendant cohabitant under article 
3 I 5 of the Swiss Code, that the child's mother led a frivo-
lous life, does not imperatively operate against a foreign na-
tional law, since such dissimilarities are to be borne under the 
principle of territorialism (meaning domicil) dominating the 
Swiss international private law.60 
Finally, the award of alimony often is either simply con-
56 Prussian Obertribunal, 54 Striethorst 47, no. 12. 
57 OGH. (March 4, 1937) 19 SZ. no. 70, applying Allg. BGB. § 163. 
58 France: after the time determined in C. C. art. 340, a suit is not taken in 
hand, even though the child acquired French nationality only after the end of 
it; Cass. {req.) (July 15, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 151; Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 
1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82. Cf. NmOYET, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; BATIFFOL, 
Revue Crit. 1935, 622; ibid. 1938, 83; see also the criticism by COSTE-FLORET, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 129 no. 64. Contra: Cour Paris (March 14, 1952) Revue 
Crit. 1952, 325. 
59 Personal Law: Also on this point the Prussian courts comtantly applied 
the domiciliary law of the mother; see I REHBEIN 84, no. 23. Germany: per-
sonal law of the mother against foreign defendants, see LEWALD 144, 146 If.; 
RAAPE 513. Lex fori: Austria: OGH. (Feb. 19, 1924) 6 SZ. 152 no. 66, and 
WALKER 818 n. 59, declaring the rejection of exceptio plurium concumbentium 
(Allg. BGB. § 163) as imperative, contra: OGH. (Sept. 21, 1946) OJZ. 1947, 
uo, 15 Z.ausi.PR. (1949/so) 466; OGH. (March 3, 1948) 21 SZ. (1946-48) 
no. 77, 15 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1949/so) 467. 
On the Dutch controversy, supra pp. 659-660. 
60 BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 94· 
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN 
trolled by the law of the forum, 61 or, even if the personal law 
is primarily applied, the usual amounts of support are con-
sidered as the maximum 62 or, conversely, the minimum.63 
By the latter consideration, a foreign law granting little or 
no support is eliminated as inhuman or scandalous. 
What persons may be liable to support the child, 64 or in 
what circumstances the right to institute the action is for-
feited or lost by limitation,65 has been held subject to the per-
sonal law. 
4· Time Element 
If the law of the place of birth or the mother's personal 
law at this date obtains, it is implied that a pregnant girl 
who, before confinement, changes her nationality by marriage 
or otherwise, or changes her domicil, respectively, will 
thereby affect the fate of the child she gives birth to after-
wards, unless the child acquires a nationality of its own by 
jus soli. On the other hand, a change in the local connections 
61 The lower Dutch courts applied the personal law of a natural father or 
of the minor child to the question who had to sue for the child; but the 
Supreme Court, H. R. (June 13, 19Z4) W. IIZ95 declared the appointment of 
a special curator under art. 344h of the Dutch BW. indispensable. 
6 2 France: Most decisions take it for granted that French law is applicable; 
Trib. Seine (June 18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619. BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 
431 praises the prudence of Cass. (civ.) (July 20, 1936) Gaz.Pal.1936.2.696, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 65, Revue Crit. 1937, 694 because the court speci-
fies the characteristics of § 1708 of the German BGB. which make the section 
inapplicable in France. 
Germany: RAAPE 5z1 contends that an award under foreign law which 
would ruin the defendant should not be given. Contra: Italy: FEDOZZI 496. 
63 Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG. 
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) JW. 1934, 2644, IPRspr. 1934, no. 7 (English 
mother and child); AG. Kehl (Sept. 22, 1935) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 
242 (Luxemburg); LG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Old 
Rumania). 
Contra: Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 11, 1933) Clunet 1933, 1041 
(Belgian public order not interested). Germany: LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 31, 
193 I) ]W. 1932, 3831. 
64 German LG. Hartenstein (Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79 (paternal 
grandfather liable under Swiss law). 
65 Swiss BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503, 505. 
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of the person whose personal law at birth is decisive does not 
affect alimentary duties as once established or denied. 66 The 
Polish law generalizes this rule so as to include all relations 
between father and child.67 
French courts followed this rule until the first World 
War 68 and occasionally later up to 1920.69 As, however, the 
cases became more frequent where a child changed its nation-
ality between its birth and a judgment for alimentation, the 
highest Court developed a peculiar doctrine amounting to the 
following rules: A foreign child acquiring French nationality 
is subjected to French law.70 A child of French nationality 
changing to foreign citizenship is also subject to French law 
on the ground of the theory of vested rights.71 This theory 
"turns so as only to protect the lex fori," 72 a purpose which 
seems disproportional to the fact that the French law is back-
ward on this point and puts the child at a disadvantage. 
No such questions arise in this country, as each court ap-
plies its own state statute. 
5· Renvoi 
In this particular field, the German statute has omitted to 
provide for renvoi. It has been applied nevertheless/3 against 
some opposition.74 
66 Swiss BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89. 
Germany: RAAPE 514; same, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 454ff. 
Italy: Cass. (Dec. 2, 1933) Foro Ita!. I934.I.683. 
67 Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21. 
68 VALERY I I45 no. 807; BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 4IO no. 35; 3 ARMIN JON 55 
no. 47• Cf. J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 38I. 
69 Cour Paris (Dec. 22, I92o) S.1921.2.97· 
7° Cass. (req.) (June 8, 1921) Mihaesco, Revue I924. 73; Cour Paris 
(March 27, 1933) Contardo, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; Cass. (req.) (July IS, 
1936) Contardo c. Chaffy, Revue Crit. 1937, I 52; Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937) 
Roure c. Maumy, Revue Crit. 1938, 82; Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 1949) Revue 
Crit. 1950, 65, Clunet I950, 180. 
71 Cass. (civ.) (June 28, I932) Revue 1932, 685 at 688, Clunet I933• 368; 
Cass. (civ.) (May 27, I937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82. 
72 J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 499· 
73 AG. Stuttgart (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. I93I, IS7, IPRspr. I93I, no. 87 (Amer-
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In the French system, adopted in many countries, acknowl-
edgment of a child by father or mother must precede any 
claim of rights on the ground of illegitimate relationship and 
moreover is a condition of legitimation. In another phase, 
recognition may improve the situation of an illegitimate child 
without reaching full legitimation (Greece, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and others) or only exclude the exceptio plu-
rium concumbentium (Germany) . We are dealing therefore 
not with one but several distinguishable institutions of pri-
vate law. 
I. Formalities 
Formalities, which greatly differ, 75 would be expected to 
suffice if complying with the place where the act of recogni-
tion occurs.76 But the rule ((locus regit actum" is challenged 
by the personal law. Dominant opinion in France, in par-
ticular, requires a formal "authentic" declaration such as is 
usual in France when a Frenchman recognizes a child abroad 
and lets the local regulation determine only what solemnity 
"authentic" documents ought to have. 77 
In the Restatement, § 140, the law of the parent's domicil 
ican mother: the American courts, applying the law of the forum, are 
deemed to approve of the domiciliary court doing the same, following an 
opinion of the writer); LG. Flensburg (Dec. 17, 1952) MDR. 1953, 298, Revue 
Crit. 1953, 792. Also the French App. Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924, 
410 seems to apply New York law because the father still was domiciled in 
New York. 
74 See RAAPE, IPR. 340; ECKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 242. 
75 For the United States see 4 VERNIER § 244. 
76 Swiss BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941, no. 9 at 23 If. 
77 Trib. civ. Pau (May 13, 1888) Clunet 1893, 858. Less clear Cass. (req.) 
(Aug. 2, 1897) D.1898.1.377, S.1900.1.283, Clunet 1898, 127 (Frenchman 
recognizing his child in Singapore by a "testamentary letter," a kind of will 
unknown to and invalid under English local Ia w). 
Contra: LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE 376 no. 347· 
Germany: RAAPE 520 advocates the local form, but at 522 the personal law 
respecting the question whether recognition can be made in a private wiii. 
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seems to extend to all questions including formalities. Prob-
ably, this is the actual law. 78 
2. Substantive Requirements 
The personal law seems to be universally applied. It does 
not have to be the same law, however, that governs the ali-
mentary obligation. Prevailingly, the domicil 79 or the na-
tionality 80 of the recognizing parent is determinative, smce 
78 Cf. Richmond v. Taylor ( 1913) 151 Wis. 633, 139 N. W. 435, and 2 
BEALE 7II, § 140.1. 
79 U. S. Restatement§ 140; Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (zd) 464; In 
re Forney (1919) 43 Nev. 227, 184 Pac. 206, 186 Pac. 678; Eddie v. Eddie 
(1899) 8 N.D. 376,79 N. W. 856; 2 BEALE 7II § 140-1. (the laws of mother 
and child are not to be consulted, because the act is beneficial for the status of 
the child). 
Former Pruss ian law: Prussian Obertribunal (April II, 1856) 32 Entsch. 
kgl. Ob. Trib. 401 no. 51 (recognition by a minor domiciled at a place under 
Prussian law executed in a territory of French-Rhenish law was invalid 
according to Prussian law. The court notes, at 406, as singular that the rec-
ognition would have been valid according to Rhenish law, and would have 
bound the minor as a confession of impregnation under Prussian law, if 
executed in a territory of the latter law; it regrets a hardship caused "by the 
conflict of heterogeneous legal systems." This adds an argument to the adop-
tion of the lex loci actus. But, today a court would establish an extraterri-
torial confession, although the declaration was made abroad). 
80 Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Feb. 8, 1896) Clunet 1896, 1080, 
70 0 Direito 13, Ap. Civ. no. 141. 
France: dominant practice from 1892 on, see J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 495; 
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 17, 1899) S.I899.I.I77, D.I899.1.329; Cour Paris (April 
30, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1935, 70; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. 14; 
and now confirmed by Cass. ( civ.) (March 8, 1938) Fontaine c. Pulteney, 
Nouv. Revue 1938, 120, Revue Crit. 1938, 653. The Swiss Federal Trib. (BG). 
(] une 20, 1929) 55 BGE. I 147, 149 remarks that this theory is necessitated 
by the effect of the recognition on procuring the child French nationality. 
Contra (law of child): Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1949) Revue Crit. 1950, 
zoo; Cour Nancy (Jan. 13, 1955) Clunet 1955, 404, Revue Crit. 1955, 525. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 2, 1951) Pasicrisie 1952 III 7; DEVos, 
Probleme 197. 
Germany: RAAPE 523, III 3 (a). 
Greece: App. Athens no. 445 ( 1896) Clunet 1897, 621. 
Italy: Cass. (April 7, 1932) Foro Ital. Rep. 1932, 686 nos. 36 and 39; Cass. 
(July 10, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145, no. 75· 
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 22, 1909) 3 5 BGE. I 668, 67 5; Just. Dep., BBl. 
1939, II 283 no. II (a former Swiss national, naturalized in Canada, cannot 
adopt children in Switzerland complying with Swiss law only). Correspond-
ingly, the BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941, no. 9 at 23 has applied NAG. art. 
28 to the recognition by a Swiss father domiciled in France, thus determin-
ing the effects by renvoi under Swiss law. 
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the conditions of an act burdening its author and particularly 
his capacity should depend upon his law. Hence, even courts 
which subject the alimentary action to the law of the child or 
consider this law cumulatively proclaim the rule. Neverthe-
less, sometimes the law of the child, 81 or the cumulated laws 
of the parent and child, 82 or the child's law limited to the 
capacity and consent of the child, 83 have been adopted or ad-
vocated. In the only American case that is known to be in 
point, 84 Italian law, being that of the child's domicil, was ap-
plied, and on this basis the court held it sufficient that the 
father, newly immigrated, had executed a power of attorney 
in Philadelphia and sent it to Italy, whereupon his agent rec-
ognized the child formally in Italy. The fact that the man 
had been domiciled in Italy, at least until a short time before, 
and for the time being perhaps was merely resident in this 
country, may have influenced the decision. But it would be 
reasonable to recognize the validity of a recognition sufficient 
by the child's law where, as in this case, the parent practically 
makes an appearance in the child's country. Still more can be 
said in favor of giving the child those remedies for opposing 
a recognition, or for contesting its validity, which the child's 
own law provides.85 
st C6digo Bustamante art. 57· 
Among French writers, recently, NmOYET 769 no. 650 and Traite 478 (but 
French law if only one party is French!); LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE 380 no. 
349; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I93S, 655 and Traite 53 I (insists on this opinion 
even after the decision of the court of cassation of March S, I938). See 
supra n. So. 
82 United States: TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in 
the Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 5S9 at 6I2. 
France: Some decisions and writers, see WErss, 4 Traite 46, 3 ARMIN JON 53 
no. 44 ff., AuoiNET, Note S.I920.2.65. 
Belgium: PoULLET 466 no. 392; Nove lies Belges, 2 D. Civ. 6I9, no. 587. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI, 2 Rivista (I907) II5; DIENA, 2 Prine. ISI; CAVAGLIERI 
244 ff. 
83 Japan: Law of June IS, IS98, art. IS. 
China: Law of Aug. 5, I9IS, art. I3 (speaking of "recognition"). 
84 /n re Moretti's Estate (I932) I6 D. & C. (Pa.) 7I5, commented on by 
TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (I94o), supra n. S2, at 6I2. 
85 Italy: Cass. (April 7, I932) Foro Ita!. Rep. (I932) 6S6 nos. 3S and 39· 
The Netherlands: VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 634 no. 195. 
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3· Scope 
The personal law determines: 
Who may recognize, e.g. after the parent's death; 
Under what conditions; 86 
Whether before the child's birth, and whether after its 
birth; 
Whether the child must have reached a certain age; 
Whether the child's consent is required; 
Whether adulterine children can be recognized and under 
what conditions; 87 
Under what conditions and by whom a recognition may be 
contested; 88 
And, as submitted earlier, all effects of recognition.89 
86The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (Jan. 27, I9I3) W. 9438 and (May 2, 
I913) W. 9557 (paternal recognition under foreign law during the lifetime 
of the mother without her consent recognized, although prohibited by BW. 
art. 339). 
87 Bruxelles (July I5, I904) I7 Pand. Per. (Belg.) I904, no. 859, Novelles 
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 6I9 no. 586 (recognition abroad under foreign laws valid); 
in accordance: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 2, 195I) Pasicrisie I952 III 7; 
Cour Nancy (Jan. I3, I955) Clunet I955, 404; public order is advanced by 
AUDINET, Revue 19I7, 5I6 at 527; POULLET 509 no. 390. 
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 24, I926) Clunet I928, 710 (Russian recogniz-
ing Italian child, Soviet Russian law); App. Colmar (Nov. 28, I93o) Clunet 
I932, 470 (German law; on the person entitled to contest); Cass. (civ.) 
(Jan. I7, I899) S.I899.1.I77, 8 D. H. I899.1.329, Clunet 1899, 546, and Cass. 
(req.) (Jan. 9, I9o6) Revue I907, I54 (case of Bourbon de Bari, Italian 
law); much criticized by the critics, ANZILOTTI, 3 Rivista (I9o8) I7I, Note, 
and WEISS 4 Traite 73, 75; PILLET, Note, S.I899.1.177 and BARTIN, Note, 
D. H. I899.1·334, among others, were of different opinions). 
Germany: LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Aug. 17, 1932) JW. 1933, I9I, IPRspr. 
I933, no. 48 (in application of EG. art. 2I, sentences I and 2 held that the 
recognition cannot be annulled but recovered as undue enrichment). 
Switzerland: BG. (July 7, I949) 75 BGE. II 177, I83; BG. (March 16, 
1950) 9 Schwz. Jahrb. (I952) 242. 
89 Switzerland: NAG., art. 8 par. I. 
The Netherlands: Arbitration Court for maritime accident insurance (Feb. 
26, 1938) 42 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) 69 no. I0992 (recognition under German 
BGB. § 17I8 does not constitute a relationship of the character required for 
a right for damages by law on maritime accidents). 
France: in the case of Cass. (civ.) (March u, I936) Revue Crit. 1936, 714 
with Note by NIBOYET ( ?) , 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I3I no. 66 with Note by 
CosTE-FLORET, recognition made in Saigon, Indo-China, by an English father 
was considered invalid on the ground of English law, but treated as a confir-
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN 
The eHect of acknowledgment or recognition on the prob-
lems of succession upon death, in any consistent rule, should 
be determined by the same rule as that governing the for-
mation of the act, 90 unless the inheritance statute either re-
jects dl!,,.!ren born out of wedlock 90a or admits illegitimate 
children irrespective of recognition 91 or irrespective of a 
recognition other than as specified by the statute itself.92 
IV. MoTHER AND FATHER 
Modern statutes determine expressly the law under which 
an illegitimate mother may sue the procreator or cohabitant 
for the costs of pregnancy, delivery, and support. Again, they 
may variously refer to the laws of the mother,93 the mother 
and child,"' or the defendant. 95 Courts without express stat-
utory provisions will incline to the law of the forum.96 
A problem of classification ought to be reported in this 
connection. French practice gives the mother an action 
mation of the natural obligation imposed on the illegitimate father in French 
conception. The court applied French law without considering the conflicts 
problems involved which are new and doubtful. 
90 See supra p. 635 and infra pp. 7oo-705. 
noa In re Vincent's Estate (1947) 71 N. Y. S. (2d) 165 (Irrelevance of 
recognition under Haitian law because illegitimate children are excluded 
from any inheritance under New York law). 
91 United States: Moen v. Moen (1902) 16 S. D. 210, 92 N. W. 13 (since 
under the South Dakota law every illegitimate child inherits, it is entirely im-
material what right Norwegian law attached to the recognition). 
92 Van Horn v. Van Horn (1899) 107 Iowa 247, 77 N. W. 846 (a notorious 
recognition suffices under the Iowa inheritance law, irrespective of the sig-
nificance given the recognition in New Jersey). 
93 Germany: EG. art. 21. 
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 21; MARIDAKIS, Revue Crit. 1938, 347 indicates 
as motive of the draft, that the mother needed protection. 
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 27 par. I 
sentence 1. 
94 Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21. 
95Japan: Law of June 15,1898, art. 21. 
China: Law of Aug. s, 1918, art. r6. 
96 E.g., the Netherlands: Law of the mother: Amsterdam (Dec. 13, 1929) 
W. 12193; Rb. Groningen (May 21, 1932) W. 1932, 12479 (law of the place of 
cohabitation-in the Netherlands). Rb. den Haag (Nov. 29, 1934) W. 1936, 
no. 652. For former views see KosTERS 542. 
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against the father, ostensibly on the ground of a tort con-
sisting in the illegitimate intercourse, but actually as a sub-
stitute for the remedies of support missing in the written law. 
The courts award the woman, together with her own dam-
ages, alimony on behalf of the child. Under which conflicts 
rule should such a claim be subordinated in a non-French 
jurisdiction whose municipal law establishes for the analo-
gous purposes specific family obligations? A reasonable an-
swer should eliminate all technical legal constructions and 
envisage the social purpose of the claim. The adequate con-
flicts rule to deal with these institutions is evidently bound to 
be independent from tort considerations as well as from a 
narrow meaning of "family" law, going directly to the ques-
tion of what an illegitimate mother is entitled to demand 
from her cohabitant.97 It follows that, if the cohabitation 
took place in France, French and German courts should ap-
ply to a French mother the French remedy, and if the facts 
occurred in Germany, the German family law.98 
The French courts, however, oppose to the German law 
their u ordre public." 99 
V. CoNcLusiONs 
The state of chaos reported in this part could easily be re-
duced by a simpler, if not uniform, approach. The legiti-
mate family ought not to be denied a unified legal regulation; 
it was an entirely sound idea that the law of its head should 
govern all relations of the family. The two main objections 
to this axiom raised in the last decades are unconvincing. One 
of these objections is associated with the nationality principle 
in Continental Europe. In view of the modern trend toward 
97 To this extent the theory of the writer, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 265 has been 
approximately allowed by NEUNER, Der Sinn 110 and RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 
IV 52& to 533· 
98 NEUNER and RAAPE (precedent note) seem to draw more radical con-
clusions. 
99 App. Douai (March 1, 1939) Bull. In st. Int. 1940, 81 no. 11032. 
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granting separate nationalities to married women and chil-
dren, the conclusion is popular that the national law of the 
father must yield its dominant role; that it must either con-
cur with the children's laws or even give way to them com-
pletely. This may be logical, but it amounts to a new in-
road upon the nationality principle itself. This principle, 
then, is no longer, if it ever was, suitable as the main vehicle 
of conflicts law. It will be abolished some day. So long as it is 
maintained, however, the objection should be disregarded. 
The only practical method consists in determining the events 
affecting the life of the family according to the national law 
of the father and, after his death, that of the mother. The 
other reason for opposing the rule of the parent's law has 
been derived from the need of the child to be protected. We 
have tried to show that the benefit of the child ought to be 
protected by all legislatures and all courts rather than exclu-
sively by the law and the jurisdiction to which the child be-
longs, often only accidentally. Conflicts law must presuppose 
equality among the particular national laws, statutes, and 
tribunals. 
Consequently, it is natural that in the countries devoted 
to the principle of domicil the law of the domicil of the fam-
ily head at the birth of the child determines the latter's legiti-
macy; furthermore, his law at the time of a legitimation or 
adoption governs the conditions and effects of such acts, as 
at later dates it indicates the rights and duties following from 
legitimate father-child relations. The inheritance law of a 
domicil acquired after legitimate birth, legitimation, or adop-
tion ought not to change any of their effects, unless there 
is a distinct, exceptional public policy, either prohibitive or 
permissive, at the forum of inheritance. 
The only question less definitely answerable by theoretical 
and practical considerations is concerned with the American 
peculiarity of ascribing different positions to a child with re-
PARENTAL RELATIONS 
spect to his father and his mother. The ideas and conse-
quences of this peculiarity have not been fully explained, to 
the knowledge of the writer. 
Entirely different is the nature of the problems arising 
from illegitimate filiation; French and other conflicts laws 
should not have formed a category of "filiation" compre-
hending all children. Of course, any act of acknowledgment 
or recognition by a parent is governed simply by the law of 
this parent. Moreover, something can be said for the per-
sonal law of the mother with respect to her relationship to 
the child. But the relations to the procreator which are de-
rived from conception, birth, or cohabitation cannot be re-
ferred, without artifices, to the place where any one of the 
three persons involved was domiciled, or was a national, and 
still less to the contacts at the time of the action. As it is very 
important for the purpose of a serviceable conflicts rule not 
to base it on any special domestic construction of the liabili-
ties or the rights of the parties, the simplest contact, viz., 
with the place of the birth, is the most commendable. The 
danger that, before giving birth, the mother may move to a 
locality where the law is unfavorable to her or the child, is 
negligible; an improvement for the child is welcome. 
These suggestions are not meant, however, to supersede 
the system under which bastardy proceedings are now au-
thorized in this country. Support is awarded under similar 
considerations throughout the country, and interstate rela-
tions are the only ones to be considered. Hence, the chief con-
cern is with jurisdiction, which naturally is found at the fa-
ther's domicil as well as where personal jurisdiction over him 
is obtained at the mother's domicil. Every court applies its 
own law. 
Lex fori, as a matter of fact, can be defended in this doc-
trine with comparatively better justification than anywhere 
else. In international matters, however, it should be avoided. 
CHAPTER 17 
Adoption 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
I. Definition of Adoption 
I N some archaic civilizations, including the Greek, Ro-man, and Japanese, adoption has been the means of continuing a house and ancestor cult threatened with ex-
tinction. Hence, the original type of this institution implies 
that the adoptive son be considered exactly in the position of 
a veritable legitimate male issue (Greek: v16s vfr6s, made 
son). In much later periods, adoption was used with the pri-
mary object of securing the welfare of a child. In this appli-
cation, the class of persons capable of participating in the 
transaction was considerably enlarged (e.g., to include fe-
male adopters), and new varieties of adoption were intro-
duced, with restricted effects, particularly in that the rights 
to be acquired by the adopter would be limited to care and 
education. 
As a result, the national legislations present a much varied 
picture. In a number of countries, such as Portugal and 
Paraguay, adoption has never been introduced. The re-
cent Civil Code of Guatemala abolished the formerly ex-
isting institution of adoption, because it had led to misuse 
by despoiling the assets and exploiting the labor of mi-
nors.1 In most of the world, however, adoption in one 
form or another has been recognized by statute. The com-
mon law countries, including England, finally have followed 
this trend. However, many legislators have thought that they 
1 MATOS 394 no. 277. 
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had to surround the institution with formidable obstacles, 
while a strong modern current favors adoption as the best 
means of caring for destitute children. New adoption laws 
in France 2 and many other countries,3 which facilitate adop-
tion through careful investigations by advisory offices, evi-
dence this tendency. 
The variety of policy considerations behind the national 
legislations is amazing. The Roman requirements implied by 
the saying, uadoptio imitatur naturam," have suggested 
many rules regarding age and family conditions of the par-
ties, but these rules often also have been rejected as for in-
stance in the Code Napoleon which prohibited any adoption 
of minors in order to protect infants against exploitation. 
This rule, recently repealed in France and Belgium, still ex-
ists in other countries. On the other hand, only infants may 
be adopted in England, Sweden, and some of the United 
States. Southwest Africa requires that the sixteenth year be 
not completed. Other fundamental differences characterize 
the effects of "adoption." In this country, some statutes de-
clare that the adopted person is to be considered a legitimate 
child to all legal intents and purposes, but others follow the 
French method of enumerating the specific rights and duties 
affected. Although the latter method is generally accom-
panied by broad construction of the statutory texts,4 the re-
sults are not necessarily in favor of a standard of full legiti-
macy. Contrary to general custom, by some laws the natural 
father retains parental power, and by American and some 
foreign statutes adoption does not preclude marriage with 
2 France: Law of June 19, 1923, July 29, 1939, and August 8, 1941. 
8 Argentina: Law no. 13,252 of September 23, 1948. 
Belgium: Law of March 22, 1940. 
Chile: Laws No. 5,343 of 1934, and No. 7,613 of 1943. 
Ireland: Law of April 29, 1952. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) arts. 291 fl.; etc. 
The Netherlands: Arts. 344i-3440 B. W., as added by Law of Jan. 26, 1956. 
4 4 VERNIER 406, §§ 261 fl. 
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the adopter. The child's name is subject to many variations. 
The statutes also exhibit the greatest diversity with respect 
to the rights of intestate inheritance from and by the 
adopted parent, the child, and the natural family. 
An important difference consists in the fact that in many 
laws the private contract effecting an adoption is construed 
as the very core of the transaction, the state acting only to 
authorize the agreement, while in othe~ statutes the official 
decree ordering adoption on a party's application constitutes 
the essence of the act. In the latter case, the decree may be 
granted either as an act of discretionary power or as cor-
responding to a right of the parties who have complied with 
the legal conditions of adoption. Validity and revocability of 
the transaction depend largely upon these premises. 
Finally, the state agencies intervening differ, and official 
action either precedes or follows the private agreement. 
Thus, adoption forms an exemplar of the difficulties that 
may present themselves in formulating a uniform definition. 
As a matter of fact, the description of adoption given in the 
Restatement as a "relation of the parent and child created by 
law between persons who are not in fact parent and child," 5 
is certainly too narrow, since in a number of legislations 
parents may adopt their natural children. If taken literally, 
this definition seems also to exclude all those institutions 
bearing the name of adoption that do not grant as respects 
both parties the full status of parent and child. Is this the 
real meaning, and, if so, is it right? 
A clear answer to these questions would facilitate the dis-
cussion of certain problems concerning succession upon death 
by and from foreign adopted children. In the midst of this 
confused discussion, a well-elaborated American decision 
ventured to proclaim that "A person is either adopted or 
5 Restatement § 142 comment a. 
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not; a woman is either married or not. . . . there is no such 
thing as a limited status of adoption." 6 This is manifest 
error and a very prejudicial one. A woman is indeed either 
married or unmarried, and, likewise, a child is legitimate or 
illegitimate, but there are adopted children of totally dif-
ferent kinds. It is of primary importance that each type 
should be understood and recognized according to its merits. 
No wonder that it is hard to know what is meant by adop-
tion in every one of the national conflicts rules. At any rate, 
the concept of adoption held in the municipal law of the 
forum is of no direct avail. Instead, a sound construction of 
the existing rules depends to some extent upon their own 
character. When a conflicts rule emerges from the patriarchal 
thinking still characteristic of most family laws and there-
fore simply refers to the law of the adopter, especially the 
father, it is logical to assume that this rule is to be applied 
only to transactions creating a rather complete parent-child 
relation and not to an act exclusively conferring a right of 
inheritance upon the child. Again, if a conflicts rule calls for 
the law of the child only, this rule may embrace those kinds 
of adoption that contemplate only quasi-familial care and 
education. Quite reasonably, a German draft of 1929 pro-
vided for the application of the national law of the child to 
govern foster parenthood,7 though the primary German rule 
determines adoption according to the national law of the 
parent. Thus, the scope of conflicts rules dealing with "adop-
tion" may vary. One limit, however, exists; no institution can 
be designated as adoption, unless it makes the child legiti-
mate in relation to the adopting parent. An "adoption by the 
Nation" of French war orphans is, of course, not recorded 
in a Swiss register of civil status.8 
6 In re Riemann's Estate ( 1927) 124 Kan. 539 at 542, 545, 262 Pac. 16-18, 
confirming the view held in Bilderback v. Clark ( 1920) 106 Kan. 737 at 742, 
189 Pac. 977, 980. 
7 See RAAPE 601 VIII no. 4· 
s Swiss BBl. 1924 II, 29 no. 15. 
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2. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
American writers and the Restatement speak of the "law 
governing adoption as a status"; 9 they probably mean the 
law of the forum at the domicil of a party. However, in his 
treatise, Beale exclusively discusses jurisdiction for adoption. 
American and English co~rts, in fact, appear to be concerned 
not with choice of law problems but only with the question 
what courts have the power to create adoptions with extra-
territorial effect. If so, common law is again in opposition to 
civil law, which sharply distinguishes between jurisdictional 
and conflicts rules and in principle applies foreign statutes. 
In the civil law countries, jurisdiction for adoption does 
not offer much of a problem, since for this purpose foreigners 
usually enjoy the "hospitality" of the courts. It is true that 
access of foreigners to the courts for the purpose of adoption 
was questioned in France/0 but it now seems assured every-
where. A number of countries, however, refrain from taking 
jurisdiction, if the homeland does not approve of it. 
The main question in these countries is concerned with 
choice of law, that is, primarily with selecting the law ap-
plicable to adoption of or by foreigners in the forum, but 
regularly the same conflicts rule suffices to determine recog-
nition of foreign adoptions. 
The difference of method between reference to a foreign 
personal law and simple application of the law of the forum 
seems fundamental. It is tempting to think that the personal 
law is more obviously to be complied with when the whole act 
is thought to be chiefly founded upon the contract of the 
parties. On the other hand, if the act of a governmental 
agency or court is the essentially constitutive part within the 
9 Restatement § 142 (within "status," not "jurisdiction"). Similar MINOR 
221, 222 § 101; STUMBERG 336; Note, "Descent of Foreign Lands to Child 
Legitimated by Adoption," 36 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 85. 
1o The controversy on which see WEISS, 2 Traite 234 was ended by the 
Law of June 19, 1923, amending C. C. art. 345 par. r. 
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structure of adoption, the personal law of the parties may be 
neglected. However, distinctions are not so neat in actual 
practice. In this country, the personal law is never consid-
ered, although the civil law view emphasizing the significance 
of the private contract of adoption has left deep traces in 
many statutes. 
II. ADOPTION OF OR BY FOREIGNERS WITHIN THE FoRUM 
1. Law of the Forum 
(a) United States. Although the cases are known to be 
rather scarce and confused and certainly are contradictory, a 
prevailing opinion seems to be forming to the effect that two 
different grounds for assuming jurisdiction are open to elec-
tion. 
In the first place, it is agreed that a child can be adopted in 
the state of its domicil, irrespective of the domicil and resi-
dence of the adopting parents.11 In the second place, there is 
increasing authority for concurrent jurisdiction of the state 
where the adopting parents are domiciled. The Restatement 
does not approve of this view, except when this state has 
jurisdiction over the person having legal custody of the 
child or when the child is a waif and subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state.12 But the consent of the natural parents or 
the guardian, wherever they may live, should suffice.18 The 
few cases which may be looked to as authority seem to justify 
the unconditional jurisdiction of the adopter's domicil.14 
The domicil of the child as a basis of jurisdiction 15 has, 
however, been questioned. Sometimes, a mere domicil by 
operation of law, locating the child with its natural father or 
guardian, has been held insufficient without actual residence 
11 GoODRICH 448 § 146 n. 51, 52; Restatement§ 142 (a). 
12 Restatement § 142 (b); cf. 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2. 
13 LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 no. 341. 
14 GOODRICH 448 § 146 n. 54· 
15 Strictly required by 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2 and Restatement § 142. 
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at the same place.16 Moreover, actual residence, particularly 
if habitual, has been preferred to a merely formal domicil, 
since the state where the child is dwelling is believed to have 
more ability to control th~ person of the child and to be more 
interested in its welfare.17 In reality, neither domicil nor 
residence, especially in large cities, guarantees that a court 
will be able to exercise effective supervision. On the other 
hand, every court, not excluding that of the adopter, will 
ordinarily be eager to safeguard the well-being of the child.18 
The modern means of communication and the social relief 
agencies facilitate obtaining information. The interest of the 
child's consanguineous family will be better cared for by the 
court of the formal domicil of the child.19 
These principles determine equally the granting of an 
adoption and the recognition of a foreign adoption. 
(b) British Law. Under the British Adoption Act, 1950,20 
an adoption order is not granted, unless the applicant is domi-
ciled and resident in England and the infant is resident in 
England. No provision is made regarding adoptions by Brit-
ish subjects domiciled abroad. Children of foreign national-
ity who, under the Act of 1926, had been excluded from 
adoption proceedings in England can be adopted since 1949. 
It is difficult to believe that no foreign adoption would be 
recognized with respect to British subjects, as has been sug-
gested.21 The implication seems rather to be "that the domi-
cil of the adopter at the time of the adoption is alone rna-
16 Blanchard v. State ex rel. Wallace (1925) 30 N.Mex. 459,238 Pac. 1004. 
17 See esp. STUMBERG 337 ff., who invokes Stearns v. Allen (1903) 183 Mass. 
404, 407, 67 N. E. 349 (child in Massachusetts with technical domicil in Scot-
land); Rizo v. Burruel (1921) 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234; Taylor v. Collins 
(1927) 172 Ark. 541, 289 S. W. 466. 
18 See GOODRICH 448 § 142 n. 55· 
19 Cf. the propositions as to choice of law in England by MANN, "Legitima-
tion and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. ( 1941) u2, 
123 n. 44· 
zo 14 Geo. 6, c. 26. 
2l DICEY (ed. 5) 535 n. u; 2 BEALE § 143.1. Contra DICEY (-WELSH) 468. 
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terial." 22 But certainly hardships are caused by the tenacious 
reluctance of English courts to acknowledge that the adopter 
has transferred his domicil from England to a foreign coun-
try.2a 
In Canada similar restrictions obtain. Indeed, a Canadian 
court has held that the adoption of a child domiciled with 
its natural parents in Alberta and adopted by order of an 
Alberta court, while the adoptive parents were domiciled in 
Saskatchewan, was invalid in the latter province. 24 Must all 
parties be domiciled in the same province? Falconbridge sees 
a solution of this strange conflict only in uniform and recip-
rocal legislation by the provinces grounded on the principle 
of the child's domiciP5 But we may infer that the system of 
exclusive application of the law of the forum tends to absurd 
results, notably in the case where the different jurisdictions of 
the parties do not recognize each other's decrees. In Quebec, 
jurisdiction is granted, if one party is domiciled there.26 
(c) Scandinavian Countries. The domicil of the adopter 
determines the state where adoption must be sought under 
the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. II), 
which also decides expressly that the law of the forum is ap-
plicable (art. 12). With respect to adoptions in other for-
eign countries, the law of the forum governs under the Dan-
ish adoption law of 1923, with certain exceptions for Danes 
adopting abroad and foreign children adopted in Denmark.27 
22 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws-Legitimation by Adoption or Recog-
nition," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, at 39· 
23 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflicts of Laws," x6 Bell Yard (1935) 
4, 6 (a Scotchman resident but not considered "domiciled" in England cannot 
adopt the daughter of his deceased brother, even though the brother was 
domiciled in England and the daughter is resident there). 
24 Culver v. Culver and Gammie [1933] 2 D. L. R. 535, with reference to 
Haultain, C. J. S., in Burnfiel v. Burnfiel (Sask.) [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129. 
25 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171. 
26 Quebec: Adoption Act, R. S. Q. 1941, c. 324, s. 5; cf. x JoHNSON 349· 
2 7 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 54; BORUM 128. 
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More consideration is given to foreign law by the conflicts 
rules of Norway 28 and Sweden. 29 
(d) Law of the forum governing formalities everywhere. 
It is in the nature of a state act, n_ecessary in all countries to 
some extent to effect adoption, that all formalities required 
by the municipal law of the court (or other acting agency) 
must be observed. Also, recognition in another country de-
pends on compliance with the formalities prescribed by the 
law under which the act is alleged to have been performed.30 
Illustration: An oral adoption agreement, completely per-
formed by the adopted person and concluded within the 
state,31 will be given effect as creating a status by a :Missouri 
court of equity, but is regarded as ineffective by a Missouri 
court, if concluded in Rhode Island and invalid according to 
the laws of such state.32 
Courts are naturally inclined to apply this principle with 
enhanced rigor when it comes to determining their own judi-
cial procedure. Under the duty of applying foreign personal 
law, conflicts arise. Thus, German courts, in the case of a 
Soviet Russian adopter, refuse to confirm the contract be-
cause under the Soviet law adoption is created by mere state 
act.33 In applying a foreign law requiring that the court ex-
amine the social advantages enuring to the child by the adop-
tion, German courts even took it for granted that they were 
unable to intervene, because under the German Civil Code 
the courts (other than the court of custody) had only to in-
28 Law of April 2, 1917 as amended by laws of September 23, 1921, and 
May 24, 1935, §§ 29, 30. 
29 International Family Law 1904, c. 6, as amended 1949. 
3o It is sometimes asserted that the parties may constitute an adoption in 
any country according to their personal law, since the maxim locus regit 
actum is only of optional application. But there is no proof of actual force 
of this assumption which overlooks the significance of the administrative act. 
31 Buck v. Meyer (1916) 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997· 
32 Mutual Life of New York v. Benson (1940) 34 F. Supp. 859. 
33 KG. (April 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 67; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 31, 1934) 
]W. 1935, 1190. 
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quire into the fulfillment of certain legal conditions. They 
refused, therefore, to authorize adoptions by French, Ru-
manian, and all other adopters whose personal law requires 
a substantive investigation of the child's benefit by the 
court.34 If, however, a foreign personal law is to be applied 
at all, as prescribed by the German conflicts law, and juris-
diction is not doubtful, the procedure should be adjusted so 
as not to frustrate the purpose of the institution.35 This co-
operative attitude has been recommended in France.36 Re-
markably, the Finnish statute directly provides that formali-
ties essential under the national law of both parties should 
be observed so far as possible. 37 
2. Systems of Personal Law 
(a) Law of the adopter. Still starting from the postulate 
that one sole law should govern a family, many conflicts rules 
determine the substantive requisites of adoption exclusively 
according to the personal law of the adopter.38 As, according 
to the municipal laws, a married person generally needs some 
34 KG. (June 30, 1922) 42 ROLG. x88; KG. (Jan. 15, 1932) 6 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1932) 3II, IPRspr. 1932, no. 98; KG. (March xo, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 
53, and still after a fundamental change of the adoption law by a law of 
November 23, 1933, see decision KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) 13 Jahrb. FG. I75· This 
practice was abandoned however by KG. (Nov. 8, 1935) JW. 1936, 53· 
35 See RAAPE 597; RABEL, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 310. 
36 NIBOYET 776 no. 662. 
37 Finnish Law of Dec. 5, 1929, § 25. 
38 Germany: EG. art. 22 par. 1 (the father). 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 23 (the adopter) ; cf. SULKOWSKI, "Conception 
du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique en Pologne," 41 
Recueil 1932 III 696 ff. 
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 13 par. x. 
Italy: C. C. (1938) Disp. Pre!. art. 10 par. 2 and C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. 
art. 20 par. 2, adding to the text of the final draft-"national law of the 
adopter"-the words: "at the time of the adoption." 
France: App. d'Aix (March 16, 1909) Revue 1909, 642; SuRVILLE 464 no. 
316; 3 ARMIN JON 55 nos, 53, 54· 
Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. x6, 1940) 56 Arch. Jud. 421 
(adoption made in Brazil; Italian law applied to capacity and consent of 
adoptive parent and natural mother of Italian nationality). 
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joint action or consent of the other spouse for adopting a 
child, the situation where. the spouses have different personal 
laws raises difficulties. The principle of personal law is best 
applied to this case, each spouse being distinctively subjected 
to his or her own law.89 
In this system, the child's interests are protected just as 
well or badly as the personal law of the adopter provides. In 
the prevailing construction of the German statutory rules, 
for instance, the personal law of the adopted person is not 
considered, unless he be a German,40 but it follows only that 
the provisions of the internal law of the forum, requiring the 
consent of the child or otherwise protecting it, are applicable. 
Illustrations: (i) Where a German adopts a Danish child, 
the contract of adoption can be made, according to § I 7 50, 
par. I of the German Civil Code, by the child's guardian with 
authorization of the court. As the Danish principle of domi-
cil refers to the local German law, the German court has 
jurisdiction. (KG. (June 7, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. 88.) 
( ii) Adoption of a Swedish illegitimate child by a Ger-
man depends on the consent of the illegitimate mother, ac-
cording to § I 7 4 7 of the German Civil Code, but not subject 
to authorization of the Swedish king as required by Swedish 
law. (RG. (July II, 1929) I25 RGZ. 265, IPRspr. 1929, 
no. 89.) 
(b) Consideration of the child's law. In opposition to ex-
clusive control of the law of the adopter, it has been postu-
lated that the law of the child should govern those require-
ments which may be established for the protection of the 
child's status against hasty or dangerous alterations.41 This 
39 See RAAPE 580, but also 589 (par. 4). 
40 See the decision following in the text; and KG. (June 30, 1922) 42 
ROLG. x88, 189; KG. (Oct. 29, 1926) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 8x; LG. 
Dresden (Dec. 20, 1929) and OLG. Dresden (Feb. x8, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, 
nos. 90, 91. Contra: most writers, see RAAPE 550, 4 FRANKENSTEIN 174· 
41 This theory was prominently developed by BAR 547 § 199 and NIBOYET 
775, 776 no. 659. In different manner: BATIFFOL, x Repert. 252 nos. 3, 5; 
4 FRANKENSTEIN 171. 
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category was understood to include those provisions that re-
quire a certain age 42 or full age 43 of the adopted person, or 
his consent or that of the persons and authorities charged 
with his personal care.44 To the law of the adoptive parent 
are left the requirements concerning the adopter's age, any 
requisite difference in age between the parties, the absence 
of legitimate issue, or other interests of the family into 
which the adopted person is to enter. For instance, adoption 
of natural children by their parents was forbidden by the 
Italian Civil Code of 1865 (art. 205) but permitted by 
French practice.45 As this matter concerns the adopter's 
family, under this principle, an Italian could not adopt his 
own illegitimate child in France. A Frenchman would be per-
mitted adoption of his natural child in Italy, if it were not 
considered contrary to public policy.46 
(c) Exclusive application of the child's personal law. In 
some recent opinions, the law of the child governs exclusively 
all conditions of adoption.47 This thesis is based on the un-
42 WEiss, 4 Traite 113. 
43 When minors could not be adopted in France, before the Law of June 19, 
1923, adoption abroad was considered void; see Trib. Valenciennes (infra 
n. 47). 
~4 ROLIN, 2 Principes 167, 168 nos. 634, 635; PILLET, I Traite Pratique 
651, 652 no. 319; Germany: EG. art. 22 par. 2 (as to German children). 
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, §§ 30, 31. 
Treaties: On Judicial Assistance between Czechoslovakia and Poland of 
Jan. :u, 1949 (3 I U.N. Treaty Series 205) art. 27 par. 2; between Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1951, § 26 par. 2; between Hungary and 
Bulgaria of August 8, 1953, § 27 par. 3, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. (1956) 
487, 493· 
45 Cass. (May 13, 1868) D.1868.1.249· 
,!;6 2 FIORE 310 ff. no. 761; SURVILLE 464 ff. no. 316. 
47 France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 1914) Clunet 1919, 242 (a 
minor girl of French nationality adopted by German parents; the decision 
may have rested also upon French public policy); Cour Paris (Jan. 14, 1926) 
Clunet 1927, 641; Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 10, 1948) Revue Crit. 1848, 108; 
Trib. Civ. Lyon (April 24, 1951) Clunet 1952, 198. Writers limit themselves 
generally to the application of French law to French children. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 22, Nov. 21, 1952) Clunet 1955, 908 
(Dutch adopters, the Dutch law then ignoring adoption); cf. infra n. 48. 
Italy: App. Milano (May 9, 1910) Clunet 1913, 243· 
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warranted identification of the child's law with the law best 
securing its welfare. 
(d) Both laws cumulatively applied. Finally, in one of 
those well-known attempts to cumulate the laws where a 
choice between them seems hard, adoption is said to depend 
on all the requirements stipulated in each law of both the 
parties.48 Such a mechanical addition results in not applying 
any one of the statutes and in impeding a transaction that all 
students of juvenile welfare wish greatly to foster. 
Consideration of the law of a foreign party is accom-
plished in a much sounder way in those statutes that pro-
hibit authorization of adoptions, unless these are recognized 
as valid by the laws of both parties.49 That is, this rule has 
a proper place, provided that recognition is granted in the 
foreign country in a broad-minded spirit without insisting on 
the fulfillment of peculiar domestic requirements. 
Egypt: Trib. Alexandria (I926 no. I84) Clunet I928, III2 (American 
woman adopting a Greek child; Novella I7 of Emperor Leo applied). 
Soviet Russia: Law of January 4, I928, art. 6 (see MAKAROV 42I): where 
adopting and adopted parties belong to different Soviet Republics, the consul 
shall apply the law of the child, if known, otherwise the law of the adopter, 
or, last, what law the adopter demands. 
48 Austria: OGH. (April I5, I930) Zentralblatt I931, I30 no. 33, Clunet 
I932, I98. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Charleroi (April 30, I954) Clunet I955, 904. 
Italy: Prevailing opinion, restricting C. C. ( I942) art. 20 par. 2 to the 
effects of adoption, App. Bologna (Jan. 5, I95I) Monitore I95I, 26o; 
MORELLI, Elementi I27; MONACO, L'efficacia I77· 
Greece: C. C'. ( I940) art. 23 par. I. 
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 35 par. 2. 
Probably of this type Japan, Law of I898, art. I9; China, Law of Aug. 5, 
I9I8, art. I4j Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I940, 
art. 23 (difficult to understand). 
Advocated by BROCHER 333, DESPAGNET 848, 849 no. 284; BARTIN in 9 
Aubry et Rau § 555 at I76, and n. 2; BARTIN, 2 Principes § 276 at I66; DrENA, 
2 Prine. I86; CAVAGLIERI 247; 2 ZITELMANN 883; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I n. 4; 
LEWALD I 53; contra: RAAPE 549· 
49 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § 24 par. 2. 
Norway: Law of April 2, I9I7 with amendments of September 23, I92I, 
and May 24, I935, § 29 par. I. 
Sweden: International Family Law of I904, c. 6, as amended I949, § I 
par. I. 
Switzerland: Just. Dept. June 30, I928, 25 SJZ. So. 
6go PARENTAL RELATIONS 
In the Finnish enactment, it is added that the adoptive re-
lationship, if the adopter is a foreigner, cannot be rescinded 
in Finland, except if the adopter is there domiciled and the 
rescission is recognized in his national country.50 
(e) Special rules on the effect of adoption. In those juris-
dictions where the personal law of the adoptive father gov-
erns the act creating adoption, the same law of the adoptive 
parent may govern the effect of adoption 51 at any later mo-
ment, in the same way as a parent's law governs creation and 
effect of a legitimate parent-child relation. This means that, 
in the case of a change of personal law, later events are gov-
erned by the personal law of the time being. Where, how-
ever, the law of the child is influential in the constitution of 
the family relationship, this law is not appropriate to regu-
late the ensuing relationship within the adoptive family. 52 
Therefore, the statutes involved have mostly restricted the 
child's law to the creation of adoption and applied the par-
ent's law to its effects.53 In another, not more attractive, 
opinion advocated by Italian and French writers, the law of 
the child governs the child's position in its natural family, in-
cluding reciprocal inheritance rights, while the adoptive re-
lationship is determined by the parent's law.54 Pillet has, in 
5 0 Finland: Law of 1929, § 24 par. 2. Similarly, Norway, Law of I9I7, as 
amended, § 30 par. I; Sweden: Law of I904, as amended c. 6, § 2 par. I. 
51 See for example, Germany: EG. arts. 22 and I9j Italy: C. C. (I942) 
Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 2, but see supra n. 48. 
52 This however has been proposed by WEISS, 4 Traite 126; BATIFFOL, I 
Repert. 255 no. 23, and has been adopted in Siam: Law of I939 on private 
international law, § 35 par. 2 sentence 2. 
63 Japan: Law of I898, art. I9 par. 2; China: Law of I9I8, art. I4 par. 2; 
Finland: Law of I929, § 26; Italy: C. C. ( I942) art. 20 par. 2; France: 6 
LAURENT 77 no. 39; SURVILLil 464ff no. 3I6j PILLET, I Traite Pratique 652 
no. 320. Poland: Law of I926, art. I9 par. 2, and Greece: C. C. (I940) 
art. 23 par. 2, extend their reference to the last common nationality to the 
effects of adoption. 
54 2 FIORE 296, 297, 298 no. 752; DESPAGNET 850 no. 286; VALERY 1153 
no. 8I4; NIBOYET 778 no. 665. This solution has been reproduced in C6digo 
Bustamante art. 74 with the modification that the adopter's law governs "in so 
far as his estate is concerned," and that of the adopted person "in respect to 
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despair, suggested that the judge be allowed free choice of 
law.55 
Ill. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADOPTION 55a 
1. Conditions of Recognition 
The above described English and American jurisdictional 
rules seem to imply that a foreign adoption will be recog-
nized, if the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign state is based 
either on the adopter's domicil 55b or, in the American view, 
on the domicil of the child. It is true that not even among 
the sister states does this principle appear clearly settled. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion 
to proclaim that the Federal Constitution did not oblige a 
state to recognize legitimations and adoptions made in an-
other state.56 The underlying doubts are connected, however, 
with the specific effect of adoption upon inheritance rather 
than with the principles of recognition. It seems that there 
is no serious question respecting recognition in general. 
Whether in addition to the two grounds for jurisdiction 
mentioned above, adoptions occurring in the national state of 
the adopter are to be recognized, may be questioned. There 
is no compelling reason for recognition, for instance, where 
an American child resident in the United States is adopted 
in a German court 57 pursuant to German law by a German 
domiciled and resident in the United States; 58 still less, if all 
the name, the rights and duties which he retains regarding his natural family, 
as well as to his own estate in regard to the adopting person," while the 
right to maintenance is left to public policy (art. 76). 
Contra: see RAAPE 594· 
55 PILLET, Principes 324 no. 154, renouncing any rule. 
55a On Anglo-American Jaw, DoPFFEL, Anerkennung ausHindischer Adop-
tionen im englischen Rechtskreis, 22 Z.ausi.PR. (1957) 22o-261. 
55b Dictum in In re Wilson [1954] Ch. 733, esp. 741, 744, Revue Crit. 1954, 
544 per Vaisey, J. 
56 Hood v. McGehee (1915) 237 U. S. 6u. 
57§ 66 par. 2 of the German Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction. 
58 KrPP, in KrPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht § 99 n. 12. 
6g2 PARENTAL RELATIONS 
parties concerned, though German nationals, are domiciled 
and resident in Australia. ssa 
Exclusive jurisdiction over nationals as claimed by the 
frequently cited Austrian and Hungarian tradition 59 still 
subsists in the Scandinavian states. Swedes and Norwegians 
cannot adopt or be adopted abroad without permission of 
the king.6° Finns need the permission of their Minister of 
Justice.61 Other states generally reserve judicial activity in 
status matters of nationals to their own tribunals. France, 
Belgium, and Hungary require that nationals should seek 
supplementary authorization at their home court.62 Italy 
subjects recognition even to the procedure of exequatur.63 
Recently the National Socialist innovations in German adop-
tion law have inspired the view that a foreign adoption of a 
German always needs confirmation by a German court in 
order to have effect in that country.64 
Opposition of public policy to foreign adoptions has 
formed a natural problem in countries in which no form of 
~adoption has been instituted. In England, which until re-
cently belonged in this category, no case has occurred, but 
Dicey pronounced his decided opposition to the recognition 
of any foreign adoption and impressed Beale and the Ameri-
can Restatement with this theory. This influence, together 
with the common law tradition, repugnant to adoption, was 
ssa R.v.A. [I955] V. L. R. 24I, 22 Z.ausi.PR. (I957) 357· 
59 Austria: supra p. 427; Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 4I Z.int.R. (I929) I07 at 
I82. 
60 Sweden: International Family Law of I904, c. 6, as amended I949• 
§I par. 2. 
61 Finland: Law of I929, § 24 par. I sentence 2. 
62 ROLIN, 2 Principes I7I no. 637; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 659 no. I49· 
Hungary: Decree no. 23/I952, §IS. 
63 Cass. civ. (June 24, I932) Monitore I932, 929, Clunet I933, 454; cf. App. 
Genova {Dec. I6, I932) Monitore I933, 225. 
Contra for France, WEISS, 4 Traite I30· 
64 RAAPE's view, IPR. {ed. 3) 250, has, however, been gradually rejected, 
RAAPE IPR. {ed. 4) 374· 
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strong enough to prevent recognition of an American adop-
tion in Canada even after the Canadian reform laws, on the 
ground that this legislation had no retroactive effect.65 The 
court, using this argument, overlooked that not the reform 
law but the strength of the present public policy was in ques-
tion. In the Nether lands, before enactment of the present 
law, foreign adoptions were recognized when the national 
laws of both parties permitted it, but naturally not when one 
party was of Dutch nationality. 66 
Remarkably, the opposite liberal view has been taken in 
Portugal, 67 Argentina, 68 and Guatemala. 69 
In countries with adoption, the domestic law is frequently 
applied to a foreign adoption to which a subject of the forum 
is a party, at least insofar as it is thought that this individual 
must be protected. In France and in Latin countries,70 public 
policy is invoked in such cases for almost all internal condi-
tions of adoption as being of "international public order." 
Adoption between foreigners in their own national states 
should be and is regularly recognized without any such limi-
tations.71 But a French decision was concerned with the 
following case: A Russian married couple, the husband 
forty-nine, the wife forty-five years old, adopted in I 9 I 2 in 
Ru~sia a child of twelve years. The transaction was perfectly 
65 Burnfiel v. Burnfiel [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129; Haultain, C. J. S., in this 
strange decision acknowledged that the case was absolutely similar to that 
contrarily decided in In re Throssel [1910] 12 W. L. R. 683. In both cases 
the adoption had been made by decree in Iowa. 
66 H. R. (Dec. 20, 1950) N. ]. 1952 no. 40; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 
no. 203. 
67 See Sup. Trib. Lis bonne (May 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 424; supra 
pp. 191-194· 
68 See 2 VICO 128, no. 172. 
69 MATOS 394 no. 277. 
7
°France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 1914) Clunet 1919, 242. Italy: 
App. Palermo (June 12, 1931) 24 Rivista (1932) 563, Clunet 1933, 1091. 
VALERY II51 no. 812. 
71 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 56. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 7, 1920) W. 10632 (child of 
foreign nationality born in the Netherlands). 
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valid under Russian law; it would not have been allowed 
under article 343 of the French code, as it stood at that time, 
requiring a fifty-year age of the adopter and full age of the 
adopted person. Instead of simply recognizing the foreign 
act, the court of Paris declared it effective only because in 
the meantime the French provision had been changed so as 
to require forty years of the adopter and fifteen years of age 
difference. 72 The implied claim to control an entirely foreign 
act by the municipal law of the forum is absurd. 
2. Effects of Recognition 
Where no obstacle arises from jurisdictional considera-
tions or public policy of the forum, it may yet be dubious to 
what extent the foreign created adoption is effective at the 
forum. The only consistent solution of this question is given 
in such statutes as that of Quebec: 
"A person resident outside of the Province who has been 
adopted according to the laws of the United Kingdom or any 
part of the British possessions other than the Province of 
Quebec or of any foreign country, shall possess in this Prov-
ince the same rights of succession that he would have had in 
the said United Kingdom or part of the British possessions 
or in the said foreign country in which he was adopted." 73 
The French-Belgian doctrine has always supported the 
clear principle that the effect of adoption is governed by the 
applicable foreign law.74 
72 Cour Paris (Jan. 2, 1936) Gaz.Pai.I936.1.55I, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 159 
no. 83, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427, but apparently approved 
by CosTE-FLORET, 7 Giur. Camp. DIP. 160. Ten years later, the same court 
recognized this same adoption without recourse to the S).lbsequent change of 
French adoption requirements, Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Nouv. Revue 1948, 
217, 227. 
73 Quebec: 14 Geo. V, c. 75 s. 14 (1924) as amended by 25-26 Geo. V, 
c. 67 s. 2 ( 1935)' R. s. 1941, c. 324 s. 22. 
Similar, Alberta, Infants Act, 1913 (2), c. 13, s. 33, and Domestic Relations 
Act. R. S. A. 1942, c. 300, s. 49; unification proposed by I jOHNSON 353· 
74 WEISS, 4 Traite uS; 6 LAURENT 75 no. 37; ROLIN, 2 Principes 172 no. 
638. 
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The Swiss Federal Tribunal in a quite recent case has left 
no doubt on the application of the Swiss intestate portion for 
legitimate children (including adopted children), to a girl 
adopted in Moscow in -1912. It expressly states that her 
adoption had taken place according to the then Russian law 
"not only as a so-called contractual adoption without in-
heritance right, but as a fully operating one conferring rights 
equal to those of a legitimate child." 75 
Indeed, foreign adoptions should be recognized, if at all, 
to exactly the extent to which they have been created as 
measured by the entire legislation of the state of adoption; 
they should not be given either more or less effect. One would 
think that in the United States the same solution must 
smoothly flow from the recognition of adoption orders ren-
dered hy the domiciliary court either of the parent or the 
child, but things have taken another course. The question has 
been much discussed in this country and recently also a little 
in German literature. 
Before entering into the main subject of the controversy 
regarding inheritance rights, it may be permissible to indicate 
the points where disturbances seem to have set in. 
(a) General attention has been devoted to the problems 
of recognition arising in the succession upon death to the 
adopted parents or sometimes to the adopted child, or to 
property of the natural parents. It should be noticed, how-
ever, that statutes on adoption differ widely also on other 
points such as alimentary support quoad the child's con-
sanguineous family, the paternal power of the natural father, 
the name of the child, etcetera. In the United States, many 
statutes terminate the effects of the natural parent-child rela-
tion in the case of adoption, while others make it "exceed-
ingly difficult to find in the legislative pronouncements any 
1s BG. (Oct. 21, 1943) 69 BGE 357, 363. 
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intent to work a complete severance of parental relationship 
and substitution of parent." 76 
Again, the effect of adoption between the adoptive parties 
seems reduced in South Carolina to property rights, 77 and 
courts in Mississippi may limit the right of the adopted child 
to certain benefits. 78 
If we face this broad field, recognition of the foreign act 
with its proper effects appears to be the only suitable maxim. 
Certain countries, of course, headed by France, will indulge 
in large exceptions, also in this respect, on the ground of 
public policy/9 
(b) The reluctance of the Dutch and English jurists in 
earlier periods to conceive an extraterritorial effect of judi-
cial acts and to acknowledge a "status unknown to the 
forum," as we have seen, finally resulted in the similarity 
doctrine, expressed by the Restatement in § 143: 
"The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having 
jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in an-
other state as is given by the latter state to the status of 
adoption when created by its own law." 80 
The foregoing section probably was exclusively influenced by 
consideration of inheritance problems. Another section, 
§ 305, expresses a second time the same idea in application to 
distribution; the adopted person shall be treated "as if he 
were a natural-born legitimate child of his adoptive parent 
if the law that regulates distribution gives such effect to 
adoption." 
76 4 VERNIER § 261 at 406; cf. Sup pl. 127 ff. 
77 South Carolina: Code of Laws 1942, C. C. § 8679. 
78 Miss.: Code Ann. ( 1942) § 1269, cf. 4 VERNIER § 261 at 406. 
79 Cf., for instance, on aliments: WEISS, 4 Traite 120; BATIFFOL, 1 Repert. 
256 no. 25; prohibition to marry {C. C. art. 354): 2 FIORE 39 no. 539; BATIF-
FOL, 1 Repert. 256 no. 26; on C. C. arts. 343-346 {before reform): VALERY 
1151 no. 812; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427. 
80 2 BEALE § 143.1 classifies, correspondingly, the cases along the distinction 
whether or not the adopted foreign child is treated like a child adopted at the 
forum. 
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Even in limitation to the problems of distribution, It IS 
amazing, not only that.no foreign adoption should be recog-
nized in a country not knowing adoption, but also that every 
foreign adoption of whatever extent should be treated like 
a full adoption, if the law governing inheritance does so 
with respect to adoptions performed within the state. 81 This 
unexpected dogma has certainly not found favor with Ameri-
can courts,81a but it does contribute to obscure the picture. It 
has caused, at least, more readiness to recognize an adoption 
similar to the domestic type than a dissimilar one, which is 
an unfortunate starting point. 
Certain Canadian statutes avoid enlarging the rights 
created by foreign adoption, but they share the main rule of 
the Restatement. For instance, the Ontario statute provides 
that: 
"A person ... adopted in accordance with the laws of the 
province where he is domiciled, shall be entitled to the same 
rights of succession as to property in Ontario as he would 
have had in the province in which he was adopted but not 
exceeding the right he would have had if adopted under this 
Act." 82 
(c) Faced with their usual topic, viz., the share to which 
foreign adopted children are entitled in a succession, Ameri-
can courts have decided from case to case, as results seemed 
warranted by the circumstances, although in some instances 
they have been influenced by the formalistic arguments fre-
81 See the critical analysis by YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (I936) 2I2. 
8la See, however, cases and statutes collected by TA!NTOR, "Adoption in 
the Conflict of Laws," I5 University of Pittsburgh Law Review (I953/54) 
222-267. 
82 Ontario (1927) I7 Geo. V, c. 53 s. I3, re-enacted R. S. 0. 1950, c. 7 s. IS. 
Similar, British Columbia, Adoption Act. R.S.B.C. I94S c. 7 s. II; Prince 
Edward Island, Adoption Act, I93o, c. I2 s. I5 and €hildren's Act (I940) 
c. I2 s. 124, R.S. P.E.I. I951, c. 3 s. I5; Alberta, R.S. I942, c. 300 s. 49; 
Manitoba, R.S. I954, c. 35 s. 9S; New Brunswick, R.S. I952, c. 3 s. 32; Quebec, 
R.S. I94I, c. 324 s. 22; Saskatchewan, R.S. I953, c. 239 s. Sr. 
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quent in English and Canadian courts. Unfortunately, a 
theoretical point has been introduced. The courts and their 
annotators usually distinguish whether a right to inherit by 
or from an adopted person has been established by the state 
where the adoption has been performed and, if so, whether 
the statute giving the right is an adoption statute or an in-
heritance statute. To illustrate, it has been said in a remark-
ably explicit note that, if the right of inheritance has been 
limited in the state of adoption, the restriction may be im-
posed either upon the status or upon the right to succession. 
The first is to be presumed, if the child, by the statute of 
the state of adoption, has been granted the full position of 
a natural child in relation to the adopter, but not to his 
collateral relatives; this limitation, then, has to be recog-
nized in the state of inheritance. Where, however, adopted 
children are placed in second rank, to favor the legitimate 
issue primarily entitled, the limitation concerns the heredi-
tary right. 83 
It is submitted that the courts are facing an impossible 
task with this method. It suffices to observe what distinctions, 
verbal interpretations, and inferences a modern author has 
felt obligated to propose, "in order to decide whether a 
right asserted by a claimant should be treated as one which 
flows from status, if at all, or as one which is given irrespec-
tive of the existence or non-existence of status." 84 More 
appropriately, it has been repeatedly asserted that statutes 
of adoption and statutes of inheritance of the same state 
must be read together. In fact, the entire effect of adoption 
is either defined at one place in the laws, namely, in the 
chapter on adoption, or has to be deduced from both cate-
83 L. R. A. 1916 A 668; similar for legitimation 73 A. L. R. 958. 
84 TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in the Conflict of 
Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691, at 703. RAAPE 592 attempts similar 
distinctions. 
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gories of statutory provisions taken together. Usually, there 
is neither any legislative intention nor any sound reason for 
presuming by interpretation, that one group of provisions 
should govern only domestic adoptions and the other foreign 
adoptions, or that one group should prevail in the domestic 
courts only and the other have extraterritorial effect. Nor is 
it the task of these internal provisions to make such distinc-
tions. It is up to the law of conflicts to find the solution. As 
has been contended above, the entire legislation of the state 
of adoption defines the effects to be recognized. 
(d) Two practical considerations may guide us. On the 
one hand, it is inadmissible that an adopter could change the 
effect of an adoption by changing his domicil. He would be 
able to do just that, if the statute of distribution at his last 
domicil were given predominance in construing the previ-
ously made adoption. On the other hand, an adopter who has 
not by the adoption created inheritance rights is free to 
maintain the effects of the transaction or to supplement them 
by gift or by will, so far as the statute of distributions allows 
him. It is no natural task of conflicts law to demolish these 
results of private law. 
3· Effect on Inheritance Rights in Particular 
In order to distinguish the scope of the conflicts rule on 
adoption from those concerning succession upon death, it is 
justly said that the law governing succession determines 
whether adopted children as a class are competent to succeed, 
and the law governing the creation of adoption determines 
whether a certain person is an adopted child. 85 This, how-
ever, does not answer all questions. 
85 See for instance GoODRICH, "Legitimation and Adoption in the Conflict 
of Laws," 22 Mich. L. Rev. (1924) 637 and Handbook 449 ff.; LoRENZEN, 6 
Repert. 349 no. 342; Notes, L. R. A. 1916 A 666 and 65 L. R. A 186. 
Germany: RAAPE 591 ff. and RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents 
et enfants," so Recueil 1934 IV 401, 508 no. 81. 
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(a) Construction of language. Where a testator has de-
vised or bequeathed property to his or other people's "chil-
dren" or "issue," it was argued, especially in Canadian cases, 
that children or issue born in wedlock are meant. This was 
contended even after the introduction of adoption into the 
legislation, at least in construing older wills.86 The tradi-
tional opposition of the common law to adoption was still 
effective, though in British Columbia the contrary opinion 
was followed even where a will used the term "heirs." 87 It 
may now be assumed that the intention underlying a will or 
deed is to be construed according to the mere factual circum-
stances, and statutes are not to be deemed any longer to 
demand legitimate birth or blood relationship.87a 
(b) Major rights acquired by foreign act.88 A group of 
cases is characterized by larger rights granted in the state of 
adoption than in the state of distribution. In particular, the 
statute applicable to the succession may be wholly ignorant 
of the kind of adoption accomplished abroad. We have to 
distinguish as follows: 
(i) Law of situs of immovables. A social and ethical 
background such as lay behind the famous Statute of Merton 
8 6 Supreme Court of Canada: Donald, Baldwin & Mooney [1929] 2 
D. L. R. 244 (Washington adoption). 
Ontario Supreme Court: Re Skinner ( 1929) 64 0. L. R. 245, [1929] 4 D. L. 
R. 427 (Ohio adoption). See FALCONBRIDGE, Cases on the Conflict of Laws 
(ed. 4, 1938) 170. 
8 7 In re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks [1925] 3 D. L. R. 854. 
87a Statutes in Canada now usually contain a rebuttable presumption that 
the expression "child" in any will or instrument includes adopted children, 
see Alberta, R. S. 1942, c. 300 s. 48; British Columbia, R. S. 1948, c. 7 s. 12; 
New Brunswick, R. S. 1952, c. 3 s. 31; Ontario, R. S. 1950, c. 7 s. 12 par. 3; 
Prince Edward Island, R. S. 1951, c. 3 s. 17; Quebec, R. S. 1941, c. 324 s. 21; 
Saskatchewan, R. S. 1953, c. 239 s. So. In an international case and in the 
absence of l!n ascertainable intention, the question of course remains: Are 
these statutes applicable to govern the status of adoption or the succession? 
Recent decisions tend to the first solution, Re Pearson [1946] V. L. R. 356; 
In re Brophy [1949] N.Z.L.R. 1006, II Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954) 409. Contra: 
DICEY 514. 
88 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 358 sub (C). 
ADOPTION 701 
(A.D. I236) 89 and still continued at the time of the English 
case of Birtwhistle v. P ardill (A.D. I 840) 90 may well have 
required birth in lawful wedlock as the sole title to succession 
to land. This conception, however, seems finally to have lost 
its hold in the English land law. But it survives strangely in 
the Alabama courts, 91 while in Florida foreign adopted chil-
dren are excluded unless-they become citizens of the state; 92 
in both states, recent statutes remedy the law.92a The Su-
preme Court of Mississippi overruled its former acceptance 
of this conception in I 917 with the express denial of a public 
policy preventing the adopted child from inheriting.93 Sur-
prisingly in one decision, the French Court of Cassation also 
applied the law of the situs rather than that governing 
adoption, as a pretext for sticking to French law.94 
(ii) Local policy. Apart from such peculiar prohibitive 
policy claimed for the laws of succession and leaving aside 
the bulk of the cases, which offer no problem because both 
states involved grant similar positions to adopted children,95 
there is authority denying that local policy should normally 
intervene. 96 
This view was applied to the problem of inheritance from 
89 20 Henry III, c. 9 (1236). 
90 7 CI. and F. 895. 
91 Brown v. Finley ( 1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577; cf. on legitimation the 
Lingen case (1871) 45 Ala. 410, supra p. 628, n. 157. 
92Tankersley v. Davis (1937) 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501. 
92aAJabama Code (1940) 27 §9; Florida Stat. Ann. (1941) §731.30 (as 
amended 1945 and 1952) · 
93 Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267, overruling 
Fisher v. Browning ( 1914) 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132. 
94 Cass. (req.) (April 21, 1931) D.1931.1.52, S.I931.1.377, Clunet 1932, 142, 
Revue 1932, 526; Contra: BARTIN, "Adoption et transmission hereditaire," 
Clunet 1932, 5; NrBOYET, Decision note, Revue 1932, 541. Distinguished in 
Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Nouv. Revue 1946, 217, 227. Favorable to the 
decision, however, WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 167 n. 1; LEWALD, Regles 
generales des conflits de lois (1941) 137. 
95 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 357 sub (A). 
96 For this opinion also FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171. 
In re Finkenzeller's Estate (1929) 105 N.J. Eq. 44, 146 Atl. 656; Keegan v. 
Geraghty ( 1881) 101 Ill. 26. 
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natural parents. In Slattery v. The Hart ford Connecticut 
Trust Company,07 an individual adopted in Michigan claimed 
his share in his natural father's estate and was successful in 
Connecticut. The statute of Michigan maintains, that of 
Connecticut terminates, the right of inheritance of an adop-
tee from his native parents. The Supreme Court of Errors 
of Connecticut held that, as the right of inheritance of the 
child was not lost by the statute of Michigan, he could claim 
it; the legislature of Connecticut debarring a child from such 
a right "has not attempted to lay down any rule applicable in 
the case of children coming here from another state where 
they have been adopted under laws which do not take away 
that right." 98 This argument is equivalent to saying, as we 
did, that the extension of the inheritance rule to foreign cases 
with foreign elements is up to the conflicts rule, and that, 
under this rule, adoptions made in the domiciliary state must 
be recognized with their own effects. The restriction imposed 
on the statute by this conception is not only equitable and 
justified by the anomalous structure of the Connecticut type 
of adoption, 99 but consistent with the advisable general 
postulates. The case demonstrates with particular clarity the 
necessity of protecting by adequate conflicts rules those legal 
effects which the parties to a transaction were entitled to 
foresee. 
Yet the contrary view was recently taken by the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania 100 refusing intestate succession to 
grandchildren from their natural grandmother through their 
97 Slattery v. The Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1932) II5 Conn. 163, 
161 Atl. 79, commented by YNTEMA and DE NovA in 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
352 ff. no. 169. 
98 There follow excellent explanations why public policy is not contrary to 
recognizing such a provision "dissimilar" to the domestic regulation. 
99 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359, against criticism of the decision 
in 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1932) 213. 
100 In re Crossley's Estate (1939) 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 524, 7 Atl. (2d) 539; 
noted 24 Minn. L. Rev. (1940) 268. 
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mother adopted by unrelated persons in Ohio. The Court 
construed section r 6 (b) of the intestate statute of Pennsyl-
vania, excluding adopted children from taking from or 
through their natural parents, to the effect of including all 
foreign adopted children and their issue. This thesis is not 
justified by the argument that "to hold otherwise would 
create a power in another state to limit and nullify the au-
thority of this state to determine for itself how property 
shall descend on intestacy." The intention of the Pennsyl-
vania statute cannot be changed by another state, but why 
should a statute intend implicitly to exclude foreign adopted 
children whose adoption did not abolish their status in their 
natural families where it was done? The only sound method 
is to leave the application of the intestate statute to the con-
flicts rule which should not be dubious. 
The climax, so to speak, of incomity seems reached by 
Frey v. Nielson/01 where an inheritance statute of New 
Jersey admitting adopted children was construed to be re-
stricted to children adopted in New Jersey; similarly, In re 
Wilson restricted the inheritance rights in England on chil-
dren adopted abroad.101a Also, in the Nether lands, where a 
foreign party has acquired Dutch nationality, a former adop-
tion of or by this party formerly was not recognized.102 This 
refusal, however, was not ascribed to the Dutch statute of 
distribution; it denied the entire family law relationship by 
adoption and was based on public policy regarding Dutch 
nationals. 
Another outstanding case, Brown v. Finley,103 has been 
101 Frey v. Nielson ( 1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 135, 132 Atl. 765; the Note, "Con-
flict of Laws-Inheritance by Adopted Child," 25 Mich. L. Rev. (1926) 189 is 
uncritical. 
lOla [1954] Ch. 733, 740, Revue Crit. 1954, 544; In re Wilby (1955) [1956] 
1 All E. R. 27, Rev. Crit. 1956, 87; In re Marshall [1957] 3 All E. R. 172 
(C. A.). 
102 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 636 no. 203. 
lOS Brown v. Finley ( 1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577, reproduced in 22 
Z.int.R. ( 1912) 164. 
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sharply criticized by European writers.104 The Alabama 
court refused a right of distribution to a person adopted in 
Georgia, because the adoption had not been registered at 
the probate court as required in Alabama, though not in 
Georgia. The refusal has been called a denial of international 
private law. 
(c) M ajar rights granted by the statute of distribution. 
Where inheritance rights are conferred by the law of succes-
sion and denied by the law presiding over adoption, in a 
logical solution the original effect of the act cannot be en-
larged by the law of another state. This some American 
cases state.105 
Opposition, in part, is based again on the formal argument 
that a foreign statute depriving an adopted child of in-
heritance is a statute of distribution and as such not suscepti-
ble of extraterritorial application.106 There is no proof for 
that assumption, and the result comes as a startling surprise 
to the parties. Where an English woman has adopted an 
English child in England, all parties, at least their solicitors, 
have understood that no right upon death was implied; why 
should the legal situation be reversed by the woman's mov-
ing to New Hampshire and dying there? 107 
Some decisions, however, are based on quite different con-
siderations that flow from a sound policy. The statute of 
104 LEWALD, "Question de droit international des successions," 9 Recueil 192s 
IV 7S n. 3; RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Re-
cueil 1934 IV S09 n. I. 
105 Estate of Sunderland ( 1882) 6o Iowa 732, 12 N. W. 66s; Meader v. 
Archer (1889) 6s N.H. 214; Shaver v. Nash (1930) 181 Ark. III2, 29 S. W. 
(2d) 298; Shick v. Howe (1908) 137 Iowa 249, II4 N. W. 916; Ross v. Ross 
(1878) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; Boaz v. Swinney (1909) 79 Kan. 
332, 99 Pac. 621, overruled in In re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. S39, 
262 Pac. x6, infra n. IIO. 
See Note, 73 A. L. R. 961, 973; YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 3S7 i 
WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 163 n. 2. 
106 This argument is invoked by STUMBERG, 339 f.; also RAAPE, so Recueil 
1934, IV S09 no. 82. 
107 Thus far of the same opinion RAAPE, so Recueil 1934, IV SII no. 8s. 
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distribution may allow a share to all children, inclusive of 
illegitimates, so as to eliminate any discrimination among 
children.108 Furthermore, courts have resorted to a permis-
sive public policy in cases in which adoptive children were a 
class of persons entitled in the forum; explanation of the 
child's unfavorable treatment by the statute creating adop-
tion is found in an antiquated prejudice against bastards.109 
Thus, in In re Riemann's Estate, the Illinois statutory pro-
vision, denying the child's relationship with the relatives of 
the adopter, was considered a "peculiar discrimination," 
repugnant to the "generous spirit" underlying the law of 
Kansas.110 In Pfeifer v. Wright,111 the progressive view was 
expressly directed against the tradition extending from the 
Statute of Merton to such cases as Keegan v. Geraghty and 
Frey v. Nielson. 
But public policy should not be overdone. The Mississippi 
court says poignantly: 
"It would be unjust to both parent and child, to hold that 
the mere fact of moving to another state would upset and 
unsettle this relationship. It is of the utmost importance that 
the status of this character should be maintained so far as it 
i& possible. . . . " 112 
108 In re Crowell's Estate ( 1924) 124 Me. 71, 126 Atl. 178 (an "adoption 
into the family" in Nova Scotia had no legal significance in this province, but 
fulfilled the conditions for inheritance in Maine). 
109 Anderson v. French (1915) 77 N. H. 509, 93 At!. 1042 (estate of adop-
ter); Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266 (estate of 
adoptive child). 
llO[n re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16. 
111 Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (2d) 464. 
112 Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358 at 369, 76 So. 267, overruling 
Fisher v. Browning, supra n. 93· 
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537-539· 
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126. 
foreign divorce, 536, 549-550. 
foreign marriage of Austrians, 126, 
306. 
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of 1913 of an international private 
law, 30. 
Authorization of Domicil 
France, 83, n. 30, 152. 
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of the parties, 90. 
Babinski, 24. 
Balladore Pallieri, 24. 
Bar, 8, 18. 
Barbey, 24. 
Bartin, IO, 14, 15, 31, 49. 53. 58, 6o, 
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Batiffol, 24-
Beale, 12-14, 66-67. 
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Bigamy, 541. 
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beginning of personality, legal sta-
tus, I75-176. 
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Biihm, x8. 
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foreign divorce, 535-536, 541, 56I. 
marital property, 374, 388. 
marital relations, 329-33 z. 
marriage requirements, 269. 
nationality law, I47· 
renvoi, 85. 
separation, 468. 
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to contract, 202-:!03, 338. 
to have rights and duties, uo, I73-
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38o-391, 483-493, 544, 6os-6o6, 
617. See also Status; Domicil. 
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general concept, 49, so. 
adoption, 679, 694-705. 
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338. 
claims for support, 58-59. 
community property, 402-403. 
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domicil, 154-159· 
domicil by operation of law, 152, 
n. 159, 334, 649-650, 
engagement to marry, 217-221. 
formalities of marriage, 225-227. 
inheritance, 403-413, 634-635, 694-
705. 
legitimation, 634-635. 
marital property law, 357-359, 367, 
403-410. 
marriage settlements, 392. 
mutability of marital law, 388-389. 
parental consent, 225, 287-289. 
primary and secondary, 71. 
religious marriage rites, 23 I-233· 
statute of frauds, 56-s&. 
successoral pacts, 62-63. 
theory, 52-66. 
Cheatham, 24. 
Cheshire, 23. 
Children. See also Divorce; Parent 
and Child. 
action for contesting paternity, 6ro, 
649· 
action for declaration of paternity, 
658. 
adulterine, 612, 622, 625-628, 633-
635, 672. 
custody, 572-575· 
domicil, 648-6 so. 
exceptio plurium, 66o-666. 
illegitimate, 654-676. 
father and child, 6 57-673. 
father and mother, 673-674. 
mother and child, 654-656. 
interest, 6or, 6os. 
legitimate, 599· 
nationality, 662-663, 667. 
of invalid marriage, 6zo-6r3. 
personal law, 6ox, 6o4-6os, 6x8-
619, 636, 6ss, 687-690. 
presumptions as to conception, 609, 
666. 
recognition, 656-657, 669-673. 
support, 653-654, 666-667. 
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capacity, 126. 
foreign divorce, 53 9· 
substantive requirements for mar-
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conflicts law, ongm, 29. 
Choice of Law by the Parties, 90"-94· 
Civil Procedure. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
Hague Convention of July 17, 1905, 
33· 
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Classification. See also Characteriza-
tion. 
concept, 49-50. 
adoption and inheritance, 694-705. 
alimony and torts, 673-674. 
capacity, 194-195. 
community property, 402-403. 
legitimation and inheritance, 634-
635. 
marital and tort laws, 347· 
marital law and inheritance, 403-
410. 
marriage settlements, 392. 
married women's capacity, 335-
338. 
parental relations and torts, 650. 
recognition and inheritance, 673. 
relations of illegitimate children, 
657-66o. 
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See also Table of Statutes. 
C6digo Bustamante, 36-37, 45-46. 
See also Table of Statutes. 
"on personal law," 123. 
Collusion, 426, sn. 
Colonies 
marriage, 236. 
Comitas Gentium, 66-69. See also 
Territorialism. 
Commercial Acts, Capacity for, 185. 
Commercial Name, 183. 
Common Law Marriage, 227, 236, 
241-242. 
Community Property Systems, 357-
359, 361, 364, 383, 389. 
composition, 402-403. 
Comparative Method, II, 63-64. 
Composite National Laws 
different systems, 134-146. 
Conflict Rules. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
codifications, 29-32. 
independent, 102-103. 
internationalization, 103-105. 
interpretation, so, 52-66. 
parts and structure, 47-72. 
policy considerations, 96-99. 
purpose, 94-99. 
specialization, 99-102. 
Conjugal Rights. 
action for restitution of, 331-333. 
Connecting Factor, 48. 
Consent by Husband. See Married 
Women. 
Consent to Marriage, 286. 
of parents, 287-290, 641. 
Consular Marriages, 237-239, 255-
259. See also Americans Abroad. 
Contact, 48. 
Contracts, Types of, 100. 
Contrat de Mariage, 317. 
Conventions, 32-42. See also Table 
of Statutes. 
Cook, Walter Wheeler, 14, 20, 23, 
24, 6o, 95· 
Cormack, 89. 
Cowan, 89. 
Customary Law, 44-46. 
Czechoslovakia. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
Law of March II, 1948, 30. 
Damages for Breach of Promise, 216. 
Darras, 15. 
Davis Case, 505, 554, 555· 
Death 
in common disaster, legal presump-
tion, 179-181. 
legal presumption, 176-179. See 
also Absentees. 
Declaration of Death 
by the courts, 176-179· 
restricted to domestic assets, 177. 
Deductive Methods, 73· 
Defective Formalities, 248-250. 
marriage celebration, 247-250. 
Delibazione, 512. 
Denmark. See also Table of Statutes. 
domicil, concept, 151. 
marriage formalities, substantive 
requirements, 270, 277· 
renvoi, 84-85. 
Deper;age, 101. 
Deserters. See also Marriage, in-
trinsic requirements. 
ability to procure marriage li-
censes, 306. 
Despagnet, 54· 
Dicey, II, 23, 66. 
Diena, x6. 
Directive Marriage Requirements, 
3II. 
Dispensation to Marry, 298, 308. 
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Divorce. See also Americans Abroad, 
divorce; Judicial Separation. 
concepts, historical, 425, 457· 
alimony, 35o-351, 566-570. 
based on foreign law, 459-460. 
cause having arisen outside state 
of domicil, 438, 486-493. 
change of domicil or nationality, 
483-493· 
collusion, 426. 
consular, 450. 
cumulative application of national 
laws, 459-472, 474, n. 230, 489. 
custody of children, 572-575. 
decrees, 448-450. 
different national Jaws involved, 
473-479· 
disposition of property, 571-572. 
domiciliary law, 429-431, 456-457, 
482, 491-493· 
effect on one party only, 307, 475-
479, 539, 557-559· 
effects of non-recognized divorce, 
557-561. 
effects of valid divorce, 561-575. 
evasion, 487, 492-493, 544-551. 
ex parte proceedings, 424-425, 432-
436. 
Greek Orthodox laws, 445, 448, 
451-453· 
grounds, 468-479, 49o-492, 500. 
Hague Convention, 33· See also 
Table of Statutes. 
Jewish laws, 444-446, 448, 471, 473· 
jurisdiction, 425-453, 53D-533· 
at domicil, 428-447. 
at residence, 437· 
based on consent of defendant, 
426. 
exclusive, 426-428, 53D-531. 
in rem, 428, 434· 
national courts, 426-428. 
restricted by lex fori, 437-440, 
493· 
restricted by national Jaw, 44o-
448. 
lex fori applied, 419, 474-479. 
lex fori celebrationis, 457-459. 
migratory, 422-424. 
mills, 416-419, 422-424, 435, 532, 
550. 
municipal laws, 415-419. 
nationality principle, 420, 459-480. 
of foreigners, 413-415. 
opportunity for defense, 533· 
permissibility, 461-465. 
private, 448. 
procedure, 447-448. 
prohibited, 415, 448, n. 110, 462, 
535-542· 557· 
public policy, 42o-422. 
permissive, 472-473. 
prohibitive, 462-464, 468-472. 
recognition, 497-556. 
scope, 52o-522. 
religious, 444-447 and passim, 413-
496. 
renvoi, 48o-483. 
requiring valid marriage, 45D-453· 
residence requirement, 438-440,489, 
495-496. 
res judicata, 522. 
similar grounds, 468-472, 542-544. 
statistics, 422-423. 
without judicial litigation, 523-530. 
Divorced Person, Marriage Prohi-
bition, Spanish Jaw, 148, 294, 
54D-542· 
Domicil 
concept 
general, 151 
English and American, 161. 
authorized French view, 83, n. 30, 
152. 
basis for divorce, 429-431, 457-
459, 482, 491-493· 
by choice, u9. 
by operation of law, II91 152, 172, 
333-334, 435-436, 638, 648-6so, 
657· 
change 
effect on divorce, 483-493, 544· 
effect on marital property, 38o-
392. 
effect on parental relations, 6o5-
6o6, 617. 
effect on status, 16o-16r. 
characterization, 153-159. 
common to both spouses, 429-431. 
compromises between different sys-
tems of national laws, 168-170. 
determination, 15o-159· 
in marital relations, 323, 344-
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in parental relations, 602, 614-618, 
63o-631, 63 8, 
last, 141. 
last common, 43o-432. 
matrimonial, 282, 285-286, 370, 373, 
428-429· 
of illegitimate children, 655, 66x, 
670· 
of origin, II7, 141-x43· 
of wife, 432-436. 
principle of, u7, 28o-282. 
rationale, 161-171· 
rules in parts of the British Em-
pire, 139. 
test of effects of marriage on prop-
erty, 374, 375· 
Dominion Nationality, 139· 
Donnedieu de Vabres, H., 15. 
Dowry, 361, 641. 
Dumoulin, 14, 92, 369. 
Dutch School, 7, n. 12. 
Ecclesiastical Courts, 266-267, 524. 
Ehevertrag, 318. 
Emancipation, 188. 
Emigration, Influence on Nationality 
Principle, 165-166. 
Engagement to Marry, 215-221. 
England 
literature, II. 
adoption, 683-689. 
annulment of marriage, 578-584. 
foreign, 453· 
capacity, 206-207. 
cases ex misericordia, 252, 452-453. 
consent of parents, 225, 288-289. 
consular marriages, 237-241. 
divorce 
foreign, 498-500, 519. 
grounds, 468. 
jurisdiction, 429-432, 482, 493· 
domicil, concept, ll7-II9, 150, 153· 
marital property, 365, 372, 381. 
marital relations, 322. 
marital settlement, 394-396. 
marriage, substantive require-
ments, 28o-282. 
personal law, uo-113, 117-119. 
renvoi, 8o-82. 
support, 3 so, 6 55, 667. 
Espinola, 17. 
Evasion 
of divorce laws, 487, 491-493, 544-
sso. 
of marriage formalities, 250. 
of substantive requirements for 
marriage, 271-279. 
Expectancies, 405-408. 
Expectation of the Parties 
concerning property rights, 94· 
Extradition 
principle of double criminality, 
145-146, n. 137. 
Falconbridge, 24. 
Family Expense Statutes, 342-345· 
Federal Law 
of the United States, 43· 
Fedozzi, 17. 
Ferrari Case, 476, 487, 492, 495, 535, 
557. 558, 573· 
Fiore, 8. 
Foelix, 8. 
Foreign Corporations, 4· 
Forgo Case, 78, 83, xs6. 
Formalities 
as distinguished from procedure, 
227. 
of marriage, 223-262 • 
Forum Pcrpetuatur, 483-484. 
Foster, 23. 
Fragistas, 24-
France 
literature, 7, n. II, 14-16, 25. 
adoption, 693-694-
capacity, 203. 
colonial marriages, 236. 
consular marriages, 238-239, 255-
256. 
divorce, 4351 459, 468, 475-477, 487, 
492, 495· 
domicil, authorization, 83, n. 30, 
152. 
dowry, 36x.· 
foreign divorce, 508-srz. 
fraude a Ia loi, 477-479, 547-549· 
identification card, x 52-154, 440, n. 
81. 
illegitimate child, 656-657, 663-665, 
668, 674· 
immovables, 367-368, 3791 386, 389. 
immutability, marital property, 
382, 386. 
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marital relations, 329, 340, 342, 
344-345> 347> 349· 
marriage settlement, 92, 393· 
implied contract theory, 369-374. 
national interest, doctrine, 204. 
nationality laws, 146, 148. 
nationality principle, uo. 
possession d'etat, 249· 
putative marriage, 587-590. 
renvoi, 78. 
secret foreign marriages, laws to 
prevent, 244-247. 
territorialism, principle, 164. 
unity of family, principle, 366, 368, 
379, 386, 389· 
wife's lien, 352, 361-362. 
Frankenstein, 10. 
Full Age, Acquired by Marriage, 186. 
Galgano, 23. 
Gebhard, 18. 
Gerber, 18. 
Germany 
law, 26. 
literature, 17-18, 21-23. 
certificates for marriage, 308, n. 
184. 
declaration of death, 176-179· 
dissolution of conjugal union, 465-
466, 527. 
foreign divorces, 512-516. 
law concerning Soviet divorces, 
527-530. 
limping marriages, 251, 306. 
marital property, 367, 386-388, 4oo-
402. 
nationality laws, 150. 
personal relations between hus-
band and wife, 325, 329, 331, 
342-344. 349· 
racial laws, 304, n. 164. 
stateless persons, 133-134. 
Gierke, 18, 95. 
Gifts Between Husband and Wife, 
346-347, 565. 
Gould v. Gould, 152, 507, 542, 565. 
Greece 
literature, 19. 
consular marriages, 255-260. 
foreign marriages, 300. 
marriage, conflicts rule modified 
by religious requirements, 230-
233, 235· 
Greek Orthodox Rite, 23o-233, 524, 
6o8. 
Gretna Green Marriages, 241. 
Griswold, 24, 89. 
Guardianship of Minors 
Hague Convention, 33-35. 
Haddock v. Haddock, 414, 432, 501, 
ss6. 
Hague Academy of International 
Law, 25. 
Hague Convention, Sixth, 130, 132. 
See also Table of Statutes. 
Hague Convention on Conflict of 
Nationality Laws of 1930, 131. 
See also Table of Statutes. 
Hague Conventions, 26, 3o-32, 34· 
See also Table of Statutes. 
Hancock, 24. 
Harper, 24. 
Harrison, Frederick, 20. 
Heilmann, 14. 
Heimatzustiilldigkeit, 138. 
History of Conflicts Law, 6-n. 
Homologa~iio, 535· 
Huber, Ulricus, 66, 69. 
Husband and Wife. See also Domi-
cil; Marital Property; Marriage 
Settlements. 
action for restoration of conjugal 
rights, 33o-333. 
agreements preceding divorce, 348, 
565, 572. 
alimony, 566-570. 
capacity of married women, 363, 
377. 378-380. 
earnings, 364. 
gifts, 346-347, 565. 
lawsuits, 347· 
personal relations, 317-352. 
power to obligate, 34:'.-345· 
property relations, 353-410. 
support, duty, 349-351. 
transactions, 340, 342-348. 
with third parties, 341-345. 
wife's lien, 352, 361. 
Immovables 
American rule, 353-354, 36:>.-367, 
397-398. 
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Immovables (continued) 
Civil law rules, 644-646. 
English rule, 628, 70o-7or. 
Impediments, 263. 
Implied Marriage Contract 
different doctrines, 369-374-
Impotence, 291, 586, n. 49· 
Inductive Methods, 73· 
Infants, r85-r88. 
Inheritance Laws 
marital property, 403-410, 
parent and child, 634-635, 672, 
694-696. 
Injures Graves, 418, 469-471. 
Insanity, 196. 
Intention of the Parties 
legal effect, 90. 
Interdiction, 18'}-190. 
Hague Convention, 33· See also 
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concept, 7-8. 
Interpretation of Conflicts Rules, 49, 
sz-66. 
Interregional Law on Status, 136-138. 
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literature, r6. 
Canon marriage with civil effects, 
233, n. 6z, 234, n. 63, 240, 585. 
capacity, commercial conflicts rule, 
former, 207, zo8. 
foreign annulments, recognition, 
584-586. 
foreign divorce, anti-divorce policy 
of the forum, 535, 539-541, 548. 
foreign marriages, 299. 
nationality, principle, 120, zoo, zo8. 
renvoi, 86, 142-143. 
Japan, Conflicts Law, 29. See also 
Table of Statutes. 
Jewish Marriage, 23o-233, 236. 
Jitta, 17. 
Judicial Separation, 413, 437, 465-
468, 57o-571. 
conversion to divorce, 526-527. 
Jurisdiction, 3-4. 
for adoption, 681-685. 
for divorce, 425-453, 53o-533. 
Jurisdictional Rules, 3· See also Law 
of Conflicts. 
Just Results of Conflicts Law 
policy considerations, 97-98. 
Kahn, n, 18, 51, 53, 69, 96. 
Keller, 18. 
Kent, 12. 
Kosters, 17. 
Kuhn, Arthur K., 26. 
La Pradelle, r 51 25. 
Lasala Llanas, 17. 
Latin America. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
treatises, 17. 
capacity, 126-129. 
to marry, 277-278, 299, 301. 
divorce 
jurisdiction, 429. 
recognition, 517-518. 
marriage requirements, 267-3 II, 
277-278. 
Laurent, 8, II. 
Law Applicable 
meaning, 66-72. 
Law of Conflicts, 3, zo. 
Law of the Forum. See also Public 
Policy. 
concept, 48. 
adoption, 682-685. 
applied to subjects of the forum, 
328-329, 377-378, 474-479, 639. 
664. 
divorce, 42o-422, 453-457, 459-461, 
535-544· 
effects, 563-564. 
ecclesiastical courts, 266-267. 
illegitimacy, 661, 673. 
legitimate birth, 604-605. 
legitimation, 619-620. 
parental relations, 643. 
Law of Place of Celebration 
effect on marital property, 3 78. 
marriage 
formalities, 227-250. 
intrinsic requirements, 264, 267-
271. 
Law of Place of Contracting, Ca-
pacity, 197. 
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LeBar, 24. 
Legal Relation, as Object of Con-
flicts Rules, 50 
Legitimacy 
presumption, 609. 
status, 599-601. 
Legitimate Birth, 6o1-6o7. 
decisive time, 6os-6o6. 
necessary prerequisite for inherit-
ing land, 6z8. See also Lex Situs. 
Legitimatio Per Rescriptum Prin-
cipis, 629. 
Legitimation, 613-635· 
concept, 598-599. 
by subsequent marriage, 613-628. 
by voluntary act, 629-632. 
decisive time, 614-617, 623. 
effects, 6zg-62o. 
inheritance rights, 632-63 5· 
invalid subsequent marriage, 623-
624. 
public policy, permissive and pro-
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knowledgment, 599, 616-617, 6zz-
623. 
renvoi, 6zo. 
unknown to the forum, 19o-193. 
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Leroux v. Brown, 55-56. 
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Lewald, 21, 22. 
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concept, 48. 
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the Place of Celebration. 
Lex Loci Contractus, 197. 
Lex Situs. See also Immovables. 
immovables, American rule, 353-
354· 
legitimate birth required, 6z8, 7oo-
701. 
marital property law, 36o-369. 
renvoi, 378. 
Liechtenstein. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
law, 31. 
Limping Marriages, 251, 306, 451-
452, 478-479, 558-559, 6o7-6o&. 
Literature, 3-26. 
Lizardi Case, 203. 
Local Conceptions, 102. 
Local Law, Theory, 68-6g. 
Localization, 47· 
Locus Regit Actum, 227. 
Logic 
concepts in the development of 
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